In re Pers. Restraint of McWilliams

FILE
IN CLERKS OFFICE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
In the Matter of the Personal Restraint of )
) No. 88883-3
DANTE DOMICO Me WILLIAMS, )
) En Bane
Petitioner. )
) Filed DEC 2 4 2014
MADSEN, C.J.-Petitioner Dante McWilliams received the exceptional sentence
of 120 months of confinement and 18 months of community custody, which, in the
aggregate, exceeded the statutory maximum for his offense. This, he claims, is error. We
agree and hold the appropriate remedy is a notation in the judgment and sentence that
explicitly states that the total term of confinement and community custody actually
served may not exceed the statutory maximum.
FACTS
On August 10, 201 0, Me Williams pleaded guilty to second degree assault
committed in November 2009. At sentencing, he had an offender score of7, which
resulted in a standard sentencing range of 43 to 57 months of confinement. The statutory
maximum sentence of confinement for second degree assault is 120 months. RCW
9A.36.021(2); RCW 9A.20.021(1)(b). The plea agreement entered into by the parties
No. 88883-3
recommended an exceptional sentence 1 of confinement of 120 months-the statutory
maximum-along with 18 months of community custody .. The trial court imposed this
sentence as stipulated in the agreement. Me Williams did not appeal.
More than one year passed after entry of judgment. 2 Me Williams then filed this
personal restraint petition directly in this court, arguing that his judgment and sentence is
facially invalid under RCW 9.94A.701(9) because the combined term of confinement and
community custody exceed the statutory maximum for the offense. Me Williams requests
that we remand the case to the trial court to reduce the term of community custody in
accordance with RCW 9.94A.701(9). 3
ANALYSIS
Both the State and the petitioner conclude that the trial court erred in sentencing.
We agree. RCW 9.94A.505(5) restricts a trial court from imposing a combined term of
confinement and community custody that exceeds the statutory maximum. Here, the
exceptional sentence of 120 months of confinement combined with the 18 months of
community custody potentially exceeds the statutory maximum of 120 months, assuming
1
An "exceptional sentence" is a sentence imposed outside of the standard range. RCW
9.94A.535.
2
A statutory one-year time limit exists on collateral attacks. RCW 10.73.090. But this time
limit does not apply to facially invalid judgments where the trial court exceeds its statutory
authority. See In re Pers. Restraint ofCoats,l73 Wn.2d 123, 136,267 P.3d 324 (2011). IIere,
the trial court exceeded its statutory authority under RCW 9.94A.505(5) (stating that a court may
not impose a combined term of imprisonment and community custody that exceeds the statutory
maximum).
3
Petitioner also suggests that the only effective remedy is to sentence him within his standard
confinement range of 43 to 57 months with an additional 36 months in community custody.
Petitioner, however, provides no argument to support this remedy. We therefore decline to
consider it.
2
No. 88883-3
the petitioner actually served the full sentence. 4 The issue for this court is the appropriate
remedy.
McWilliams argues that RCW 9.94A.701(9) applies in this situation. That statute
states, "The term of community custody specified by this section shall be reduced by the
court whenever an offender's standard range term of confinement in combination with
the term of community custody exceeds the statutory maximum for the crime as provided
in RCW 9A.20.021." RCW 9.94A.701(9) (emphasis added). When the trial court
imposes a sentence in violation of this statute, we remand to the trial court to amend the
community custody term or to resentence consistent with the statute. State v. Boyd, 17 4
Wn.2d 470, 473, 275 P.3d 321 (2012). Thus, ifRCW 9.94A.701(9) applies, the remedy
is clear.
Whether RCW 9.94A.701(9) applies in this case depends on the meaning of the
statutory language, an issue of law that we review de novo. Tingey v. Haisch, 159 Wn.2d
652,657, 152 P.3d 1020 (2007). When the meaning of statutory language is plain on its
face, the court must give effect to that plain meaning. City ofSpokane v. Spokane
County, 158 Wn.2d 661, 673, 146 P.3d 893 (2006). In determining plain meaning, we
consider the language of the provision, as well as related statutes or other provisions in
the same act that disclose legislative intent. Id. Plain language, however, does not
4
Reduction of time in confinement as a reward for good behavior while in prison pursuant to the
authority ofthe Department of Corrections (DOC) under RCW 9.92.151 and DOC Policy
Directive 350.100 often reduces the actual time in custody from that imposed on the judgment
and sentence at the rate of at least 10 percent.
3
No. 88883-3
require construction. Koenigv. CityofDesMoines, 158 Wn.2d 173,181, 142P.3d 162
(2006).
By its plain language, RCW 9.94A.701(9) applies only to terms of confinement
imposed within the standard range. The Sentencing Reform Act of 1981 (SRA) (ch.
9.94A RCW), however, allows exceptional sentences outside of the standard range. See
RCW 9.94A.535 (permitting exceptional sentence that depart from the standard sentence
range). Nothing in the plain language ofRCW 9.94A.701(9) refers to an exceptional
sentence. To apply RCW 9.94A.701(9) to an exceptional sentence would read the phrase
"standard range" out of the statute. The court will not interpret a statute in a manner that
renders a portion of the statutory language superfluous. See Kilian v. Atkinson, 147
Wn.2d 16, 21, 50 P.3d 638 (2002). If the legislature wishes to make RCW 9.94A.701(9)
applicable to exceptional sentences, it must say so. Based on its plain language, RCW
9.94A.701(9) does not apply when a court imposes an exceptional sentence of
confinement, as the court did in this case. Division Two of the Court of Appeals reached
this same conclusion in State v. Chouap, 170 Wn. App. 114, 126-27, 285 PJd 138
(2012).
Nevertheless, the trial court's sentence still violates RCW 9.94A.505(5), which
restricts a trial court from imposing a combined term of confinement and community
custody that exceeds the statutory maximum. Prior to the enactment ofRCW
9.94A.701(9), we held that a notation on the judgment and sentence explicitly stating that
the combination of confinement and community custody would not exceed the statutory
4
No. 88883-3
maximum satisfied RCW 9.94A.505(5). In re Pers. Restraint of Brooks, 166 Wn.2d 664,
211 P .3d 1023 (2009). This notation in the judgment highlighted to the Department of
Corrections (DOC) that it needed to modify the amount of community custody to
conform with the statutory maximum based on the amount of confinement actually
served. ld. at 672-73. We reasoned that the SRA applies to the DOC, so when
community custody would extend the sentence beyond the statutory maximum, the DOC
must release the offender on or before that date. RCW 9.94A.505(5). We hold that an
explicit notation in the judgment and sentence is still the appropriate remedy in the case
of an exceptional sentence, and we remand to the trial court to amend the sentence to
include this notation.
CONCLUSION
When a trial court imposes a sentence of confinement outside of the standard
range and a sentence of community custody when combined, exceed the statutory
maximum for the offense, our holding in Brooks still applies. The trial court should
include a notation in the judgment and sentence that clarifies that the total term of
confinement and community custody actually served may not exceed the statutory
maximum. We grant Me Williams' petition and remand to the trial court to amend the
judgment to include this notation.
5
No. 88883-3
WE CONCUR:
/
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6
In re Pers. Restraint of McWilliams, No. 88883-3
(Gordon McCloud, J., Dissenting)
No. 88883-3
GORDON McCLOUD, J. (dissenting)-! agree with the majority that the trial
court erred in sentencing Dante Me Williams to a combined term of imprisonment
and community custody that exceeded the statutory maximum and that Me Williams
is therefore entitled to relief. But I disagree that this relief is limited to remand for
the addition of a Brooks 1 notation. Instead, I believe that Me Williams is entitled to
a full resentencing. I therefore respectfully dissent.
ANALYSIS
Not every error in a judgment and sentence necessitates a full resentencing-
some errors can be corrected through remand for a "ministerial correction." State v.
Ramos, 171 Wn.2d 46, 48-49, 246 P.3d 811 (2011). That remedy is appropriate if
the error does not implicate the trial court's discretion. Id. at 49.
By remanding for the addition of a Brooks notation to Me Williams's judgment
and sentence, the majority treats the error in this case as a purely ministerial matter.
But that is contrary to our case law on errors involving the length of a sentence,
1
In re Pers. Restraint of Brooks, 166 Wn.2d 664, 211 P .3d 1023 (2009).
1
In re Pers. Restraint ofMe Williams, No. 88883-3
(Gordon McCloud, J., Dissenting)
whether it is the length of the imprisonment portion of the sentence or the length of
the community custody portion of the sentence.
Under that case law, a mistake regarding the period of community custody
requires a full resentencing even if the correct term is fixed by statute (and thus not
subject to the trial court's discretion). State v. Broadaway, 133 Wn.2d 118, 135-36,
942 P.2d 363 (1997). This is so because the term of community custody and the
term of incarceration are linked, so the trial judge must be allowed to "reconsider
the length of the standard range sentence in light ofthe correct period of community
[custody] required." Id. at 136 (emphasis added). 2
McWilliams was given an exceptional sentence of 120 months of
incarceration plus 18 months of community custody. Under RCW 9.94A.701(2),
the trial court was required to impose an 18-month term of community custody for
McWilliams's offense-second degree assault. 3 But, as the majority recognizes, the
trial court was also prohibited from imposing a combined term of incarceration and
2
To be sure, one recent decision-Ramos-contains language that is inconsistent
with the rule Broadaway announced. Ramos, 171 Wn.2d at 49 (stating, in dicta, that
remand for imposition of a particular term of community custody "would be purely
ministerial[ if] the length of community [custody will be] dictated by statute"). But
Broadaway thoroughly examined the issue and has not been overruled. We should endorse
its well-reasoned approach.
3
RCW 9.94A.701(2) (trial court must impose 18-month community custody term
when sentencing a person for "a violent offense that is not considered a serious violent
offense"); RCW 9.94A.030(54)(a)(viii) (second degree assault is a "violent offense").
2
In re Pers. Restraint of McWilliams, No. 88883-3
(Gordon McCloud, J., Dissenting)
community custody that exceeded the statutory maximum of 120 months. RCW
9.94A.505(5); majority at 2. A Brooks notation is one way to correct the error and
ensure that the combined term does not exceed the statutory maximum.
But that is not the only way. Another way to comply with RCW 9.94A.505(5)
would be to reduce the term of incarceration by 18 months. Indeed, that approach is
the only way to ensure that Me Williams will eventually serve the full 18 months of
community custody-the mere addition of a Brooks notation leaves open the
possibility that he will serve all 120 months in total confinement, having earned no
early release time, and then be released to the community with no period of
supervised transition.
The point is that the trial court, rather than this court, has a choice.
CONCLUSION
The remedy ordered by the majority-a Brooks notation-informs the
Department of Corrections that the sum of the terms of incarceration and community
custody cannot exceed the statutory maximum. But it does not fully address the
error that occurred in this case. It does not allow the trial court to exercise its
sentencing discretion "in light of the correct period of community [custody]."
Broadaway, 133 Wn.2d at 136.
3
In re Pers. Restraint of Me Williams, No. 88883-3
(Gordon McCloud, J., Dissenting)
By restricting the trial judge's discretion on remand, the majority diminishes
the error at hand to a ministerial matter. Because I believe that this conflicts with
our precedent on sentencing errors, I would remand Me Williams' case for a full
resentencing.
4
In re Pers. Restraint of Me Williams, No. 88883-3
(Gordon McCloud, J., Dissenting)
5