DocketNumber: No. 71786-9
Citation Numbers: 148 Wash. 2d 224
Judges: Alexander, Madsen, Sanders, Smith
Filed Date: 12/19/2002
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 11/16/2024
Petitioners, two local chapters of the Fraternal Order of Eagles, Tenino and Whidbey Island Aeries, and several female members of the Tenino Aerie ask this court to review a decision of the Court of Appeals, Division Two, which reversed a ruling of the Thurston County Superior Court that the male-only membership policy of the Grand Aerie of the Fraternal Order of Eagles barring admission of new female applicants violated the Washington Law Against Discrimination, chapter 49.60 RCW. We reverse.
QUESTION PRESENTED
The principal question presented in this case is whether the Washington Law Against Discrimination requires a “fraternal organization” to be “distinctly private” in order to qualify for exemption under the law.
The Fraternal Order of Eagles (Eagles) was organized in this state in 1898.
In its early history, the Eagles chartered Aeries or chapters in other states with male-only membership. It has continued growth over the years by adding chapters and members worldwide.
The Eagles traditionally restricted membership to males
Members in Washington State, approximating 66,000, belong to 106 local Aeries.
On November 27, 1995, the judicial branch of the Eagles, the Grand Tribunal, issued its formal Opinion 750 stating that the organization’s male-only membership policy was inconsistent with prevailing civil law on gender discrimination.
On July 20, 1999, by amended complaint, local Aeries, Tenino Number 564 and Whidbey Island Number 3418, and nine female members of the Tenino chapter sued the Grand Aerie in the Thurston County Superior Court, claiming that the male-only admission policy violated the Washington Law Against Discrimination (WLAD) and Washington’s Equal Rights Amendment; and stating that reversing the policy would not impinge on the Eagles’ right of free association.
The trial court, the Honorable Richard A. Strophy, interpreted RCW 49.60.040(10) as indeed exempting “fraternal organizations” from the WLAD, but only if the organiza
In his extensive oral ruling on January 28, 2000, Judge Strophy included the following statement:
I conclude .. . that “fraternity” has as much to do with a shared common purpose than it does with a men’s club, if you will. And so looking not only to acts and practices, but to the defendants’ own literature, and listening to the arguments of counsel, I find and conclude that there are no material facts about which there’s a genuine dispute regarding the FOE [Fraternal Order of Eaglesfs aggressive and wide range of membership enhancement programs and goals, such that I conclude that the selectivity of membership is minimal in the Eagles.
The next factor for review by the Court in determining whether or not an organization is distinctly private is its size. Local Aeries in Washington average over 600 members. The state aeries have over 66,000. Nationally or internationally, there’s approaching a million to over a million. But, certainly, the Court finds that the membership size and the membership enhancement programs are markedly different from those clubs or groups under scrutiny in the case law cited to the Court, such that in terms of considering and applying that factor, that one consideration, the size of Eagles and the local Aeries would militate against a finding that Fraternal Order of Eagles is distinctly private.
The next consideration is whether or not the community and the protected class—women—can participate in activities of the organization. It is, in my assessment of the record before me, beyond cavil or genuine dispute that the Eagles are an active outreach organization in the community that involves community members to participate in projects to aid other community members who are nonmembers and involves nonmembers in the activities of the organization from time to time*234 such that I could not, given consideration to that factor, conclude that the Fraternal Order of Eagles is distinctly private.
Another factor is how admission of women would affect the male members’ rights of association. The Grand Aerie and State Aerie argue, “Well, this is a brotherhood and we have rituals, and it would significantly and adversely affect the ability of the brotherhood to maintain this close familial relationship and observe its rituals if women were admitted.” Counsel has done a very good job, in my view, on this point of arguing vigorously for his clients, the Defendants Grand and State Aeries. And with all due respect to counsel in that regard, even the most skillful of us as attorneys have never been really able to make a silk purse out of a sow’s ear, and on this issue, what is fatal to the Grand Aerie’s position is that women have been allowed to remain. What does that say to the Aerie’s intense argument that we can’t be the club we want to be if we have women? If that was true and if that was a laudable and valid position, then the Grand Tribunal should not only have withdrawn its Opinion 750, but decreed that, henceforth, all current female members must be expelled and excluded to preserve this precious fraternal relationship that we must foster in order to be the organization our literature says we seek to be.
Because it is the essence of the Washington Law Against Discrimination to prohibit discrimination against persons which would deny them full enjoyment of any places of public accommodation because of gender, it does matter whether the challenged organization, even a fraternal organization, is distinctly private or not, and that consideration is more significant tha[n] whether it’s composed only of men or only of women. I conclude, therefore, that, in that context, the terms “fraternal organization” and “distinctly private” are sufficiently ambiguous to warrant this court to construe the exception—in light of the liberal purpose of the statute—strictly and in a way that reinforces accomplishment of that purpose.
And this conclusion is arrived at in light of the requirement that the Fraternal Order of Eagles Grand and State Aeries have the burden of convincing this Court that the Fraternal Order of Eagles comes within the exception. The burden is not on the plaintiffs to establish that the Grand and State Aeries*235 are not within the exception or exemption. And if there even be that burden, the plaintiffs have sustained it.
In coming to the decision I have come to, to grant the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment that the conduct of the Grand and State Aerie is in violation of the Washington Law Against Discrimination by restricting membership in the aeries to only males, I have not done so lightly. I have done so with the recognition that persons do have the right to associate and restrict their associations in a way that could be based upon gender or other considerations such as a specific religious denomination, but that is only when they are strictly or distinctly private in activity and nature. There is nothing about the Fraternal Order of Eagles, almost a million strong across this country, that tells me that its goals, its purpose or its conduct is distinctly private. It is the opposite. And I congratulate the Eagles because of that. I think that’s what makes it vital and valid and wonderful.
On March 24, 2000, the trial court granted Petitioners’ summary judgment motion, concluding that the Eagles may not discriminate on the basis of gender and must admit women into membership. The court granted summary judgment to Respondent Eagles on Petitioners’ claim of violation of the Equal Rights Amendment to the Washington Constitution and the Consumer Protection Act.
Respondent Eagles filed a timely appeal, arguing that the trial court erred in its interpretation of the statute and in its conclusion that there remained no issue of material fact concerning the organization’s public or private status.
Briefs amicus curiae urging reversal were filed by The Women’s Law Project; Washington Women Lawyers; National Association for the Advancement of Colored People; Washington State National Organization for Women; American Association of University Women of Washington; Washington Chapter of the National Council of Jewish Women; Anti-Defamation League; California Women’s Law Center; Center for Women Policy Studies; Feminist Majority and Feminist Majority Foundation; National Gay and Lesbian Task Force; NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund; Trial Lawyers For Public Justice; Women Employed; Washington State Human Rights Commission; and the Washington Attorney General.
A brief amicus curiae urging affirmance was filed by the Conference of Private Organizations.
This court granted review on April 2, 2002.
DISCUSSION
At issue in this case is the question whether the Court of Appeals erred in its reading of the Washington Law Against Discrimination to automatically exclude fraternal organizations from application of the prohibitions in RCW 49-.60.040(10) and that fraternal organizations are included in the exemption for “any institute, bona fide club, or place of accommodation, which is by its nature distinctly private, including fraternal organizations.”
During oral argument before this court counsel for Petitioners and Respondents expressed agreement that, under the principles of summary judgment law, there remained no material fact to be determined by the trial court in this case.
The Washington Law Against Discrimination (WLAD), originally enacted in 1949, is a broad remedial statute, the purpose of which is to prevent and eradicate discrimination on the basis of race, creed, color, national origin, sex or disability in “public accommodations.”
The Act created a state agency, later designated in 1971 as the Washington State Human Rights Commission, and granted it jurisdiction and powers to carry out the provisions of the Act and the “policies and practices of the commission in connection therewith.”
“Public accommodation” is broadly defined to include:
[A]ny place, licensed or unlicensed, kept for gain, hire, or reward, or where charges are made for admission, service, occupancy, or use of any property or facilities ... or where food or beverages of any kind are sold for consumption on the premises, or where public amusement, entertainment, sports, or recreation of any kind is offered with or without charge, or . . . where the public gathers, congregates, or assembles for amusement, recreation, or public purposes, or public halls ....
PROVIDED, That nothing contained in this definition shall be construed to include or apply to any institute, bona fide club, or place of accommodation, which is by its nature distinctly private, including fraternal organizations, though where public use is permitted that use shall be covered by this chapter; nor shall anything contained in this definition apply to any educational facility, columbarium, crematory, mausoleum, or cemetery operated or maintained by a bona fide religious or sectarian institution....
The parties disagree on their interpretation of RCW 49.60.040(10). Respondents argue that since the language of the exception is clear and unambiguous, application of statutory construction principles to interpret it violates the well-established rule that “a statute which is clear on its face is not subject to interpretation.”
Petitioners counter with the argument that the statute is grammatically flawed, thus creating an ambiguity which requires the court to apply rules of statutory construction.
Statutory Interpretation
The construction of a statute is a question of law that this court reviews de novo.
Legislative definitions provided in a statute are controlling, but in the absence of a statutory definition, courts may give a term its plain and ordinary meaning by reference to a standard dictionary.
An unambiguous statute is not subject to judicial construction.
The first role of a court is to examine the language of a statute while adhering to the legislature’s intent and purpose in enacting it. Following that precept, the Court of Appeals used rules of punctuation and grammar in analyzing the statute to determine legislative intent. The punctuation, the court noted, sets “fraternal organizations” apart from “institute,” “club,” and “place of accommodation.” It noted that those three terms are connected by commas and the word “or” indicating they are alternatives to each other and meant to be read together as a common idea. The legislature, the court concluded, purposely did not include “fraternal organizations” in the list because such organizations do not share a similar connection.
The Court of Appeals indicated that the words “fraternal organizations” which separate the phrase “which is by its nature distinctly private,” according to rules of grammar, is known as an adjective clause or relative clause.
Petitioners provide an alternative rule of grammar in response to the decision of the Court of Appeals.
The two semicolons in the “public accommodation” definition, Petitioners contend, support their claim of two exceptions and undercut Respondents’ assertion that the “fraternal organizations” category stands alone as a third separate, unqualified exemption.
The statute is not necessarily ambiguous simply because of two different interpretations. The question, however, is whether those interpretations are sufficiently reasonable to warrant further inquiry. It is not always necessary to strictly adhere to technical grammatical rules in interpreting statutory provisions.
Petitioners argue that because the Court of Appeals did not acknowledge ambiguity, it did not interpret the statute in accord with cases requiring courts to construe ambiguous statutes “ ‘in the manner that best fulfills the legislative purpose and intent.’ ”
Since the WLAD does not define “fraternal organizations” and “clubs,” the words may be given their ordinary meaning by reference to a standard dictionary.
Application of the ordinary meaning of the words “club” and “fraternity” to RCW 49.60.040(10), however, nevertheless still leaves a strained result. It does not seem logical
In ascertaining legislative intent, this court resorts to legislative history, statutory construction, and relevant case law.
Legislative History
After Washington was admitted to statehood, the legislature in 1889 enacted the State’s first antidiscrimination law, a civil rights act, which granted to all persons “ ‘full and equal enjoyment of the public accommodations . . . applicable alike to all citizens of whatever race, color or nationality.’ ”
In 1949, the legislature enacted the WLAD to prevent and eliminate discrimination based on race, creed, color, or national origin in employment.
The legislature in 1957 passed House Bill 25, which rewrote the Act’s definition section to include the language that “nothing herein contained shall be construed to include or apply to any institute, bona fide club, or place of accommodation, which is by its nature distinctly private, including fraternal organizations, though where public use is permitted that use shall be covered by this act.”
Since its enactment, over the next five decades the scope of the Act has expanded to its current broad remedial form. The Act was amended in 1957 to provide any person the right to pursue any action or remedy for a violation of that person’s civil rights.
Legislative Purpose
The legislative purpose of the WLAD is codified in RCW 49.60.010 which provides:
This chapter shall be known as the “law against discrimination.” It is an exercise of the police power of the state for the protection of the public welfare, health, and peace of the people of this state, and in fulfillment of the provisions of the Constitution of this state concerning civil rights. The legislature hereby finds and declares that practices of discrimination against any of its inhabitants because of race, creed, color, national origin, families with children, sex, marital status, age, or the presence of any sensory, mental, or physical disability . . . are a matter of state concern, that such discrimination threatens not only the rights and proper privileges of its inhabitants but menaces the institutions and foundation of a free democratic state. A state agency is herein created with powers with respect to elimination and prevention of discrimination in employment, in credit and insurance transactions, in places of public resort, accommodation, or amusement, and in real property transactions because of race, creed, color, national origin, families with children, sex, marital status, age, or the presence of any sensory, mental, or physical disability ....
This court has held that the purpose of the WLAD—to deter and eradicate discrimination in Washington
The WLAD requires liberal construction of its provisions in order to accomplish the purposes of the law and states that nothing contained in the law shall “be construed to deny the right to any person to institute any action or pursue any civil or criminal remedy based upon an alleged violation of his or her civil rights.”
Other Jurisdictions
Other states have enacted legislation similar to the WLAD.
Courts in other jurisdictions consider “fraternal organizations” within the definitional scope of “bona fide clubs” which are exempt under state and federal antidiscrimination laws if determined to be distinctly private in nature.
Respondents contend decisions requiring clubs to admit women when the clubs’ business activities are prevalent are not relevant because the special exemption of fraternal organizations is not inconsistent with our state’s goal of preventing discrimination in access to business and professional, instead of merely social, opportunities. This contention, however, is based upon an incorrect assumption that our legislature has determined fraternal organizations to be private social entities when they are not engaged in any major business activity.
Examining the business character of an organization to determine whether a state’s public accommodation statute applies is but one factor among several the courts consider
The California Court of Appeal in Board of Directors of Rotary International concluded that Rotary satisfied the definition of a business establishment because of its “businesslike attributes,” which included its large staff, extensive publishing activities, and complex structure which encouraged recruitment of professionals and businessmen to generate commercial benefits among members.
Within this context, the Supreme Court in Roberts v. United States Jay cees announced a list of factors to serve as a framework for distinguishing “private organizations” from “public accommodations.” The factors include size, purpose, policies, selectivity, congeniality, and other characteristics pertinent to the particular case.
Like other states’ public accommodation laws, the WLAD reaches the membership policies of organizations.
Other jurisdictions, while observing the “public business facility” standard, emphasize the “open invitation” stan
Determining the Private or Public Nature of an Organization
Our case law has not identified what constitutes a “distinctly private” club. We have looked to federal cases to determine what makes a club “private” for purposes of enforcing state antidiscrimination laws.
The United States Supreme Court cases of Roberts and Rotary Club of Duarte illustrate application of the factors to cases in which the membership policies of the organizations
Similarly, in Rotary Club of Duarte the Supreme Court concluded that Rotary membership practices lacked the selectiveness necessary to claim constitutional protection as an organization based upon a private, intimate relationship.
In this case, in reaching its conclusion that the exemption under the WLAD was unambiguous and automatically exempted fraternal organizations, the Court of Appeals examined the nature of the Eagles organization.
Because this appeal arises from a trial court order granting summary judgment, this court reviews the order of summary judgment de novo, engaging in the same inquiry as the trial court, which is to consider all facts submitted in the record and reasonable inferences in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party.
In considering the purpose and selectivity of the Eagles, the trial court focused its examination on Respondents’ actual practices by reviewing their literature to gain insight into membership programs and goals. The literature indicated that the Eagles supports and undertakes benevolent social causes and projects, and asks for membership participation in these service projects to better serve others and make their communities and countries better. The new member welcoming brochure concludes with the
The record indicates that the Eagles is a complex structure with distinct departments charged with particular responsibilities. The membership department has created recruitment and incentive programs to increase membership rolls.
The record reveals facts suggesting the Eagles’ membership practices are selective. In order to become a member, the candidate must be proposed for membership by two current members in good standing.
In a declaration by one of its officers, the Eagles claims it does not advertise or solicit membership at public functions.
Interpreting RCW 49.60.040(10) to unconditionally exempt groups merely designating themselves as “fraternal organizations” undermines the purpose of the WLAD to prevent and eliminate discrimination in all public settings. The WLAD should be interpreted in a manner consistent with legislative intent. Legislative intent is initially discerned from the purpose section which broadly proscribes discrimination in settings open to the public.
On the entire record before us, we conclude the conclusions reached by the trial court on the summary judgment motions were not in error.
Attorney Fees
Petitioners ask for reasonable attorney fees incurred in this appeal pursuant to RAP 18.1 and RCW 49.60.030(2). We conclude they are entitled to reasonable attorney fees, the amount to be determined by the Supreme Court Clerk.
The Washington Law Against Discrimination (WLAD), chapter 49.60 RCW, requires a “fraternal organization” to be “distinctly private” in order to qualify for exemption under RCW 49.60.040(10).
Because this appeal arises from a trial court order granting summary judgment, this court reviews the order of summary judgment de novo, engaging in the same inquiry as the trial court, which is to consider all facts submitted in the record and reasonable inferences in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Summary judgment is appropriate if there remains no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Petitioners and Respondents agree there remains no genuine issue of material fact following the orders on summary judgment granted by the trial court.
Interpreting RCW 49.60.040(10) to unconditionally exempt groups merely identifying themselves as “fraternal organizations” undermines the purpose of the WLAD to prevent and eliminate discrimination in all public settings. It is consistent with legislative intent to interpret the statute to exclude distinctly private organizations from the purview of the WLAD.
Neither this court nor the legislature has defined what constitutes a “distinctly private” club. However, the United States Supreme Court in Roberts v. United States Jaycees has announced a list of factors which courts may use in determining the status of an organization: (1) size, (2) purpose, (3) policies, (4) selectivity, (5) public services offered, (6) practices, and (7) other characteristics pertinent to a particular case. These factors were relevant considerations in this case.
We conclude from the record in this case that the trial court properly granted summary judgment after concluding there remained no issue of material fact on the question whether the Fraternal Order of Eagles is a distinctly private organization and that Respondent Eagles is not
Johnson, Ireland, Bridge, and Owens, JJ., and Webster, J. Pro Tern., concur.
Clerk’s Papers at 866. The Fraternal Order of Eagles was founded on February 6, 1898, in Seattle, originally as the Order of Good Things, later changing to its current name.
Id. at 786.
Id. at 644.
Id. at 596.
Id. at 597, 866.
Id. at 636.
Id. at 748.
Id. at 669.
Id. at 597.
Id. at 638.
Id. at 935-36.
Id. at 598.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 747.
Id. at 866.
Id. at 598, 647.
Id. at 598.
Id. at 153-54.
Id. at 152.
Id. at 819. Opinion Number 750 reads in pertinent part:
Our review of relevant civil cases, involving not only the Fraternal Order of Eagles, but other private organizations confirms that the Courts have consistently upheld legislation designed to prevent discriminatory membership policies in private clubs when such policies are based solely on gender. Given these interpretations, our fraternal laws must then yield to prevailing civil law.
It is the opinion of the Grand Tribunal that the use of the word ‘male’ appearing at Section 70.2 of the Statutes is not consistent with prevailing civil law. This prevailing civil law takes precedent over our laws on this subject. The Grand Aerie will impose no restrictions upon membership in the Local Aerie, on the basis of gender. To the extent that prior Opinions 698, 698-A and 700 are inconsistent herewdth, they are expressly overruled.
Id. at 639.
Id. at 821-22.
Id. at 825.
Id. at 823.
Id. at 569-79, 1016-23.
Id. at 569-79, 1016.
Id. at 580-94.
RCW 49.60.040(10).
Pet. for Review at App. C.
Id.
Id. at 71-74.
Br. of Appellants at 2.
Fraternal Order of Eagles, Tenino Aerie No. 564 v. Grand Aerie, Fraternal Order of Eagles, 108 Wn. App. 208, 215, 27 P.3d 1254 (2001).
Id.; RCW 49.60.040(10).
Marquis v. City of Spokane, 130 Wn.2d 97, 108, 922 P.2d 43 (1996); RCW 49.60.010.
RCW 49.60.030.
See RCW 49.60.030(1).
RCW 49.60.120(3); see Phillips v. City of Seattle, 111 Wn.2d 903, 908, 766 P.2d 1099 (1989); RCW 49.60.050, ,051-.120(3).
RCW 49.60.120(4).
RCW 49.60.040(10).
Id. (emphasis added).
Br. of Appellants at 12-14 (quoting Marquis, 130 Wn.2d at 108).
Id. at 12-16.
Br. of Resp’ts at 17-24.
Id. at 18-20.
State v. Keller, 143 Wn.2d 267, 276, 19 P.3d 1030 (2001); Rettkowski v. Dep’t of Ecology, 128 Wn.2d 508, 514-15, 910 P.2d 462 (1996).
State v. Sullivan, 143 Wn.2d 162, 174-75, 19 P.3d 1012 (2001); State v. Chester, 133 Wn.2d 15, 21, 940 P.2d 1374 (1997).
Keller, 143 Wn.2d at 276.
Sullivan, 143 Wn.2d at 174-75.
State v. McDougal, 120 Wn.2d 334, 350, 841 P.2d 1232 (1992).
State v. Day, 96 Wn.2d 646, 648, 638 P.2d 546 (1981).
Keller, 143 Wn.2d at 276.
Id.
Id. at 277 (quoting W. Telepage, Inc. v. Tacoma Dep’t of Fin., 140 Wn.2d 599, 608, 988 P.2d 884 (2000)).
Fraternal Order of Eagles, Tenino Aerie No. 564, 108 Wn. App. at 214-16 (citing Caughey v. Employment Sec. Dep’t, 81 Wn.2d 597, 602, 503 P.2d 460 (1972)).
In re Habeas Corpus of Andy, 49 Wn.2d 449, 302 P.2d 963 (1956); see, e.g., Caughey, 81 Wn.2d at 602 (“[W]here no contrary intention appears in a statute, relative and qualifying words and phrases refer to the last antecedent.”).
Fraternal Order of Eagles, Tenino Aerie No. 564, 108 Wn. App. at 216.
Id. at 215.
Resp’ts’ Mot. for Recons, at 7.
Id. at 7 (citing Brian A. Garner, A Dictionary of Modern American Usage 648 (1998)).
Id. at 8.
Id. at 7.
Br. of Resp’ts at 21-22.
id.
Duke v. Johnson, 123 Wash. 43, 49, 211 P. 710 (1923).
Keller, 143 Wn.2d at 276.
State ex rel. Royal v. Bd. of Yakima County Comm’rs, 123 Wn.2d 451, 459, 869 P.2d 56 (1994) (quoting In re Marriage of Kovacs, 121 Wn.2d 795, 804, 854 P.2d 629 (1993)).
Cockle v. Dep’t of Labor & Indus., 142 Wn.2d 801, 808, 16 P.3d 583 (2001).
Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 430, 903 (3d ed. 1993) defines “club” as “an association of persons for social and recreational purposes or for the promotion of some common object.. . .” “Fraternal” is defined as “of, relating to, or being a fraternity .. ..” “Fraternity is defined as “a group of people associated or formally organized for a common purpose, interest, or pleasure: as .. . [a] fraternal order ....”
Resp’ts’ Mot. for Recons, at 22-23.
Platt Elec. Supply, Inc. v. City of Seattle, 16 Wn. App. 265, 277, 555 P.2d 421 (1976), review denied, 89 Wn.2d 1004 (1977).
Cockle, 142 Wn.2d at 808.
Powell v. Utz, 87 F. Supp. 811, 815 (E.D. Wash. 1949) (quoting Laws op 1889-90, ch. 16).
Id.
Id,.', see also Browning v. Slenderella Sys. of Seattle, 54 Wn.2d 440, 445-46, 341 P.2d 859 (1959) (holding a beauty salon’s discrimination of an African American because of her race violated the public accommodation laws; also noting that in reenacting the 1909 public accommodation act, the legislature added an additional subsection expanding the meaning of “public accommodation” to remove judicial limitations placed on the act in this court’s decisions in Goff v. Savage, 122 Wash. 194, 210 P. 374 (1922) (holding that a soda fountain in a drugstore was not a place of public accommodation)); and Finnesey v. Seattle Baseball Club, Inc., 122 Wash. 276, 210 P. 679 (1922) (holding a baseball park was not a place of public accommodation)).
Browning, 54 Wn.2d at 445-46.
See RCW 9.91.010(l)(d); RCW 49.60.040(10).
Browning, 54 Wn.2d at 446.
Marquis, 130 Wn.2d at 105-06.
See Laws of 1949, ch. 183, § 12.
The Washington. State Board Against Discrimination was renamed the Washington State Human Rights Commission in 1971. ROW 49.60.051.
See Laws of 1949, ch. 183, §§ 1, 4.
See Washington Law Against Discrimination, Laws of 1957, ch. 37, § 4; H.B. 25,35th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 1957). On February 7,1957, in the second reading of the H.B. 25, the Judiciary Committee recommended that the Bill pass with the following amendment: “In section 15, page 9, lines 26 and 27 of the original bill... after the word ‘religious’ and before the word ‘sectarian’ strike the word ‘or’ and insert in lieu thereof a comma (,); and after the word ‘institution’ and before the word ‘from’ insert the following: ‘, or fraternal organizations.’ ”
H.B. 25, 35th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 1957). See RCW 49.60.040(10).
See Washington’s Law Against Discrimination, Laws of 1957, ch. 37, § 2.
In re Johnson, 71 Wn.2d 245, 427 P.2d 968 (1967).
See Human Rights Comm’n v. Cheney Sch. Dist. No. 30, 97 Wn.2d 118, 126-28, 641 P.2d 163 (1982).
See RCW 49.60.175, .176, .178, .222.
Marquis, 130 Wn.2d at 109 (citing Mackay v. Acorn Custom Cabinetry, Inc., 127 Wn.2d 302, 309-10, 898 P.2d 284 (1995); Burnside v. Simpson Paper Co., 123 Wn.2d 93, 99, 864 P.2d 937 (1994)).
Id. (citing Allison v. Hous. Auth., 118 Wn.2d 79, 86, 821 P.2d 34 (1991)).
Mackay, 127 Wn.2d at 310.
Marquis, 130 Wn.2d at 105-06.
Laws of 1973, ch. 141, § 1.
ROW 49.60.020.
Phillips v. City of Seattle, 111 Wn.2d 903, 908, 766 P.2d 1099 (1989).
See Ob. Rev. Stat. § 659A.403 (2001); Minn. Stat. ch. 363.01 (excluding fraternal corporations if religious in nature); Md. Code Ann. art. 49B § 5 (2001).
United States v. Trs. of Fraternal Order of Eagles, Milwaukee Aerie No. 137, 472 F. Supp. 1174 (E.D. Wis. 1979) (denying summary judgment motion on the basis that a factual issue existed as to whether the Fraternal Order of Eagles is a private club and therefore exempt from the Civil Rights Act of 1964 which excluded “a private club or other establishment not in fact open to the public.”);
U.S. Jaycees v. McClure, 305 N.W.2d 764 (Minn. 1981) (concluding the Jaycees organization was a public business); Rogers v. Int’l Ass’n of Lions Clubs, 636 F. Supp. 1476, 1478-79 (E.D. Mich. 1986).
McClure, 305 N.W.2d at 770 (citing Nesmith v. Young Men’s Christian Ass’n of Raleigh, N.C., 397 F.2d 96 (4th Cir. 1968); Cornelius v. Benevolent Protective Order of Elks, 382 F. Supp. 1182 (D. Conn. 1974); Wright v. Cork Club, 315 F. Supp. 1143 (S.D. Tex. 1970)).
McClure, 305 N.W.2d at 769-70; Rotary Club of Duarte v. Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary Int'l, 178 Cal. App. 3d 1035, 224 Cal. Rptr. 213 (1986).
Id.
Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537, 546, 107 S. Ct. 1940, 95 L. Ed. 2d 474 (1987); Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 620, 104 S. Ct. 3244, 82 L. Ed. 2d 462 (1984); Rogers, 636 F. Supp. at 1479; Trs. of Fraternal Order of Eagles, Milwaukee Aerie No. 137, 472 F. Supp. at 1175-76.
See U.S. Jaycees v. McClure, 305 N.W.2d 764 (Minn. 1981); Rotary Club of Duarte v. Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary Int’l, 178 Cal. App. 3d 1035, 224 Cal. Rptr. 213 (1986), aff’d, 481 U.S. 537 (1987).
Bd. of Dirs. Rotary Club Int’l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537, 542-43, 107 S. Ct. 1940, 95 L. Ed. 2d 474 (1987) .
Id. at 543.
McClure, 305 N.W.2d at 772.
Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 104 S. Ct. 3244, 82 L. Ed. 2d 462 (1984); Bd. of Dirs. Rotary Club Int’l, 481 U.S. 537.
Roberts, 468 U.S. at 620.
Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537; Roberts, 468 U.S. at 612; Rogers, 636 F. Supp. at 1478; Trs. of Fraternal Order of Eagles, Milwaukee Aerie No. 137, 472 F. Supp. at 1175-76.
See, e.g., Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537; Roberts, 468 U.S. at 616; Rogers, 636 F. Supp. at 1478-79; Trs. of Fraternal Order of Eagles, Milwaukee Aerie No. 137, 472 F. Supp. at 1175-76; Lahmann, 180 Or. App. at 422.
McClure, 305 N.W.2d at 767.
La. Debating & Literary Ass’n v. City of New Orleans, 42 F.3d 1483, 1494-95 (1995).
Kiwanis Int’l v. Ridgewood Kiwanis Club, 806 F.2d 468, 473-74 (3d Cir. 1986).
Dezell v. Day Island Yacht Club, 796 F.2d 324, 329 (9th Cir. 1986).
Roberts, 468 U.S. at 620.
Id.; Rogers, 636 F. Supp. at 1479 (citing Kiwanis Int’l v. Ridgewood Kiwanis Club, 627 F. Supp. 1381, 1388 (D.N.J. 1986)).
Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537; Roberts, 468 U.S. at 614.
Roberts, 468 U.S. at 621.
Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. at 546.
Id. at 546-47 (quoting 2 Rotary Basic Library, Club Service 9-11 (1981)).
Fraternal Order of Eagles, Tenino Aerie No. 564, 108 Wn. App. at 217.
Id.. The Court of Appeals did note that the WLAD applied to the organization when it acts like a public accommodation (e.g., holding public dances or renting facilities for events).
Enter. Leasing, Inc. v. City of Tacoma, 139 Wn.2d 546, 551, 988 P.2d 961 (1999); Wilson v. Steinbach, 98 Wn.2d 434, 437, 656 P.2d 1030 (1982).
Stokes v. Polley, 145 Wn.2d 341, 346, 37 P.3d 1211 (2001); CR 56.
cc c^ mateiial fact is one upon which the outcome of the litigation depends in whole or in part.’ ” Samis Land Co. v. City of Soap Lake, 143 Wn.2d 798, 803, 23 P.3d 477 (2001) (quoting Atherton Condo. Apartment-Owners Ass’n Bd. of Dirs. v. Blume Dev. Co., 115 Wn.2d. 506, 516, 799 P.2d 250 (1990)). The “distinctly private” factors serve as material facts because the outcome of the case relies on proving the factors favor one conclusion over the other.
See Clerk’s Papers at 759, 802-12.
Id. at 597, 928.
Id. at 928.
Id. at 596.
RCW 49.60.010.
See RCW 49.60.020, .040(10).
RAP 18.1(j).
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