DocketNumber: No. 4647
Citation Numbers: 32 Wash. 517
Judges: Hadley
Filed Date: 8/11/1903
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 8/12/2021
The opinion of the court was delivered, by
Henry B. Carratt and Sarah Carratt had been, for many years prior to Uovember 28, 1889, husband and wife. On said date Sarah Carratt died. On March 29, 1887, and during the existence of the community arising from the said marriage relation, one Wise for a consideration of $2,500 executed a warranty deed to said Henry B. Carratt, purporting to convey certain described lands in Klickitat county, Washington. Said Carratt and wife at once entered into the possession of said lands and continued to occupy the same until the time of the wife’s death. Henry B. Carratt remained in possession thereof after his wife’s death. The said Wise, grantor in said deed, claimed title to the land by virtue of a conveyance thereof made by the Horthern Pacific Railroad Company, bearing date March 24, 1887. The lands described in the deeds above mentioned were included in the land grant made to said, railroad company by act of Congress. On September 29, 1890, Congress passed what is commonly called the “Forfeiture Act,” whereby it declared “that there is hereby forfeited to the Hnited States, and the Hnited States hereby resumes the title thereto, all lands heretofore granted to any state or to any corporation to aid in the construction of a railroad opposite to and coterminous with the portion of any such railroad not now completed, and in operation, for the construction or benefit of which such lands were granted; and all such lands are
The respondent Rachel Oarratt urges, first, that the lands were not community property, and further, that, if they were, appellant is barred by adverse possession, and is also estopped by a release of all his interest in his mother’s estate, executed by him to his father Henry B. Oarratt. We think, under the facts hereinbefore stated, that the lands were not the property of the community. With the death of the wife in November, 1889, the community ceased to exist. Nearly one year after that time the act of Congress mentioned above declared a forfeiture of the lands, and the title became absolute in the government. The act extended to the person in possession the privilege of purchasing. The privilege was granted to the person in actual possession at the time the law was passed. That person was Henry B. Oarratt. The community was not in possession after the death of the wife, since it had ceased to be. The community, therefore, could not have been in possession whén the law was passed, for the reason that no such an entity then existed. Actual possession by the purchaser was made a necessary element of the right to purchase granted by the law. The title conveyed by the government must therefore have vested in the person so in possession, proof of which was required before the convey
The above point essentially disposes of the case. The trial court also found facts from which it concluded that appellant was barred in any event by adverse possession, and also that he was estopped by a quitclaim and release unto his father of all interest in his mother’s estate. It is not necessary that we shall discuss these points, further than to say that from our examination of the evidence we should not be disposed to disturb the findings and conclusions in those particulars, even though it were necessary to discuss them for the determination of the case.
The judgment is affirmed.
Euleebton, C. J., and Anders and Mount, JJ., concur.