In re Paternity of M.H.

This opinion was filed for record
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SUSAN L. CARLSON
SUPREME COURT CLERK
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
In the Matter of the Paternity ofM.H. )
) No. 92620-4
STEPHANIE BELL, )
)
Petitioner, )
) EnBanc
v. )
)
JUAN SID RAN HEFLIN, )
)
Respondent. ) Filed: NOV i 0 2fi1~
)
MADSEN, C.J.~The Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (UIFSA) governs
how Washington courts are to enforce child support orders issued by courts in other
states. In this case, we must clarify under which ofUIFSA's choice of law rules our
state's nonclaim statutes fall. Relying on the comments to the model UIFSA and other
states' interpretations ofUIFSA, we hold that under UIFSA's choice oflaw provision, a
statute authorizing wage withholding is a "remedy," whereas a nonclaim statute is a
"statute of limitation." After comparing the two statutes of limitations applicable in this
case, the 20-year Indiana statute oflimitation controls because it is longer. Therefore, the
trial court had the authority to enter the wage withholding order, and we reverse and
No. 92620-4
remand this case for entry of judgment in Stephanie Bell's favor. Bell is awarded
attorney fees and costs at trial and on appeal.
FACTS
Stephanie Bell and Juan Sidran Heflin are the parents ofM.H. (born May 13,
1985). In 1994, Bell established paternity and obtained an order of child support from
the Vigo Circuit Court in Indiana. The order mandated that Heflin pay $77 per week in
child support, as well as $539 of back support. Bell and M.H. lived in Indiana at that
time, but Heflin lived in Washington. On September 9, 2010, Bell registered the Indiana
support order in King County, Washington for enforcement only. After various hearings,
the King County Superior Court confirmed the Indiana support order, in the sum of
$110,709.23, as a registered foreign child support obligation on February 24, 2011. 1
Clerk's Papers (CP) at 12-13. The parties then entered into a settlement agreement on
December 7, 2011 where Heflin agreed to pay a sum of$120,000 in monthly payments of
$2,000. After Heflin failed to abide by the terms of the settlement agreement, Bell filed
the motion for wage withholding in King County Superior Court that is the subject of this
appeal. After finding that Indiana law applied, the superior court issued the wage
withholding order. CP at 66-69.
The Court of Appeals, Division One, reversed the wage withholding order in an
unpublished opinion. In re Paternity of MH., No. 72527-1-I (Wash. Ct. App. Sept. 28,
2015) (unpublished), http://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/pdf/72527l.pdf. The Court of
1
The order is dated February 23, 2011, but the superior court clerk filed the order on
February 24, 2011.
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No. 92620-4
Appeals applied RCW 4.56.210(2), which states, "An underlying judgment or judgment
lien ... for accrued child support shall continue in force for ten years after the eighteenth
birthday of the youngest child." 2 Ultimately, the court found that RCW 4.56.210(2) fell
under the "procedures and remedies" section of the UIFSA choice of law statute, RCW
26.21A.515(3). Therefore, the law of Washington applied and the trial court lacked the
authority to issue the wage withholding order because the time period in RCW
4.56.210(2) had passed and the judgment had thus expired. MH., slip op. at 6.
Bell petitioned this court for review. The Washington State Department of Social
and Health Services filed an amicus brief in support of Bell.
ANALYSIS
The issues here present questions under UIFSA, RCW 26.21A.515. Statutory
construction is a question oflaw that this court reviews de novo. State v. Ammons, 136
Wash. 2d 453, 456,963 P.2d 812 (1996).
Our court has not had many opportunities to interpret UIFSA, which governs how
Washington courts enforce child support orders issued by courts in other states. We did
recount a brief history ofUIFSA in In reMarriage of Schneider, 173 Wash. 2d 353, 358-59,
268 P.3d 215 (2011). Prior to UIFSA, parties could have competing child support orders
in different states, parents could avoid obligations by moving to states with more
favorable laws, and the resulting litigation caused the system to be in a state of general
"'chaos."' !d. at 358 (quoting UIFSA (2008), 9 pt. 1B U.L.A. § 611 cmt. at 139-40
2
The Court of Appeals also discussed RCW 6.17 .020(2), which sets out a similar limitation of
10 years after the 18th birthday of the youngest child. Our cases that discuss these nonclaim
statutes typically discuss both. This opinion refers only to RCW 4.56.210(2) for simplicity.
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No. 92620-4
(Supp. 2011)). UIFSA established a '"one-order'" system where one state would have
continuing, exclusive jurisdiction over a support order to help alleviate this chaos. I d. at
358-59 (quoting 9 pt. lB U.L.A. § 611 cmt. at 139-40 (Supp. 2011)). To maintain this
system, UIFSA includes various provisions relating to modifying and enforcing support
orders from other states. Id. at 359.
The first issue in this case is which provision of the UIFSA choice of law statute
applies. That statute states:
(1) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (4) of this section, the law
of the issuing state or foreign country governs:
(a) The nature, extent, amount, and duration of current payments
under a registered support order;
(b) The computation and payment of arrearages and accmal of
interest on the arrearages under the support order; and
(c) The existence and satisfaction of other obligations under the
support order.
(2) In a proceeding for arrears under a registered support order, the
statute oflimitation of this state or of the issuing state or foreign country,
whichever is longer, applies.
(3) A responding tribunal of this state shall apply the procedures and
remedies of this state to enforce current support and collect arrears and
interest due on a support order of another state or foreign country registered
in this state.
(4) After a tribunal of this or another state determines which is the
controlling order and issues an order consolidating arrears, if any, a tribunal
of this state shall prospectively apply the law of the state or foreign country
issuing the controlling order, including its law on interest on arrears, on
current and future support, and on consolidated arrears.
RCW 26.21A.515.
Heflin argues that RCW 4.56.21 0(2)-the nonclaim statute applied by the Court of
Appeals-is a "remedy" under RCW 26.21A.515(3), thus Washington law should apply
to bar the claim because the time for enforcement has expired. But RCW 4.56.21 0(2)
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No. 92620-4
does not fit well within the remedy section. UIFSA does not define "remedies," but the
comment to the model act refers to mechanisms such as "license suspension or revocation
statutes" as examples of remedies. UIFSA (2008), 9 pt. lB U.L.A. § 604(b) cmt. at 197
(Supp. 20 16). Based on that comment, the wage withholding mechanism used in this
case, for example, would be a "remedy" under RCW 26.21A.515(3). See RCW
26.18.070. The text of the chapter authorizing such wage withholding orders supports
this view. In enacting the wage withholding remedy, the legislature found that there was
an urgent need for vigorous enforcement of child support and that "more efficient
statutory remedies need[ ed] to be established to supplement and complement the
remedies provided in chapters 26.09, 26.21A, 26.26, 74.20, and 74.20A RCW." RCW
26.18.010 (emphasis added). 3 The legislature also mandated that the "remedies provided
in [the child support enforcement] chapter" be "liberally construed to assure that all
dependent children are adequately supported." RCW 26.18.030(1), (3) (emphasis added).
RCW 4.56.210(2), on the other hand, does not provide a procedural mechanism to
enforce a child support order. Rather, it provides a durationallimit on the general
enforcement of an underlying judgment for child support. This distinction has been made
by a court in at least one other state. In that case, the North Carolina Court of Appeals
held that "remedy" under a different provision ofUIFSA refers to the "procedural means
of enforcing support orders," rather than the enforcement itself. State ex ref. George, 120
N.C. App. 552, 558, 503 S.E.2d 686 (1998). Further, the Bray court discusses a North
3
Notably absent from the legislature's enumerated list of child support enforcement remedies are
RCW 4.56.210(2) and RCW 6.!7.020(2).
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No. 92620-4
Carolina durationallimit statnte for child support actions that is identical to RCW
4.56.21 0(2). Interestingly, the Bray court does not discuss the time limit in relation to
"remedies" under UIFSA; rather, the court discusses the time limit only in its section on
the applicable statnte of limitation under UIFSA. This supports finding that
Washington's identical statnte is not a "remedy" and is therefore not governed by the
remedies section of the UIFSA choice of law provision.
The other option, which Bell and amicus advocate for, is that RCW 4.56.210(2) is
a "statnte of limitation" under RCW 26.21A.515(2). 4 Heflin argues that RCW 4.56.210
and RCW 6.17.020 are not statntes of limitation. This is generally a correct statement of
Washington case law. Hazel v. VanBeek, 135 Wash. 2d 45, 60-61, 954 P.2d 1301 (1998)
(describing RCW 6.17.020(1) as a jurisdictional time limit rather than a normal statnte of
limitations); Grub v. Fogle's Garage, Inc., 5 Wash. App. 840, 842, 491 P.2d 258 (1971)
(stating RCW 4.56.210(1) is a statute creating a lien right for a definite length of time
only, and not a statnte of limitation, '"because it does not exist outside of the period
during which it is conferred'" (quoting Hutton v. State, 25 Wash. 2d 402, 407, 171 P.2d 248
( 1946))). This court explained the distinction between the jurisdictional time bar found in
nonclaim statntes like RCW 4.56.210 and statntes of limitation in Hutton. "A statnte
creating a lien right for a definite length of time only, is something that is in addition to
the cause of action or substantive right in question and is not a statute of limitations,
4
RCW 26.21A.515(2) provides, "In a proceeding for arrears under a registered support order, the
statute of limitation of this state or of the issuing state or foreign county, whichever is longer,
applies." The Court of Appeals did not have the opportunity to address the applicability of this
section because the parties failed to argue that it should apply.
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No. 92620-4
because it does not exist outside of the period during which it is conferred." I d. at 407
(emphasis added).
No Washington case, however, analyzes whether these nonclaim statutes are
"statutes oflimitation" for purposes of the UIFSA choice oflaw provision. But several
cases from other states have faced this issue when applying their versions ofUIFSA.
These cases suggest that despite the Washington case law disavowing the "statute of
limitation" label for RCW 4.56.210 generally, this court should treat the section
regarding child support orders as a statute of limitation for UIFSA choice of law. RCW
26.21A.905 emphasizes that in applying and construing UIFSA, "consideration must be
given to the need to promote uniformity of the law with respect to its subject matter
among states that enact it." See also Schneider, 173 Wash. 2d at 369 ("Because this is a
matter of first impression in Washington of interpreting a uniform law adopted by all 50
states, we may consider how these other states have addressed the issue. RCW
26.21A.905.").
In Martin v. Phillips, the Kansas Court of Appeals discussed this choice oflaw
issue as between the applicable Kansas statute and the same Washington statute at issue
here. 51 Kan. App. 2d 393, 347 P.3d 1033 (2015). The court explained the related
concepts of a "statute of limitation" and a "dormant judgment." I d. at 398. In that case,
the defendant did not challenge that the statute of limitation provision in UIFSA applied,
and the court stated, "That makes sense-neither a dormant judgment nor a claim barred
by a statute of limitations may be collected. In addition, quite literally, a dormancy
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No. 92620-4
statute is a statute of limitations: it limits by statute one's ability to collect on a
judgment." !d. at 399. Under UIFSA, the Kansas dormancy statute applied, rather than
RCW 4.56.210(2), because arrearages were always collectible under Kansas law (at that
time-the law was subsequently amended), as compared to the 10 years after the 18th
birthday limit set forth in RCW 4.56.210. !d. at 397-98.
Cases from other states are in accord. Hale v. Hale, 33 Kan. App. 2d 769, 771,
108 P.3d 1012 (2005) (stating that the specific UIFSA statute of limitation provision
controls over general statutes relating to the duration of an enforceable judgment;
comparing Kansas dormancy statute with Oklahoma statute providing that child support
judgments never become dormant to determine which applied under UIFSA's choice of
law statute); In re B.C., 52 S.W.3d 926, 929 (Tex. App. 2001) (a dormancy, jurisdiction-
type statute for enforcing arrearages is a statute of limitation for UIFSA purposes, even
where other cases specify that it is not a statute of limitation for other purposes); In re
Marriage ofMorris, 32 P.3d 625, 626-27 (Colo. App. 2001) (a jurisdiction time limit
statute "functions as a statute of limitations" for UIFSA choice of Jaw).
Based on these cases and the general policy rationale underlying UIFSA, we hold
that RCW 4.56.210(2) is a "statute of limitation" for UIFSA choice oflaw purposes,
despite the fact that it is not a statute of limitation for other purposes and not a "remedy"
under RCW 26.21A.515(3).
Because we hold that RCW 4.56.210(2) is a statute oflimitation for UIFSA choice
of law purposes, we must compare its time period with the statute of limitation in
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No. 92620-4
Indiana, the issuing state, to determine which is longer. See RCW 26.21A.515(2). The
parties dispute the correct statute of limitation for this action in Indiana. Indiana has a
statute similar to RCW 4.56.21 0(2) that states, "An action to enforce a child support
obligation must be commenced not later than ten (1 0) years after: (1) the eighteenth
birthday of the child; or (2) the emancipation of the child; whichever occurs first." IND.
CODE§ 34-11-2-10. But Indiana also has a statute that states, "Every judgment and
decree of any court ... shall be considered satisfied after the expiration of twenty (20)
years." IND. CODE§ 34-11-2-12. 5 And both of these statutes come into play in support
orders.
The Court of Appeals ofindiana has explained that the 10-year statute (Indiana
Code§ 34-11-2-10) applies to claims to enforce a child support obligation. Wilson v.
Steward, 937 N.E.2d 826, 829 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010). But once there has been a judgment,
the 20-year statute (Indiana Code § 34-11-2-12) applies. !d. In Wilson, the mother had a
1989 judgment holding the father in contempt for nonpayment of child support and
ordering him to pay the child support arrearage. That 1989 judgment was what the
mother was attempting to enforce; therefore the 20-year statute applied. Id. In the
present case, Bell is not seeking to enforce a child support obligation. Rather, Bell is
seeking to enforce the February 24, 2011 order that mandated Heflin pay $110,709.23 of
5
It is worth noting that this Indiana statute is another example of a statute that the Indiana state
courts have interpreted as a "statute oflimitation" for UIFSA choice oflaw purposes, despite
holding in other sih~ations that the provision is not a statute of limitations (it is rule of evidence
providing a rebuttable presumption of a valid judgment). See Wilson v. Steward, 937 N.E.2d
826, 830 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010).
9
No. 92620-4
unpaid child support obligations (aka arrearages). Therefore, under the law oflndiana,
the 20-year statute applies.
Under the Washington statute, Bell's period for enforcing the arrears judgment
would have expired 10 years after M.H.'s 18th birthday. M.H. was born May 13, 1985.
Her 18th birthday was thus May 13, 2003. Under RCW 4.56.210(2), the judgment would
not be enforceable after May 13, 2013. But under the Indiana statute, Bell's judgment
remains enforceable for at least 20 years. The judgment for arrearages that Bell seeks to
enforce is from February 24,2011. Under Indiana Code§ 34-11-2-12, this judgment
would be enforceable until at least February 24, 2031. Because the Indiana statute of
limitation is longer than the Washington statute of limitation, RCW 26.21A.515(2)
mandates that Washington courts apply the Indiana law. The trial court thus properly
applied the Indiana law and had the authority to issue the wage withholding order to
satisfy the judgment for child support arrears.
The policy behind UIFSA supports our holding. UIFSA sought to avoid allowing
parents to forum-shop based on which states could limit their liability under existing
support orders. The comment to the model act explains the rationale behind the statute of
limitation provision is that "the obligor should not gain an undue benefit from his or her
choice of residence if the forum state ... has a shorter statute of limitations for
arrearages." UIFSA (2008), 9 pt. 1B U.L.A. § 604(b) cmt. at 197 (Supp. 2016). Amicus
persuasively argues that holding that a statute that limits the time for recovery of
arrearages, like RCW 4.56.210(2), is not a "statute of limitation" for UIFSA choice of
10
No. 92620-4
law purposes would prevent courts from applying RCW 26.21A.515 as it was intended to
be applied. If the directive to apply the longer limitation period does not apply to the
enforcement period under RCW 4.56.210(2), the directive is meaningless. Foreign
support orders registered in Washington would be unenforceable under RCW 4.56.210(2)
even if the statute of limitation for such enforcement had not yet expired in the issuing
state. By mandating the application of the longer statute of limitation period, UIFSA
suggests an intent to keep judgments for arrearages enforceable as long as possible to
give children the most support possible. Holding that RCW 4.56.210(2) is a statute of
limitation for UIFSA choice of law purposes is the most consistent with that intent.
Bell also asserts that applying the nonclaim statute violates the full faith and credit
clause of the constitution, U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 1, but the Court of Appeals rejected this
claim because Bell provided no meaningful legal argument. Because we resolve this case
on nonconstitutional grounds, 6 we do not address Bell's full faith and credit clause claim.
Bell requested attorney fees pursuant to RCW 26.18.160 in the Court of Appeals.
We treat such a request as a continuing request in this court. RAP 18.1(b). A prevailing
party is entitled to costs and attorney fees incurred at the trial level and on appeal. In re
Marriage of Capetillo, 85 Wash. App. 311, 320, 932 P.2d 691 (1997) (citing RCW
26.18.160; In reMarriage ofHunter, 52 Wn. App. 265,273,758 P.2d 1019 (1988)).
Because Bell is the prevailing party on appeal of the motion for wage assignment, RCW
6
"'It is well established that if a case can be decided on nonconstitutional grounds, an appellate
court should decline to consider the constitutional issues."' Tesoro Ref & Mktg. Co. v. Dep 't of
Revenue, 173 Wash. 2d 551, 559 n.3, 269 P.3d 1013 (2012) (quoting HJS Dev., Inc. v. Pierce
County, 148 Wn.2d 451,469 n.75, 61 P.3d 1141 (2003)).
11
No. 92620-4
26.18.070, she is entitled to recovery of costs, including an award for reasonable attorney
fees under RCW 26.18.160, provided she complies with RAP 18.1.
CONCLUSION
We reverse the Court of Appeals and hold (1) a "remedy" under UIFSA choice of
law, RCW 26.21A.515(3), is the statute authorizing wage withholding, RCW 26.18.070,
rather than the time for judgment statute, RCW 4.56.210(2); (2) RCW 4.56.210(2) is a
"statute of limitation" for UIFSA choice of law purposes; and (3) under RCW
26.21A.515(2), the 20-year Indiana statute of limitations controls because it is longer.
Therefore, the trial court had the authority to enter the wage withholding order. We
reverse and remand for entry of judgment in Bell's favor.
12
No. 92620-4
WE ONCUR:
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