State Of Washington v. Esteban Joel Flores

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l
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l FILED
MAY 12, 2016
In the Office of the Clerk of Court
WA State Court of Appeals, Division III
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION THREE
STATE OF WASHINGTON, )
) No. 33270-5-111
Respondent, )
)
v. )
)
ESTEBAN JOEL FLORES, ) PUBLISHED OPINION
)
Appellant. )
FEARING, C.J. -RCW 28A.635.030 provides: "Any person who shall willfully
create a disturbance on school premises during school hours ... shall be guilty of a
misdemeanor, the penalty for which shall be a fine in any sum not more than fifty
dollars." This appeal asks whether the trial court may impose punishment, other than a
fine not more than fifty dollars, such as detention or community supervision under the
statute. After employing principles of statutory construction, we hold that the trial court
may only impose the limited fine.
FACTS
Appellant Esteban Flores, a seventeen-year-old student at Walla Walla High
School, punched another student while on the high school campus with school in session.
No. 33270-5-111
State v. Flores
PROCEDURE
The State of Washington charged Esteban Flores with disturbing school activities
when punching a fellow student. The trial court found Flores guilty of the crime.
The Walla Walla County Department of Court Services (Court Services) prepared
a predisposition report recommending that the trial court sentence Esteban Flores to three
days of confinement in juvenile detention, four months of community supervision, and
ten hours of community service. Court Services also recommended that the court impose
a curfew on Flores from 8:00 p.m. to 7:00 a.m., $75 as a crime victim's compensation
assessment, restitution as ordered by the court, and $110 in court costs.
Esteban Flores contested the validity of Court Services' recommendation. He
argued that RCW 28A.635.030, by its plain language, only authorized the trial court to
impose a monetary fine of not more than fifty dollars. Flores maintained that the court
lacked authority to impose confinement and, by extension, community supervision,
because doing so would result in a sentence greater than that which an adult could face
for the same offense. He asked the court to impose a fine of no more than $50, plus any
crime victim's compensation assessments permitted by law. The State argued that the
court could impose the sanctions recommended by Court Services because RCW
28A.635.030 does not specifically exclude imprisonment as a penalty, and therefore
imprisonment is also available to a court sentencing an adult for the same crime.
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The juvenile court sentenced Esteban Flores as recommended by Court Services.
The court entered the following conclusions of law:
2. The standard range disposition for misdemeanors is local
sanctions. RCW 13.40.0357; 13.40.020(18).
3. The fine for Disturbing School Activities is capped at fifty dollars
($50). RCW 28A.635.030.
4. Any standard condition of disposition not specifically modified
by statute remains unaltered and may be imposed. State v. Shannahan, 69
Wn. App. 512, 516, 849 P.2d 1239 (1993).
5. Based on the foregoing, the Court may impose standard range,
with the exception of a cap on any fine.
Clerk's Papers (CP) at 56.
LAW AND ANALYSIS
Incarceration, Supervision, and Service
Esteban Flores argues that RCW 28A.635.030 only authorizes a trial court to
sentence him to a maximum fine of $50, and, therefore, he cannot be sentenced to
incarceration, community supervision, or community service. In support of this
argument, Flores relies on canons of statutory interpretation and other provisions within
chapter 28A.635 RCW that establish specific punishments for other offenses committed
on public school campuses. The State contends that, because RCW 28A.635.030 does
not specifically exclude standard misdemeanor criminal penalties authorized by RCW
9A.20.021, imprisonment is a permissible additional penalty. Each side forwards a
reasonable interpretation of RCW 28A.635.030. We accept Flores' argument.
We must construe RCW 28A.635.030. As noted above, RCW 28A.635.030
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provides:
Any person who shall willfully create a disturbance on school
premises during school hours or at school activities or school meetings
shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, the penalty for which shall be a.fine in
any sum not more than fifty dollars.
(Emphasis added.) On the one hand, the statute does not expressly authorize the court to
impose penalties other than a fine. On the other hand, the statute does not specifically
exclude the trial court from imposing detention or other sanctions in addition to a fine.
RCW 28A.635.030 classifies a school disturbance as a "misdemeanor," and this
categorization may suggest the court may impose the standard sentence for a
misdemeanor. Title 9A RCW defines "misdemeanor" as:
Any crime punishable by a fine of not more than one thousand
dollars, or by imprisonment in a county jail for not more than ninety days,
or by both such fine and imprisonment is a misdemeanor. Whenever the
performance of any act is prohibited by any statute, and no penalty for the
violation of such statute is imposed, the committing of such act shall be a
misdemeanor.
RCW 9A.20.010(2)(a) (emphasis added). In tum, RCW 9A.20.021(3) declares:
Misdemeanor. Every person convicted of a misdemeanor defined in
Title 9A RCW shall be punished by imprisonment in the county jail for a
maximum term fixed by the court of not more than ninety days, or by a fine
in an amount fixed by the court of not more than one thousand dollars, or
by both such imprisonment and fine.
(Emphasis added.)
Under the juvenile justice grid, a misdemeanor sentence for a juvenile offender is
pursuant to "local sanctions." RCW 13.40.0357. "Local sanctions" does not refer to
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sanctions unique to the offender's local community, but are:
"Local sanctions" means one or more of the following: (a) 0-30 days
of confinement; (b) 0-12 months of community supervision; (c) 0-150
hours of community restitution; ( d) or $0-$500 fine.
RCW 13.40.020(18).
No earlier decisions discuss punishment for a violation ofRCW 28A.635.030. So
we look to statutory rules of construction.
The State argues that use of the word "misdemeanor" in RCW 28A.635.030, the
school disturbance statute, denotes legislative intent to include detention time and other
punishment for the offender, since a misdemeanor includes jail time. We disagree. All
of the statutory definitions of "misdemeanor" allow jail time, but the definitions do not
dictate jail time. Instead, the definitions assume some sentences will not include
detention.
As already stated, RCW 9A.20.010(2)(a) defines "misdemeanor" as any "crime
punishable by a fine of not more than one thousand dollars, or by imprisonment in a
county jail for not more than ninety days, or by both such fine and imprisonment is a
misdemeanor." RCW 9A.20.021(3) declares that a misdemeanor shall be "punished by
imprisonment in the county jail for a maximum term fixed by the court of not more than
ninety days, or by a fine in an amount fixed by the court of not more than one thousand
dollars, or by both such imprisonment and fine." In both statutes, jail time is in the
disjunctive from the option of a fine only. In analyzing the plain language of a statute,
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we presume that the word "or" does not mean "and" and that a statute's use of the word
"or" is disjunctive to separate phrases unless there is a clear legislative intent to the
contrary. State v. Riofta, 134 Wn. App. 669, 682, 142 P.3d 193 (2006), aff'd, 166 Wn.2d
358, 209 P.3d 467 (2009). "Local sanctions" are one or more of the following: (a) 0-30
days of confinement, (b) 0-12 months of community supervision, (c) 0-150 hours of
community restitution, (d) or $0-$500 fine. RCW 13.40.020(18). Again, confinement is
optional to a fine only, and detention is not necessarily the typical penalty.
The State contends that, even when a statute establishes a specific monetary
penalty as RCW 28A.635.030 does, imprisonment is still an available punishment unless
the legislature affirmatively excludes it. According to the State, since RCW 28A.635.030
does not address imprisonment, the statute does not exclude imprisonment. Similarly,
silence as to imprisonment means the status quo controls and detention is an available
remedy. We find no principle of statutory construction or any decision that supports
these arguments.
This court's duty includes construing statutes so as to avoid rendering meaningless
any word or provision. State v. Contreras, 124 Wn.2d 741, 747, 880 P.2d 1000 (1994).
If imprisonment is always an available punishment for all misdemeanors, then the
definition of misdemeanor in RCW 9A.20.010(2)(a) as "[a]ny crime punishable by a fine
of not more than one thousand dollars, or by imprisonment in a county jail for not more
than ninety days," means nothing. (Emphasis added.) A more inclusive and logical
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interpretation ofRCW 9A.20.010(2)(a) is that offenses that only carry fines as penalties
are still considered misdemeanors by our legislature.
In moving beyond the plain language ofRCW 28A.635.030, Esteban Flores
invokes two maxims of statutory construction, expressio unius est exclusio alterius and
the general-specific rule. Both maxims bolster his position.
Expressio unius est exclusio alterius declares that, when a statute specifically
designates the things or classes of things on which it operates, an inference arises in law
that all things or classes of things omitted from it were intentionally omitted by the
legislature. State v. Swanson, 116 Wn. App. 67, 75, 65 P.3d 343 (2003). RCW
28A.635.030 imposes a penalty of "a fine in any sum not more than fifty dollars." The
statute admits no other penalty. Under expressio unius est exclusio alterius, the courts
should add no additional penalty.
The State argues that, if the legislature intended no punishment beyond the fifty
dollar fine, the legislature would have drafted RCW 28A.635.030 to read: "the penalty
for which shall be only a fine in any sum not more than fifty dollars." Br. ofResp't at 5-
6. In the alternative, the State contends the legislature would have included language
stating that the crime is "not punishable by imprisonment." Br. of Resp't at 6. The
maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius harms, if not defeats, these contentions.
A review of other statutory crimes catalogued in chapter 28A.635 RCW signals
that the Washington Legislature, when it wanted jail time for a school crime, designated a
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jail sentence. For example, under one statute, anyone who interferes by force or violence
with a school administrator, teacher, or student in the conduct of his or her duties "is
guilty of a gross misdemeanor and shall be fined not more than five hundred dollars, or
imprisoned in jail not more than six months, or both such fine and imprisonment." RCW
28A.635.090(2). Under another statute, anyone who intimidates by threat of force or
violence any administrator, teacher, or student during the conduct of his or her duties or
studies "is guilty of a gross misdemeanor and shall be fined not more than five hundred
dollars, or imprisoned in jail not more than six months, or both such fine and
imprisonment." RCW 28A.635.100(2). These two other statutes demonstrate that the
legislature knew the appropriate language to employ when imposing imprisonment for
crimes on school property.
The "general-specific" rule of statutory interpretation also favors Esteban Flores'
position. This maxim stands for the proposition that a specific statute prevails over a
general statute. Residents Opposed to Kittitas Turbines v. State Energy Facility Site
Evaluation Council, 165 Wn.2d 275, 309, 197 P.3d 1153 (2008). Stated another way,
when a general statute, standing alone, includes the same subject as the special statute
and then conflicts with it, the court deems the special statute to be an exception to, or
qualification of, the general statute. State v. Reeder, 181 Wn. App. 897, 922-23, 330 P.3d
786 (2014), ajf'd, 184 Wn.2d 805, 365 P.3d 1243 (2015). In this appeal, the general
misdemeanor sentencing statute, RCW 9A.20.021(3), includes the same subject matter as
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RCW 28A.635.030. Both statutes address criminal penalties for misdemeanors. The
former addresses general misdemeanor penalties, while the latter addresses the penalty
applicable to a specific offense occurring on school property. Therefore, RCW
28A.635.030's silence with regard to a prison sentence prevails over RCW 9A.20.021(3).
Finally, the rule of lenity requires us to construe ambiguous criminal statutes in
favor of Esteban Flores, absent a legislative intent to the contrary. City ofSeattle v.
Winebrenner, 167 Wn.2d 451, 462, 219 P.3d 686 (2009); State v. Jacobs, 154 Wn.2d
596, 601, 115 P Jd 281 (2005). The rule of lenity applies to sentencing statutes. In re
Pers. Restraint of Sietz, 124 Wn.2d 645, 652, 880 P.2d 34 (1994); State v. Breaux, 167
Wn. App. 166, 176, 273 P.3d 447 (2012). Under the rule oflenity, an ambiguous
criminal statute cannot be interpreted to increase a penalty. Winebrenner, 167 Wn.2d at
462; State v. Workman, 90 Wn.2d 443, 454, 584 P.2d 382 (1978).
The State of Washington relies on this court's holding in State v. Shannahan, 69
Wn. App. 512, 849 P.2d 1239 (1993) to support the sentence of Esteban Flores to
community supervision and imprisonment for violating RCW 28A.635.030. In
Shannahan, a court convicted Terry Shannahan of negligent driving and ordered him to
pay restitution to the person injured by his driving. On appeal, Shannahan argued that the
trial court could not order him to pay restitution because the statute under which he was
convicted did not explicitly authorize restitution in lieu of a fine. That statute provided:
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It shall be unlawful for any person to operate a motor vehicle in a
negligent manner. . . . Any person violating the provisions of this section
will be guilty of a misdemeanor: PROVIDED, That the director [of
licensing] may not revoke any license under this section, and such offense
is not punishable by imprisonment or by a fine exceeding two hundred fifty
dollars.
Former RCW 46.61.525 (1990). The restitution statute provides, in relevant part:
If a person has gained money or property or caused a victim to lose
money or property through the commission of a crime, upon conviction
thereof ... the court, in lieu of imposing the fine authorized for the offense
under RCW 9A.20.020, may order the defendant to pay an amount, fixed
by the court, not to exceed double the amount of the defendant's gain or
victim's loss from the commission of a crime.
RCW 9A.20.030(1) (emphasis added).
In light of the restitution statute's language and the legislature's demonstrated
policy preference of ordering restitution whenever possible, the Shannahan court held
that a statute need not expressly authorize restitution for a court to order it instead of the
applicable fine. In so holding, this court relied on RCW 9A.04.090's command that "the
provisions of chapters 9A.04 through 9A.28 RCW of this title are applicable to offenses
defined by this title or another statute, unless this title or such other statute specifically
provides otherwise." State v. Shannahan, 69 Wn. App. at 515 (quoting RCW
9A.04.090).
The State argues that Esteban Flores raises an almost identical issue as that raised
by Terry Shannahan insofar as Flores argues that the language limiting part of the
standard penalty for misdemeanors excludes all other potential penalties not addressed by
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the statute. The State misapprehends the holding in Shannahan. We distinguish
Shannahan because the Shannahan court did not impose an additional punishment on
Shannahan. Rather, the court chose to order restitution in lieu of the maximum $250 fine
authorized by the negligent driving statute. We view this distinction as important
because the rule of lenity requires this court to construe ambiguous statutes in favor of a
criminal defendant and against increasing a criminal penalty. The trial court in
Shannahan did not increase Shannahan' s penalty. The court ordered a different penalty
in lieu of the penalty present in the negligent driving statute.
The State also argues that the legislative history behind RCW 28A.635.030
supports only a desire of simplifying collection of fines. In support of this argument, the
State cites LAWS OF 1984, ch. 258, § 301, the lengthy Court Improvement Act of 1984.
Section 301 of the 1984 enactment mentions the need to assure accountability,
uniformity, economy, and efficiency in the collection and distribution by superior,
district, and municipal courts of fees, fines, forfeitures, and penalties assessed and
collected for violations of state statutes and county, city, and town ordinances. This
legislative intent does nothing to promote incarceration of offenders. Section 315 of the
Court Improvement Act of 1984 removed language from former RCW 28A.87.060,
recodified as RCW 28A.635.030, directing the county treasurer to collect fines and
transmit the fines to the state treasurer. The omitted language does not suggest a
violation ofRCW 28A.635.030, either before or after the 1984 amendment, merits
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incarceration.
The State suggests that a ruling in favor of Esteban Flores will harm defendants in
general. The State notes that, under CrR 3 .1, the right to counsel only attaches to crimes
that include jail time, so an indigent defendant charged with a violation ofRCW
28A.635.030 may no longer be entitled to counsel. The State also observes that an
offense that only imposes a fine is an infraction to be proved by the State by only a
preponderance of evidence. The burden of proof and the need to appoint counsel are not
issues before us, and we decline to address these arguments.
Court Costs
Esteban Flores next contends that the trial court erred in ordering him to pay $110
in court costs. He argues that the trial court lacked statutory authority to impose court
costs and that RCW 13.04.160 expressly prohibits the court from doing so. The State
contends that the trial court may order costs under RCW 13.40.192. We agree with the
State.
Whenever a person is convicted in superior court, the trial court may order the
payment of legal financial obligations as part of the sentence. RCW 9.94A.760(1).
Financial obligations include court costs. RCW 10.01.160(2). RCW 13.40.192(1)
provides in part: "If a juvenile is ordered to pay legal financial obligations, including ...
court costs ... , the money judgment remains enforceable for a period often years." In
addition, RCW 13.04.160, a provision generally enforceable throughout Title 13 RCW,
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provides: "No fees shall be charged or collected by any officer or other person for filing
petition, serving summons, or other process under this chapter."
The juvenile department of the Superior Court of Walla Walla County adjudicated
Esteban Flores' case. Thus, both the general legal financial obligation provision of RCW
10.01.160 and chapter 13.40 RCW provide statutory authority for a court to order Flores
to pay $110 in court costs. The general provision to which Flores cites, RCW 13.01.160,
only prohibits the imposition of fees for filing a petition, serving a summons, or "other
process." The statute does not prohibit the imposition of financial obligations under Title
10 RCW. Thus, on remand, the juvenile court may still impose legal financial
obligations that are statutorily authorized.
CONCLUSION
We vacate Esteban Flores' sentence and remand for resentencirtg. The trial court
may not impose detention time, incarceration, community supervision, or community
service on Esteban Flores.
WE CONCUR:
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