Edward F. Flanagan v. Nancy duMont (Flanagan)

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal
revision before publication in the Vermont Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of
Decisions by email at: JUD.Reporter@vermont.gov or by mail at: Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State
Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801, of any errors in order that corrections may be made before
this opinion goes to press.
2016 VT 115
No. 2015-466
Edward F. Flanagan Supreme Court
On Appeal from
v. Superior Court, Lamoille Unit,
Family Division
Nancy duMont (Flanagan) May Term, 2016
Dennis R. Pearson, J.
Peter G. Anderson of Anderson & Associates, Stowe, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
Cynthia L. Broadfoot of Broadfoot, Attorneys at Law, Burlington, for Defendant-Appellant.
PRESENT: Reiber, C.J., Dooley, Skoglund, Robinson and Eaton, JJ.
¶ 1. ROBINSON, J. This appeal arises from a dispute regarding the parties’ obligations
with respect to several tax liens discovered post-divorce in light of two hold-harmless provisions in a
final divorce decree. Wife contends that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to enforce the
hold-harmless and indemnification provisions and failing to address the parties’ respective
obligations with respect to the tax liens. We agree, and accordingly reverse and remand so the trial
court can address wife’s claims under Article 13 of the parties’ divorce decree.
¶ 2. The parties’ final divorce decree, entered on March 26, 2013, was based on a partial
settlement agreement and the court’s order resolving the remaining contested matters after a contested
hearing. Articles 8, 11, and 13 are particularly relevant to this appeal.
¶ 3. Article 8 awarded wife “sole use, ownership, and possession” of a property on Taber
Hill Road in Stowe, Vermont (the property) free of any marital interests of husband. Wife was
obligated to refinance the outstanding mortgage loan on the property to remove husband from any
liability by February 26, 2014. In connection with this refinance, husband was obligated to “execute
and deliver appropriate documents of conveyance to [wife] to convey all right, title and interest in the
property.” If wife was unable to refinance, then she was required to immediately sell the property at
a price agreeable to both parties. In the event that wife failed to make any mortgage loan payments
on the property, after ten days husband was authorized to make the outstanding loan payment and
offset any sums owed to wife for spousal maintenance and child support.
¶ 4. Article 11 gave husband sole ownership of his business, The Dayboat Fish Company
LLC. Husband was solely responsible for “all liabilities in connection with the business,” and was
required to “hold [wife] harmless and indemnify her against the payment of any monies and
obligations or expenses in connection [with the business] which [wife] shall be obligated to pay to
third parties by virtue of [husband’s] failure to comply with the terms of this paragraph, including
reasonable counsel fees and costs.”
¶ 5. Finally, Article 13 allocated various debts of the parties. In addition to specifically
addressing certain outstanding debts, it included the following general provisions:
[Wife] shall be solely responsible for any and all debts or obligations,
including credit cards debts [sic], which are in her name alone.
[Husband] shall be solely responsible for any and all debts or
obligations, including credit cards debts [sic], which are in his name
alone.
Neither party shall incur or contract any debt, charge, obligation or
liability whatsoever for which the other party, his or her legal
representatives or his or her property or estate is or may become liable,
and shall indemnify and hold the other party harmless of all loss,
expenses (including reasonable attorneys’ fees) and damages in
connection with or arising out of a breach of the foregoing.
The provision did not mention any outstanding tax obligations.
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¶ 6. The trial court found that the events giving rise to this particular dispute began in
February 2014, when wife was unable to refinance the outstanding mortgage on the property and
accordingly listed the property for sale. Wife entered into a purchase and sale agreement with a buyer
in September 2014 at a sale price of $220,000. This sale price would have been sufficient to discharge
the outstanding mortgage and provide wife with net proceeds of about $31,000. The closing for the
purchase and sale of the property was to take place in November 2014. However, during the title
search of the property, the buyers discovered that both the IRS and the State of Vermont Tax
Department had outstanding tax liens on the property.
¶ 7. The first IRS lien was recorded in the Stowe land records in November 25, 2013, in
the amount of $10,841 for alleged underpayment of 2011 income taxes. The second was recorded on
January 1, 2014, in the amount of $3949 for alleged underpayment of 2010 income taxes. Both IRS
liens were recorded as against husband only. The family division noted that the parties filed their
federal taxes jointly for the 2010 tax year, but that it was not clear how they filed in 2011. As for the
state tax liens, the first was recorded on May 15, 2014, in the amount of $9237, and the second was
recorded on August 29, 2014, in the amount of $1055. Both of the Vermont tax liens were against
“[husband]/Dayboat Fish Co LLC” and were for sales and use taxes allegedly not paid or underpaid
by husband’s business.
¶ 8. The family division found the record to be “murky and inconclusive” regarding
whether wife knew previously about the IRS tax claims. Wife testified at the hearing that she looked
at the land records when she originally listed the property, but that it did not occur to her that she
should be looking for outstanding liens on the land. The family division noted that wife’s claim she
was “totally ignorant” of at least the 2010 tax lien was not credible because she filed an application
for “Discharge of Property from Federal Tax Lien” in January 2014, and had filed with the IRS a
“Request for Innocent Spouse Relief” as to the 2010 tax deficiency in September 2013. However, it
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also found that husband did not inform wife about the existence of any of the liens and did not inform
wife that he was having tax issues, even though he had admitted the state deficiencies and entered
into a payment plan with the Vermont Department of Taxes in June 2014. In any event, husband was
not able to clear the tax liens in September and October of 2014, thus preventing the closing and sale
of the property.1
¶ 9. Because of the difficulties surrounding the attempted sale of the property, including
the need for wife’s tenants to move out and the consequent loss of her rental income, wife missed
some mortgage payments. Husband eventually made some payments on the mortgage, and he
deducted those payments from the child support and spousal maintenance payments he owed to wife
as permitted by the final divorce decree. The proper accounting for these deductions was one of the
issues before the trial court below.
¶ 10. Husband’s deductions from child support and spousal maintenance payments and
wife’s inability to sell the property due to tax liens prompted wife to file with the family division a
motion to enforce the final divorce decree and for attorney’s fees. Wife pointed to the debt allocation
and indemnification provisions in the final divorce decree, and explained that the likely loss of this
buyer put her in a vulnerable position economically. She requested that the court order husband to
immediately pay the tax obligations or otherwise arrange for discharge of the liens so that the home
could eventually be sold. In addition, wife requested that the court order husband to assume wife’s
obligation to pay the mortgage, taxes, and all other carrying costs of the property until the liens were
removed and the property sold. Wife further asked the court to suspend the provision in the final
1
In December 2014 husband apparently received another “Notice of Deficiency” from the
IRS asserting unpaid income taxes by him for the 2012 tax year of $145,572, plus a substantial tax
understatement penalty of $29,114, for a total amount due of $174,686. This alleged deficiency
apparently arose from the sale of the parties’ other residence in 2012 in connection with which the
1099 documenting the entire amount of the sale proceeds was issued to husband only. Questions
regarding responsibility for this tax liability were not the subject of the motions giving rise to this
appeal, and are not before us.
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decree that allowed husband to offset his mortgage payments from his spousal and child support
obligations. Finally, wife requested that the court order husband to hold wife harmless and indemnify
her for any damages she suffers from the attachment of his tax liens to the property.
¶ 11. Husband opposed the motion and cross moved for contempt and enforcement against
wife. He argued that because the trial court had awarded the property to wife before the tax liens
attached, the tax liens were inoperative and wife’s time would be better spent seeking confirmation
from the IRS that the liens are inoperative. He took the position that any indemnification obligations
he had under the final order “do not arise until such time as [wife] is actually obligated to pay monies
to a third party” and are not triggered by the tax liens. And he argued that wife was attempting to
modify the final order concerning property division by requesting that he become responsible for the
mortgage and any taxes and carrying costs associated with it. Husband sought a contempt finding
against wife for her failure to pay the mortgage. He further requested that the court order wife to
reimburse him for all costs and expenses incurred by him in paying the past-due mortgage.
¶ 12. The family division held a contested hearing on the motions on April 23, 2015, and
July 8, 2015.2 With respect to the financial issues, the court concluded that the only issue before it
and capable of resolution was “whether the accounting for [the] mortgage payments not made by
[wife], and deductions (or credits) taken by [husband] against his combined spousal maintenance and
child support payment, is accurate.” The trial court found on the basis of the record before it that
husband owed wife a total of $94.30. With respect to the tax liens, their effect on wife’s ability to
sell the property, and wife’s request to suspend the offset of husband’s child and spousal support
obligations on account of his mortgage payments, the trial court wrote:
As to the larger issue of [wife’s] inability to sell [the property], the
court is unable to force any effective resolution until the tax liens are
resolved, and lifted from the land records. The latter is essentially
2
Although this appeal focuses narrowly on the property issues before the court in that hearing,
we note that the hearing also addressed mother’s motion to modify parent-child contact, and much of
the court’s order relates to parent-child contact issues.
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undoable on this record because either [husband] does not have the
wherewithal to do so, or the court under this docket number does not
have the authority to adjudicate their respective liabilities. No
contempt order, or monetary sanction is going to have any practical
effect or achieve the desired result.
The court concluded that the “property situation is still too fluid for the court to make any definitive
determination of who owes what to whom.” It therefore denied without prejudice all requests
regarding the property and ordered husband to pay wife the outstanding $94.30 in combined spousal
maintenance and child support payments. The court did not consider whether husband had an
affirmative obligation to clear the tax liens, whether he was liable for any damages pursuant to the
indemnification provisions, or whether wife was entitled to any of the relief she requested as a means
of enforcing husband’s obligation. Wife appealed.3
¶ 13. On appeal, wife argues that the trial court erred by failing to enforce the hold-harmless
and indemnification provisions of the parties’ final decree and order. Husband reiterates the
arguments he made below as to the merits of wife’s motion.
¶ 14. We conclude that the trial court did err in failing to address the questions raised in
wife’s motion as to the parties’ respective legal obligations, and that husband does have a present
legal obligation pursuant to the indemnification provisions. Whether wife is entitled to any of the
remedies she requests is a matter to be addressed in the first instance by the trial court.
I. Failure to Address Wife’s Claims
¶ 15. In her motions, wife argued that husband has various obligations with respect to the
tax liens by virtue of the final divorce order, and she requested various types of relief to enforce those
obligations. The trial court’s observation that its order was unlikely to have any practical effect in
light of the tax liens and the parties’ financial circumstances was reasonable, but this fact did not
3
Husband did not cross appeal the trial court’s denial of his motion for contempt, and we do
not address that issue.
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discharge the trial court from addressing the claims before it. The trial court should have addressed
the arguments in wife’s motion.
¶ 16. Although the trial court may be right that husband does not have any practical ability
to immediately pay the outstanding taxes that underlie the liens, this fact does not prevent the trial
court from issuing an order reflecting the parties’ respective obligations. The inability to comply with
a financial obligation in an order issued by the family division may be a defense in a contempt
proceeding, 15 V.S.A. § 603(e), but it does not vitiate the underlying obligation to pay. Moreover,
an order establishing husband’s obligations relative to the liens may have influenced his decision to
leave wife the task of advocating to the IRS that the liens were invalid. Insofar as the parties’
circumstances were, as the court suggested, fairly hopelessly “stuck,” an order establishing their legal
rights was one potential step toward breaking the logjam. Cf. State v. Ryan, 135 Vt. 491, 497, 380
A.2d 525, 529 (1977) (noting in context of pretrial motions in criminal case that, although trial court
has some discretion as to which motions to resolve before trial versus later, where defendant requests
ruling that will affect defense strategy and “there is no apparent reason to postpone the determination
of the motion other than the desire to avoid a difficult issue,” court should rule).
¶ 17. Additionally, while the trial court was correct that it did not have jurisdiction to
adjudicate the parties’ respective liabilities to the IRS, and could not have issued a binding order as
to whether the liens were enforceable by the IRS, it did have jurisdiction to adjudicate the parties’
respective obligations to one another pursuant to the final divorce decree. Because the issue of the
parties’ obligations to one another was squarely before the court below, it had a duty to resolve that
issue. See Sec’y, Vt. Agency of Nat. Res. v. Irish, 169 Vt. 407, 419, 738 A.2d 571, 580 (1999)
(recognizing trial court’s “fundamental duty” to “resolve the issues before it”).
II. Indemnification and Hold-Harmless Clauses
¶ 18. Wife argues that the clear and unambiguous language of Articles 11 and 13 place the
burden on husband to bear responsibility for any liabilities in his sole name or associated with his
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business. She asserts that the hold-harmless and indemnification agreements should be read to protect
her from the consequences of husband’s tax liens currently encumbering the property in her sole
name. She also asserts that, because of husband’s tax liens, she has suffered damages that are
recoverable under the final decree. Husband argues that the indemnification and hold-harmless
clauses kick in only when wife has paid money to third parties on account of husband’s debts. Since
wife has not been forced to pay any money on husband’s outstanding tax liens, she remains unharmed
for purposes of the indemnification and hold-harmless clauses, and therefore there is nothing for
husband to indemnify.
¶ 19. We interpret final divorce decrees “according to contract principles.” See Meyncke v.
Meyncke, 2013 VT 82, ¶ 12, 194 Vt. 556, 82 A.3d 585 (citing Sumner v. Sumner, 2004 VT 45, ¶ 9,
176 Vt. 452, 852 A.2d 611). Our review of the trial court’s interpretation of any contract is
nondeferential and plenary. Dep’t of Corrs. v. Matrix Health Sys., P.C., 2008 VT 32, ¶¶ 11-12, 183
Vt. 348, 950 A.2d 1201. We look first to the explicit terms of the decree and decide if they are
ambiguous. John A. Russel Corp. v. Bohlig, 170 Vt. 12, 16, 739 A.2d 1212, 1216 (1999). “Where
the language of the decree is unambiguous, we apply it according to its terms.” Sumner, 2004 VT
45, ¶ 9 (citation omitted). “If an agreement, even if ‘inartfully worded or clumsily arranged, fairly
admits of but one interpretation, it may not be said to be ambiguous or fatally unclear.’ ” Towslee v.
Callanan, 2011 VT 106, ¶ 5, 190 Vt. 622, 55 A.3d 240 (quoting Isbrandtsen v. N. Branch Corp., 150
Vt. 575, 580-81, 556 A.2d 81, 85 (1988)). Because the applicability of the indemnification clauses
in this case presents a question of law that we review without deference, and because a remand would
be unnecessary if wife’s arguments had no merit, we consider the applicability of the indemnification
provisions to the circumstances of this case.
A. The Scope of Articles 11 and 13
¶ 20. We conclude that husband does not have present legal obligations to wife pursuant to
Article 11, but that he may have present legal obligations pursuant to Article 13. “We interpret the
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indemnification provisions of this document as we do all contract provisions—to give effect to the
intent of the parties as that intent is expressed in their writing.”4 Hamelin v. Simpson Paper (Vt.) Co.,
167 Vt. 17, 19, 702 A.2d 86, 88 (1997).
¶ 21. To indemnify is “[t]o reimburse (another) for a loss suffered because of a third party’s
or one’s own act or default” or “[t]o promise to reimburse (another) for such a loss” or “[t]o give
(another) security against such loss.” Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014). To hold a person
harmless means “[t]o absolve (another party) from any responsibility for damage or liability arising
from the transaction.” Id.
¶ 22. In some cases, an indemnitor’s obligation may accrue only when “the indemnitee has
actually paid an obligation for which the indemnitee has been found liable” and the indemnitor’s
liability is limited to the actual amount the indemnitee was required to pay. Long v. McAllister-Long,
221 S.W.3d 1, 11 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006). In other cases, a hold-harmless provision may require the
indemnitor to pay certain sums of money or to perform other acts that will prevent harm or loss to the
indemnitee. Id. Such provisions are sometimes described as “indemnity against liability”
agreements. Id. (citing Crestar Mortg. Co. v. Peoples Mortg. Co., 818 F. Supp. 816, 819 n.4 (E.D.
Pa. 1993); Diaz v. Diaz, 403 N.E.2d 1219, 1220 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980)). Ultimately, the scope of the
indemnitor’s liability is determined by the parties’ intent as reflected in their indemnification
provision.
¶ 23. Applying this guidance, we conclude that husband has no present legal obligation to
wife pursuant to Article 11 solely by virtue of the tax liens attached to her property. Article 11 assigns
husband sole ownership of his business and requires that he “hold [wife] harmless and indemnify her
against the payment of any monies and obligations or expenses in connection [with the business]
4
Although the indemnification provision at issue here was incorporated into a court order,
the record reflects that the parties mutually approved the language of the indemnification provisions
in the court’s order.
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which [wife] shall be obligated to pay to third parties by virtue of [husband’s] failure to comply with
the terms of [Article 11], including reasonable counsel fees and costs.” Husband’s obligation under
this provision may accrue if wife becomes obligated to pay a third party—in this case the IRS or
Vermont Department of Taxes—but his obligation does not extend to circumstances like this in which
wife is not currently obligated to pay the tax arrears upon which the liens are based. See, e.g.,
McDonald v. McDonald, 882 S.W.2d 134, 136-37 (Ky. Ct. App. 1994) (noting trial court had no
authority to order husband to indemnify wife under hold-harmless clause where husband had
underlying debt discharged in bankruptcy and creditor had not yet proceeded against wife).
¶ 24. In contrast, we conclude that Article 13 imposes a broader obligation on husband and
that he does have potential present liability on the basis of the tax liens regardless of whether wife is
personally liable for any of the tax arrears. Article 13 assigns to husband and wife responsibility for
each of their respective individual debts and provides:
Neither party shall incur or contract any debt, charge, obligation or
liability whatsoever for which the other party, his or her legal
representatives or his or her property or estate is or may become liable,
and shall indemnify and hold the other harmless for all loss, expenses
(including reasonable attorneys’ fees) and damages in connection with
or arising out of a breach of the foregoing.
(Emphasis added).
¶ 25. Several features of this provision support our conclusion that husband’s potential legal
obligations under Article 13 have accrued and are not dependent on an enforcement action by a third
party. First, the provision specifically prohibits both parties from not only personally incurring any
obligations for which the other may become liable, but also from incurring any obligations which the
other’s “property or estate” may become liable. This provision expressly contemplates and addresses
liabilities that attach to “property” or “estates” in addition to those for which the other person may
become individually liable. Second, the provision is not limited to indemnifying wife against
payment of monies for which she may become obligated; it expressly provides for payment of
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expenses, including attorneys’ fees, and damages arising from a breach of either party’s obligation
not to incur debt for which the other person or his or her property may become liable. Husband’s
obligation under this broadly worded provision arises upon breach of his obligation not to subject
wife or her property to liability, rather than upon a third party’s efforts to collect from wife,
determination of her liability, or actual payment by her. See, e.g., Gardner v. Gardner, 2012 UT App
374, ¶ 24, 294 P.3d 600 (holding that, where hold-harmless clause required wife to “prevent harm or
loss to” husband resulting from parties’ mortgage, wife must indemnify husband not only for his
mortgage payments, but also for damages flowing from her non-payment); Long, 221 S.W.3d at 10-
11 (reasoning that “[a] hold harmless agreement . . . is generally classified as an indemnity against
liability” agreement).
¶ 26. We reject the suggestion that the indemnification requirement in Article 13 applies
only to debt incurred after the divorce. The placement of this provision in the section governing
“distribution of debts,” immediately following provisions assigning the parties any and all debts or
obligations in their respective sole names, and the indemnification provision’s express application to
“breach of the foregoing” supports the conclusion that the indemnification requirements apply not
only to debts incurred post-divorce, but also to individual debts incurred during the marriage and
either undisclosed or unaddressed in the final divorce order. To conclude otherwise would render the
word “foregoing” superfluous. See Dyke v. Scopetti, 2015 VT 53, ¶ 21, 199 Vt. 127, 121 A.3d 684
(applying Pennsylvania law and explaining that “ ‘we must give effect to every word and clause’ of
a legal instrument, ‘so as not to render any provision nugatory or mere surplusage’ ” (citation
omitted)).
¶ 27. Moreover, this understanding is most consistent with Article 13 as a whole. Article
13 allocates some specified debts to one party or another, and each such allocation is accompanied
by an indemnification clause. If we read the clause at issue here as applying only to post-divorce
debts, then Article 13 would allocate specific debts to each individual through express
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indemnification provisions and would provide for indemnification in connection with debt incurred
post-divorce, but would include no enforcement mechanism for its general catch-all allocation of
individual debts. SKI, Ltd. v. Mountainside Props., Inc., 2015 VT 33, ¶ 23, 198 Vt. 384, 114 A.3d
1169 (“When interpreting a contract, we ‘strive to give effect to every part of the instrument and form
a harmonious whole from the parts.’ ” (citation omitted)).
B. Application to the Liens in Question
¶ 28. We conclude that husband may have breached his obligations pursuant to Article 13
and may therefore be subject to present liability with respect to one of the two federal tax liens, and
that he has breached the requirements of the final divorce order as to both of the state tax liens.
¶ 29. Husband has not breached Article 13 in connection with the tax lien for the outstanding
2010 federal taxes because those taxes were a joint debt at the time of the divorce. The trial court
found that for the 2010 tax year, husband and wife filed a joint federal tax return, meaning the tax
obligation associated with that return was a joint debt. The court found that following the divorce,
wife had requested from the IRS “Innocent Spouse Relief” in connection with this tax arrearage, and
that the IRS had either denied the relief or had not yet ruled on it.5 Even assuming that the IRS has
formally released wife from the joint debt so that she is not liable to the IRS, husband has not breached
Article 13 in connection with that debt because he did not fail to pay a debt that was his sole debt at
the time of the divorce and did not incur a debt post-divorce for which wife or her property became
obligated.
¶ 30. By contrast, it appears that husband has breached Article 13 in connection with the
second federal tax lien for underpayment of 2011 income taxes. We hedge in our analysis of the 2011
tax arrearage because the trial court found that the record was not clear as to whether the parties filed
5
Wife testified at the hearing that she had been awarded relief from the IRS in response to
her request, and the court admitted a copy of an IRS letter dated March 13, 2014, reflecting its grant
of the requested relief. Our analysis does not turn on the accuracy of the trial court’s finding on this
point.
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their federal income tax return jointly in 2011 and that the tax return was not of record. It also found
that the tax lien itself was recorded as against husband only. On remand, the trial court should
determine whether the 2011 income tax arrearage upon which the tax lien is based is a personal debt
owed by husband only at the time of the divorce or if it is instead a joint debt.
¶ 31. The tax arrearages underlying the two state tax liens are and were at the time of divorce
husband’s sole debts, and his failure to pay them amounts to a breach of Article 13. Both arrearages
were for unpaid sales and use taxes that were either not paid or were underpaid by husband’s business.
Although the unpaid taxes were due from husband’s limited liability company, liability for failure to
pay them extends to husband individually. 32 V.S.A. § 9703 (providing that liability to pay sales and
use tax extends to any officer or agent of corporation or entity who is under duty to collect tax and
transmit it to tax commissioner). A substantial portion of the unpaid sales and use taxes were unpaid
at the time of the final divorce, and husband has incurred the additional debts since that time.
Husband’s failure to pay these taxes, and the consequent impact on wife as a result of the tax liens,
triggers the protections of Article 13 and may support a claim for damages or other relief.
III. Damages and Remedies
¶ 32. Whether in this case wife is entitled to damages or other remedies is a question for the
trial court to consider on remand. In connection with her motion to enforce below, wife asked the
trial court to: (1) order husband to immediately pay off the liens or otherwise obtain their discharge
from the property; (2) order husband to assume all carrying costs associated with the property,
including the mortgage and property taxes, until the property is sold; (3) suspend husband’s ability to
offset any mortgage payments made on the property from his spousal maintenance and child support
obligations; (4) order husband to hold wife harmless and indemnify her against any obligations or
expenses arising from the tax liens, including but not limited to any cause of action by the buyers
under the purchase and sale agreement; and (5), order husband to pay any attorneys’ fees incurred by
wife in connection with her motion to enforce.
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¶ 33. Whether any or all of these remedies are warranted by the evidence and are permissible
methods of enforcing husband’s obligations under Article 13 are questions for the trial court to
consider on remand. Compare Boisselle v. Boisselle, 162 Vt. 240, 242, 548 A.2d 388, 389 (1994)
(“Vermont law is clear that the court cannot modify the property disposition aspects of a divorce
decree absent circumstances . . . that would warrant relief from a judgment generally.”), with
Schwartz v. Hass, 169 Vt. 612, 614, 739 A.2d 1188, 1190-91 (1999) (mem.) (affirming trial court’s
order under motion to enforce suspending portion of husband’s maintenance payments under decree
until wife paid him $50,000 because this Court “view[ed] this situation as one in which the family
court was not modifying its property division or maintenance award but, rather, was seeking to
enforce the terms of the decree as originally entered in the face of intransigence by one of the parties”).
Affirmed in part (as to claims based on Article 11), reversed in part (as to claims based on
Article 13), and remanded.
FOR THE COURT:
Associate Justice
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