DocketNumber: No. 6599
Citation Numbers: 46 Wash. 256
Judges: Crow
Filed Date: 4/12/1907
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 10/19/2024
Action by A. B. Stewart and wife against the Yesler Estate, Incorporated, to enforce specific performance of an alleged trust. The following facts are undisputed: Early in 1888, Henry Yesler, owning twenty acres of unplatted land in Seattle,, and block 1 (containing twenty-four lots) in Sarah B. Yesler’s First Addition to Seattle, entered into a written agreement, as first party, with L. S. J. Hunt, J. F. McNaught, J. D. Lowman, and A. B. Stewart, as second parties, stipulating that upon their request he would plat the twenty acres and sell the same and block 1 to purchasers procured by them, at not less than $500 per acre for the twenty acres, and $225 per lot for block 1; that all disbursements for platting, clearing, grading and improving and all taxes were to be advanced by the second parties; that Yesler was to first receive $15,400, of the proceeds of sales made,; that the second parties were then to be reimbursed for their advancements, and that the remainder was to be paid, one-third to Yesler and one-sixth to each of the second parties. This agreement was destroyed in the great Seattle fire in 1889.
Henry Yesler died December 16, 1892. On December 15, 1892, he being then alive but on his death bed, J. D. Low-man, acting as Yesler’s attorney in fact, under a power of attorney held by him, executed and delivered to Jacob Furth a deed for the real estate above mentioned. On December 16, 1892, but after Yesler’s death, Furth executed and delivered the following insti-ument:
“Whereas Henry L. Yesler, by the hand of James D. Low-man, his attorney in fact, did, on the 15th day of December,
The agreement then provides for ' the payment of one-third of the residue to Yesler and one-sixth each to Hunt, McNaught, Lowman and Stewart. In November, 1894, a
“This indenture entered into this - day of November, A. D. 1894 between Jacob Furth of the first part, and L. S. J. Hunt and Jessie N. Hunt, his wife, A. B. Stewart and May Stewart, his wife, Joseph F. McNaught and Jennie E. McNaught, his wife, J. D. Lowman and Mary B.. Low-man, his wife, of the other part, Witnesseth: That, whereas, by deed bearing date December 15th, 1892, Henry L. Yesler did convey to the party of the first part [here follows description of land above mentioned.] And whereas, the said conveyance was made to me in trust upon the confidences and trusts embraced and expressed in a certain declaration of trust executed by the party of the first part under his hand and seal on the 16th day of December, 1892, which declaration of trust was delivered to L. S. J. Hunt, A. B. Stewart, Joseph McNaught, J. D. Lowman and Henry L. Yesler on the day of its date; and which declaration of trust is hereto attached and made a part hereof. And whereas, Henry L. Yesler, J. D. Lowman, J. F. McNaught and L. S. J. Hunt did on the 10th day of January, 1892, make and deliver to The James Street Construction Company their promissory note for the sum of twenty-five hundred dollars ($2,500) with interest thereon from June 16th, 1891, until paid at the rate of eight per cent per annum, and on the 10th day of July, 1892, did make and deliver to the said payee their other promissory note of twenty-five hundred dollars ($2,500) bearing date July 10th, 1892, payable one year after date with interest from June 16th, 1892, until paid at the rate of eight per cent per annum, which said promissory notes are now' held by M. H. Young, and have been presented to the administrators of the estate of Henry L. Yesler, deceased, as a claim against the said estate. And whereas, said notes were given by the makers, thereof as a subsidy to the James Street Construction Company, for the Broadway branch of the Union Trunk line. And, whereas, since the execution of said deed and declaration of trust, the north half of said block one (1) has been sold for the sum of four thousand dollars ($4,000.00) and said sum paid to the estate of Henry L. Yesler upon the payment of fifteen thousand four hundred dollars ($15,400.00) due him under said declaration of trust;
“Now, therefore the said declaration of trust is modified' as hereinafore said so as to express the true understanding and agreement of the parties as above stated, and that the parties in interest do hereby agree to such modification.”
This instrument was executed by all the parties thereto, including the plaintiff Stewart.
At no time prior to the commencement of this action did’ Stewart or his associates clear, plat, grade, or improve the-land or pay taxes. The taxes became delinquent and certificates of delinquency were issued. Between 1892 and 1898,.
On December 9, 1901, Mr. Furth wrote Stewart that the defendant, claiming Stewart had no interest in the property, had demanded a deed from Furth, and stated that he would delay action for fifteen days until Stewart could consider his course of procedure. On December 11, 1901, Stewart wrote Furth, claiming a one-sixth interest in the real estate, and stated that he was ready and willing to-pay one-sixth of the taxes, upon being furnished a statement. About the same
The defendant in its answer pleaded laches, estoppel, and other defenses. The trial court made findings in substantial accordance with the above statement. Thereupon the plaintiff paid into court a tender of $5,612.69, and a decree was entered, awarding him specific performance, and appointing a trustee to plat and sell the land and distribute the proceeds, as follows: (1) To the defendant $11,400; (2) to the payment of taxes and other charges; and (3) one-sixth of the remainder to the plaintiff, and five-sixths to the defendant. The defendant has appealed.
The only defense which we will consider is that of laches. The respondent comes into a court of equity demanding specific performance of the trust agreement. He claims a one-sixth interest in the profits, admitting his liability for taxes and other disbursements. The first question presented
After Henry Yesler’s death, the real estate was sold and, by mesne conveyances, passed to the appellant. It redeemed the property from tax sale, preventing its complete and irrevocable loss. During this time, if the trust agreement was valid and had not been abandoned by the respondent, it was the duty of himself and associates to advance all these taxes and pay for clearing, grading and improvements, but .not one dollar did they expend. They did nothing. A- period of financial depression ensued and continued for a number of years. The estate of Henry Yesler, its creditors, and the Yesler Estate, Incorporated, severally struggled to save the propert}' from total loss, carrying all financial burdens thereby imposed, but the respondent still remained inactive. In 1898 his associates abandoned and surrendered their interests. Respondent made no formal surrender, yet in view of existing conditions, the depreciation in values, and the unsalable character of the property, it is impossible to conceive
The respondents, after December, 1901, indulged in four additional years of inactivity, then in December, 1905, the property having increased tenfold in value, he instituted this action and, after trial, made his first payment of $5,612.69, at a time when he could realize a large and immediate profit, approximately estimated at $25,000. Should he, after all these years of inactivity, be permitted by á court of equity to realize tin’s large return from property saved and improved by the appellant without assistance from him or his associates? We think not. The facts here constitute a much stronger showing of laches than was presented in Ferrell v.
■ “There is no inflexible rule controlling the application of the defense of laches. The facts and circumstances of each case must govern, courts of equity in permitting said defense to be made. The authorities show that, while lapse of time is one of the elements to be considered in applying this equitable defense to stale claims, it is only one, and that it is not necessarily the controlling or most important one. Regard must be had to all of the facts and surrounding circumstances, and if, when carefully considered, they do not appeal to the conscience of the chancellor, on behalf of a claimant, the defense of laches should be allowed.”
See, also, Hayward v. National Bank, 96 U. S. 611, 24 L. Ed. 855; Townsend v. Vanderwerker, 160 U. S. 171, 16 Sup. Ct. 258, 40 L. Ed. 383.
This action for specific performance was commenced by the respondent after long and unexplained delay, and at a time when the property had increased tenfold in value. Unreasonable delay of a party in performance, or in enforcing his rights when disputed, may shorten the period fixed by the statute of limitations and constitute such laches as will amount to an abandonment of the contract on his part and deprive him of the remedy of specific performance.
“It is indeed generally essential that the party seeking a specific performance should not himself have been backward; that he should not have held off until circumstances may have changed, or kept himself aloof so as to enforce or to abandon the contract as events might prove most advantageous.” Ford v. Euker, 86 Va. 75, 9 S. E. 500.
The plaintiff in McCabe v. Matthews, 155 U. S. 550, 15 Sup. Ct. 190, 39 L. Ed. 256, had remained inactive for some nine years, until the land advanced in value from $150 to $7,500. He then sued for specific performance. Mr. Justice Brewer, in closing his opinion, said:
“It seems to us to be a case of a purely speculative contract on the part of the plaintiff; doing nothing himself, he waits
See, also, Fry, Specific Performance (3d ed.), § 1072; Whitney v. Fox, 166 U. S. 637, 17 Sup. Ct. 713, 41 L. Ed. 1145; Patterson v. Hewitt, 195 U. S. 309, 25 Sup. Ct. 35; Fowler v. Marshall, 29 Kan. 665.
Further comment and authority are unnecessary. Equity and good conscience will not permit any relief to the respondent in the face of his laches and long-continued neglect. Were he to recover, there w'ould be no limit to the prosecution of stale claims in violation of the present ■well-established doctrine of laches as universally announced.
The judgment is reversed, and the cause remanded, with instructions to dismiss the action.
Hadley, C. J., Dunbar, and Mount, JJ., concur.