State of Washington v. John Cameron Ira Young

FILED
October 4, 2016
In the Office of the Clerk of Court
WA State Court of Appeals, Division III
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION THREE
STATE OF WASHINGTON, )
) No. 32514-8-111
Respondent, )
)
v. )
)
JOHN CAMERON IRA YOUNG, ) PUBLISHED OPINION
)
Appellant. )
SIDDOWAY, J. -John Young appeals his conviction for first degree murder,
arguing that he received ineffective assistance of counsel when his trial lawyer stipulated
to the admission of his confession. He contends that in order to establish the corpus
delecti of the crime, the State was required to present independent evidence of each of the
crime's elements, and his confession was not admissible until it did. He argues that the
State would not have been able to offer independent evidence of premeditation.
To establish the corpus delecti of first degree murder, the State need not present
independent evidence of the mental state required for that crime. Because the State
presented ample independent evidence of the fact of death and a causal connection
between the death and a criminal act, the corpus delecti was established. We affirm.
No. 32514-8-111
State v. Young
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On the morning of July 4, 2013, John Young entered the Desert Food Mart in
Benton City and asked the cashier to call 911 because he had witnessed a shooting.
When Lieutenant Chuck Jones of the Benton County Sheriffs Office arrived, Mr. Young,
who the lieutenant described as appearing "nervous and scared," told him that "he
witnessed somebody get murdered," and that the perpetrator, Joshua Hunt, was outside in
the parking lot. Report of Proceedings (RP) at 129-30. Mr. Young informed Lieutenant
Jones that the victim was 16-year-old Jacob S. 1 Police immediately arrested Mr. Hunt.
When Sheriffs Detective Scott Runge arrived at the Food Mart, Mr. Young
repeated his claim that Mr. Hunt-his friend-had shot someone at the nearby Horn
Rapids Off-Road Vehicle Park. Detective Runge would later describe Mr. Young as
"excited-to the point of almost being inaudible" and Sergeant Danny McCary, who was
also present for this initial contact with Mr. Young, described him as "distraught. He was
crying off and on." RP at 149, 183. Together, Detective Runge, Mr. Young, and
Sergeant McCary drove to the Horn Rapids Park. At this point, Mr. Young was being
treated as a witness.
1
"Jacob S." is a pseudonym for the juvenile victim. See General Order of
Division III, In re the Use of Initials or Pseudonyms for Child Victims or Child Witnesses
(Wash. Ct. App. June 18, 2012), http://www.courts.wa.gov/appellate_trial_courts/.
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State v. Young
The park was in Richland, and the Richland Police Department was notified of a
possible shooting victim. It dispatched two officers, who quickly found Jacob's body and
secured the crime scene.
As the Benton County sheriffs officers proceeded to the park with Mr. Young,
Detective Runge spoke to him about Jacob and the events of the night before. Mr. Young
told the detective that Jacob had previously stolen two ounces of weed from Mr. Hunt
and owed Mr. Hunt $70. Despite that, after Mr. Young and Mr. Hunt ran into Mr. Jacob
and his girlfriend at a party the night before, the three men ended up driving to the park,
where they smoked marijuana. Mr. Hunt had been carrying a handgun.
According to Mr. Young, after smoking, Jacob "got[] up and asked, 'Now what?'
and Mr. Hunt basically pulled out the pistol and said, 'This is now what,' and began
firing on him." RP at 150. Mr. Young told the officers he and Mr. Hunt later traveled to
the Benton City area, where they disposed of their shoes and other evidence by placing
them in a backpack that they threw into the river.
When Detective Runge explained to Mr. Young that the city of Richland had
jurisdiction, Mr. Young agreed to speak with Richland detectives. Richland Police
Officer Jeff Bickford drove Mr. Young from the park to the Richland police station,
where Mr. Young consented to audio and video recording of an interview.
During a break in the interview, Officer Bickford learned from another Richland
police officer that Mr. Hunt was telling a different story, implicating Mr. Young in the
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No. 32514-8-111
State v. Young
murder. Upon reconvening the interview, Officer Bickford read Mr. Young Miranda 2
warnings and obtained his agreement that he understood he was now a suspect and any
statements he made could be used against him. Mr. Young then confessed that he fired
the final shot at Jacob. He claimed Mr. Hunt shot Jacob three times, then handed the gun
to him, and that he then fired one shot into Jacob's head near the temple-cheek region.
Mr. Young said that Jacob's body had been twitching when Mr. Young was first handed
the gun, but that he stopped twitching after Mr. Young shot him in the head. 3
Mr. Young told officers that after he and Mr. Hunt shot Jacob, they went to the
Desert Food Mart (the same one from which he later called 911 ), bought cigarettes, drove
up the road, parked, and switched out the shoes they had been wearing for ones that Mr.
Hunt had in his trunk. They then put the potentially incriminating shoes, the handgun,
and ammunition in a backpack, loaded the backpack with rocks to weigh it down, and
dropped it in the river. Mr. Young described the shoes they had disposed of in the river
as a pair of gray, neon yellow, and green Nike tennis shoes (Mr. Young's) and a pair of
black Adidas (Mr. Hunt's).
2
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966).
3
Mr. Young's videotaped interview was played for the jury but is not transcribed
in the verbatim report of proceedings. A transcript of the interview prepared before trial
was admitted as an illustrative exhibit but was not designated as part of the clerk's papers
on appeal. We are left to rely on certain unchallenged witness testimony about what Mr.
Young said in the interview. E.g., Clerk's Papers at 706,722, 729-31.
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No. 32514-8-111
State v. Young
Richland police were able to locate and retrieve the backpack containing Mr.
Young's and Mr. Hunt's shoes, ammunition, and Mr. Hunt's Charter Arms five-shot
revolver. The shoes matched footprints and shoe patterns that had been found in the sand
near Jacob's body.
The Washington State Patrol Crime Laboratory determined that all of the bullets
recovered from the crime scene had been fired from the Charter Arms revolver found in
the backpack. A pristine bullet found in the vicinity of the body suggested one shot had
missed.
Interviews of Mr. Young's and Mr. Hunt's acquaintances yielded a witness who
had heard Mr. Hunt comment in the two weeks before the murder about shooting people,
including about shooting Jacob. The witness heard Mr. Young and Mr. Hunt talk about
"a place to go to take [Jacob]" and the fact that Mr. Hunt had five bullets. RP at 384.
Jacob's girlfriend confirmed that the last time she had seen Jacob was in the early
morning of July 4, when Mr. Hunt, Mr. Young and Jacob dropped her off at the
apartment complex where she lived.
It was concluded from the autopsy performed on Jacob that he had been shot three
times: he was first shot in the left mid-chest while standing, was then shot in the head
while standing, and was finally shot in head while lying on the ground. Mr. Young was
charged with first degree murder.
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No. 32514-8-111
State v. Young
A first order of business when the case was called for trial was to conduct a CrR
3.5 hearing. Instead, Mr. Young's lawyer stipulated to the admission of the videotaped
interview, telling the court:
[W]e believe it's in our interests to actually stipulate to the 3.5 hearing, and
I've discussed that with Mr. Young, and I know the Court will make its
own inquiries, but he knows and understands he has a right to that hearing,
but we believe it's in our benefit and strategic interest to proceed with the
stipulation.
RP at 41-42. The court questioned Mr. Young, who stated he understood he had a right
to a hearing on the admissibility of the statements but was agreeing instead that all of his
statements were admissible.
During trial, Mr. Young's videotaped confession was played for the jury. At the
conclusion of the evidence, the jury returned a guilty verdict. Mr. Young appeals.
ANALYSIS
Mr. Young identifies only one issue on appeal: he contends defense counsel
provided ineffective assistance of counsel by stipulating to the admission of Mr. Young's
confession "when there was no independent evidence apart from his confession, under
the corpus delecti rule, sufficient to establish all the elements of first degree murder." Br.
of Appellant at 1. If Mr. Young is correct about the extent of independent evidence
required, Mr. Young's confession would not have been admissible. "It has long been the
rule in Washington that such statements [by a defendant] cannot be considered by the
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No. 32514-8-111
State v. Young
finder of fact unless the State first establishes the corpus delecti of the crime by
independent evidence." State v. Hummel, 165 Wn. App. 749, 758, 266 P.3d 269 (2012).
To demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show that
defense counsel's representation was deficient, i.e., it fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness based on consideration of all the circumstances; and that the deficient
representation prejudiced the defendant, i.e., there is a reasonable probability that, except
for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been
different. Stricklandv. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688-89, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d
674 (1984). The defendant must show in the record the absence of legitimate strategic or
tactical reasons supporting the actions challenged. State v. McFarland, 127 Wn.2d 322,
336, 899 P.2d 1251 (1995). If one of the two prongs of the Strickland test is absent, this
court need not inquire further. State v. Hendrickson, 129 Wn.2d 61, 78,917 P.2d 563(1996).
Professor Lafave has observed that
[m]ost corpus delecti cases are homicide cases, where the difficulty may be
either (a) that, the victim having simply disappeared, no dead body can be
produced so as to make it absolutely certain that the victim will not later
turn up alive and well, or (b) that, although a dead body is found
conveniently lying about, examination of the body and the surrounding
circumstances reveals that the death may have been caused as well by
accident, suicide or natural causes as by someone's foul play.
WAYNER. LAFAVE, 1 SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW§ l.4(b) at 30 (2d ed. 2003)
(emphasis omitted).
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No. 32514-8-111
State v. Young
In a homicide case, the corpus delecti generally consists of two elements: (1) the
fact of death, and (2) a causal connection between the death and a criminal act. State v.
Aten, 130 Wn.2d 640, 655, 927 P.2d 210 (1996); State v. Lung, 70 Wn.2d 365,371,423
P.2d 72 (1967). It can be proved by direct or circumstantial evidence, which need not be
enough to support a conviction or send the case to the jury. Aten, 130 Wn.2d at 656. In
assessing whether there is sufficient evidence of the corpus delicti independent of a
defendant's statements, we assume the truth of the State's evidence and all reasonable
inferences from it in a light most favorable to the State. Id. at 658; City ofBremerton v.
Corbett, 106 Wn.2d 569, 571, 723 P.2d 1135 (1986).
Jacob was found dead, proving the first element. And one gunshot wound to the
chest and two through the head would appear to establish the causal connection with a
criminal act. If that were not enough, any possibility of self-infliction of the wounds was
eliminated by the testimony of an expert pathologist that the first shot to the head would
have resulted in an immediate loss of consciousness. It was also eliminated by the fact
that the revolver from which the shots were fired was found miles away, in a backpack
that had been weighted down and disposed of in a river.
Mr. Young nonetheless argues that our Supreme Court held in State v. Dow, 168
Wn.2d 243,227 P.3d 1278 (2010), that the State "must ... prove every element of the
crime charged by evidence independent of the defendant's statement." Br. of Appellant
at 9 (emphasis added). He attributes the asserted deficiency in the State's independent
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No. 32514-8-111
State v. Young
evidence against Mr. Young "particularly" to the lack of independent evidence of
premeditated intent. Id. at 7.
A defendant made the same argument in Hummel, relying on Aten, Dow, and State
v. Brockob, 159 Wn.2d 311, 150 P .3d 59 (2006). But in a decision whose reasoning we
endorse, Division One of our court held that Mr. Hummel "misconstrues these cases and
ignores the decades of case law explaining the application of the corpus delecti rule in ...
Washington." 165 Wn. App. at 762.
The panel in Hummel acknowledged that the court in Aten had raised the mental
state required to prove the second degree manslaughter charged in that case, but it
pointed out that the Aten court did not discuss how the independent evidence did or did
not establish that mental state. Instead, the court "addressed only whether the evidence
supported a reasonable and logical inference that the infant died as a result of a criminal
act." Id. at 763.
While Dow states that in order to establish the corpus delecti the State must prove
"every element of the crime charged by evidence independent of the defendant's
statement," that statement was entirely unnecessary to the court's decision. 168 Wn.2d at
254. As Hummel points out, the State had no evidence to prove that a crime had been
committed in Dow apart from the defendant's statements, so discussion of the quantum of
proof was dictum. 165 Wn. App. at 764.
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No. 32514-8-111
State v. Young
Finally, Hummel points out that a requirement to prove every element of the crime
"directly contradicts, without explicitly overruling or distinguishing, decades of Supreme
Court and Court of Appeals decisions holding that proof of identity, while a necessary
element to be proved at trial, need not be proved to establish the corpus delecti of the
charged crime." Id. at 765.
For all of these reasons, we agree with Hummel that the State is not required to
present independent evidence sufficient to demonstrate anything other than the fact of
death and a causal connection between the death and a criminal act. It unquestionably
demonstrated those facts in this case.
Mr. Young's claim of ineffective assistance fails for the further reason that he has
not undertaken in his briefing to show in the record the absence of a legitimate strategic
or tactical reason for the stipulation-this, despite the fact that Mr. Young's lawyer told
the court that he and his client believed that stipulating was "in our benefit and strategic
interest." RP at 42. A strategic reason is suggested by the record.
One of the detectives who participated in the interview of Mr. Young was
formerly a resource officer at his high school, and she described Mr. Young at trial as
someone who was "sensitive," RP at 721, and who
doesn't like to see people suffer. He doesn't like to see people bullied. He
doesn't like to see, you know, someone being beaten up.
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No. 32514-8-111
State v. Young
RP at 720. She agreed that Mr. Young told officers that before firing the gun he "froze
up" and "began tripping out"-a reaction she believed would be consistent with the
personality characteristics of Mr. Young she had described. RP at 721.
In closing argument, Mr. Young's lawyer urged the jury to conclude that it was
most likely Mr. Young-"sensitive," "frozen," and "tripping out"-who fired the one
shot that missed. RP at 1071-72 ("John Young does not know whether he hit his target or
not, if you could even really consider it a target. He doesn't know that.") It appears from
his closing argument that Mr. Young's trial lawyer believed his client's videotaped
interview would advance that argument. Mr. Young fails to demonstrate that his trial
lawyer lacked a strategic reason for the stipulation.
Affirmed.
WE CONCUR:
Fearing, C.J.
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