Michael Adrian Woodley v. Commonwealth of Virginia

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
UNPUBLISHED
Present: Judges Athey, Fulton and Causey
MICHAEL ADRIAN WOODLEY
MEMORANDUM OPINION*
v. Record No. 0694-22-4 PER CURIAM
JUNE 13, 2023
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF ARLINGTON COUNTY
Daniel S. Fiore, II, Judge
(Bradley R. Haywood; Office of the Public Defender, on brief), for
appellant.
(Jason S. Miyares, Attorney General; Collin C. Crookenden,
Assistant Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.
The Arlington County Circuit Court (“trial court”) found Michael Woodley (“Woodley”) in
violation of the terms and conditions of his probation, revoked his previously suspended sentence in
its entirety, and ordered that he serve the balance of his suspended sentence following conviction on
an underlying felony. On appeal, Woodley contends that the trial court abused its discretion by
imposing the remaining balance on his previously suspended sentence. After examining the briefs
and record in this case, the panel unanimously holds that oral argument is unnecessary because “the
appeal is wholly without merit.” Code § 17.1-403(ii)(a); Rule 5A:27(a).
I. BACKGROUND
In 2005, Woodley pled guilty to a single count of felony uttering, in violation of Code
§ 18.2-172. He was subsequently sentenced to three years in prison, with two years and two months
suspended, conditioned upon his successful completion of three years of probation. Following his
*
This opinion is not designated for publication. See Code § 17.1-413.
release from active incarceration, he began supervised probation in April of 2006 before absconding
from supervision shortly thereafter. On September 1, 2006, the trial court issued a bench warrant
for his arrest, and following his apprehension, the trial court, on December 2, 2008, found Woodley
in violation of the terms and conditions of his supervised probation. As a result, the trial court
revoked Woodley’s previously suspended sentence, resuspended that sentence in its entirety, and
restored Woodley to supervised probation to end in December of 2011.
The trial court also added a special condition requiring Woodley to enter and complete the
Ethel Elan Safe Haven program located in Baltimore, Maryland. When Woodley subsequently
failed to complete the treatment program and again absconded from supervision, the trial court
issued a second bench warrant on April 6, 2010, before, once again, finding Woodley in violation of
his probation for the second time on February 4, 2011. This time, the trial court revoked the balance
of his suspended sentence again, sentenced Woodley to serve 90 days of the suspended sentence in
jail, resuspended the remaining balance of the suspended sentence, and restored him to supervised
probation again.
On March 21, 2011, Woodley completed his 90-day sentence and was released from the
Arlington County Detention Facility. Woodley never reported to the probation office following his
release, leading the probation office to seek a capias upon an allegation that Woodley had again
absconded from probation. Service of the capias was finally accomplished five years later on
March 24, 2016. Subsequently, on April 1, 2016, the trial court convicted Woodley of violating his
probation for a third time for absconding and resuspended the balance of his suspended sentence
except “time served to 4/18/2016.” The trial court also ordered him to complete 159 hours of
community service and comply with substance abuse treatment.
Less than three months after being restored to supervised probation, Woodley absconded
for a fourth time, and as a result, Woodley’s probation officer filed a major violation report and
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requested another capias.1 The major violation report alleged that the last reported contact between
Woodley and his probation officer occurred on June 29, 2016. The report also indicated that his
probation officer had made numerous attempts to contact Woodley without success before
concluding that “Offender Woodley has made himself unavailable for supervision and his
whereabouts are unknown.” The trial court issued another capias on August 22, 2016, but Woodley
was not arrested on the capias until almost six years later in January of 2022.
The trial court conducted its fourth probation violation hearing regarding Woodley on
March 4, 2022. He admitted to the violation and explained that, after absconding from probation,
he was gainfully employed as a long-distance mover until 2020. He further testified that he had
stopped working in 2020 because of the COVID-19 pandemic and also due to mental health issues.
He also advised the court that he suffered from “serious depression related to the death of his son,”
which led to “a couple of voluntary commitments to mental health institutions.” Woodley noted
that the underlying felony for which he was on probation “didn’t appear to be a particularly serious
property crime” and that he remained of uniform good behavior while a fugitive. He further
requested that the trial court impose a 90-day jail sentence and close the case. The Commonwealth
agreed that “this case is ripe for closure,” but did not offer any particular recommendation for
sentencing. The sentencing guidelines recommended a range of punishment of three months to one
year of incarceration.
The trial court noted Woodley’s “extensive history of absconding” and found no good cause
for retroactive adjustment to Woodley’s sentence. The trial court also opined that Woodley simply
did not believe that probation applied to him and ruled that the trial court’s original sentence should
therefore be enforced. The trial court then found Woodley in violation of the terms and conditions
1
As the record does not include any of the major violation reports or final sentencing
orders entered before 2016, we have drawn these facts from the uncontested major violation
report dated August 8, 2016.
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of his probation and imposed the remaining balance of his suspended sentence. In sentencing the
defendant to an active period of incarceration above the high end of the guidelines, the trial court
explained “there is no reasonable term of probation that the court could order for defendant to
remain on probation. An upward departure was warranted.”
On April 7, 2022, the trial court entered its final sentencing order revoking the balance of
Woodley’s previously suspended sentence and ordered that it be served.2 Woodley appealed.
II. ANALYSIS
A. Standard of Review
“In accordance with familiar principles of appellate review, the facts will be stated in the
light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the prevailing party [below].” Poole v. Commonwealth,
73 Va. App. 357, 360 (2021) (quoting Gerald v. Commonwealth, 295 Va. 469, 472 (2018)). In
doing so, we “discard the evidence of the [appellant] in conflict with that of the Commonwealth,
and regard as true all the credible evidence favorable to the Commonwealth and all fair inferences to
be drawn therefrom.” Gerald, 295 Va. at 473 (quoting Kelley v. Commonwealth, 289 Va. 463,
467-68 (2015)).
“Whether to revoke the suspension of a sentence lies within the sound discretion of the trial
court.” Keeling v. Commonwealth, 25 Va. App. 312, 315 (1997). We will not reverse a court’s
decision “unless there is a clear showing of abuse” of that discretion. Jacobs v. Commonwealth, 61
Va. App. 529, 535 (2013) (quoting Davis v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 81, 86 (1991)). “[T]he
abuse of discretion standard requires a reviewing court to show enough deference to a primary
decisionmaker’s judgment that the [reviewing] court does not reverse merely because it would have
2
According to the sentencing guidelines, the remaining balance on Woodley’s suspended
sentence was 1 year, 10 months and 5 days.
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come to a different result in the first instance.” Commonwealth v. Thomas, 73 Va. App. 121, 127
(2021) (alterations in original) (quoting Lawlor v. Commonwealth, 285 Va. 187, 212 (2013)).
[A] court abuses its discretion: “when a relevant factor that should
have been given significant weight is not considered; when an
irrelevant or improper factor is considered and given significant
weight; and when all proper factors, and no improper ones, are
considered, but the court, in weighing those factors, commits a clear
error of judgment.”
Lawlor, 285 Va. at 213 (quoting Landrum v. Chippenham & Johnston-Willis Hosps., Inc., 282 Va.
346, 352 (2011)). “Only when reasonable jurists could not differ can we say an abuse of discretion
has occurred.” Minh Duy Du v. Commonwealth, 292 Va. 555, 564 (2016) (quoting Grattan v.
Commonwealth, 278 Va. 602, 620 (2009)).
B. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in its sentencing determination.
Woodley contends that the trial court abused its discretion by imposing the balance of his
suspended sentence. He also contends that the sentencing court ignored mitigating factors, gave
improper weight to the aggravating factors, and ignored the recommendation contained within the
sentencing guidelines. We disagree.
“In any case in which the court has suspended the execution or imposition of sentence, the
court may revoke the suspension of sentence for any cause the court deems sufficient that occurred
at any time within the probation period, or within the period of suspension fixed by the court.”
Code § 19.2-306. “If the court, after hearing, finds good cause to believe that the defendant has
violated the terms of suspension, then the court may revoke the suspension and impose a sentence in
accordance with the provisions of § 19.2-306.1.” Code § 19.2-306(C). If the basis of the violation
is a third or subsequent technical violation, the court “may impose whatever sentence might have
been originally imposed.” Code § 19.2-306.1(C). We will not reverse a trial court’s sentencing
decision in the absence of an abuse of its “judicial discretion, the exercise of which implies
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conscientious judgment, not arbitrary action.” Allison v. Commonwealth, 40 Va. App. 407, 411
(2003) (quoting Hamilton v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 325, 327 (1976)).
The record indicates that Woodley appeared before the trial court on four separate occasions
for absconding from probation. In fact, the trial court found him in violation of probation
specifically for absconding in 2008, 2011, 2016, and 2022. More than five years passed between
his violation in 2011 and his arrest in 2016, and almost six years elapsed between his violation in
2016 and his arrest in 2022. While on probation, Woodley failed to complete the Ethel Elan Safe
Haven program, failed to submit to substance abuse treatment, and failed to perform any community
service hours as previously ordered by the court. He also failed to pay any money toward his fines
and court costs. Thus, because this was Woodley’s fourth violation, the trial court permissibly
revoked the entirety of his previously suspended sentence pursuant to Code § 19.2-306.1(C), and we
find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s decision to do so. The fact that the sentence exceeded
the high end of the recommended sentencing guidelines does not alter this result. Although the trial
court must “review and consider the suitability of the applicable discretionary sentencing
guidelines,” Code § 19.2-298.01, it is well settled that the Virginia Criminal Sentencing Guidelines
are “discretionary, rather than mandatory.” West v. Dir. of Dep’t of Corr., 273 Va. 56, 65 (2007).
Also, Woodley’s assertion that the trial court failed to consider the mitigating evidence is
not supported by the record. At the hearing, the trial court inquired if Woodley admitted to the
violation and gave him an opportunity to explain his reasons for absconding. The trial court heard
evidence that Woodley maintained gainful employment from 2016 to 2020 and that he suffered
from mental health issues for which he recently sought treatment. The trial court was also apprised
of the fact that Woodley did not incur any new offenses during his fugitive status. The trial court
expressly weighed those factors against the importance of complying with court orders generally,
and in judging whether Woodley’s mitigating evidence warranted a “retroactive adjustment” to his
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original sentence specifically. We find no error in the trial court’s resolution of the matter after
weighing and considering the evidence before it. Indeed, while the trial court had a “duty to
consider mitigating evidence along with other evidence in determining the appropriate sentence,” it
was “not required to give controlling effect to the mitigating evidence.” Reid v. Commonwealth,
256 Va. 561, 569 (1998) (quoting Correll v. Commonwealth, 232 Va. 454, 468-69 (1987)). By
revoking Woodley’s suspended sentence and ordering that it be served in its entirety, the trial court
“did nothing more than confirm that the conditions of probation were in fact conditions of
probation.” Price v. Commonwealth, 51 Va. App. 443, 449 (2008).
III. CONCLUSION
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in revoking Woodley’s previously suspended
sentence and ordering that it be served in its entirety. We therefore affirm the trial court’s
judgment.
Affirmed.
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