Judges: Powers, Slack, Moulton, Thompson, Graham
Filed Date: 2/4/1932
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 10/19/2024
These are two cases tried together, and each comes before us on defendant's exceptions to the sustaining of the demurrer to his pleas in bar. It has been stipulated that the complaints in the two actions are substantially identical, except as to the allegations of damage; that the pleas in bar, demurrers, and bills of exceptions are identical; and that such disposition as may be made of one applies with equal force to the other, the questions raised being identical in each case. The record, consisting of the complaint, pleas, demurrers, and bill of exceptions in the case of Rutland Buick Company, Inc. v. FrancisA. Perry, is the one which has, by stipulation, been printed and submitted.
The complaint is in tort, and alleges that a Buick automobile, owned by the plaintiff and driven and operated by Harold Stafford, was damaged in a collision with a La Salle automobile driven and operated by the defendant, and that the accident was caused by the negligence of the defendant and without the fault of the plaintiff.
There are three pleas in bar, the allegations of which may be summarized as follows: Prior to the institution of the present action Harvey R. Kingsley, the owner of the La Salle automobile, brought suit against the Rutland Buick Co., Inc., Guy A. Fletcher, and Harold Stafford for the damage to it caused by this same accident, and recovered a judgment, which has not been reversed, annulled, or set aside, but is of full force and effect; that a controlling fact or question involved in that action was the negligence of the defendants therein in the operation of the Buick automobile, which after full trial and opportunity to be heard was decided adversely to them; that the same fact or question is material and controlling in the present case; that at the time of the accident the present defendant, Perry, was a bailee of the La Salle automobile, and as such was in privity with Kingsley, his bailor; and that therefore the present plaintiffs are barred and estopped from again litigating the question of their negligence.
The demurrer challenges the alleged conclusiveness of the judgment in Kingsley's action as a bar or estoppel in favor of the defendant in the present proceeding.
A former judgment is an absolute bar to a subsequent action only where the parties, the subject-matter, and the causes *Page 232
of action are identical, or substantially so. Blondin v. Brooks,
Furthermore it is the general rule that an estoppel must be mutual, and therefore a party will not be concluded by a former judgment unless it would have been a protection to him if it had been the other way, and conversely no person can claim the benefit of a judgment as an estoppel upon his adversary unless he would have been prejudiced by a contrary decision of the case.Dunnett v. Shields Conant,
A bailee may be in privity with his bailor, where the question concerns the title to the property which is the subject of the bailment. Hughes v. United Pipe Lines,
A bailee has a special property in the thing bailed, and, although he may not be accountable over to the bailor, he may maintain an action for an injury to it while in his possession caused by the negligence of a third person, and may recover *Page 233
the full amount of the damages. Wooley v. Edson,
It follows also that the defendant Perry was not in any sense a real or substantial party to the former action. Cutler v.Jennings, supra,
The defendant, however, urges that the doctrines of privity and mutuality of estoppel have their exceptions, and that, as a matter of public policy, the plaintiff ought not to be allowed again to litigate a question which has once, after a full trial with every opportunity to be heard, been decided against him. But while we recognize that "it is for the benefit of the community that a limit should be prescribed for litigation" (see FirestoneTire and Rubber Co. v. Hart's Estate, supra), and are not to be understood as saying that there may not be in some conceivable situations exceptions to the strict doctrine of mutuality (seeSpencer v. Dearth,
It follows that there was no error in the ruling of the trial court, and the entry in each case is: Judgment affirmed, andcause remanded with leave to defendant to apply. *Page 235
Gibson v. Bessemer & Lake Erie Railroad ( 1910 )
Dunnett v. Shields and Conant ( 1924 )
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Hart's Estate ( 1932 )
Orleans Village v. Union Mutual Fire Insurance Co. ( 1975 )
Weiner v. Prudential Insurance Co. of America ( 1938 )
Laird v. State of Vermont Highway Dept. ( 1941 )
Belfore v. Vermont State Highway Department ( 1936 )
Turner, Admx. v. Bragg ( 1947 )