William Haller Coiner v. Vickie Anne Coiner

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Benton, Elder and Bumgardner
WILLIAM HALLER COINER
MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY
v. Record No. 1848-97-2 JUDGE RUDOLPH BUMGARDNER, III
JUNE 9, 1998
VICKIE ANNE COINER
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF CHESTERFIELD COUNTY
William R. Shelton, Judge
(Richard M. Bing; Richard M. Bing, P.C., on
brief), for appellant. Appellant submitting
on brief.
(Joseph E. Blackburn, Jr.; Joseph E.
Blackburn; White, Blackburn & Conte, P.C., on
brief), for appellee. Appellee submitting on
brief.
By final decree entered July 1, 1997, the circuit court
granted Vickie Anne Coiner a divorce on the grounds of
constructive desertion. It granted Mrs. Coiner child support and
spousal support and decreed equitable distribution of the marital
property. Mr. Coiner appeals arguing that the trial court erred
by imputing income to him but not to his wife, by valuing the
marital assets as of the date of the depositions, by not giving
him credit for mortgage payments made during separation, and by
failing to consider the tax consequences when distributing his
IRA. Finding that the court did not err, we affirm.
Mr. Coiner was employed as president of the Virginia Retail
Merchants Association. In June 1996 he voluntarily resigned his
*
Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not
designated for publication.
position though it was at the insistence of the board of
directors. Employees had filed sexual harassment charges against
him. While there was conflicting evidence whether Mrs. Coiner
had a role in having Mr. Coiner dismissed, the court resolved
these in her favor.
Both parties agree that the standard of review on the issue
of imputing income is one of abuse of discretion. See Steinberg
v. Steinberg, 11 Va. App. 323, 329, 398 S.E.2d 507, 510 (1990).
The wife having prevailed, we view the evidence in the light most
favorable to her. In doing so, we find evidence from which the
trial court could find that the husband voluntarily put his job
at risk by improper conduct toward employees. Accordingly, the
court did not abuse its discretion in imputing income to Mr.
Coiner.
Mrs. Coiner had not worked for five years before the
separation. Upon separating she moved to Hampton and secured
employment as a school nurse. Though this job might have paid
her less that what she earned in 1991 when last employed in
Richmond, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it
found that she was not underemployed. She had custody of her two
school-aged children, and the position she took allowed her
schedule and their schedules to coincide. Mr. Coiner presented
no evidence that positions were available in Hampton that offered
the salary she had received in Richmond in 1991. It was not an
abuse of discretion to decline to impute income to her.
Mr. Coiner objects to valuing assets as of the date the
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depositions were taken because Mrs. Coiner had completely
depleted her IRA by then. Code § 20-107.3 establishes the date
of the evidentiary hearing as the date at which to determine
value. It sets the date at a point that will provide the most
current and accurate information while it avoids inequitable
results. See Gaynor v. Hird, 11 Va. App. 588, 593, 400 S.E.2d
788, 790-91 (1991). While Mr. Coiner contends the evidence shows
that Mrs. Coiner wasted the asset, other evidence showed that she
expended it for necessary living expenses. The evidence did not
show as a matter of law that inequitable results would result
from using the date of the hearing. Accordingly, the court did
not abuse its discretion in using that date.
Mr. Coiner argues that the court erred in denying him credit
for mortgage payments made during separation. The husband never
presented evidence of the amount that these payments curtailed
the principal. During the period for which he claims a credit,
he had the use and possession of the marital home and resided in
it. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying a
credit for the mortgage payments.
Finally, Mr. Coiner argues that the trial court erred in not
considering the tax consequences of distributing his IRA. The
decree distributed the entire IRA to him and did not mandate any
early withdrawal. It also shows that the trial court did
consider all factors set forth in Code § 20-107.3(E) when
decreeing equitable distribution. Finding no error, we affirm.
Affirmed.
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