DocketNumber: No. 4889
Citation Numbers: 35 Wash. 156, 76 P. 737, 1904 Wash. LEXIS 428
Judges: Dunbar
Filed Date: 5/7/1904
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 10/19/2024
This is an action brought by the appellant to quiet title to certain lands in controversy. The complaint alleges, plaintiff’s ownership in, and possession of, the lands; that the defendants claim some right, title, or interest in and to said lands adverse to plaintiff, and that the said claim is without any right whatever; and asks, that the defendants he- required to set forth the nature of their claim; that, by decree, it be declared and adjudged that the defendants have no estate, right, title, or interest whatever in or to said land; that the title of the plaintiff thereto be declared and adjudged to be valid; that the title thereof he quieted as against any and all claims of any kind whatever; and that defendants be perpetually enjoined from asserting or setting up any estate, right, title, or interest whatever in or to said land; and prays for costs“and general relief.
The reply admits the commencement of the action set forth in the answer, the obtaining of the judgment, issu
The court found the issues, in relation to the maintaining of the homestead right by the plaintiff, against her; and judgment was entered dismissing the action, with costs to defendant. From that judgment this appeal is taken.
The cause was tried on the theory that it was the duty of the .appellant to maintain her right to the selected homestead by actual occupancy of the same, and the judgment was rendered against her for the reason that, in the opinion of the court, such occupancy had not been proven, and for the further reason that the debt contracted was antecedent to the passage of the homestead law of 1895, wherein the value of the homestead exempt was raised from $1,000 to $2,000. But the question of occupancy is not a material one in the case, for § J of chap. 6é, p. 109, of the Sessions Laws of 1895, an act defining a homestead and providing for the manner of selecting the same,
ISTor could the judgment of the court be sustained on the theory that the appellant was entitled to an exemption of only $1,000, instead of $2,000; for, in this instance, the property was not sold in the manner provided by law for the sale of homesteads, and no exemption at all was allowed. The law points out definitely the manner in which such sales shall be conducted, and the homestead cannot be legally disposed of in any other way.
It is insisted by the respondents that, in any event, this judgment must be affirmed, for the reason that this is a collateral attack upon the judgment of sale and confirmation of the lands in dispute, and that the judgment cannot be avoided by reason of any irregularities or illegality in obtaining it, even though it be void, if, upon the face of the judgment, it is legal. This is true as a general proposition, but, under the provisions of our statute, as they have been construed by this court, the only question that can he determined upon the confirmation of the sale of lands is the regularity of the sale. In Krutz v. Batts, 18 Wash. 460, 51 Pac. 1054, after quoting the statute governing confirmations, it was said:
“It will thus be seen that the only question which the court has a right to investigate is a question of irregularity in the proceedings concerning the sale. The law is plain and imperative on that proposition, and the matters ob-' jected to by the respondents here were not matters concerning the irregularity of the sale, but concerning the*161 jurisdiction of the court which rendered the judgment in the first instance.”
It was also decided, in Harding v. Atlantic Trust Co., 26 Wash. 536, 67 Pac. 222, that the confirmation by the court of an execution sale of realty, after it had been claimed as exempt as the homestead of the judgment debtors, would not constitute an adjudication upon the question of the homestead claim, since the only question the court could properly investigate upon application for confirmation was that of irregularity in the proceedings concerning the sale.
The judgment is reversed, and the cause remanded, with instructions to proceed in accordance with this opinion.
Fullerton, C, J., and Hadley, Anders, and Mount, JJ., concur.