DocketNumber: No. 1352
Citation Numbers: 10 Wash. 393, 39 P. 110, 1894 Wash. LEXIS 234
Judges: Anders, Hoyt
Filed Date: 12/27/1894
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 10/19/2024
The opinion of the court was delivered by
The respondent is a corporation organized and existing under and by virtue of the laws of the Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, and, at the times hereinafter mentioned, was lawfully conducting the business of insurance in this state, and was represented by a local agent in the city of Seattle. It was also engaged in similar business in California and in all the other states and territories on the Pacific Coast, and had a general agent for the management thereof in all of said states and territories, including this state, whose office and place of business was at San Francisco, in the state of California. All moneys collected by local agents were remitted to this general agent, and the funds of the company for the payment of losses were kept in San Francisco and disbursed by him only, the local agents throughout said states and territories having no authority to settle or pay losses on account of the company, except as requested and directed by him.
On July 2, 1890, the respondent, by its agent at Seattle, delivered a properly executed policy of insurance to one C. H. Knox, a citizen of this state, whereby it agreed to insure him against loss or damage by fire, to the amount of $1,000, on a stock of merchandise owned by him in Seattle, for the period of one year from said date. On September 19, 1890, and while the policy was in full force and effect, the property so insured was totally destroyed by fire. Thereafter the respondent adjusted the loss at $1,000, but before the same was paid, and on October 1, 1890, certain creditors of Knox, residing in San Francisco, commenced actions in the superior court of the city and county of San Francisco to recover the
It is disclosed by the record that other insurance companies besides the respondent, indebted to Knox on policies of insurance covering the burned stock of goods, were likewise garnished in the attachment proceedings in the California court. The total amount of indebtedness so attached, including the amount due from the respondent, was $4,500. The total amount of the claims of the California creditors, upon which suits were brought and in which garnishments were served upon respondent, was $5,078.15. Two of the creditors who caused garnishment process to be served upon the respondent in California, namely, Wheaton, fruhrs & Co., and Ksberg, Bachman & Co., afterwards filed their claims in this state with the appellant as assignee of Knox.
From what we have stated it will be observed that the facts in this case are almost identical with those involved in the case of Neufelder v. German-American Ins. Co., 6 Wash. 336 (33 Pac. 870, 36 Am. St. Rep. 166). In that case this court held that the California court acquired jurisdiction of the debt owing by the insurance company to Knox, and, having acquired jurisdiction, could enforce its payment by
The first and most material point made is that the trial court in rendering its judgment overlooked one of the provisions of our insolvent law, to the injury of the appellant, or rather of the creditors in this state. The claim, more specifically stated, is that inasmuch as, by virtue of our insolvent debtors act, then in force, prior attachments were dissolved, in this state, by a general assignment, the court should have held the law operative to the same extent upon the California attachments, and permitted the action to proceed without any regard whatever to the proceedings in that state. The appellant’s contention is based upon the general proposition, that the laws of a state have no binding force beyond its territorial limits, and are only permitted to operate in other states upon the principle of comity, and when neither the state where the foreign law is sought to be applied, nor its citizens, would be injured by its application. We have no disposition to dispute this proposition, for it may be said to be the statement of an elementary principle of law. Sutherland, Stat. Const., 12; Dunlap v. Rogers, 47 N. H. 287 (93 Am. Dec. 433).
But, while it is true that if writs of attachment had been levied upon the property of Knox at the suit of creditors, in this state, they would have been dissolved by his assignment by operation of law, it does not necessarily follow that the court erred in recognizing the California attachments as valid and binding there. It is said by the learned author above cited (page 12), that the observance and recognition of foreign laws rests in comity and convenience, and in the aim of the law to adapt its remedies to the great ends of justice. And courts, in furtherance of justice, do recognize the validity of acts done under foreign laws, which would not be valid if done in the jurisdiction of the forum, as will be hereafter shown.
The learned counsel for the appellant cite the case of
So, in this case, the trial court merely held that the debt sued upon, having been lawfully attached and held for the satisfaction of any judgments the California creditors might recover against Knox, prior to the assignment, passed to the appellant, as assignee, subject to those attachments. Nor
That the conclusion of the court below was not improper will also, we think, be disclosed by an examination of the decision of the supreme court of the United States in the well considered case of Green v. Van Buskirk, 7 Wall. 148, wherein the court said:
“ Attachment laws, to use the words of Chancellor Kent, are legal modes of acquiring title to property by operation of law. They exist in every state for the furtherance of justice, with more or less of liberality to creditors. And if the title acquired under the attachment laws of a state, and which is valid there, is not to be held valid in every other state, it were better that these laws were abolished, for they would prove to be but a snare and a delusion to the creditors.” .
If the title to property acquired by attachment in one state, and which is valid there, is to be deemed valid in every other state, it would seem logically to follow that an attachment, valid in the state where it is levied, ought to be held valid in every other state. Nor, as we understand it, does the case of Cole v. Cunningham, 133 U. S. 107 (10 Sup. Ct. 269), cited by appellant, overrule or modify the court’s former decision in the 7th of Wallace, above cited.
Under the circumstances; therefore, we are unable to perceive wherein the appellant was injured by the judgment complained of. If the respondent is compelled to pay the sum of money here claimed, or any part of it, to the creditors in San Francisco, of course it ought not to be obliged to pay it again to appellant. But if it is not compelled to pay there, then the final judgment of the court in this state will be in favor of the appellant for the amount due upon the policy.
It is further claimed by the appellant that Wheaton, Uuhrs & Co., and Esberg, Bachman & Co., by filing their
We perceive no error prejudicial to appellant, and the judgment is therefore affirmed.
Dunbar, C. J., and Scott and Stiles, JJ., concur.
Note — As to the conflict between attachments or other legal proceedings in one state and general assignments or insolvency proceedings in another state, see note to Long v. Forrest, (Pa.) 23 L. R. A. 33.