Johanna Grider v. Christopher Quinn

FILED
MARCH 8, 2022
In the Office of the Clerk of Court
WA State Court of Appeals Division III
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION THREE
JOHANNA GRIDER, a single woman, )
) No. 37836-5-III
Appellant, )
)
v. )
)
CHRISTOPHER QUINN, a married man; ) UNPUBLISHED OPINION
CHRISTIAN PANG, a single man; )
ALKALOID INC., a Washington corporation, )
LUCID NORTH SPOKANE, LLC, a )
Washington Limited liability company )
)
Respondents )
FEARING, J. — After the superior court issued a ruling and signed findings of fact
and conclusions of law, but not a judgment or decree, partners transferred partnership
funds to their appellate lawyer contrary to the superior court’s ruling. The injured partner
did not discover the misappropriation of funds until after the superior court entered a
judgment and after the wronging partners appealed the superior court’s judgment. When
the injured partner asked the superior court for an order compelling return of the funds to
the partnership, the court recognized the breach of fiduciary duty, but ruled that it lacked
authority to correct the wrong. We disagree and reverse.
FACTS
This appeal is a companion to JoHanna Grider v. Christopher Quinn, et. al., Case
No. 37433-5-III and arises from the same Spokane County Superior Court filing. We do
No. 37836-5-III
Grider v. Quinn
not repeat most of the facts written in the companion appeal’s opinion. Appellant
JoHanna Grider challenges the superior court’s denial of her motion to return $70,000 in
attorney fees paid to counsel for Christopher Quinn, Christian Pang, and Alkaloid, Inc.
We collectively refer to Quinn, Pang, and Alkaloid as “the defendants.”
JoHanna Grider entered into a partnership agreement with Christopher Quinn and
Christian Pang to operate a North Spokane marijuana retail store. The agreement
included a promise to employ Grider as the general manager of the store at $7,500 per
month. Quinn and Pang later grew angry with Grider for her refusal to invade tax
reserves to purchase additional marijuana for sale. Quinn was also displeased that Grider
received a salary despite her herculean efforts to find a location for the store, renovate the
store from a log home to comply with Washington State Liquor and Control Board (LCB)
regulations, garner a personal loan for the renovations, and toil for long hours at the store.
Quinn and Pang successfully connived to oust Grider from her promised employment as
manager of the store and her interest in the partnership business.
JoHanna Grider filed suit against Christopher Quinn and Christian Pang and
Quinn’s corporation, Alkaloid, Inc., which corporation the two gentlemen exploited in
their scheme. The complaint alleged nine causes of action. The first, third and sixth
causes of action pled alternative theories of recovery for the failure to repay the loans that
Grider procured to fund the renovation and opening of the partnership store. The second,
third, fourth, fifth, seventh and eighth causes of action pled alternative theories of
recovery for wrongful termination from Grider’s salaried position and failure to pay
2
No. 37836-5-III
Grider v. Quinn
wages before termination. Her ninth cause of action asked for a receivership of the
partnership business. In response, Quinn and Pang denied any partnership existed and
contended that Alkaloid owned the state license to sell marijuana and operate the store.
After Christopher Quinn and Christian Pang banished JoHanna Grider from
partnership affairs, the two refused Grider access to partnership financial records. Quinn
and Pang also dallied, during discovery, to produce the records. On September 13, 2017,
Thor Hoyte, counsel for Alkaloid and Christopher Quinn, wrote to his clients:
Gents, still not afraid of this guy [JoHanna Grider’s counsel]. As
Jason [has] pointed out, he seems like the cranky old bastard kind of guy
where [facts] don’t seem to enter into the conversation. I suspect we will
have to beat him[ ]back a couple of times.
He also doesn’t like very well not being immediately obeyed[.] That
will work fine for us. I am not interested in given (sic) him rafts of
[documents] and the like for him to sit back and pick through given us new
[headaches] every week. We control the document flow.
Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 1262, Grider v. Quinn, No. 37433-5-III (Wash. Ct. App.).
After exiled from the partnership business, JoHanna Grider developed concern
that Christopher Quinn mismanaged the retail store. She particularly worried that Quinn
failed to pay taxes and file tax returns and that he used partnership funds to pay personal
expenses.
JoHanna Grider filed a motion for appointment of a receiver pending litigation.
The superior court denied the motion based on Christopher Quinn’s and Christian Pang’s
stipulation to maintain the status quo. The court entered a July 23, 2018 order that
3
No. 37836-5-III
Grider v. Quinn
prohibited Quinn and Pang from using the funds derived from the marijuana store for
personal expenses. The order declared in relevant part:
1. Pending trial, no payments shall be made from Alkaloid, Inc.
other than those which are reasonable and necessary in the normal course of
business, and
2. Pending trial, Alkaloid, Inc. shall pay no compensation or
personal expenses, directly or indirectly, to any director or shareholder of
the corporation or Christian Pang or any entity controlled or owned by them
including, but not limited to Lucid Management LLC, and
3. Pending trial, Alkaloid, Inc. shall make no shareholder
distributions no shareholder distributions pending trial.
CP (#37433-5-III) at 919. During the hearing on the entry of the order, the following
colloquy occurred between JoHanna Grider’s counsel and the superior court:
MR. BALTINS: Also, there should be a limit, Your Honor. There
should be no payment of attorney fees to counsel for the shareholders.
THE COURT: I’m not going to go that far. They can—I’m not
going to hamstring their ability to pay their lawyers.
CP (#37433-5-III) at 3011. Defendants thereafter used more than $200,000 derived from
marijuana sales to pay their trial counsel, Thor Hoyte.
At the conclusion of a bench trial, the superior court ruled in favor of JoHanna
Grider on eight of her causes of action. As part of its ruling, the superior court declared
the relationship between Grider, Christopher Quinn, and Christian Pang to be a
partnership and further ruled that the LCB license to sell marijuana was an asset of the
partnership. The court also held that, because of transfers of partnership interests to third
parties by Quinn and Pang, Grider became the controlling partner in the business. The
court awarded Grider substantial damages. The superior court denied the ninth cause of
4
No. 37836-5-III
Grider v. Quinn
action, seeking a receivership, because the request was moot presumably because the
court declared Grider to be the controlling partner of the business.
On August 22, 2019, the superior court signed findings of fact and conclusions of
law, but no judgment. Conclusion of law 34 read:
[T]he [c]ourt concludes that as of July 14, 2016, Ms. Grider with
33% became the controlling partner as opposed to Quinn with 25%.
CP (#37433-5-III) at 214.
The defendants objected to the findings of fact and conclusions of law signed by
the superior court on August 22, 2018. Among other objections, the defendants
complained about the superior court’s ruling that Alkaloid, Inc. was property of the
partnership.
On August 23, JoHanna Grider’s counsel sent opposing trial counsel, Thor Hoyte,
a missive reading: “Ms. Grider . . . will be reassuming management of the partnership
business” and “no further payments shall be made . . . to defray [respondents’] legal
fees.” CP (#37433-5-III) at 2821. Defendants ignored the letter and refused to allow
Grider access to the partnership store or access to financial records.
On October 1, 2019, attorney Ian Cairns entered an appearance in the lawsuit on
behalf of Alkaloid, Inc. for purposes of appeal. No one sent Cairns a copy of JoHanna
Grider’s counsel’s letter of August 23, 2019.
On November 18, 2019, the court sent a letter ruling directing JoHanna Grider’s
counsel to remove the language from the August 22 findings of fact and conclusions of
5
No. 37836-5-III
Grider v. Quinn
law that declared Alkaloid, Inc. to be an asset of the partnership. The superior court
maintained its ruling that the partnership owned the LCB license to sell marijuana.
JoHanna Grider tried diligently to timely enter a judgment in her favor. Grider
scheduled a hearing on the presentment three times: October 4, 2019, December 6, 2019,
and December 20, 2019. Finally, on February 6, 2020, Grider filed a motion to expedite
entry of judgment for February 18, 2020.
On February 17, 2020, the superior court signed its second amended findings of
fact and conclusions of law, which reaffirmed the ruling that the partnership owned the
marijuana retail license and that Grider was the controlling partner. The only significant
change between the August and February findings of fact and conclusions of law was the
removal of language that Alkaloid was an asset of the partnership. The findings of fact
also addressed an award of reasonable attorney fees in favor of JoHanna Grider against
the defendants. Finding of fact 13 read, in part:
It is also significant that Ms. Grider owned a majority of the
partnership control rights and defendants persuaded the court to allow their
[attorney] fees to be paid by the partnership store, while the case was
pending. At the same time, Ms. Grider’s fees were not paid!
CP (#37433-5-III) at 256 (emphasis added). On February 17, the superior court also
signed a judgment and decree.
On February 28, Ian Cairns filed an amended notice of association of counsel to
represent Christopher Quinn and Christian Pang, in addition to his representation of
Alkaloid. On March 2, 2020, JoHanna Grider reassumed control of the partnership store
6
No. 37836-5-III
Grider v. Quinn
and commenced examining the financial records. She discovered that, during the course
of the trial, the partnership paid Thor Hoyte $217,763 from marijuana sales revenue
during the time window of November 8, 2017 through January 20, 2020. The records
lacked any contracts, invoices, or other documentation supporting the fee payments.
JoHanna Grider also discovered, from the partnership financial records, that the
partnership, in October 2019, after the superior court entered the first findings of fact and
conclusions of law, paid Ian Cairns two payments totaling $50,000. On February 18,
2020, the day that the superior court entered the second amended findings of fact and
conclusions of law and second amended judgment and decree, Cairns received another
payment from the partnership store of $20,000. Grider found no contracts, invoices, or
other documentation supporting the fee payments to Cairns.
On March 3, 2020, JoHanna Grider’s counsel sent a letter to Ian Cairns advising
him that he acted in derogation of Grider’s earlier request to cease and desist all activities
purportedly taken on behalf of Alkaloid. The letter also requested disclosure of all
documents related to his purported representation of Alkaloid. On March 4, Cairns
responded. He rejected Grider’s request and asserted that Grider based her demands on
the erroneous assertion that Alkaloid Inc. is an asset of the partnership. Cairns wrote that,
although
the court found that the license held by Alkaloid Inc. is a partnership
asset, it did not find that Alkaloid Inc. is a partnership asset or that Ms.
Grider controls the corporation. . . . [Therefore] Alkaloid Inc. is entitled to
counsel of its choice . . . [and] [n]o order or judgment authorizes Ms. Grider
7
No. 37836-5-III
Grider v. Quinn
. . . to demand the disgorgement of funds [Alkaloid’s] attorneys have been
paid.
CP (#37433-5-III) at 2913. On March 4, defendants appealed the superior court’s
judgment in favor of JoHanna Grider.
On June 9, 2020, a frustrated JoHanna Grider filed a motion to compel
disgorgement of attorney fees paid from partnership funds. The superior court denied
Grider’s motion without prejudice. The court commented:
[I]t seems to me that the money that was used to pay the fees really
is the partnership’s money, but it was appropriated by Quinn and Pang
through Alkaloid, again using Alkaloid to manipulate the circumstances.
Report of Proceedings (RP) (June 26, 2020) at 4, Grider v. Quinn, No. 37433-5-III
(Wash. Ct. App.) (emphasis added). The superior court invited Grider to renew the
motion with authority allowing the court “to recover this money that really should have
been in the partnership and available to Ms. Grider but was wrongfully paid out by
whoever was controlling Alkaloid; Quinn, and Pang, maybe others.” (RP) (June 26,
2020) at 5 (emphasis added).
In August, 2020, JoHanna Grider renewed her motion to compel disgorgement of
attorney fees. The motion argued the court had inherent equitable powers to compel the
return of the partnership funds. During an oral ruling, the superior court commented:
An additional breach of fiduciary duty was the paying out of this
$70,000 when they knew that after two years of litigation, numerous
motions, whatever it was, a four-day bench trial, written closings, proposed
findings, and careful deliberation that I found that the partnership held the
license that was a cornerstone of the initiation of the partnership and Ms.
Grider had 33 percent and Mr. Quinn had 25 percent and because Mr. Pang
8
No. 37836-5-III
Grider v. Quinn
transferred his interest to others under the partnership act, he lost the ability
to vote on a distribution like that.
RP (#37433-5-III) (Sep. 25, 2020) at 19-20. The court added: “This whole case is very
concerning with the way these gentlemen treated Ms. Grider.” RP (#37433-5-III) (Sep.
25, 2020) at 20. The superior court, however, regretfully denied the motion without
prejudice. The written order read:
“[although the payment of fees is] yet another instance of [Quinn
and Pang] violating their fiduciary duties, the Court does not believe it has
the authority to add to its Second Amended Judgment and Decree at this
time.
CP (#37433-5-III) at 3105 (emphasis added).
During oral argument before this court, defendants’ counsel represented that, after
he received notice of the dispute regarding payment of attorney fees, he restored to his
firm’s trust account the amount of $14,000 in fees earned. Therefore, the entire $70,000
in payments remain in the trust account. Counsel also conceded that all of the $70,000
amount arose from revenues garnered by the marijuana business.
We recently issued a ruling in the related appeal. We affirmed the superior court’s
monetary judgment in favor of JoHanna Grider, but reversed the superior court’s
declaration of JoHanna Grider being the controlling partner. We remanded to the
superior court to decide whether to impose a receivership in lieu of placing Grider in
control of the marijuana business. We granted Grider reasonable attorney fees on appeal
because of the oppressive and inequitable conduct of the defendants.
9
No. 37836-5-III
Grider v. Quinn
LAW AND ANALYSIS
On appeal, JoHanna Grider seeks return of the $70,000 paid to Ian Cairns after the
August 2019 findings of fact and conclusions of law. She argues that, despite the
superior court not yet signing a judgment, defendants knew that, based on the entered
findings of fact and conclusions of law, the partnership owned the marijuana retail store
and that she controlled the affairs of partnership. Therefore, no one else had authority to
authorize the payment. She relies on the superior court’s equitable powers to require that
Cairns, Christopher Quinn, and/or Christian Pang return the fees to the partnership. She
also contends that the July 23, 2018 restraining order prohibited Quinn and Pang from
using marijuana revenues for personal expenses, which included payment of attorney
fees.
The defendants respond that findings of fact and conclusions of law lack any
binding effect. Since the superior court had yet to enter a judgment or decree declaring
JoHanna Grider to control partnership affairs and declaring the partnership to own the
marijuana business, Alkaloid still controlled the business. According to defendants,
Alkaloid remained free to use marijuana revenues as it saw fit including paying its
attorney fees and fees of Christopher Quinn and Christian Pang. Alkaloid violated no
order by paying the fees because the superior court, in its July 23, 2018 order, excluded
the payment of fees from the restraining order. The defendants also argue that the
superior court lacked any authority to require repayment of the fees to the partnership,
10
No. 37836-5-III
Grider v. Quinn
particularly since the case pended before this appellate court when Grider brought her
motion.
We decline to address most of the arguments of the parties. We can resolve this
appeal in a more narrow and direct manner. We hold that the superior court had
authority, despite the appeal, and should have exercised that authority to require return of
the attorney fees. Regardless of whether JoHanna Grider controlled the daily operations
of the marijuana retail business, the partnership never approved of the payment of fees.
Regardless of whether a court order declared the partnership to own the business, the
partnership owned the marijuana business. A court in equity may require that money
taken from a partnership without authorization by a partner be returned to the partnership.
A court in equity may also require a partner to return funds taken from the partnership for
his own benefit.
Return of Money
We first address whether the law supports an order compelling the return of the
$70,000 in attorney fees paid to Ian Cairns by Alkaloid. After answering this question in
the affirmative, we concentrate on whether the superior court possessed authority to enter
such an order during the pendency of the appeal by the defendants of its rulings in favor
of JoHanna Grider.
In its ruling, the superior court declared that Christopher Quinn and Christian Pang
violated additional fiduciary duties when usurping marijuana revenues owned by the
partnership to pay Alkaloid’s and their personal attorney fees and costs. The undisputed
11
No. 37836-5-III
Grider v. Quinn
evidence establishes this finding. The law also supports a ruling of a breach of fiduciary
duty by use of the funds to pay attorney fees, and the law imposed a trust on the
marijuana revenues, such that the fees must be returned to the partnership.
When a party misappropriates property of another to whom that party owes a
fiduciary duty, the malefactor is liable for the misappropriated property as well as for the
profits realized therefrom even if the wrongdoer has an interest in the misappropriated
property. 59A AM. JUR. 2D Partnership § 390 (2021). Partners are liable to each other
for the fruits of misappropriated partnership property. Thompson v. Grantham, 489 So.
2d 414 (La. Ct. App. 1986); 59A AM. JUR. 2D Partnership § 390 (2021). The law
imposes a constructive trust as a remedial device over the misused property. 59A AM.
JUR. 2D Partnership § 390 (2021). Since partners stand in a fiduciary relationship one to
the other, any rights obtained by one partner for his individual benefit, to which rights the
copartnership held ownership, is held in trust for the copartnership. Stewart v. Ulrich,
117 Wash. 109, 114, 201 P. 16 (1921); Shrader v. Downing, 79 Wash. 476, 477, 140 P.
558. Textile Mills, Inc. v. Colpack, 264 Ala. 669, 89 So.2d 187 (1956); Crone v. Crone,
180 Ill. 599, 54 N.E. 605 (1899); In re Curran, 157 B.R. 500, 509-10 (Bankr. D. Mass.
1993).
The one partner must account to his copartners for the property taken. Stewart v.
Ulrich, 117 Wash. 109, 114, 201 P. 16 (1921). Members of a partnership, no more than
officers of a corporation, cannot give away, or appropriate property or funds for their own
use. Textile Mills, Inc. v. Colpack, 264 Ala. 669, 673 (1956). One partner cannot dispose
12
No. 37836-5-III
Grider v. Quinn
of the partnership property in payment of his individual debt without the consent of his
copartners, either express or by necessary implication. Lovelace v. Reliable Garage, 33
Ga. App. 289, 125 S.E. 877, 877 (1924); Ulrich v. McConaughey, 63 Neb. 10, 88 N.W.
150, 151 (1901), modified, 69 Neb. 773, 96 N.W. 645 (1903). The fiduciary relation
among partners prohibits all forms of trickery, secret dealings and preference of self in
matters relating to and connected with a partnership and joint venture. Kehoe v.
Wildman, Harrold, Allen & Dixon, 387 Ill. App. 3d 454, 899 N.E.2d 1177, 1190 (2008).
The superior court should right the wrong committed by Christopher Quinn and
Christian Pang against the partnership and their partner, JoHanna Grider. The trial court
should exercise its authority liberally, as well as equitably, to the end that substantial
rights be preserved and justice between the parties be fairly and judiciously done. Griggs
v. Averbeck Realty, Inc., 92 Wn.2d 576, 582, 599 P.2d 1289 (1979); White v. Holm, 73
Wn.2d 348, 351, 438 P.2d 581 (1968). In equity, a judicial officer may fashion broad
remedies to mete substantial justice to the parties and put an end to litigation. Hough v.
Stockbridge, 150 Wn.2d 234, 236, 76 P.3d 216 (2003). Although the superior court
found that it did not have authority, “the trial court is not powerless to fashion and
impose appropriate sanctions under its inherent authority to control litigation.” In re
Firestorm 1991, 129 Wn.2d 130, 139, 916 P.2d 411 (1996).
The defendants argue that Alkaloid could utilize the marijuana revenues for any
purpose, including payment of attorney fees owed by it, Christian Pang, or Christopher
Quinn until the superior court entered its judgment in February 2020. The defendants
13
No. 37836-5-III
Grider v. Quinn
impliedly argue that no partnership existed and Alkaloid legally controlled the operations
of the marijuana retail store until the superior court entered the judgment and decree even
despite the entry eight months earlier of findings of fact and conclusions of law granting
JoHanna Grider control of the business. We disagree. The trial court’s rulings did not
create the partnership. The trial court rulings confirmed the prior existence of the
partnership, the partnership’s ownership of the marijuana retail store and the license to
sell marijuana, and the partnership’s control of the marijuana operation.
The defendants may argue that the superior court’s July 23, 2018 order, confirmed
by later conclusions of law, authorized use of marijuana revenue to pay attorney fees and
costs. The superior court declared that it did not wish to interfere in the payment of fees.
Nevertheless, the July 2018 order only controlled before trial. The order expressly read
“pending trial.” Trial had ended when the defendants transferred the funds to Ian Cairns.
In the related appeal, we reversed the superior court’s declaration of JoHanna
Grider as the controlling partner of the partnership. The defendants, in anticipation of the
reversal, contend that this appeal falls moot. We disagree. Regardless of who controls
the partnership, the partnership never authorized the payment.
The question might rise as to whether Ian Cairns must directly repay the fees as
opposed to Christopher Quinn and Christian Pang reimbursing the partnership.
Nevertheless, Cairns and his law firm have agreed to abide by any ruling of this court.
Cairns asserts no interest in the funds. Thus, we order Cairns and his law firm to return
the funds to the partnership. We commend Cairns for his professionalism in placing all
14
No. 37836-5-III
Grider v. Quinn
of the fees, including fees earned, in a trust account when notified of the dispute and his
professionalism when foregoing the argument that he need not be bound by any ruling.
Superior Court Authority during Appeal
RAP 7.2 governs the authority of a superior court while a case pends before the
court of appeals. The rule reads in relevant part:
(e) Postjudgment Motions and Actions to Modify Decision. The
trial court has authority to hear and determine (1) postjudgment motions
authorized by the civil rules, the criminal rules, or statutes, and (2) actions
to change or modify a decision that is subject to modification by the court
that initially made the decision. The postjudgment motion or action shall
first be heard by the trial court, which shall decide the matter. If the trial
court determination will change a decision then being reviewed by the
appellate court, the permission of the appellate court must be obtained prior
to the formal entry of the trial court decision.
Two Washington decisions illustrate the authority of the superior court to act
during an appeal and the application of RAP 7.2. In In re Marriage of Burrill, 113 Wn.
App. 863, 56 P.3d 993 (2002), the husband brought a postjudgment motion before the
superior court. He sought damages to the house awarded by the superior court in the
marital dissolution. In the meantime, the wife had appealed the superior court ruling.
Before the husband took possession, the wife stripped the residence of appliances and
fixtures, even window coverings and light switch covers. Cat feces ornamented the rugs.
The superior court awarded the husband $3,000. On appeal, the wife argued that the
superior court lacked jurisdiction to enter a postjudgment order concerning the damage to
the abode. This court disagreed.
15
No. 37836-5-III
Grider v. Quinn
In State v. J-R Distributors, Inc., 111 Wn.2d 764, 765 P.2d 281 (1988), the State
of Washington appealed a ruling made by the superior court requiring the return of
illegally seized property. The superior court issued its ruling while the suit lay pending
before the Supreme Court. The State argued before the Supreme Court that the superior
court lacked jurisdiction to issue the order while the case pended appeal unless the
defendant first obtained permission from the Supreme Court. Based on RAP 7.2, the
court disagreed. The Supreme Court noted that RAP 7.2 changed the earlier practice that
the movant always file a motion in the appellate court seeking permission to file a
postjudgment motion in the superior court. RAP 7.2 eliminates unnecessary work for the
appellate court. RAP 7.2 intended to grant more authority to the superior court. Because
the superior court’s ruling did not affect the decision already on review, the defendant did
not need to seek Supreme Court approval before filing the postjudgment motion.
Any superior court order requiring reimbursement of the partnership of the
$70,000 of attorney fees paid does not affect the case on review. Therefore, the superior
court should have granted the motion to disgorge.
In this appeal, the defendants do not contend that JoHanna Grider needed to file a
separate lawsuit to seek the return of funds. Christopher Quinn and Christian Pang’s
payment of fees from the marijuana business continued an ongoing and egregious series
of breaches of fiduciary duty echoing the allegations in Grider’s complaint.
16
No. 37836-5-III
Grider v. Quinn
Attorney Fees on Appeal
JoHanna Grider requests an award of reasonable attorney fees on appeal. Because
she prevails and because of the inequitable conduct of the defendants, we award her
reasonable attorney fees on appeal against the three defendants. Hsu Ying Li v. Tang, 87
Wn.2d 796, 798, 557 P.2d 342 (1976); Green v. McAllister, 103 Wn. App. 452, 468,14
P.3d 795 (2000); Guntle v. Barnett, 73 Wn. App. 825, 836, 871 P.2d 627 (1994), adhered
to on reh’g, 93 Wn. App. 1067 (1999).
CONCLUSIONS
We remand to the superior court to enter an order compelling the return to the
partnership of the $70,000 in fees paid to Ian Cairns. We grant JoHanna Grider
reasonable attorney fees on appeal.
A majority of the panel has determined this opinion will not be printed in the
Washington Appellate Reports, but it will be filed for public record pursuant to RCW
2.06.040.
_________________________________
Fearing, J.
WE CONCUR:
______________________________
Siddoway, A.C.J.
______________________________
Lawrence-Berrey, J.
17