DocketNumber: No. 14617
Citation Numbers: 101 Wash. 51, 171 P. 1025, 1918 Wash. LEXIS 796
Judges: Holcomb
Filed Date: 4/4/1918
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 10/19/2024
This action is one to recover a balance alleged to be due upon the purchase price of a lot of Australian hardwood, sold and delivered by respondent to appellant for use in the construction of a dry dock for the United States government at Bremerton. Upon the trial of the issues, the court found, in substance: (1) That respondent sold and delivered
Appellant excepted to the findings numbered 3, 4, 5, and 6, and the conclusions of law in conformity therewith and supporting the judgment against it, and assigns its errors thereon.
All of these assignments involve questions of fact except as to the conclusions which followed the findings. We have carefully examined the entire record and are of the opinion that the evidence supports the findings of the trial court.
Objection is made to the allowance of the cost of consular invoices and cablegrams. It is conceded that the duty was to be paid by appellant upon' the arrival of the shipments in this country. The consular invoices issued by the United States consular officer were necessary in order that the shipments could be received in this country and for the payment of duty. While there was a dispute as to whether the timbers were to be shipped f. o. b. Bremerton, or c. i. f., that is, cost, insurance and freight, there was testimony justifying the court in finding that the shipments were to be made cost, insurance and freight, and the insurance and freight were invariably paid by prepaying upon shipment and adding it to the cost of the timbers. The
The contract was made by appellant with the Ehrlich-Harrison Company, a timber brokerage concern of Seattle, acting through a Mr. Abbott. The contract was for the materials to be ordered from respondent in Sidney, Australia. The price to be' paid was stated in American money, but was to be paid to the respondent in Australia, and appellant agreed to and did furnish a letter of credit to cover the $60 per thousand which was to be paid to respondent in Australia. It was not, therefore, a contract made, between two parties in this state, but was a contract made between a party in this state and a party in Australia. A letter of credit which appellant authorized its bank to deposit in a bank in Australia, followed by a cablegram and a letter from appellant’s bank, apparently interpreted the understanding of the agreement between the parties on the part of appellant, that respondent should receive the $60 per thousand feet upon shipping documents and policy of insurance, including consular invoice with costs, insurance and freight added to the cost of the timbers. This was later confirmed by letter from appellant to the bank in Sidney.
The third assignment of error assails the fifth finding of fact, to the effect that appellant had paid no part of the sum agreed upon except the sum of $30,-063.36, leaving a balance due and owing of $1,204, based upon the contention that the court credited appellant only with the proceeds of the drafts negotiated for the advance payment at $60 per thousand con
As to the claim of error in the finding of the court that but 20,000 feet of the timbers delivered, instead of 46,626 feet, were too small, and in finding that the cost to the appellant of buying the additional lumber was $1,560 instead of $3,925.20, the amount which appellant paid to replace the shortage in timbers, the evidence, while in conflict, justified the finding.
It would serve no useful purpose to enter into an analysis of the intricate and voluminous evidence pro and con upon these points. Suffice it to say that, while the court might have found in favor of appellant upon these questions, the evidence does not preponderate against the findings; and while it is true that appellant paid $84 per thousand for the timbers which it procured as necessary to complete its order, there was evidence which would have justified the trial court in finding that it could have procured the timbers for
Judgment affirmed.
Ellis, O.. J., Mount, and Chadwick, JJ., concur.