Citation Numbers: 143 A. 676, 101 Vt. 381
Judges: Watson, Powebs, Moulton, Chase, Thompson, Supr
Filed Date: 11/16/1928
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 10/19/2024
This is a proceeding for contempt brought before Superior Judge Willcox in which the petitionee is charged with the violation of a lawful order for the payment of temporary alimony. The petitionee moved to dismiss the petition on the ground, among others, that the order for payment of temporary alimony had never been legally served upon him. After hearing on the same the motion to dismiss was overruled, and the petitionee allowed an exception. Hearing was then had on the merits, and, as a result of the same, the petitionee was found to be in arrears with respect to the payment of temporary alimony, but was adjudged not to be in contempt. The petitionee was discharged from custody, and a new order for the payment of temporary alimony was made. Exceptions were taken by the petitionee, and the enforcement of all orders was stayed.
The petitioner moves to dismiss the exceptions. The principal ground argued, and which we consider, is that contempt proceedings brought before a single superior judge cannot be reviewed by this Court on bill of exceptions.
Not only does the county court have the implied jurisdiction to enforce an order for the payment of temporary alimony by proceedings for contempt (Andrew v. Andrew,
At common law proceedings for contempt in one court, where the court had jurisdiction of the subject-matter and of the parties, were not revisable in any other court, upon an appeal or writ of error. Vilas Platt v. Burton et al.,
G.L. 1608-1610 provide that certain specified causes and matters relating to causes pending in county court may be heard and determined by a superior judge in vacation, and exceptions may be taken from the orders and judgments of said judge as if they had been made at the stated session of a county court; but a proceeding for contempt is not one of the specified causes.
Chapter 166 of the General Laws relating to divorce gives a superior judge jurisdiction to make orders for temporary alimony and for the care and custody of minor children and to make certain restraining orders, all during the pendency of the libel for divorce. These orders invariably are for the benefit of the wife and minor children and are in force only during the pendency of the libel. The property is usually in the hands of the husband. The support of the wife and children may depend entirely upon the allowance of the judge. In most cases, if there was delay in the enforcement of such orders, the purpose of the law would be defeated. *Page 384
It is conceded that there is no statute expressly granting a review in this court by bill of exceptions of proceedings for contempt brought before and heard by a single judge; but the petitionee says that, if exceptions lie to the rulings of the county court on matters where the county court and a superior judge have concurrent jurisdiction, exceptions should lie to the rulings of the Superior Judge in such cases. To this we can only say that the so-called right of appellate review is a mere legislative privilege to be granted or withheld as may seem best to the law-making body (Miles Block Co. v. Barre Chelsea R.R.Co.,
Exceptions dismissed.