Michael Jerome Ratliff, s/k/a Michael Jerome Ratliff, Jr. v. Commonwealth of Virginia

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Humphreys, White and Retired Judge Frank
UNPUBLISHED
MICHAEL JEROME RATLIFF, SOMETIMES KNOWN AS
MICHAEL JEROME RATLIFF, JR.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
v. Record No. 1400-22-4 PER CURIAM
MAY 16, 2023
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF ARLINGTON COUNTY
Daniel S. Fiore, II, Judge
(Adam S. Farr; Office of the Public Defender, on brief), for
appellant.
(Jason S. Miyares, Attorney General; Collin C. Crookenden,
Assistant Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.
Michael Jerome Ratliff, Jr., challenges the four-year period of active incarceration the
Circuit Court of Arlington County imposed after accepting his guilty pleas. On appeal, Ratliff
argues that the trial court erred in failing to consider his mitigating evidence or alternative
sentencing options. After examining the briefs and record in this case, the panel unanimously holds
that oral argument is unnecessary because “the appeal is wholly without merit.” Code
§ 17.1-403(ii)(a); Rule 5A:27(a).
BACKGROUND
In April of 2022, Ratliff pleaded guilty to four counts of credit card theft, in violation of
Code § 18.2-192, and one count of vehicle tampering, in violation of Code § 18.2-146. Ratliff did

Retired Judge Frank took part in the consideration of this case by designation pursuant
to Code § 17.1-400(D).
 This opinion is not designated for publication. See Code § 17.1-413.
not enter into an agreement as to sentencing, and confirmed that he understood he was facing a
potential maximum sentence of 80 years and 12 months’ incarceration. After accepting his pleas
and finding him guilty, the trial court ordered a presentence report and specifically ordered that
Ratliff undergo a substance abuse screening.
At his sentencing hearing, Ratliff provided the trial court with letters of support and
requested a downward departure from the discretionary sentencing guidelines.1 Ratliff himself
spoke at length to the trial court. After reviewing the evidence presented and argument from
counsel and Ratliff, the trial court noted its concern that Ratliff was unwilling to address the issues
underlying his repeated crimes. The trial court then sentenced Ratliff to 4 years’ incarceration on
each of the credit card thefts, and 12 months’ incarceration on the remaining charge. Notably, the
trial court ordered Ratliff to serve all of his sentences concurrently.
Ratliff filed a motion to reconsider his sentence and attached two documents: a “letter of
accountability” that he wrote and a progress update from a support worker with Hillcrest Children
and Family Center. The trial court denied the motion to reconsider, remarking that Ratliff was on
supervised probation at the time of these offenses, and reiterated that he appeared unwilling to
address his issues. Ratliff now appeals.
ANALYSIS
“We review the trial court’s sentence for abuse of discretion.” Scott v. Commonwealth,
58 Va. App. 35, 46 (2011). “[W]hen a statute prescribes a maximum imprisonment penalty and
the sentence does not exceed that maximum, the sentence will not be overturned as being an
abuse of discretion.” Minh Duy Du v. Commonwealth, 292 Va. 555, 564 (2016) (quoting Alston
v. Commonwealth, 274 Va. 759, 771-72 (2007)).
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The discretionary sentencing guidelines in this case called for an active sentence
between one year at the low end, and two years and eight months at the high end.
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Ratliff argues the trial court abused its discretion by not considering the mitigating
evidence he presented. The record does not support Ratliff’s claim. The trial court not only
received evidence of Ratliff’s mitigation, but specifically stated it had “considered everything
that’s been provided” and that “[f]or the record, [the trial court] considered all the mitigation
evidence that was presented.” The record shows that the trial court received and reviewed
Ratliff’s letters of support in Ratliff’s presence. Accordingly, the record supports a finding that
the trial court considered Ratliff’s mitigating evidence. The weight the trial court gave that
evidence, though, was within the court’s purview. Keselica v. Commonwealth, 34 Va. App. 31,
36 (2000).
A trial court is not obligated to read into the record every factor considered and the
weight given to each one. “Absent a statutory requirement to do so, ‘a trial court is not required
to give findings of fact and conclusions of law.’” Bowman v. Commonwealth, 290 Va. 492, 500
n.8 (2015) (quoting Fitzgerald v. Commonwealth, 223 Va. 615, 627 (1982)). The record does
not support Ratliff’s claim that the trial court neglected to weigh his mitigation evidence when it
explicitly said the opposite. “Barring clear evidence to the contrary, this Court will not presume
that a trial court purposefully ignored mitigating factors in blind pursuit of a harsh sentence.”
Bassett v. Commonwealth, 13 Va. App. 580, 584 (1992).
Ratliff argues the trial court erred in not considering alternative punishments to
incarceration. But the record shows that the trial court itself suggested Ratliff be evaluated for
an alternative sentencing program and Ratliff was the one who noted his preference to continue
working. Ratliff claims the trial court failed to consider a correlation between his alcohol abuse
and substance use disorder and the crimes he committed. However, the trial court said more than
once that it considered, but rejected, Ratliff’s claim of a “direct connection between [Ratliff’s]
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alcohol use and the crimes committed.” This statement clearly indicates that the trial court
evaluated the relevant evidence.
Ratliff alleges that the trial court failed to consider his diagnoses for post-traumatic stress
disorder, depression, and anxiety. Ratliff conflates the absence of discussion of a factor with a
failure to consider a factor. The evidence of Ratliff’s mental health issues was squarely before
the trial court through evidence, argument, and the pre-sentence report.
To the extent that Ratliff argues his sentence is disproportionate to his crimes and
circumstances, we must reject it. This Court declines to engage in a proportionality review in
cases that do not involve life sentences without the possibility of parole. Cole v. Commonwealth,
58 Va. App. 642, 653-54 (2011). We noted in Cole that the Supreme Court of the United States
“has never found a non-life ‘sentence for a term of years within the limits authorized by statute
to be, by itself, a cruel and unusual punishment’ in violation of the Eighth Amendment.” Id. at
653 (quoting Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370, 372 (1982) (per curiam)). Cf. Vasquez v.
Commonwealth, 291 Va. 232, 243 (2016) (rejecting Eighth Amendment challenge to 133-year
active sentence because the sentence was imposed for 18 separate crimes).
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s imposition of
sentence and we affirm the judgment.
Affirmed.
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