136 Wn.2d 619, 621-22,
964
P.2d 1187 (1998). The proper remedy for a failure to comply with CrR 6.1 (d) is
remand for entry of written findings of fact and conclusions of law. Head,
136
Wn.2d at 624. Reversal is only appropriate where the defendant has
demonstrated actual prejudice. Head,
136 Wn.2d at 624.
On October 3, 2013, the trial court issued its written findings of fact and
conclusions of law supporting the convictions. On December 18, 2013, the trial
court issued its findings of fact and conclusions of law supporting the exceptional
sentence. Because the trial court entered written findings of fact and conclusions
of law, albeit untimely, remand is unnecessary.
Reversal is also inappropriate. "We will not infer prejudice .. . from delay
in entry of written findings of fact and conclusions of law." Head,
136 Wn.2d at
625. Rather, as the Supreme Court stated in Head, "a defendant might be able
to show prejudice resulting from the lack of written findings and conclusions
where there is strong indication that findings ultimately entered have been
'tailored' to meet issues raised on appeal."
136 Wn.2d at 624-25. Here, the trial
judge declared that he had not read Klamn's appellate brief. Thereafter, despite
having the opportunity to file a supplemental brief addressing prejudice, Klamn
did not do so. Accordingly, Klamn fails to demonstrate any prejudice from the
trial court's delay in entering written findings of fact and conclusions of law.
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No. 71961-1-1/7
Because written findings of fact and conclusions of law have been entered
and because he failed to demonstrate any prejudice from the delay, Klamn is not
entitled to appellate relief on this assignment of error.
Ill
Klamn contends that the trial court erred by sentencing him to 600 months
in confinement. This is so, he asserts, because 600 months is clearly excessive
for the crimes of which he was convicted. We disagree.
We review whether the length of a sentence is clearly excessive by using
an abuse of discretion standard. State v. Oxborrow,
106 Wn.2d 525, 529-30,
723 P.2d 1123 (1986). A sentence is clearly excessive if it is "'clearly
unreasonable, i.e., exercised on untenable grounds or for untenable reasons, or
an action that no reasonable person would have taken.'" Oxborrow,
106 Wn.2d
at 531 (quoting State v. Strong,
23 Wn. App. 789, 794,
599 P.2d 20 (1979)). "In
other words, the reviewing court asks whether the grounds relied on, if any, in
determining the length of the sentence are tenable and whether the amount of
incarceration imposed is such that 'no reasonable person' would have imposed
it." State v. Ross.
71 Wn. App. 556, 569,
861 P.2d 473,
883 P.2d 329 (1993)
(citing State v. Harmon.
50 Wn. App. 755, 762,
750 P.2d 664 (1988)).
"'[T]he sentencing court need not state reasons in addition to those relied
upon to justify the imposition of an exceptional sentence above the standard
range in the first instance to justify the length of the sentence imposed.'" State v.
Ritchie,
126 Wn.2d 388, 395,
894 P.2d 1308 (1995) (quoting Ross. 71 Wn. App.
at 573). "Indeed, once a reviewing court has determined that the facts support
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No. 71961-1-1/8
the reasons given for exceeding the range and that those reasons are substantial
and compelling, there is often nothing more to say." Ross. 71 Wn. App. at 571-
72. Accordingly, we first review whether an exceptional sentence is justified by
the facts in this case.
Here, the trial court found three aggravating factors that justified an
exceptional sentence: domestic violence, an ongoing pattern of abuse, and
abuse of a position of trust. The facts adequately support the trial court's
findings. Klamn is S.A.K.'s father, both a family member and someone who
occupies a position of trust to a child. However, Klamn sexually abused his
daughter for seven years. These facts support the trial court's finding of the
three aggravating factors and justify an exceptional sentence.
Additionally, the trial court found that Klamn had committed 14 offenses,
resulting in a high offender score and some offenses going unpunished. See
RCW 9.94A.535(2)(c). The trial court also found that the victim was under fifteen
at the time of the offenses. In light of these findings and the three aggravating
factors, we cannot conclude that no reasonable person would have sentenced
Klamn to 600 months.
The trial court did not err by sentencing Klamn to 600 months of
confinement.
IV
In his statement of additional grounds, Klamn contends that the trial court
erred by allowing S.A.K. to testify to Klamn's statements made during a
telephone conversation with her. According to Klamn, this testimony was overly
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No. 71961-1-1/9
prejudicial.4 Although Klamn objected to the admission of S.A.K.'s testimony at
trial, he did so on the basis of hearsay, not unfair prejudice. Issues raised for the
first time on appeal are not reviewable unless they constitute "manifest error
affecting a constitutional right." RAP 2.5(a)(3). Because Klamn's contention is
raised for the first time on appeal and does not affect a constitutional right, we
decline to consider it.
V
Klamn further contends, in his statement of additional grounds, that his
convictions are not supported by sufficient evidence. This is so, he asserts,
because he cannot be convicted on S.A.K.'s uncorroborated testimony and
because the evidence violated the "corpus delicti rule." Neither assertion has
merit.
Contrary to Klamn's assertion, there is no requirement that victim
testimony be corroborated by physical evidence. Circumstantial evidence is not
necessarily less reliable than direct evidence. State v. Delmarter,
94 Wn.2d 634,
638,
618 P.2d 99 (1980). Moreover, the trier of fact is entitled to make credibility
determinations and believe or disbelieve any of the witnesses.5 State v.
Camarillo.
115 Wn.2d 60, 71,
794 P.2d 850 (1990). Here, the trial court heard
the testimony often witnesses, and determined that S.A.K. was more credible
than Klamn. We do not disturb that determination. See Camarillo,
115 Wn.2d at
4 Klamn also asserts that S.A.K.'s testimony "assumes facts not in evidence" and
"constituted impermissible opinion testimony." These claims fail for the same reason.
5 Further, contrary to Klamn's assertions, S.A.K.'s testimony was corroborated by other
evidence. Seven witnesses testified consistent with S.A.K.'s version of events. The audio- and
videotapes presented at trial also lent support to S.A.K.'s testimony.
No. 71961-1-1/10
71 (determinations of credibility not subject to appellate review).
Similarly, Klamn's convictions do not violate the "corpus delicti rule." The
"corpus delicti rule" provides that "confessions or admissions of a person charged
with a crime are not sufficient, standing alone, to prove the corpus delicti and
must be corroborated by other evidence." State v. Aten,
130 Wn.2d 640, 655-56,
927 P.2d 210 (1996). Any self-incriminating statements made by Klamn6 were
far from the only evidence presented. Rather, S.A.K. testified as to her version of
the events. Her testimony was corroborated by seven witnesses. The "corpus
delicti rule" has no applicability to this case.
The trial court did not err by finding Klamn guilty and entering judgment on
all 14 counts.7
Affirmed.
We concur:
1
ftt^rv^B^ C)J,
'7~y
6 We assume that the statements to which Klamn refers were present on the audio- and
videotapes, as we discern no self-incriminating statements from the record provided.
7 Klamn further makes numerous claims of ineffective assistance against three of his
attorneys. However, the record on appeal is not sufficient for us to review any of these claims.
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