State v. Mayfield

/FnTEv
^ IN CLimCt OFFICE X This opinion was filed for record
•UPMBC COURT,81ME OF WMKMOtON
at a.tM on
ri47E FEB 0 7 20191
GMIEFJUSTKE
SUSAN L. CARLSON
SUPREME cbURT CLERK
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
STATE OF WASHINGTON,
No. 95632-4
Respondent,
En Banc
JOHN DOUGLAS MAYFIBLD,
Petitioner. Filed: fEB 0 7 2019
YU,J.—This case concerns an exception to the federal exclusionary rule
known as the attenuation doctrine. The attenuation doctrine provides that evidence
obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution is
not subject to the exclusionary rule if"the connection between unconstitutional
police conduct and the evidence is remote or has been interrupted by some
intervening circumstance." Utah v. Strieff, 579 U.S. , 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2061,
195 L. Ed. 2d 400(2016). We are asked whether the attenuation doctrine is
compatible with article I, section 7 of the Washington State Constitution and our
state exclusionary rule.
State V. Mayfield, No. 95632-4
We have repeatedly held that our state exclusionary rule is considerably
broader than the federal exclusionary rule. Nevertheless, our exclusionary rule
does not automatically require suppression of all evidence that would not have
been discovered but for a prior violation of article I, section 7. Because our state
exclusionary rule does not operate on a strict "but for" causation basis, it is not
categorically incompatible with the attenuation doctrine. However, to comply with
the heightened protections of article I, section 7, the attenuation doctrine must be
narrow and apply only where intervening circumstances have genuinely severed
the causal connection between official misconduct and the discovery of evidence.
It is clear that there were no intervening circumstances sufficient to satisfy
the attenuation doctrine in this case as a matter of law. We therefore hold that
petitioner John Mayfield's motion to suppress must be granted, and we reverse and
remand to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On January 3, 2015, Derek Salte came home to find an unfamiliar truck
parked in his driveway, with a man (later identified as Mayfield) asleep in the
driver's seat. Salte told Mayfield to leave, threatening to call the police if he did
not. Mayfield started the truck's engine and tried to put it in reverse, but the truck
would not move. Eventually, Mayfield got out of the truck through the passenger
State V. Mayfield, No. 95632-4
door and ran away, leaving the door open with the engine and windshield wipers
still running. Salte called the police, and Deputy Andy Nunes responded.
Deputy Nunes turned off the truck's engine, placed the keys on the driver's
seat, and closed the passenger door. He "did not search for or observe anything
within the truck's passenger compartment." Clerk's Papers(CP)at 19. He then
determined that the truck was registered to Mayfield and had not been reported
stolen. Around this time. Deputy Nunes spotted Mayfield walking on the other
side of the street, and Salte identified him as the person who was in the truck.
Deputy Nunes believed that Mayfield was trying to walk past them without making
contact, which Deputy Nunes thought was odd behavior for the truck's apparent
owner. He therefore crossed the street to talk to Mayfield.
Mayfield initially said he was parked in Salte's driveway because he needed
to use the restroom in the church next door but later said he was there because he
was having vehicle problems. Mayfield explained that he ran away because he
was afraid that Salte was about to assault him. At the suppression hearing. Deputy
Nunes testified that he did not suspect Mayfield of committing any crime, of being
under the influence of alcohol or other drugs, or of being armed or dangerous.
Nevertheless, Deputy Nunes thought the situation seemed strange.
A second officer, Sergeant Corey Huffme, arrived to assist while Deputy
Nunes asked for Mayfield's identification and checked for outstanding warrants.
State V. Mayfield, No. 95632-4
No warrants were discovered, but Deputy Nunes learned that Mayfield "was a
convicted felon, was on active [Department of Corrections] supervision, and had
prior contacts in regards to controlled substances." Id.Deputy Nunes then asked Mayfield about recent drug use, which Mayfield
denied. Deputy Nunes asked for consent to conduct a pat-down search and told
Mayfield he could refuse. Mayfield consented, and Deputy Nunes found $464 in
cash, bundled in a way that made him suspect "the money was the result of drug
transactions." Id. Deputy Nunes then asked for consent to search the truck,
informing Mayfield he had the right to refuse and the right to limit or revoke his
consent. Mayfield consented. Deputy Nunes discovered methamphetamine in the
truck and arrested Mayfield.
Mayfield was charged with one count of possession of a controlled
substance with intent to deliver. He moved to suppress the money and the
methamphetamine, arguing that Deputy Nunes unlawfully seized him without
reasonable suspicion and that his consent to search was vitiated by the unlawful
detention. The State contended that the attenuation doctrine provided an exception
to the exclusionary rule in this case.
The trial court concluded that Mayfield was unlawfully seized "when
Deputy Nunes began asking questions about [his] drug use, whether he would have
anything illegal on his person, and when he sought permission to conduct a pat-
State V. Mayfield, No. 95632-4
down search." Id. at 20. However, the court denied the motion to suppress,
concluding that the evidence was attenuated from the unlawful seizure because
Deputy Nunes gave Ferrier" warnings before Mayfield consented to the search of
his truck. The court did not separately address the money discovered on
Mayfield's person, and the parties did not ask for clarification on that point. The
jury convicted Mayfield as charged.
On appeal, Mayfield argued that the attenuation doctrine is incompatible
with article I, section 7. In the alternative, he argued that Ferrier warnings alone
are insufficient to satisfy the attenuation doctrine. In a split opinion, the Court of
Appeals declined to reach Mayfield's state constitutional argument because he did
not conduct a GunwalP analysis. State v. Mayfield, No. 48800-1-II, slip op. at 5-7
(Wash. Ct. App. Jan. 4, 2018)(unpublished), http://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/
pdf/D2%2048800-l-II%20Unpublished%200pinion.pdf. The majority further
held that the federal attenuation doctrine was satisfied "[bjecause Ferrier warnings
were an intervening circumstance and there was not purposeful or flagrant police
'State V. Ferrier, 136 Wn.2d 103, 960 P.2d 927(1998). Ferrier applies "when police
officers conduct a knock and talk for the purpose of obtaining consent to search a home, and
thereby avoid the necessity of obtaining a warrant." M at 118. To obtain valid consent, police
must "inform the person from whom consent is sought that he or she may lawfully refuse to
consent to the search and that they can revoke, at any time, the consent that they give, and can
limit the scope of the consent to certain areas of the home." Id. Mayfield's case does not require
us to determine whether Ferrier warnings are required where police seek consent to search a car,
rather than a home, and we do not purport to do so.
^ State V. Gunwall, 106 Wn.2d 54, 720 P.2d 808 (1986).
State V. Mayfield, No. 95632-4
misconduct." Id. at 10. One judge dissented on the basis that "[a] Gunwall
analysis is not required every time article I, section 7 is applied in a new context."
Id. at 14(Bjorgen, C.J., dissenting). We granted Mayfield's petition for review.
ISSUES
A. Was Mayfield's argument that the attenuation doctrine is incompatible
with article I, section 7 sufficiently briefed on appeal?
B. If Mayfield's state constitutional argument was sufficiently briefed, is
the attenuation doctrine compatible with article I, section 7?
C. If the attenuation doctrine is compatible with article I, section 7, is it
satisfied in this case?
ANALYSIS
It is well established that article I, section 7 often provides broader
protections than the Fourth Amendment. As such, we reaffirm that no Gunwall
analysis is needed to justify an independent state law analysis of article I, section 7
in new contexts. Mayfield's appellate briefing was therefore sufficient, and his
argument that the attenuation doctrine is incompatible with our state exclusionary
rule should be considered on its merits.
Carefully and narrowly applied, the attenuation doctrine is not categorically
incompatible with article I, section 7. However, we hold as a matter of
independent state law that the attenuation doctrine can apply only where the State
State V. Mayfield, No. 95632-4
proves that the causal chain between official misconduct and the discovery of
evidence has been genuinely severed by intervening circumstances. That standard
is not satisfied here, so Mayfield's motion to suppress must be granted.
A. A Gunwall analysis is not required to justify an independent state law
analysis of article I, section 7 in new contexts
In Gunwall, we set forth six nonexclusive factors to guide the threshold
inquiry of'"whether, in a given situation, the Washington State Constitution
should be considered as extending broader rights to its citizens than the United
States Constitution.'" Blomstrom v. Tripp, 189 Wn.2d 379, 400, 402 P.3d 831(2017)(quoting Gunwall, 106 Wn.2d at 58). In this case, Mayfield's appellate
briefing did not include a threshold Gunwall analysis. We nevertheless hold that
Mayfield sufficiently briefed his state constitutional claim and that he is entitled to
have that claim considered on its merits.
We recognize that our cases have been somewhat unclear on the need to
conduct a threshold Gunwall analysis. We therefore take this opportunity to
reaffirm that no Gwwwa//analysis is required to justify an independent state
constitutional analysis of article I, section 7 in new contexts.^ Courts and parties
^ We confine our holding to article I, section 7 and do not reach the broader question of
whether a Gunwall analysis is needed to justify an independent state constitutional analysis of
other provisions of the Washington State Constitution.
State V. Mayfield, No. 95632-4
may assume an independent state analysis is justified and move directly to the
merits of the article I, section 7 claim presented.
"It is well established that article I, section 7 qualitatively differs from the
Fourth Amendment and in some areas provides greater protections than does the
federal constitution." State v. Chenoweth, 160 Wn.2d 454, 462, 158 P.3d 595(2007)(citing State v. McKinney, 148 Wn.2d 20, 29, 60 P.3d 46(2002)).
Therefore, we have previously held that when a new issue arises pursuant to article
I, section 7, parties and courts are not required to conduct a Gunwall analysis
before engaging in an independent state law analysis on the merits. Id. at 463
{ciiing State v. Jackson, 150 Wn.2d 251, 259, 76 P.3d 217(2003)). Instead,
"the focus is on whether the unique characteristics ofthe state
constitutional provision and its prior interpretations actually compel a
particular result." This involves an examination ofthe constitutional
text, the historical treatment ofthe interest at stake as reflected in
relevant case law and statutes, and the current implications of
recognizing or not recognizing an interest.
Id. (citation omitted)(quoting City ofSeattle v. McCready, 123 Wn.2d 260, 267,
868 P.2d 134 (1994)). This approach is reflected in several of our prior cases that
considered federally recognized exceptions to the exclusionary rule on an
independent state law basis without first conducting a Gunwall analysis. State v.
Afana, 169 Wn.2d 169, 179-84, 233 P.3d 879(2010)(rejecting the good faith
exception); State v. Winterstein, 167 Wn.2d 620, 631-36, 220 P.3d 1226(2009)
(rejecting the inevitable discovery doctrine); State v. Gaines, 154 Wn.2d 711,717-
State V. Mayfield, No. 95632-4
22, 116 P.3d 993(2005)(adopting the independent source doctrine). And in our
most recent case to consider whether the attenuation doctrine is compatible with
article I, section 7, both the lead opinion and the dissent addressed the merits
without any Gunwall analysis. State v. Eserjose, 171 Wn.2d 907, 259 P.3d 172(2011)(plurality opinion).
Mayfield's appellate briefing followed this precedent. He did not conduct a
Gunwall analysis, but he presented argument and cited authorities supporting his
specific claim that the attenuation doctrine is incompatible with article I, section 7
based on the constitutional text, relevant precedent, and the differences in history
and purpose between our state exclusionary rule and the federal exclusionary rule.
The State opposed Mayfield's state constitutional argument on the merits, without
suggesting it was inadequately briefed or procedurally barred."^
However, the Court of Appeals declined to reach the merits, concluding that
Mayfield's appellate briefing was insufficient because he did not conduct a
Gunwall analysis. Mayfield, No. 48800-1-II, slip op. at 5-7; see also State v.
Witkowski, 3 Wn. App. 2d 318, 339-41, 415 P.3d 639(Sutton, J., concurring),
review denied, 191 Wn.2d 1016(2018). The majority's analysis implies that
^ In its supplemental brief to this court, the State cites RAP 2.5 and notes that Mayfield
did not raise a state constitutional argument at the trial court level. We nevertheless reach the
merits of Mayfield's state constitutional argument because it is an important, unresolved
question oflaw and the State did not raise RAP 2.5 until after we granted review.
State V. Mayfield, No. 95632-4
Blomstrom reimposed a Gunwall requirement when applying article I, section 7 in
new contexts. We clarity that it did not.
Blomstrom considered whether article I, section 7 allows random urinalysis
testing to be imposed as a condition of pretrial release for individuals arrested for
alleged driving under the influence. 189 Wn.2d at 383-84. The majority did
conduct an abbreviated Gunwall analysis before turning to the merits. Id. at 401-
02. However, it did not suggest that the failure to do so is fatal to an otherwise
fully argued article I, section 7 claim, nor did it undertake the analysis required to
reverse our precedent holding that Gunwall is unnecessary when applying article I,
section 7 in new contexts. The parties in Blomstrom did not dispute the need for a
Gunwall analysis, so this court did not make any holding on that issue.^
We reaffirm that a Gunwall analysis is not required to justify an independent
analysis of article I, section 7 in new contexts. We also reaffirm that on the merits,
it is not sufficient for parties to simply "mention our state constitution in their
briefs" and note that article I, section 7 is often more protective than the Fourth
Amendment. State v. Rojo Armenta, 134 Wn.2d 1, 10 n.7, 948 P.2d 1280(1997).
Parties must provide argument and relevant authorities supporting the specific
^ Amicus objected to performing a Gunwall analysis in Blomstrom because, according to
amicus, our precedent held that article I, section 7 is not more protective than the Fourth
Amendment regarding the privacy rights of pretrial defendants. Blomstrom, 189 Wn.2d at 400
n.l7. We conducted a Gunwall analysis over this objection, not because we intended to
reimpose a Gunwall requirement but because amicus misread our precedent. Id.
10
State V. Mayfield, No. 95632-4
outcome they seek in light of"the constitutional text, the historical treatment of the
interest at stake as reflected in relevant case law and statutes, and the current
implications of recognizing or not recognizing an interest." Chenoweth, 160
Wn.2d at 463. Mayfield did so, and we therefore consider his state constitutional
argument on the merits.
B. A narrowly applied attenuation doctrine is not categorically incompatible
with article I, section 7
Article I, section 7 and its corresponding exclusionary rule provide uniquely
heightened privacy protections. Unlike many other jurisdictions, the primary
purpose of Washington's exclusionary rule is not to deter official misconduct
under threat of suppression. Deterrence is a benefit of our state exclusionary rule,
but its primary purpose is to protect the individual right to privacy and to provide a
certain remedy when that right is violated. We have therefore adopted a broad
exclusionary rule and rejected several exceptions recognized by other jurisdictions.
Nevertheless, our precedent recognizes that our exclusionary rule does not operate
on a strict "but for" causation basis. In narrow circumstances, evidence may be
admissible even if the evidence likely would not have been discovered but for a
prior article I, section 7 violation.
The underlying purpose ofthe attenuation doctrine is to prevent the
exclusionary rule from operating on a "but for" basis, which is consistent with
article I, section 7. However, a broadly applied attenuation doctrine allows the
11
State V. Mayfield, No. 95632-4
State to benefit from the misconduct of its officials by failing to exclude illegally
seized evidence, which is not at all consistent with article I, section 7. This tension
has made it difficult to determine whether the attenuation doctrine applies as a
matter of independent state constitutional law. In our most recent case to consider
the question, three justices would have adopted the attenuation doctrine as applied
by federal courts, four justices would have rejected the attenuation doctrine
entirely, one justice concurred in result only, and one justice would not have
reached the issue.® Eserjose, 171 Wn.2d 907. The applicability of the attenuation
doctrine as a matter of state constitutional law therefore remains an open question.
After examining the history, purpose, and operation of the attenuation
doctrine and our state exclusionary rule, we hold that they are not categorically
incompatible with each other. However, we strongly caution that in order to
comply with article I, section 7, the attenuation doctrine must be carefully and
narrowly applied. The State must prove that intervening circumstances gave rise to
a superseding cause that genuinely severed the causal connection between official
misconduct and the discovery of evidence. If the State fails to meet its burden then
the attenuation doctrine cannot apply, regardless of whether the official misconduct
® Other cases have declined to reach the issue because it was unnecessary, not raised, or
inadequately briefed. State v. Smith, 111 Wn.2d 533, 545 n.4, 303 P.3d 1047(2013)(plurality
opinion); State v. Ibarra-Cisneros, 172 Wn.2d 880, 885 n.2, 263 P.3d 591 (2011); Armenta, 134
Wn.2d at 10 n.7.
12
State V. Mayfield, No. 95632-4
was flagrant and purposeful, and regardless of whether suppression is likely to
deter similar misconduct in the future.
1. Washington courts apply a broad exclusionary rule based on
independent state law
In order to determine whether and how the attenuation doctrine might apply
to our state exclusionary rule, we must first explore the historical development,
purposes, and scope of the exclusionary rule in Washington. Doing so reveals a
long-standing commitment to an independent exclusionary rule that broadly
protects the right to individual privacy.
The history of our state exclusionary rule starts with the federal exclusionary
rule. The United States Supreme Court first indicated that federal courts should
suppress illegally seized evidence in 1886, referring "to the use of the evidence
there seized as 'unconstitutional.'" Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 647, 81 S. Ct.
1684,6 L. Ed. 2d 1081 (1961)(quoting v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 638,6
S. Ct. 524, 29 L. Ed. 746 (1886)). The federal exclusionary rule was further made
explicit in the 1914 case of Weeks v. United States, which recognized that
[i]f letters and private documents can thus be [illegally] seized and
held and used in evidence against a citizen accused of an offense, the
protection of the Fourth Amendment declaring his right to be secure
against such searches and seizures is of no value, and, so far as those
thus placed are concerned, might as well be stricken from the
Constitution.
13
State V. Mayfield, No. 95632-4
232 U.S. 383, 393, 34 S. Ct. 341, 58 L. Ed. 652(1914). Denying a defendant's
motion to suppress illegally seized evidence was thus "a denial ofthe
constitutional rights of the accused" and could not be permitted. Id. at 398.
The federal exclusionary rule was first held applicable to the states in 1961.
Mapp,367 U.S. at 660. Washington, however, adopted an independent state
exclusionary rule almost 40 years earlier, in 1922. State v. Gibbons, 118 Wash.
171, 189, 203 P. 390 (1922). The facts presented in Gibbons well illustrated the
need for an exclusionary rule to protect individual rights. A county sheriff
suspected the defendant possessed liquor, which was illegal at the time. The
sheriff telephoned for a search warrant but, instead of waiting for a warrant to be
issued, ordered the defendant to drive to the sheriffs office at gunpoint. On arrival
at the sheriffs office, the sheriff removed a suitcase from the defendant's car and
found several bottles of whiskey inside.
Easily concluding that the sheriffs actions were unconstitutional, we
considered whether the whiskey could nevertheless be used as evidence in the
defendant's trial for felony unlawful possession of intoxicating liquor. We held it
could not because regardless of whether the federal exclusionary rule applied to the
states, the Washington State Constitution's protections against unlawful searches
and compelled self-incrimination required an exclusionary rule at least as robust as
the federal rule. Id. at 184(quoting WASH. CONST, art. I, §§ 7, 9).
14
State V. Mayfield, No. 95632-4
Washington was in the minority of states when it adopted the exclusionary
rule, as most states followed English common law and refused to suppress any
relevant evidence, even if it was illegally obtained. State v. Buckley, 145 Wash.
87, 89, 258 P. 1030(1927). Our minority position was subject to significant
criticism. A prominent commentator asserted that states that had adopted the
exclusionary rule were infected with a '"contagion of sentimentality'" resulting
from the "'heretical influence of Weeks v. United States State v. Rousseau, 40
Wn.2d 92, 98, 241 P.2d 447(1952)(Finley, J., concurring in result)(quoting 8
John Henry Wigmore,Evidence in Trials at Common Law § 2184, at 31 (3d
ed. 1940)). There were calls from within this court to either abandon the
exclusionary rule or make "some reasonable modification or exception" on the
basis that "it often and unreasonably may obstruct prosecution and confer
immunity upon undeserving law violators." Id. at 99. However, this court
consistently reaffirmed that "[i]t is the duty of courts to protect citizens from
unwarranted, arbitrary, illegal arrests by officers of the law," and there could be
"no doubt that the exclusionary doctrine of the Weeks case ... is the law of this
Jurisdiction." State v. Young, 39 Wn.2d 910, 917,239 P.2d 858(1952); State v.
Smith, 50 Wn.2d 408, 409, 314 P.2d 1024(1957)(italics omitted).
Our exclusionary rule thus has its basis in independent state law.
Nevertheless, for many years our state exclusionary rule was similar in scope to the
15
State V, Mayfield, No. 95632-4
federal exclusionary rule. Sanford E. Pitler, Comment, The Origin and
Development of Washington's Independent Exclusionary Rule: Constitutional
Right and Constitutionally Compelled Remedy, 61 WASH.L. Rev. 459, 486-87
(1986). This was so because when we first adopted the exclusionary rule, the
federal rule was broadly protective, holding "in no uncertain language, that it is
beneath the dignity of the state, and contrary to public policy, for the state to use
for its own profit evidence that has been obtained in violation of law." Buckley,
145 Wash, at 89 (citing 5c»y<7, 116 U.S. 616; Weeks, 232 U.S. 383; Silverthorne
Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385,40 S. Ct. 182,64 L. Ed. 319(1920);
Gouled V. United States, 255 U.S. 298, 41 S. Ct. 261,65 L. Ed. 647(1921); Amos
V. United States, 255 U.S. 313, 41 S. Ct. 266,65 L. Ed. 654(1921); Agnello v.
United States, 269 U.S. 20, 46 S. Ct. 4, 70 L. Ed. 145 (1925)). Because the federal
exclusionary rule was so broad, there was no need for Washington to
independently define the contours of its own exclusionary rule. Pitler, supra, at
487.
However, the federal exclusionary rule is no longer the broad doctrine it
once was. Over time, federal courts have increasingly limited the exclusionary
rule by narrowly focusing on the federal rule's purpose of deterring Fourth
Amendment violations. This narrow focus has allowed for exceptions to the
federal exclusionary rule in cases where suppression appears unlikely to deter
16
State V. Mayfield, No. 95632-4
official misconduct in the future. Washington has repeatedly rejected calls to
similarly narrow our own exclusionary rule.
Our first clear departure from federal law occurred when we held that the
exclusionary rule applies to evidence discovered in a search incident to an arrest
based on an unconstitutional stop-and-identify statute. State v. White, 97 Wn.2d
92, 109-10, 640 P.2d 1061 (1982).^ The United States Supreme Court had recently
reached the opposite conclusion, holding that "[n]o conceivable purpose of
deterrence would be served by suppressing evidence" in such a case. Michigan v.
DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 38 n.3, 99 S. Ct. 2627, 61 L. Ed. 2d 343 (1979). We held
that such a result "is justifiable only if one accepts the basic premise that the
exclusionary rule is merely a remedial measure for Fourth Amendment violations."
White, 97 Wn.2d at 109. We squarely rejected that premise as applied to article I,
section 7 and reiterated that for our state exclusionary rule, "the emphasis is on
protecting personal rights rather than on curbing governmental actions." Id. at 110.
Suppression is an integral component ofthe right to privacy itself, and "whenever
the right is unreasonably violated, the remedy must follow." Id.^ We have since clarified that Whitens holding applies only to an arrest made pursuant to a
statute that is '"so grossly and flagrantly unconstitutional by virtue of a prior dispositive judicial
holding that it may not serve as the basis of a valid arrest.'" State v. Brockob, 159 Wn.2d 311,
341 n.l9, 150 P.3d 59(2006)(internal quotation marks omitted)(quoting White, 97 Wn.2d at
103). However, we have consistently adhered to White's reasoning when considering whether to
recognize a new exception to our state exclusionary rule. Afana, 169 Wn.2d at 180; Winterstein,
167 Wn.2d at 631-34.
17
State V. Mayfield, No. 95632-4
We similarly declined to adopt the federal inevitable discovery doctrine,
which "allows admission of illegally obtained evidence if the State can 'establish
by a preponderance of the evidence that the information ultimately or inevitably
would have been discovered by lawful means.'" Winterstein, 167 Wn.2d at 634(quoting Mx v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 444, 104 S. Ct. 2501, 81 L. Ed. 2d 377(1984)). This exception is based on the view that if evidence would have been
discovered regardless of official misconduct,"then the deterrence rationale has so
little basis that the evidence should be received." Nix, 467 U.S. at 444.
We rejected that view, again reiterating that a primarily deterrence-based
rationale for the exclusionary rule "is at odds with the plain language of article I,
section 7, which we have emphasized guarantees privacy rights with no express
limitations." Winterstein, 167 Wn.2d at 635. Therefore,"balancing of interests
should not be carried out when evidence is obtained in violation of a defendant's
constitutional rights." Id. at 632. We concluded that the inevitable discovery
doctrine carmot be compatible with article I, section 7 because "the inevitable
discovery doctrine is necessarily speculative and does not disregard illegally
obtained evidence." Id. at 634.
We also rejected the good faith exception, which provides that evidence will
not be suppressed "when a search or seizure was unconstitutional but the police
officer's belief that it was constitutional was objectively reasonable at the time."
18
State V. Mayfield, No. 95632-4
Afana, 169 Wn.2d at 180. Federal courts recognize the good faith exception
because "[t]o trigger the exclusionary rule, police conduct must be sufficiently
deliberate that exclusion can meaningfully deter it, and sufficiently culpable that
such deterrence is worth the price paid by the justice system." Herring v. United
States, 555 U.S. 135, 144, 129 S. Ct. 695, 172 L. Ed. 2d 496 (2009).
Again, we reaffirmed that "[ujnlike its federal counterpart, Washington's
exclusionary rule is 'nearly categorical.'" Afana, 169 Wn.2d at 180(quoting
Winterstein, 167 Wn.2d at 636). "In contrast to the Fourth Amendment, article I,
section 7 emphasizes 'protecting personal rights rather than . . . curbing
governmental actions.'" Id. (alteration in original)(quoting White, 97 Wn.2d at
110). Therefore, our state exclusionary rule does not allow any exception that
"does not disregard illegally obtained evidence." /Id. at 183. If evidence is illegally obtained then it must be suppressed,
regardless of an officer's reasonable belief that his or her actions were lawful.
Thus, as our state law has developed independently over time, we have been
extremely cautious about recognizing exceptions to the exclusionary rule, ensuring
"'that the right of privacy shall not be diminished by the judicial gloss of a
19
State V. Mayfield, No. 95632-4
selectively applied exclusionary remedy.'" Winterstein, 167 Wn.2d at 632(quoting White, 97 Wn.2d at 110). Our state exclusionary rule requires the
suppression of evidence obtained in violation of article I, section 7, with no
exceptions that rely on speculation, the likelihood of deterrence, or the
reasonableness of official misconduct.
2. Washington's exclusionary rule does not operate on a strict "but for"
causation basis
Despite the broad application of our exclusionary rule, we have long
recognized that the exclusionary rule applies only to the so-called "fruit ofthe
poisonous tree," that is, evidence obtained as a direct or indirect result of an article
I, section 7 violation. State v. Rothenberger, 73 Wn.2d 596, 600, 440 P.2d 184(1968). We have also recognized that determining whether evidence actually is
"fruit ofthe poisonous tree" cannot always be resolved by simply asking whether
the evidence would have been discovered but for the official misconduct. For the
exclusionary rule to apply, there must be some proximate causal connection
between the misconduct and the evidence.
The need for a proximate causal connection is reflected in our cases
applying the independent source doctrine, the only federally recognized exception
to the exclusionary rule that we have expressly adopted. The independent source
doctrine provides that "evidence tainted by unlawful governmental action is not
subject to suppression under the exclusionary rule, provided that it ultimately is
20
State V. Mayfield, No. 95632-4
obtained pursuant to a valid warrant or other lawful means independent of the
unlawful action." Gaines, 154 Wn.2d at 718. This exception applies only where
"the challenged evidence was discovered through a source independent from the
initial illegality." State v. Betancourth, 190 Wn.2d 357, 365, 413 P.3d 566 (2018).
The independent source doctrine is compatible with article I, section 7 because
where it applies, the State derives no benefit from the misconduct of its officers.
Winterstein, 167 Wn.2d at 634.
Some cases applying the independent source doctrine have held that even
though official misconduct was arguably a "but for" cause ofthe discovery of
evidence, the evidence was nevertheless admissible. For instance, in
Rothenberger, the defendant was a passenger in a car that was allegedly unlawfully
stopped by police. 73 Wn.2d at 597. The driver did not have a license, but
Rothenberger did, so police allowed him to drive the car away. Id. Police later
discovered an active warrant for Rothenberger's arrest on felony charges and
transmitted that information to other officers, who ultimately stopped the car and
arrested Rothenberger on the active felony warrant. Id. at 597-98. Rothenberger
moved to suppress the evidence discovered following his arrest, arguing "that the
officer who caused the information to be transmitted to the arresting officers,
would not have acquired the information as to Rothenberger's identity had he not
unlawfully stopped the Rothenberger car." Id. at 598.
21
State V. Mayfield, No. 95632-4
We rejected this argument as "indescribably silly," noting that the active
arrest warrant was an "independent source" and police "not only had the right but
the duty to pursue Rothenberger and arrest him." Id. at 598-99. It was true that,
but for the unlawful stop, police likely would not have arrested Rothenberger at the
time they did because they would not have known where he was. However, the
evidence discovered after his arrest was admissible because it was not "fruit ofthe
poisonous tree" but, instead, the result of a lawful arrest pursuant to a valid warrant
that provided the authority of law required by article I, section 7. Id. at 600.
Likewise, we recently held that evidence originally obtained pursuant to a
defective warrant was admissible because a second, valid warrant was issued for
the same evidence. Betancourth, 190 Wn.2d at 373. Arguably, the original
defective warrant was a distant "but for" cause of discovering the evidence because
the State did not seek the second warrant until it discovered the defect in the first
one. Id. at 360-61. However the evidence itself was untainted because the second,
valid warrant was a truly independent source. "[T]he illegal search [pursuant to
the defective warrant] in no way contributed to the issuance of the [valid] warrant
and police would have sought the wan-ant even absent the initial illegality." Id. at
365. Therefore, the State derived no benefit from the defective first warrant, and
the evidence was admissible.
22
State V. Mayfield, No. 95632-4
Our exclusionary rule cases thus make clear two basic principles of
Washington law. First, our state exclusionary rule broadly protects the individual
right to privacy and admits no exception that allows the State to benefit from
violations of article I, section 7 by its officers, regardless of the officers' good faith
or the likelihood that suppression will deter similar misconduct in the future.
Second, our state exclusionary rule applies only to "fruit ofthe poisonous tree" and
therefore does not operate on a strict "but for" causation basis. There must be
some proximate causal connection between official misconduct and the discovery
of evidence for the exclusionary rule to apply.
In the context ofthe attenuation doctrine, these two principles stand in
tension with each other. On the one hand, a narrow attenuation doctrine could
appropriately prevent our state exclusionary rule from operating on a "but for"
basis. On the other hand, a broadly applied attenuation doctrine could improperly
allow illegally obtained evidence to be admitted based on factors including the
likelihood of deterrence and the purpose and flagrancy of official misconduct. And
as discussed below, the federal attenuation doctrine has broadened significantly
over time, making it difficult to determine whether and how to incorporate the
attenuation doctrine into our independent state law.
23
State V. Mayfield, No. 95632-4
3. The federal attenuation doctrine has grown from a narrow exception
requiring a superseding cause to a broad exception focused on
deterrence
The attenuation doctrine was developed to address "the causal relationship
between the unconstitutional act and the discovery of evidence." Strieff, 136 S. Ct.
at 2061. At its inception, the attenuation doctrine ensured that "facts improperly
obtained do not 'become sacred and inaccessible. If knowledge ofthem is gained
from an independent source they may be proved like any others.'" Nardone v.
United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341,60 S. Ct. 266, 84 L. Ed. 307(1939)(quoting
Silverthorne Lumber Co., 251 U.S. at 392). While the independent source doctrine
applies only where the evidence was obtained through a source completely
independent of official misconduct, the attenuation doctrine was applied where
"[s]ophisticated argument may prove a causal connection between" official
misconduct and the discovery of evidence, but the connection was "so attenuated
as to dissipate the taint." Id.Historically, the attenuation doctrine required intervening circumstances that
truly severed the chain of causation. "The notion of such a disrupting event comes
from the tort law doctrine of proximate causation." Strieff, 136 S. Ct. at 2072
(Kagan, J., dissenting). In tort law,"[ujnforeseeable intervening acts break the
chain of causation between 'the defendant's negligence and the plaintiffs injury.'"
Washburn v. City ofFederal Way, 178 Wn.2d 732, 761, 310 P.3d 1275 (2013)
24
State V. Mayfield, No. 95632-4
(quoting Schooley v. Pinch's Deli Mkt., Inc., 134 Wn.2d 468, 482, 951 P.2d 749(1998)). This is generally known as "the doctrine of superseding cause."
Schooley, 134 Wn.2d at 482.
The attenuation doctrine originally served the same function in the context
of the exclusionary rule that the superseding cause doctrine serves in the context of
tort law. Where unforeseeable intervening circumstances genuinely severed the
chain of causation between official misconduct and the discovery of evidence, the
intervening circumstances operated as a superseding cause. In such a case, the
official misconduct was not a proximate cause of discovering the evidence, so the
evidence was not "fruit of the poisonous tree." It was the "fruit" of the
superseding cause. See Strieff, 136 S. Ct. at 2072-73 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
Therefore, the attenuation doctrine applied, and the evidence could be admitted.
This historical version of the attenuation doctrine was most likely to be
satisfied where the intervening circumstances at issue were unforeseeable acts of
independent free will. For instance, in the seminal case of Wong Sun, the
defendant was arrested without probable cause in violation of the Fourth
Amendment. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 491, 83 S. Ct. 407,9
L. Ed. 2d 441 (1963). He had been "released on his own recognizance after a
lawful arraignment, and had returned voluntarily several days later" to make a
confession. Id. In concluding that the confession was admissible, the Wong Sun
25
State V. Mayfield, No. 95632-4
Court recognized that not all evidence "is 'fruit of the poisonous tree' simply
because it would not have come to light but for the illegal actions of the police."
Id. at 488.
Therefore, instead of applying a strict "but for" causation standard, the
question was whether the evidence was obtained '"by exploitation of that illegality
or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint.'"
Id. (quoting JOHN MacArthur Maguire,Evidence of Guilt: Restrictions
UPON Its Discovery or Compulsory Disclosure 221 (1959)). The defendant's
voluntary decision to return to the police and give his confession may not have
occurred but for his unlawful arrest. Nevertheless, the defendant's decision was an
intervening circumstance that truly severed the chain of causation. "In order for
the causal chain, between the illegal arrest and the statements made subsequent
thereto, to be broken, Wong Sun requires not merely that the statement meet the
Fifth Amendment standard of voluntariness but that it be 'sufficiently an act of free
will to purge the primary taint.'" Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 602, 95 S. Ct.
2254, 45 L. Ed. 2d 416(1975)(quoting Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 486).
The attenuation doctrine thus began as a narrow exception to the
exclusionary rule requiring a superseding cause for the discovery of evidence.
However, as federal courts have increasingly focused on the exclusionary rule's
deterrent purpose, they have adopted new exceptions and expanded existing ones.
26
State V. Mayfield, No. 95632-4
including the attenuation doctrine. The attenuation doctrine as applied by federal
courts no longer asks only whether there was a superseding cause. Instead, "[t]he
notion ofthe 'dissipation of the taint' attempts to mark the point at which the
detrimental consequences of illegal police action become so attenuated that the
deterrent effect ofthe exclusionary rule no longer justifies its cost." Id. at 609(Powell, J., concurring in part).
As such, intervening circumstances are now sufficient to satisfy the federal
attenuation doctrine if official misconduct is not the sole proximate cause of
discovering evidence, even if the misconduct is still one ofseveral proximate
causes. This is illustrated by a recent decision of the United States Supreme Court
holding that where an officer unlawfully seizes a person without reasonable
suspicion, demands the person's identification, discovers an outstanding arrest
warrant for an unpaid parking ticket, and discovers evidence in a search incident to
arrest on that warrant, the federal attenuation doctrine is satisfied. Strieff 136
S. Ct. at 2062-63. As Justice Sotomayor pointed out in dissent,"This case allows
the police to stop you on the street, demand your identification, and check it for
outstanding traffic warrants—even if you are doing nothing wrong." Id. at 2064.
We have no authority to question this application of the federal exclusionary rule,
but it clearly conflicts with our state exclusionary rule by admitting illegally seized
27
State V. Mayfield, No. 95632-4
evidence and allowing the State to benefit from the unconstitutional actions of its
officers. Winterstein, 167 Wn.2d at 634.
In addition, a "'particularly' significant" factor for courts applying the
modem federal attenuation doctrine is "'the purpose and flagrancy of the official
misconduct.'" Strieff, 136 S. Ct. at 2062(quoting Brown,422 U.S. at 604). This
factor is directly related to the deterrence rationale underlying the federal
attenuation doctrine and "reflects that rationale by favoring exclusion only when
the police misconduct is most in need of deterrence—^that is, when it is purposeful
or flagrant." Id. at 2063. Where official misconduct is "at most negligent," the
federal attenuation doctrine "strongly favors the State" and weighs heavily against
suppression. Id. This factor is completely incompatible with our exclusionary
rule's requirement to suppress all illegally seized evidence, regardless of whether
officers acted reasonably, negligently, or intentionally. Afana, 169 Wn.2d at 184.
In sum, the attenuation doctrine has its origins in the tort law doctrine of
superseding cause. The attenuation doctrine was once a narrow exception because
in order to be a superseding cause, unforeseeable intervening circumstances must
truly sever the causal connection between official misconduct and the discovery of
evidence. However, the modern federal attenuation doctrine is not focused on
whether the State can prove a break in the causal connection. Instead, the focus is
on whether suppression in one case is likely to deter similar official misconduct in
28
State V. Mayfield, No. 95632-4
the future and on whether the misconduct was so flagrant and purposeful that it
warrants deterrence at all. This evolution in the federal attenuation doctrine has
caused difficulties for Washington courts because while the narrow historical
version ofthe federal attenuation doctrine may be compatible with article I, section
7, the broad modern version is not.
4. The attenuation doctrine is compatible with article I, section 7 so long
as it is narrowly applied only where there is a true superseding cause
for the discovery of evidence
In our most recent case concerning whether the attenuation doctrine is
compatible with article I, section 7, we were essentially presented with two
options: adopt the attenuation doctrine as currently applied by federal courts or
reject the attenuation doctrine entirely and apply our exclusionary rule on a "but
for" causation basis. Eserjose, 171 Wn.2d 907. As the lead and dissenting
opinions pointed out, both options are problematic. We were therefore unable to
reach a majority holding. Today, we reaffirm what was made clear by Eserjose,
which is that neither wholesale adoption nor total rejection of the attenuation
doctrine is appropriate as a matter of state constitutional law. Instead, we
recognize a narrow, Washington-specific attenuation doctrine, to be applied only
where the State proves that unforeseeable intervening circumstances truly severed
the causal connection between official misconduct and the discovery of evidence.
29
State V. Mayfield, No. 95632-4
We cannot reject the attenuation doctrine entirely because, as the historical
discussion above makes clear, the lead opinion in Eserjose was correct in noting
that "our cases do not stand for the proposition that the exclusionary rule under
article I, section 7 operates on a 'but for' basis. Rather, we have consistently
adhered to the 'fruit of the poisonous tree' doctrine." Id. at 919-20 (footnote
omitted). We also agree with the lead opinion that on a practical level, "[a]n
alternative 'but for' principle would make it virtually impossible to rehabilitate an
investigation once misconduct has occurred, granting suspected criminals a
permanent immunity unless, by chance, other law enforcement officers initiate an
independent investigation." Id. at 922. The purpose of our state exclusionary rule
is to protect individual privacy rights, not to permanently immunize suspects from
investigation and prosecution.
Meanwhile,the dissent in Eserjose correctly highlighted the ways in which
the broad, modern version of the federal attenuation doctrine is incompatible with
article I, section 7. First, a broad attenuation doctrine not only fails to protect
individual privacy but actually gives police 'less incentive to obtain an arrest
warrant if a station house confession is admissible despite an illegal arrest." Id. at
937(C. Johnson, J., dissenting)(emphasis added). "Nor does such a doctrine
respect our paramount concern of protecting individual privacy, as it would deny a
remedy to those whose privacy has been unconstitutionally invaded. Additionally,
30
State V. Mayfield, No. 95632-4
application of the exception would necessarily be speculative, a departure from our
otherwise nearly categorical exclusionary rule." Id. at 940(footnote omitted).
Finally, the factors considered in the federal attenuation doctrine are "time,
intervening circumstances,[and] less egregious misconduct," but it is not clear
how these factors "can infuse the fruits of an illegal seizure with the authority of
law required by article I, section 7." Id.
The concerns raised by the lead and dissenting opinions in Eserjose are all
legitimate. We therefore do not wholly adopt or entirely reject the attenuation
doctrine. Instead, we adopt a narrow, Washington-specific attenuation doctrine
that ensures our exclusionary rule does not operate on a strict "but for" basis, but
protects the individual right to privacy and prevents the State from benefiting from
the unconstitutional actions of its officers. To do this, we look to the attenuation
doctrine's historical origins, which, as discussed above, arose from the tort law
doctrine of superseding cause.
To be held liable in tort, a defendant's actions must have proximately caused
the plaintiffs injuries. Proximate causation is present where the defendant's
action,"unbroken by any new independent cause produces the injury complained
of." Schooley, 134 Wn.2d at 482. Correspondingly,"[wjhen an independent,
intervening act of a third person is one which was not reasonably foreseeable then
there is a break in the causal connection between the defendant's negligence and
31
State V. Mayfield, No. 95632-4
the plaintiffs injury." Id. Where such an intervening act is present, it constitutes a
superseding cause ofthe plaintiffs injury, and the defendant is not liable.
This formulation of a superseding cause is consistent with the attenuation
doctrine as historically applied, for example in Wong Sun. As discussed above, the
defendant's confession in Wong Sun was preceded by his unlawful arrest.
However, the confession was actually obtained as the result of an unforeseeable
intervening act—the defendant's decision to return to the police and give a
confession days after he was released from custody. The defendant was not
induced or urged to return and confess by the police, but chose to do so as a matter
of independent free will. This decision acted as a superseding cause, allowing the
confession to be admitted.
We have previously indicated that the Wong Sun version of the attenuation
doctrine applies as a matter of state constitutional law. E.g., State v. O'Bremski, 70
Wn.2d 425, 428, 423 P.2d 530 (1967). We now explicitly adopt a state attenuation
doctrine that is satisfied if, and only if, an unforeseeable intervening act genuinely
severs the causal connection between official misconduct and the discovery of
evidence. If such a superseding cause is present, then the evidence is not properly
viewed as "fruit ofthe poisonous tree" but, instead, as "fruit" ofthe superseding
cause. In such a case, the State derives no benefit from its officers'
unconstitutional actions. And because a superseding cause must, by definition, be
32
State V. Mayfield, No. 95632-4
unforeseeable, this nan*ow attenuation doctrine will not encourage officials to
violate article I, section 7 in the hopes of discovering evidence.
We caution that the attenuation doctrine we adopt today must be narrowly
and carefully applied. The State bears the burden of proving that the attenuation
doctrine applies and that evidence is admissible despite a violation of article I,
section 7. Armenia, 134 Wn.2d at 14. To meet its burden, the State must prove
that unforeseen intervening circumstances genuinely severed the causal connection
between official misconduct and the discovery of evidence. The State cannot meet
its burden by merely showing that there are one or more additional proximate
causes ofthe discovery of evidence. The question of whether intervening
circumstances constitute a superseding cause is a highly fact-specific inquiry that
must account for the totality of the circumstances,just as it is in the context of tort
law. See Maltman v. Sauer, 84 Wn.2d 975, 982, 530 P.2d 254 (1975).
We also caution that the narrow attenuation doctrine we adopt today is
entirely independent of the modem attenuation doctrine used by federal courts. As
such, it is irrelevant to our state attenuation doctrine whether suppression in one
case will deter similar misconduct in the future. It is also irrelevant whether the
officer's misconduct was merely negligent or was instead flagrant and purposeful.
The only question is whether unforeseeable intervening actions genuinely severed
the causal connection between official misconduct and the discovery of evidence.
33
State V. Mayfield, No. 95632-4
If not, then the attenuation doctrine does not apply, and the evidence must be
excluded in accordance with article I, section 7 and our state exclusionary rule.
C. The Washington attenuation doctrine is not satisfied here
Although the trial court did not have the opportunity to rule on Mayfield's
suppression motion in accordance with the narrow attenuation doctrine we adopt
today, its findings of fact are sufficient for us to decide the issue as a matter of law.
It is plain that the State cannot carry its burden of proving that the causal chain
between the official misconduct and the discovery of evidence was genuinely
severed by intervening circumstances in this case. We therefore hold that
Mayfield's motion to suppress must be granted.
As related in the facts section above. Officer Nunes illegally seized Mayfield
and requested consent to search his person and his truck while the illegal seizure
was ongoing. The requests to search were certainly not unforeseeable intervening
circumstances. As found by the trial court, these requests were a purposeful
component of"a drug investigation that was not based upon any reasonable and
articulable suspicion of actual criminal conduct." CP at 20.
Mayfield's consents to the two searches were also not independent acts of
free will sufficient to establish a superseding cause. The State relies heavily on the
fact that Mayfield was told he could refuse, limit, or revoke consent to the search
of his truck, arguing that these Ferrier warnings made Mayfield's consent "an
34
State V. Mayfield, No. 95632-4
informed decision" and thus '"an independent act of free will'" sufficient to satisfy
the attenuation doctrine. Suppl. Br. of Resp't at 20. We cannot agree.
First, as the State acknowledges, Mayfield was not given full Ferrier
warnings before consenting to the search of his person.^ He was merely told he
could refuse consent. We have previously considered an almost indistinguishable
case applying the federal attenuation doctrine. In Armenia, the defendant was
unlawfully seized, was asked for consent to search his car, and was told he could
refuse. 134 Wn.2d at 6. He consented and the search yielded cocaine, which the
trial court suppressed. Id. at 8-9. We affirmed the trial court.
First, we noted that although the defendant "freely and voluntarily consented
to the search of his vehicle," it was a separate question "whether the prior illegal
detention vitiated that consent." Id. at 16-17. We then concluded that it did, based
on federal precedent holding that a "confession following issuance of Miranda"^
warnings [was] nevertheless tainted by illegal arrest and therefore inadmissible."
Id. at 17(citing Brown,422 U.S. 590). Because we have already held that warning
a person of the right to refuse consent is insufficient to satisfy the broad federal
attenuation doctrine, we easily conclude that it is insufficient to satisfy our narrow
^ Ferrier warnings are required only "where police request entry into a home for the
purpose of obtaining consent to conduct a warrantless search." State v. Khounvichai, 149 Wn.2d
557, 563,69 P.3d 862(2003).
^ Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694(1966).
35
State V. Mayfield, No. 95632-4
State attenuation doctrine. And because Deputy Nunes asked to search Mayfield's
truck based, in part, on the money he found when searching Mayfield's person, the
two searches are directly causally linked.
Second, giving consent to search upon request during an unlawful seizure is
very different from independently volunteering to be searched or giving a
confession as an act of free will. Mayfield had no time to reflect on his options
and was not free to leave. Ferrier warnings alone cannot change the fact that
Mayfield's consent to search was the direct, foreseeable result of Officer Nunes's
unconstitutional actions. Indeed, it would be unreasonable to expect a person to
believe that he or she actually can refuse consent when the Ferrier warnings are
given by the same officer who is currently subjecting the person to an ongoing
unlawful seizure. A reasonable person might well believe that the officer would
commit further constitutional violations, regardless of consent, so there would be
no benefit to refusing. Therefore, consent to search during an ongoing unlawful
seizure, even if preceded by Ferrier warnings, is entirely foreseeable and not an
independent act offree will.'° Such consent, without more, cannot be a
superseding cause sufficient to satisfy the attenuation doctrine.
Given the State's concession that Mayfield was illegally seized, we do not opine on the
substantive adequacy of Mayfield's consent to the searches.
36
State V. Mayfield, No. 95632-4
Finally, it is clear that if the state attenuation doctrine is satisfied solely by
an unlawfully detained suspect's consent to search after Ferrier warnings, then the
attenuation doctrine would not be a narrow exception to the exclusionary rule at
all. To the contrary, it would be broadly applicable to any case where officials
remember to use the appropriate "magic words" after violating a person's article I,
section 7 rights. Such a broad rule would do little to protect individual privacy and
would thus be inconsistent with article I, section 7 and our state exclusionary rule.
It would also distort the purpose ofFerrier, which is to ensure that a person who
has not been illegally seized can make an informed decision as to whether to
consent to a search of his or her home. Ferrier, 136 Wn.2d at 118. Ferrier
warnings were never designed to "purge the taint" of ongoing unlawful seizures for
purposes of the attenuation doctrine.
It is clear from the trial court's findings that there were no intervening
circumstances here that severed the causal connection between Mayfield's
unlawful seizure and the discovery ofthe money and methamphetamine used
against him at trial. Without such intervening circumstances, our state attenuation
doctrine cannot apply. Therefore, the evidence must be suppressed.
CONCLUSION
Although the attenuation doctrine is not categorically incompatible with
article I, section 7, we hold that it must be an extremely narrow exception in order
37
State V. Mayfield, No. 95632-4
to preserve the heightened protections of our state exclusionary rule. The
attenuation doctrine can apply only where unforeseeable intervening circumstances
genuinely sever the causal connection between official misconduct and the
discovery of evidence. It is clear from the trial court's findings that there were no
such unforeseeable intervening circumstances here. We therefore hold that
Mayfield's motion to suppress must be granted, and we reverse and remand for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
38
State V. Mayfield, No. 95632-4
WE CONCUR:
^nulumi-. ^(l ■ f
39
State V. Mayfield
No. 95632-4
JOHNSON,J.(concurring)—The issue presented in this case is whether the
federal attenuation doctrine is compatible with our state constitutional principles
recognized under article I, section 7 of the Washington Constitution. Our cases
interpreting article I, section 7 have rejected the federal good faith exception
doctrine and the federal inevitable discovery doctrine, and applying the same
reasoning, the federal attenuation doctrine should be rejected based on our state
constitution's stronger privacy protections and the narrower exceptions to
individual constitutional privacy protections.
Although the majority reaches the correct result, it errs in its reasoning. In
addressing the state constitutional issue, the majority correctly recognizes that a
Gunwalf factored argument is unnecessary. As correctly noted in the Court of
Appeals' dissent,"A Gunwall analysis is not required every time article I, section 7
State V. Gunwall, 106 Wn.2d 54, 720 P.2d 808 (1986).
State V. Mayfield, No. 95632-4
(Johnson, J., concurring)
is applied in a new context. Instead, the court acknowledges that article I, section 7
generally is more protective and then engages in a conventional legal analysis to
determine its scope and effect in the circumstances presented." State v. Mayfield,
No. 48800-1-II, slip op. at 14(Wash. Ct. App. Jan. 4, 2018)(unpublished),
http://www.courts.wa.gOv/opinions/pdf/D2%2048800-1 -
II%20Unpublished%200pinion.pdf(Bjorgen, C.J., dissenting).
The United States Supreme Court established a closely related subset of
exceptions to the exclusionary rule under the Fourth Amendment to the United
States Constitution. Those include the good faith exception, the inevitable
discovery doctrine, and the attenuation doctrine. Our cases analyzing article I,
section 7 have addressed these exceptions.
In State v. Afana, 169 Wn.2d 169, 184, 233 P.3d 879(2010), we rejected the
federal good faith exception doctrine. In doing so, we recognized,"In contrast to
the Fourth Amendment, article I, section 7 emphasizes 'protecting personal rights
rather than . . . curbing governmental actions.'" Afana, 169 Wn.2d at 180(alteration in original)(quoting State v. White, 97 Wn.2d 92, 110, 640 P.2d 1061(1982)). Similarly, in State v. Winterstein, 167 Wn.2d 620, 636, 220 P.3d 1226(2009), we rejected the federal inevitable discovery doctrine as "incompatible with
the nearly categorical exclusionary rule under article I, section 7."
State V. Mayfield, No. 95632-4
(Johnson, J., concurring)
Important to the issue and facts represented here, in those cases and others
cited in those cases, the evidence was obtained contemporaneously with the
constitutional violation. In Eserjose, though three separate opinions were authored,
it appears no disagreement existed that if the confession had been
contemporaneously with the illegal seizure, suppression would be required. State v.
Eserjose, 171 Wn.2d 907, 927, 933 (Madsen, C.J., concurring), 936-37(C.
Johnson, J., dissenting), 259 P.3d 172(2011).
What these cases teach, and relevant to resolution of the issue here, is where
evidence is obtained contemporaneously with the constitutional privacy violation,
the attenuation doctrine does not apply and the evidence must be suppressed.
Importantly, we have largely rejected the attenuation doctrine under nearly
identical material facts in State v. Rojo Armenta, 134 Wn.2d 1, 948 P.2d 1280(1997). Armenta involved, similar to the facts here, an illegal seizure of the
defendants and an otherwise voluntary consent to search a vehicle and its trunk
where evidence was found, after advising the defendant he could refuse to consent.
We reversed the conviction and held "consent, although voluntary, was tainted by
the prior illegal detention." Armenta, 134 Wn.2d at 17. In overturning the
conviction, we emphasized because the officer did not have '"specific and
articulable facts'" that defendants were engaged in criminal activity at the time of
State V. Mayfield, No. 95632-4
(Johnson, J., concurring)
the seizure and because the officer obtained consent "immediately after the
detention and without the benefit of Miranda"^ warnings,[the consent] did not
remove the taint ofthe prior illegal detention." Armenta, 134 Wn.2d at 17-18.
Likewise, in the present case, the officer received John Mayfield's consent to
search the truck immediately after what the State concedes was an illegal seizure.
Although Armenta purportedly relied on a Fourth Amendment analysis and
not article I, section 7, that federal foundation seems somewhat shaky. However,
its reasoning and language is consistent with our article I, section 7 cases, which
should be expressly recognized. The federal attenuation doctrine should be rejected
in circumstances where the evidence is obtained contemporaneously with the
constitution violation. As amici point out, the attenuation doctrine "denies a
remedy even as it concedes a constitutional violation." Br. of Amici Curiae^ at 13.
This is not consistent with our constitution's strong protection of privacy rights and
our "nearly categorical" exclusionaiy rule. Winterstein, 167 Wn.2d at 636. We
^ Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966).
^ Amici Curiae include the American Civil Liberties Union of Washington, Fred T.
Korematsu Center for Law and Equality, Washington Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers,
and Washington Defender Association.
State V. Mayfield, No. 95632-4
(Johnson, J., concurring)
should reject the attenuation doctrine.