State Of Washington, V Raul T. Castro

FILED
COURT OF •APPEALS
DIVISION II
2015 JAN 13 Mi 1° 1: 17
STATE OF WASHINGTON
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE
DIVISION II
STATE OF WASHINGTON, No. 45277 -4 -II
Respondent,
v.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
RAUL THATER CASTRO,
Appellant.
MAxA, J. — Raul Castro was convicted of first degree theft and two counts of unlawful
issuance of bank checks ( UIBC). He argues on appeal that ( 1) the charging information
provided insufficient notice of the first degree theft charge, ( 2) the prosecutor engaged in
prosecutorial misconduct, and ( 3) the trial court erred in treating each of Castro' s convictions
as separate offenses for sentencing purposes. The State concedes, and we agree, that the
information was insufficient as to the first degree theft charge. Therefore, we reverse the
resulting conviction and dismiss that charge without prejudice. We reject Castro' s other
arguments and affirm his two UIBC convictions, but remand for resentencing.
FACTS
On two consecutive days – December 31, 2011 and January 1, 2012 – Castro wrote a
check for $5, 000 and deposited it into his TwinStar Credit Union checking account at an
automatic teller machine (ATM) in Vancouver. Each time, the $ 5, 000 was made immediately
available to Castro, and he withdrew the full amount later each day in several transactions at.
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casinos and an ATM in La Center. Castro wrote the checks on a closed account, and they were
dishonored. As a result, TwinStar suffered a loss of $10, 024. 23.
After police contacted Castro' s family about the checks, Castro came to the police
station. There he orally confessed to writing and depositing the two bad checks and then
withdrawing the funds. He then wrote and signed a confession in the presence of police.
The State charged Castro with first degree theft and two UIBC counts. The proceedings
were stayed pending Castro' s participation in a pretrial diversion program. As part of the
program, Castro met with diversion counselor Sheila Vann. At Castro' s first meeting with Vann,
he discussed his crimes and signed paperwork confessing to and detailing those crimes.
The State later moved to revoke the stay of proceedings when Castro failed to make
restitution payments required by the diversion program. The trial court granted the motion, and
the case went to trial. At trial, Vann testified as to her interactions with Castro and his signing of
the written confession. The jury found Castro guilty on all counts.
At sentencing, Castro argued that all three convictions stemmed from the same criminal
conduct. The trial court disagreed and treated each crime as a separate offense for purposes of
calculating Castro' s offender score. The trial court ultimately sentenced Castro to 90 days
confinement.
Castro appeals his convictions and sentence.
ANALYSIS
A. INSUFFICIENT INFORMATION
Castro claims that the information provided insufficient notice of the first degree theft
charge because it did not explain that the State was treating all of Castro' s withdrawals as part of
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a common scheme or plan for the purpose of aggregating the total amount of money he
misappropriated. The State concedes this issue and recommends reversal of the theft conviction.
We agree with the parties.
Former RCW 9A. 56. 030( 1)( a) ( 2009) 1 provides that first degree theft constitutes the theft
of property or services exceeding $ 5, 000 in value. Under RCW 9A. 56. 010( 21)( c), the State can
aggregate a series of transactions that constitute theft in one count and use the aggregate value of
the transactions in determining the degree of theft. Aggregation is permitted only if the State can
show that the transactions are part of a criminal episode or a common scheme or plan. RCW
9A.56. 010( 21)( c). If the State aggregates value to reach a statutory value threshold, a common
scheme or plan is an essential element of a crime that must be included in the information. See
State v. Rivas, 168 Wn. App. 882, 890 -91, 278 P.3d 686 ( 2012), review denied, 176 Wash. 2d 1007
2013) ( applying the rule to second degree malicious mischief charge).
Here, the State charged Castro with first degree theft. Because each check was for
exactly $5, 000, the State had to aggregate the amounts of both checks in order to meet the $ 5, 000
threshold for first degree theft. However, Count 1 ( first degree theft) of the information does not
mention or imply a common scheme or plan, and no fair reading of the information reveals that
necessary element. Therefore, we hold that the information was insufficient as to Count 1,
1•
RCW 9A. 56. 030 was amended in 2012 ( LAWS OF 2012, ch. 233, § 2) and again in 2013 ( LAws
OF 2013, ch. 322, § 2). These amendments do not affect the subsection cited.
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reverse Castro' s conviction for first degree theft, and dismiss that charge without prejudice.2
B. PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT
Castro argues that the prosecutor engaged in prosecutorial misconduct, infringing his
constitutional right to a fair trial. He asserts that the prosecutor ( 1) argued facts not in evidence,
2) misstated the law, and ( 3) inappropriately disparaged defense counsel. He also argues that
the cumulative effect of this misconduct requires reversal. We reject the first of these
misconduct claims because Castro waived it by failing to object below, and we reject the other
claims because the conduct at issue was not improper.
To prevail on a claim of prosecutorial misconduct, a defendant must show that in the
context of the record and all of the circumstances of the trial, the prosecutor' s conduct was both
improper and prejudicial. State v. Thorgerson, 172 Wash. 2d 438, 442, 258 P.3d 43 ( 2011). We
examine the prosecutor' s conduct and whether prejudice resulted therefrom " by examining that
conduct in the full trial context, including the evidence presented, `` the context of the total
argument, the issues in the case, the evidence addressed in the argument, and the instructions
given to the jury.' " State v. Monday, 171 Wash. 2d 667, 675, 257 P.3d 551 ( 2011) ( internal
quotation marks omitted) ( quoting State v. McKenzie, 157 Wash. 2d 44, 52, 134 P.3d 221 ( 2006)).
Misconduct is prejudicial if there is a substantial likelihood it affected the verdict. State v.
Emery, 174 Wash. 2d 741, 760, 278 P.3d 653 ( 2012).
2 The State asks for reversal and remand. But the case law establishes that dismissal without
prejudice is the correct remedy where the charging document provides insufficient notice of a
required element. State v. Brown, 169 Wash. 2d 195, 198, 234 P.3d 212 ( 2010); Rivas, 168 Wn.
App. at 887.
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However, a defendant waives any error by failing to object to the prosecutor' s improper
conduct, unless that conduct was so flagrant and ill-intentioned that an instruction could not have
cured the resulting prejudice. Emery, 174 Wash. 2d at 760 -61. In assessing whether a failure to
object should operate as a waiver, we " focus less on whether the prosecutor' s misconduct was
flagrant or ill intentioned and more on whether the resulting prejudice could have been cured."
Id. at 762. Therefore, to avoid waiver the defendant must show that no curative instruction
would have eliminated the prejudicial effect of the prosecutor' s conduct. Id. at 760 -61. This is
the case only where the misconduct " engendered an incurable feeling of prejudice in the mind of
the jury." Id. at 762.
1. Arguing Facts Not in Evidence
Castro argues that the prosecutor committed misconduct by bolstering Vann' s credibility
during closing argument using facts not in evidence. Although we agree that this argument was
improper, Castro did not object to the prosecutor' s argument at trial. Because a curative
instruction would have prevented any prejudice, we hold that Castro waived his misconduct
claim.
It is improper for a prosecutor to submit to the jury during closing argument facts not
admitted as evidence during the trial. In re Pers. Restraint of Glasmann, 175 Wash. 2d 696, 704-
05, 286 P. 3d673 ( 2012). It is particularly improper to bolster a witness' s credibility at closing
argument with facts not in evidence. See State v. Jones, 144 Wash. App. 284, 293 -94, 183 P.3d
307 ( 2008).
Castro primarily argues that the prosecutor committed misconduct by arguing that Vann
should be believed because she would suffer professional repercussions for allowing an
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intoxicated client to sign a confession statement. One of the key issues at trial was whether
Castro had been intoxicated at the time he signed the confession in Vann' s presence. Vann
testified that Castro appeared to be sober and lucid when he signed the confession. But she did
not testify as to whether she could or would suffer professional repercussions for allowing an
intoxicated client to write and sign a confession, and the State produced no evidence of any such
repercussions.
During closing argument, the prosecutor argued to the jury that the witness should be
believed because her employment status depended on it:
Sheila Vann is - - works for the county. Her job is on the line. She had someone
write a confession; they better know what' s going on, they better understand it, or
she can be in trouble if she has an intoxicated person or someone who doesn' t
understand signing a written confession under penalty of perjury.
Report of Proceedings ( RP) at 254. When viewed in context, it appears the prosecutor was
asking the jury to consider the general possibility of professional repercussions. But even this
sort of generalized inferential argument constitutes improper bolstering. See Jones, 144 Wn.
App. at 293 -94.
Castro also argues that the prosecutor committed misconduct by telling the jury Vann had
prior experience with intoxicated clients lying about their.intoxication. In arguing that Vann was
especially perceptive of intoxication due to her professional experience as a probation officer, the
prosecutor stated:
She' s a probation officer. She probably had a lot of clients try to tell her they
weren' t intoxicated, and she could tell if they were.
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RP at 262. Vann testified that she had been a probation officer and had dealt with intoxicated
clients, but she never mentioned any intoxicated clients telling her they weren' t intoxicated.
Once again, the prosecutor' s argument was not based on any evidence and was improper.
However, Castro did not object below to either portion of the prosecutor' s argument. He
therefore waived his claim if a curative instruction would have eliminated any resulting
prejudice. See Emery, 174 Wash. 2d at 760 -61. Here, if Castro had objected the trial court could
have struck the prosecutor' s arguments from the record and instructed the jury to disregard any
arguments that the evidence did not support. This would have cured the prejudice. Therefore,
we hold that Castro waived his right to claim misconduct on the basis of these statements.
2. Misstating the Law
Castro argues that the prosecutor committed misconduct by telling the jury it could not
find Castro not guilty because it felt bad for him. We disagree.
Castro argues that the prosecutor misstated the law by failing to account for the
possibility of jury nullification. During closing argument, the prosecutor addressed jury
instruction 1, which stated: " You must not let your emotions overcome your rational thought
process. You must reach your decision based on the facts proved to you and on the law given to
you." Clerk' s Papers at 18. The prosecutor noted that the defendant may be a sympathetic
figure and then told the jury:
You' re not here to decide if he' s a good guy. You' re not here to decide if he' s a
bad guy. You' re not here to decide based on sympathy for him.
I ask you - - you to divorce yourself from emotion. I ask you to do it based on the
facts and the law that were provided to you. ... You cannot say " not guilty"
because you feel bad for him. That' s not in our system of justice, and that' s not in
these instructions you all agreed to - - to follow.
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RP at 256 -57.
We hold that the prosecutor' s argument was not improper. The prosecutor did not
mischaracterize the jury instruction, but merely applied it to the type of sympathies that might
reasonably arise among the jurors in this case.
Castro claims that the statement misstated the law because a jury can acquit for any
reason. It is true that juries possess the power to acquit a defendant despite lacking any
reasonable doubt as to the defendant' s guilt. This is commonly known as jury nullification. See
generally Andrew D. Leipold, Rethinking Jury Nullification, 82 VA. L. REV. 253 ( 1996). But
that power does not stem from any legal right.3 State v. Brown, 130 Wash. App. 767, 771, 124
P.3d 663 ( 2005). In fact, juries have a duty to find the defendant guilty if they determine that the
State has proved its case beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 771. Therefore, a jury can engage in
nullification but has no legal right to do so. The prosecutor in this case was doing little more
than reminding the jury of their duty not to nullify. We hold that this argument was not
improper.
3. Disparaging Defense Counsel
Castro argues that the prosecutor committed misconduct by disparaging defense counsel
during closing argument. We disagree.
3 The power stems from courts' unwillingness to inquire into the content of jurors' deliberations.
State v. Elmore, 155 Wash. 2d 758, 771, 123 P.3d 72 ( 2005). Because a court will not generally
investigate jurors' reasons for reaching a particular verdict, jurors can agree to acquit on virtually
any basis without court knowledge. See id. at 773 -74. Jury nullification therefore is properly
characterized as a byproduct of a court' s limited ability to enforce jurors' legal duties, not as a
legal right.
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Disparaging the role of defense counsel during closing argument in order to make it
appear that only the prosecutor is serving the cause ofjustice is improper prosecutorial conduct.
State v. Gonzales, 111 Wn. App. 276, 282 -84, 45 P.3d 205 ( 2002). A closing argument may not
draw the cloak of righteousness around the prosecutor in his personal status as government
attorney and impugn[] the integrity of defense counsel." Id. at 283 ( quoting United States v.
Frascone, 747 F.2d 953, 957 -58 ( 5th Cir. 1984)). The impropriety is rooted both in the
promotion of the prosecutor as the champion of justice and the disparagement of defense counsel
as an obstacle to justice. See Gonzales, 111 Wash. App. at 283 -84.
Castro points to one of the prosecutor' s statements during closing argument as
improperly disparaging. After summarizing the State' s evidence of Castro' s guilt, the prosecutor
said:
Now, Defense is going to get up here, they' re going to try to point out
insufficiencies or problems with the State' s case, and that' s what they do. That' s -
that' s his job. That' s what he' s here for. But I want you to remember, the State
doesn' t have to prove the case beyond all doubt; it' s beyond a reasonable doubt.
Defense is going to get into semantics. They' re going to try to get you to chase
them down the rabbit hole. I would ask that you remain focused on the fact that
that bank is out $ 10, 000. 00, and [ Castro] is responsible for it.
RP at 251 -52.
The prosecutor did not attempt to convey the impression that the defense attorney was
impeding the cause ofjustice. The prosecutor noted that it is the defense attorney' s job to attack
the State' s case. But unlike the situation addressed in Gonzales, the prosecutor was not
attempting to impugn the defense counsel' s integrity. When viewed in context, the argument
instead appears to have been an anticipatory framing of the defense argument. The prosecutor
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implored the jury to remain focused on the State' s overwhelming evidence instead of the
defendant' s argument. We hold that the prosecutor' s argument was not improper.
4. Cumulative Error
Finally, Castro argues that even if none of the aforementioned conduct is sufficient to
sustain his prosecutorial misconduct claim, the cumulative impact of the conduct deprived him of
a fair trial. However, as stated above, the prosecutor engaged in misconduct only in arguing two
facts not in evidence. Therefore, we hold that there was no " cumulative" error.
C. OFFENDER SCORE
Castro argues that the trial court abused its discretion by treating his three convictions as
separate offenses for purposes of calculating his offender score. Because we reverse the theft
conviction, the only issue is whether the two UIBC offenses constitute the same criminal
conduct. We hold that they do not because the crimes involved distinct criminal intent and were
committed at different times.
When a defendant is convicted of multiple crimes, each is treated like a prior conviction
for purposes of calculating the defendant' s offender score unless the crimes constitute the same
criminal conduct. RCW 9. 94A. 589( 1)( a). A sentencing court must find that the crimes
constitute the same criminal conduct if the crimes " require the same criminal intent, are
committed at the same time and place, and involve the same victim." Id. If the defendant fails to
prove any of those three elements, the crimes should not be considered the same criminal
conduct. State v. Aldana Graciano, 176 Wash. 2d 531, 540, 295 P.3d 219 ( 2013).
If the sentencing court finds that multiple crimes do not constitute the same criminal
conduct, we will not disturb that finding unless the sentencing court abused its discretion or
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misapplied the law. Id. at 536. Moreover,' "[ t]he statute is generally construed narrowly to
disallow most claims that multiple offenses constitute the same criminal act." Id. at 540 ( quoting
State v. Porter, 133 Wash. 2d 177, 181, 942 P.2d 974 ( 1997)).
Castro argues that he had the same criminal intent because both of the UIBC acts were in
furtherance of a common goal. He points to State v. Williams, 135 Wash. 2d 365, 369, 957 P.2d
216 ( 1998), in which we held that where multiple crimes require the same mens rea and are
committed in an " uninterrupted sequence," each may fall within the same overarching criminal
intent. However, the " uninterrupted sequence" discussed in Williams referred to a transaction
comprising immediately successive acts without significant intervening time or conduct. 135
Wash. 2d at 367 -68. In contrast, Castro' s two acts of writing a bad check were separated by an
entire day. The criminal acts were not immediately successive, and Castro had to independently
decide to continue his scheme after committing the first one. Because he chose to do so, the trial
court appropriately assigned each a different criminal intent.
The offenses also did not occur at the same time. Castro cites Williams for the
proposition that they need not have occurred at the exact same time and place. Although the
court in Williams focused on the intent requirement, it held that two offenses that were not
temporally simultaneous but were committed in immediate succession in the same location
constituted the same criminal conduct. 135 Wash. 2d at 367 -69. But Castro, unlike the defendant
in Williams, did not commit his offenses in immediate succession. In effect, Castro asks us to
extend the holding in Williams and allow a two -day period to constitute the " same time." We
decline because this would stretch the bounds of the statutory language and substantially broaden
the range of offenses that may be considered part of the same criminal conduct.
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Castro asserts, and the State concedes, that the UIBC crimes involved the same victim —
TwinStar. But because Castro cannot establish that the offenses involved the same criminal
intent and occurred at the same time, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
treating each crime as a separate offense.
We reverse Castro' s first degree theft conviction and dismiss the first degree theft charge
without prejudice, affirm Castro' s two UIBC convictions, and remand for resentencing.
A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the
Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record in accordance with RCW 2. 06. 040,
it is so ordered.
We concur:
4/wWi
SUTTON, ,J.
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