DocketNumber: Criminal No. 1:07cr209
Citation Numbers: 623 F. Supp. 2d 678
Judges: Ellis, III
Filed Date: 5/27/2009
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 11/26/2022
In this multi-count bribery, RICO, money laundering, and honest services wire fraud prosecution
The Oath and certain House Rules are referenced in the Indictment, and the government seeks to introduce these items in the course of its case-in-chief. Specifically, paragraph 6 of the Indictment quotes, in full, the Oath each Member is required to take at the beginning of a new Congress, which includes the following phrase the government contends is pertinent to this case: “I will well and faithfully discharge the duties of the office on which I am about to enter.” Additionally, paragraph 7 of the Indictment summarizes six House Rules, all of which defendant seeks to exclude: (i) clause 3 of the House Code of Official Conduct, which prohibits a Member from receiving compensation as a result of the improper exercise of influence (“the Improper Influence Rule”);
Defendant’s motion raises two principal grounds for excluding the Oath and House Rules. First, defendant challenges admission of the Oath and all of the House Rules summarized in the Indictment under Rule 403, Fed.R.Evid. Yet, prior to considering defendant’s Rule 403 objection, it is first necessary to consider whether any of the challenged evidence is inadmissible under Rule 402, Fed.R.Evid.,
Next, because the remaining rules are relevant under Rule 402, it is necessary to consider whether these rules pass muster under Rule 403. In this regard, it is clear that the House Rules that survive scrutiny under Rule 402 are not barred by Rule 403, which only authorizes the exclusion of relevant evidence “it its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.” Rule 403, Fed.R.Evid. Significantly, Rule 403 “only requires suppression of evidence that results in unfair prejudice — prejudice that damages an opponent for reasons other than its probative value, for instance, an appeal to emotion, and only when that unfair prejudice substantially outweighs the probative value of the evidence.” United States v. Mohr, 318 F.3d 613, 619-20 (4th Cir.2003) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 180, 117 S.Ct. 644, 136 L.Ed.2d 574 (1997) (“The term ‘unfair prejudice,’ as to a criminal defendant, speaks to the capacity of some concededly relevant evidence to lure the factfinder into declaring guilt on a ground different from proof specific to the offense charged.”). Here, with respect to the relevant House Rules, the danger of unfair prejudice is minimal, as is the risk that the jury will be misled or confused, given that the jury will be instructed that defendant is not on trial for a violation of the House Rules, but only for the offenses alleged in the Indictment, and that the House Rules are admitted only for the limited purpose of their relevancy to the various elements of the charged offenses. Accordingly, Rule 403 is no bar to the admission of these House Rules.
Defendant’s second ground for challenging the admission of the Oath and certain of the House Rules is a nonjusticiability / separation of powers argument based on the Rulemaking Clause of Article I of the Constitution.
Additionally, defendant’s nonjusticiability challenge to the official travel rule also fails based on Congress’s enactment of the Ethics Act. In that statute, Congress empowered the Attorney General to prosecute members of Congress who knowingly and willfully falsified or knowingly and willfully failed to file a financial disclosure statement. See 5 U.S.C.App. § 104; 18 U.S.C. § 1001. Through this authorization, Congress indicated its intent not to be the exclusive interpreter of the particular House Rules implicated by the required answers to the financial disclosure statements. See United States v. Rose, 28 F.3d 181, 190 (D.C.Cir.1994) (“[B]y codifying these requirements in a statute, Congress has empowered the executive and judicial branches to enforce them.... ”). Given that the standard financial disclosure form asks members whether they received reimbursements for officially connected travel, Congress’s enactment of the Ethics Act thus represents another ground on which defendant’s nonjusticiability challenge to the official travel rule founders. In sum, then, although the Oath and the Improper Influence rule are inadmissible, defendant’s Rule 403 challenge fails, as does his nonjusticiability argument against admission of the rule on official travel. The government may thus introduce in its ease-in-chief the House Rules summarized in the Indictment, with the exception of the Improper Influence Rule.
With respect to the portion of defendant’s motion that seeks to preclude the government from introducing evidence that defendant allegedly failed to disclose his financial interests in various businesses, defendant argues that such evidence should be excluded under Rules 402 and 403, Fed.R.Evid.
Accordingly, for these reasons and for the reasons stated from the Bench,
It is hereby ORDERED that defendant’s motion in limine to exclude House Rules, Oath, and alleged failures to disclose (Dkt. No. 344) is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. It is granted insofar as the government may not introduce evidence of the Oath or the Improper Influence Rule in its case-in-chief. It is denied in all other respects.
It is further ORDERED that either party may seek a reconsideration of these rulings based on the evidence presented during the course of trial.
The Clerk is directed to send a copy of this Order to all counsel of record.
. The Indictment's allegations are set forth in greater detail in United States v. Jefferson, 534 F.Supp.2d 645, 646-48 (E.D.Va.), aff'd, 546 F.3d 300 (4th Cir.2008), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 129 S.Ct. 2383, 173 L.Ed.2d 1294 (2009).
. At the time the Indictment was returned defendant was the sitting member of the United States House of Representatives for Louisiana's 2nd Congressional District.
.In pertinent part, clause 3 of the House Code of Official Conduct states that "[a] Member ... of the House may not receive compensation and may not permit compensation to accrue to his beneficial interest from any source, the receipt of which would occur by virtue of influence improperly exerted from his position in Congress.” House Rule XXIII, clause 3.
. The Rulemaking Clause provides that "[e]ach House may determine the rules of its proceedings.” U.S. Const, art. I, § 5, cl. 2.
. Notably, defendant correctly does not assert a hearsay objection against defendant’s financial disclosure statements or travel forms. Such an objection would clearly fail as the forms defendant submitted are statements by a party-opponent under Rule 801(d)(2), Fed. R.Evid.