In Re the Dependency of Ca.R.

FILED
DEC. 8,2015
In the Office of the Clerk of Court
WA State Court of Appeals, Division III
COURT OF APPEALS, STATE OF WASHINGTON DIVISION III
) No. 32765-5-111 cons. wI
In re Welfare of: ) No. 32776-1-111; No. 32777-9-111
)
Ca.R., ) ORDER WITHDRAWING
CI.R., ) OPINION
G.R., )
Minor(s). )
The Court on its own motion, does hereby withdraw the opinion filed with this
Court in the above-entitled case on October 27,2015.
PANEL: 3, Brown, Siddoway, Fearing
FOR THE COURT:
CHIEF JUDGE
FILED
DEC. 8,2015
In the Office of the Clerk of Court
WA State Court of Appeals, Division III
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION THREE
In re the Welfare of: ) No. 32765-5-111 cons. wi
) No. 32776-1-111; No. 32777-9-111
Ca.R., )
CLR., )
G.R., )
)
) PUBLISHED OPINION
Minor(s). )
BROWN, J. - T.T. appeals a superior court judge's denial of her request to revise
a commissioner's ruling granting the Department of Social and Health Services'
(Department's) dependency petition for her daughters, Ca.R., CLR., and G.R. T.T.
contends the court erred in finding she was not capable of adequately caring for the
girls, ordering out-of-home placement, and ordering an Interstate Compact on the
Placement of Children investigation (ICPC) with Nevada before the children's placement
with her. We find no abuse of trial court discretion in the trial court's dependency and
placement decisions. We lack a record of Nevada's ICPC involvement. Thus, T.T.'s
ICPC concerns are both premature and ungrounded. Accordingly, we affirm.
FACTS
In 2011, the State of Nevada removed Ca.R. (born 1/19/02), CLR. (born 1/17/05),
and G.R. (born 1017/06) from T.T.'s care along with a younger stepbrother, A.G., who is
No. 32765-5-111 cons. wI 32776-1-111 and 32777-9-111
In re the Welfare of Ga.R., GI.R., and G.R.
not the subject of this appeal. Nevada then petitioned for dependency based on Ca.R.'s
allegations of sexual abuse by her mother's boyfriend, AG.'s father; domestic violence;
and T.T.'s drug use. Later, the three girls were placed with their father in Oregon after
an approved ICPC. The Nevada dependency was then dismissed as to the girls. The
girls moved to Spokane with their father in the summer of 2013.
In January 2014, Ca.R. alleged her father sexually abused her and the
Department petitioned for dependency. T.T. appeared through counsel. The girls had
not seen T.T. since leaving Nevada, but had frequent telephone conversations with her.
On March 26, 2014, the girls' father agreed to dependency. T.T. participated
telephonically in a family team decision meeting, unsuccessfully requesting placement
of the girls with her in Nevada as soon as possible, without having to wait for the results
of an ICPC request.
A fact-finding hearing was held in May. Ca.R. was then in her second
placement, while CI.R. and G.R. were still together in their first placement. The
Department moved Ca. R. to a receiving home from her first placement because she
had displayed disruptive behavior, including head banging and excessive attention-
seeking behavior and over-attachment to people. Ca.R. reports she is very angry and
has nightmares. Evidence showed T.T. suffers from post-traumatic stress disorder and
panic disorder with agoraphobia. G.R. and CI.R. struggle with being overly afraid of
bugs, the outdoors, and trees. T.T. related she lives with her significant other, AO., and
her two sons, AG., and Z.O.
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No. 32765-5-111 cons. wI 32776-1-111 and 32777-9-111
In re the Welfare of Ca.R., CI.R., and G.R.
After fact-finding, the commissioner entered findings of fact noting the amount of
work T.T. had done to have her younger boys returned to her care, but found, "The
court is concerned that the services provided during mother's dependency in Nevada
were not directed at reunifying her with [Ca.R., CI.R., and G.R.]." Clerk's Papers (CP)
at 85. Specifically, the commissioner found, "The trauma that the children experienced
in the mother's home (mother's substance abuse and domestic violence as well as
[Ca.R.'s] disclosure of sexual abuse by mother's former partner) has not been
addressed." Id. Further, "[Ca.R.] has significant behavioral and emotional issues. She
is just now beginning to deal with these issues in counseling. Her behavior appears to
be parentified. If she were to be placed with her mother today she would suddenly have
new siblings and a new father figure as well as re-adjusting to living with her mother.
This could set the family up for failure." CP at 86. The commissioner found, "An ICPC
approval is needed so that the State of Nevada will provide oversight of the family if
[Ca.R.] is placed in the home." CP at 86 (Finding of Fact i).
The commissioner granted the, dependency petition, ruling "[T.T.] is currently not
capable of parenting [Ca.R., CI.R. or G.R.] due to the unresolved issues that led to the
dependency in Nevada. Specifically, T.T. needs to repair her relationship with the girls,
and to demonstrate that she can attend to their emotional needs including partiCipating
in any family counseling or other therapy needed. Mother also needs to continue her
commitment to sobriety." CP at 86.
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In re the Welfare of Ca.R., CI.R., and G.R.
The commissioner then found "an ICPC approval is needed so that the State of
Nevada will provide oversight of the family if [Ca.R] is placed in the home." CP at 86.
The commissioner noted in her oral ruling she wanted "the ICPC ... process to get
started, not because it's required for a parent but because of the additional oversight
and it's clear that you have a very good relationship with your social worker and they
may be happy to supervise and give us the oversight there that we need." CP at 327.
T.T. moved to revise the commissioner's order, arguing she could provide
I ' counseling for the girls in Nevada through state agencies and insisting she was capable
of caring for all five children. The court denied her revisions request, adopting the
commissioner's findings of fact, and finding the dependency was based on "the
children's needs, to ensure their safety and that a move to their mother's home would
be done in an appropriate manner that meets their needs." CP at 385. The court found,
"It will be helpful to this family to have a social worker in Nevada, assigned through the
ICPC process, who will help to provide services and supports in reintroducing these
children to their mother's home." CP at 385. T.T. appealed.
ANALYSIS
A. Dependency Finding
The issue is whether the revision judge erred by abusing her discretion when
denying revision of the commissioner's dependency finding. T.T. contends substantial
evidence does not support the court's finding she is not capable of parenting Ca.R.,
CI.R, and G.R
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In re the Welfare of Ga.R., GI.R., and G.R.
"We review the superior court's ruling, not the commissioner's." State v. Ramer,
151 Wn.2d 106, 113,86 P.3d 132 (2004). "Commissioner rulings are subject to revision
by the superior court." RCW 2.24.050. On revision, the superior court reviews the
commissioner's findings of fact and conclusions of law de novo based on the evidence
and issues presented to the commissioner. In re Marriage of Moody, 137 Wn.2d 979,
992-93,976 P.2d 1240 (1999). We review a superior court's dependency placement
decision for abuse of discretion. In re Dependency of A.G., 74 Wn. App. 271, 275, 873
P.2d 535 (1994). A court abuses its discretion when it "applies the wrong legal
standard, or bases its ruling on an erroneous view of the law." Gildon v. Simon Prop.
Grp., Inc., 158 Wn.2d 483,494, 145 P.3d 1196 (2006).
Parents "have a fundamental liberty interest in the care and welfare of their minor
children" must be balanced with the State's "interest in protecting the physical, mental,
and emotional health of children." In re Dependency of Schermer, 161 Wn.2d 927,941,
169 P.3d 452 (2007). Unless a child's right to nurture, physical and/or mental health, or
safety is endangered, "the family unit should remain intact." RCW 13.34.020. But when
the rights of the child and the legal rights of the parents conflict, the child's rights prevail,
as the child's health and safety [are] the paramount concern. Id. Declaring a child
"dependent" transfers legal custody to the State. Schermer, 161 Wn.2d at 942. After
filing a dependency petition, a fact-finding hearing is held to decide if the allegations are
true. Id. The petitioner must show "by a preponderance of the evidence that the child
meets one of the statutory definitions of dependency." Id.5
No. 32765-5-111 cons. wI 32776-1-111 and 32777-9-111
In re the Welfare of Ca.R., CI.R., and G.R.
Relevant here, Washington defines a "dependent child" as a child who "has no
parent ... capable of adequately caring for the child, such that the child is in
circumstances which constitute a danger of substantial damage to the child's
psychological or physical development." RCW 13.34.030(6)(c). Dependencies based
on RCW 13.34.030(6)(c) do not require a finding of parental unfitness; instead, they
"allow[ ] consideration of both a child's special needs and any limitations or other
circumstances which affect a parent's ability to respond to those needs." Schenner,
161 Wn.2d at 944. A child is not dependent if a capable parent exists. In re Walker, 43
Wn.2d 710,715,263 P.2d 956 (1953).
When evaluating evidence to determine whether a child is dependent, trial courts
have broad discretion and considerable flexibility to reach '''a decision that recognizes
both the welfare of the child and parental rights.'" Schenner, 161 Wn.2d at 952 (quoting
In re Welfare of Becker, 87 Wn.2d 470,478,553 P.2d 1339 (1976». A court has no
required factors to consider. Becker, 87 Wn.2d at 477 (interpreting predecessor
statute). Decisions to dismiss a dependency cannot "be based upon hunches or snap
judgments": all parties have a right to be heard, and children need a well-considered
decision. In re Dependency of R.H., 129 Wn. App. 83, 88, 117 P.3d 1179 (2005).
Our "appellate review is limited to whether substantial evidence supports the trial
court's findings and whether the findings support its conclusions of Jaw." Schenner, 161
Wn.2d at 940. "Substantial evidence exists if, when viewing the evidence in the light
most favorable to the prevailing party, a rational trier of fact could find the fact more
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In re the Welfare of Ga.R., GI.R., and G.R.
likely than not to be true." In re Welfare of X. T., 174 Wn. App. 733, 737, 300 P.3d 824(2013). Furthermore, we do not reweigh evidence or reassess witness credibility. Id.Here, the girls had not seen their mother since they were removed from her
Nevada home three years earlier. They were removed based on allegations of sexual
and physical abuse, substance abuse, and exposure to domestic violence. A
dependency was started but dismissed without services to address the removal
problems because the girls relocated to their father's home in Oregon. The girls now
show concerning behaviors such as head banging, unhealthy attachments, unfounded
fears, anger, and nightmares. Nothing in this record indicates T.T. understands what
the girls would need from her to address the girls' difficult behaviors. Moreover, no plan
is in place for preventing interaction between A.G.'s father and the girls in Nevada.
Sending the girls to live with T.T. without an investigation and services in place would
subject them to extraordinary risk of additional trauma due to a lack of emotional and
behavioral support, as well as exposure to a former abuser. T.T. argues services are
available through a program she is currently involved in, but further investigation is
needed to make sure the girls qualify for these services and that the services are
tailored to their, and T.T.'s, specific needs.
T.T. next incorrectly argues the court was required to find her unfit. The
Department need not prove a parent is unfit to prove a dependency. Schermer, 161
Wn.2d at 944. A dependency based on RCW 13.34.030(6)(c) does not turn on parental
7
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In re the Welfare of Ga.R., GI.R., and G.R.
"unfitness" but allows consideration of both a child's special needs and any limitations or
other circumstances which affect a parent's ability to respond to those needs. Id.This case, like the Schermer case involves special needs and circumstances.
The girls have not lived with their mother since 2011 when they were removed from her
home and dependency proceedings started. No services were offered because the girls
relocated to Oregon to live with their father. The girls have been exposed to phYSical,
sexual, and substance abuse resulting in their present concerning behaviors. Here, it is
sufficient for the Department to prove T.T. is not capable of adequately caring for Ca.R.,
CI.R., and G.R., based on their special needs and the case circumstances. The
Department has met this burden. Placing the girls with T.T. would put the children in
circumstances which constitute a danger of substantial damage to their psychological or
physical development; thus, satisfying RCW 13.34.030(6)(c). Given all, we conclude
the court did not abuse its discretion in finding th~ girls dependent.
ANALYSIS
B. Placement and ICPC Involvement
Based on her rejected adequate-parent arguments, T.T. contends the trial court
erred in not placing the children with her. Thus, she incorrectly argues ICPC
involvement is an unnecessary delay to placing the girls with her.
Dependency hearings determine what course of action serves the child's best
interests. Schermer, 161 Wn.2d at 942. In dependency proceedings, discretionary
placement decisions are reviewed for an abuse of discretion. In re Dependency of AG.,
B
No. 32765-5-111 cons. wI 32776-1-111 and 32777-9-111
In re the Welfare of Ca.R., CI.R., and G.R.
74 Wn. App. 271, 276, 873 P.2d 535 (1994). "A trial court abuses its discretion when its
decision is manifestly unreasonable or based on untenable grounds." In re Marriage of
Kovacs, 121 Wn.2d 795,801,854 P.2d 629 (1993).
When placing a child, "the best interests of the child are the court's paramount
concern." In re DependencyofR.W, 143 Wn. App. 219, 223,177 P.3d 186 (2008).
Because each case is fact specific, no exact criteria exists for determining what the
child's best interests are. Id. Even though a child's interests are the paramount
concern, the parents' interests still have weight: courts are directed "to adopt a program
which will 'least interfere with family autonomy, provided that the services are adequate
to protect the child.'" In re DependencyofJ.B.S., 123 Wn.2d 1, 12,863 P.2d 1344(1993) (quoting RG.W 13.34.130{1)(a». But, if it is not in the child's best interests, a
court is not required to reunite children with the parent who had custody at the time of
the dependency action. R.W., 143 Wn. App. at 223.
The girls were not living with T.T. when the Washington dependency proceedings
were initiated and had been previously removed from T.T.'s Nevada home for
dependency proceedings. Nothing shows the girls' special needs were remedied when
they were sent to Oregon to live with their father. These facts provide tenable grounds
for the court to deny in-home placement.
T.T. incorrectly argues the court erred by mandating ICPC proceedings before
making a placement determination. The superior court judge adopted the
commissioner's findings of fact. Finding of fact i states, "An ICPC approval is needed
9
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In re the Welfare of Ca.R., CI.R., and G.R.
so that the State of Nevada will provide oversight of the family if [Ca.R.] is placed in the
home." CP at 86. The word "needed" is not used to connote a prerequisite.
"The ICPC was drafted in the 1950s by a group of state social service
administrators to address the problem of providing services to children placed across
state lines." In re Dependency of D.F.-M., 157 Wn. App. 179, 187,236 P.3d 961(2010). Its purpose is to encourage cooperation and information sharing among
member states. Id. It is a tool for foster care placement or preliminary to an adoption.
Id. at 188. Division One of this court held, "the ICPC governs only the placement of
children in substitute arrangements for parental care." Id. at 191. The ICPC process
does not govern placement of children with parents. Placement decisions are made by
the courts. Our record does not disclose what, if any, response Nevada has made to
Washington's ICPC request. Thus, T.T.'s ICPC concerns are premature. Our case is
unlike D.F.-M. where the court dealt with an Oklahoma ICPC process that interfered
with Washington's placement decision. Here the goal remains to investigate placement
of the girls with T.T. with Nevada's ICPC assistance.
In sum, the commissioner correctly noted the ICPC process was "not ...
required for a parent." CP at 327. But this does not eliminate cooperation between the
two states as the parties work toward reunification. Rather, consistent with D.F.-M., it
leaves the decision of whether T.T. is capable of parenting the girls within the sound
discretion of the trial court rather than an administrative agency. See D.F.-M., 157 Wn.
App. at 192.
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No. 32765-5-111 cons. wI 32776-1-111 and 32777-9-111
In re the Welfare of Ga.R., GI.R., and G.R.
Affirmed.
Brown, J.
1CONCUR:
11
No. 32765-5-111; consolidated with 32776-1-111; 32777-9-111
FEARING, J. (dissent) This appeal arises from consolidated dependency petitions
involving eight children all related by blood or cohabitation. The appeal concerns three
of the children identified in the majority opinion as Ca.R., born January 19, 2002; CLR.,
born January 17,2005; and G.R., born October 7, 2006. For ease in reading, I refer to the
three girls respectively and fictitiously as Karen, now age thirteen, Cathy, now age ten,
and Georgia, now age nine. The three girls are sisters and the biological daughters of
appellant T.T., who resides in Las Vegas. W.R. is the biological father of Karen and
Georgia and listed on the birth certificate of Cathy as Cathy's father, although another
gentleman is the biological father. The parties consider W.R. as the father of all three
girls.
In January 2014, when the State of Washington intervened in the lives of Karen,
Cathy, and Georgia, the three lived with their father \V.R. and his girlfriend, Alicia
Huante, in Spokane. Huante bore other children, who resided in the household, including
male twins born in December 2012. W.R. is the father of the twins. The State removed
Karen, Cathy and Georgia from their Spokane home because of allegations of sexual
No. 32765-5-III Cons. wi 32776-I-III; 32777-9-III
In re the Welfare ofCa.R; CI.R and G.R.
abuse by W.R .. The State of Washington also removed from the household the twins and
three Greenleaf children, two girls and one boy, whose mother is Alicia Huante.
The trial court declared Karen, Cathy and Georgia dependents of the State of
Washington based on a conclusion that neither T.T. nor W.R. are capable of parenting the
three within the meaning ofRCW 13.34.030(6)(c). The statute allows a dependency
when no parent is capable of adequately caring for a child, such that the child is in
circumstances which constitute a danger of substantial damage to the child's
psychological or physical development. The trial court did not find that T.T.'s care for
any of the three daughters would constitute a danger of substantial damage and the
evidence would not support such a finding. The State would not return the two younger
girls to T.T. because the girls have a fear of the outdoors, bugs, and trees. T.T. appeals
the dependency ruling and argues that substantial evidence does not support the
dependency finding. I agree. I would reverse the trial court and dismiss the dependency
petition.
The trial court ordered a placement study by Nevada authorities, under the
"Interstate Compact on Placement of Children" (ICPC) ch. 26.34 RCW. In addition to
determining whether to uphold the dependency, this court must also decide whether the
trial court had authority to order such a study. It did not.
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In re the Welfare ofCa.R; CI.R and G.R.
FACTS
The case's facts derive from a one-day dependency trial before a court
commissioner. During the trial, the State's sole witness, social worker Amanda Plumb,
testified to the background ofT.T. Plumb's basis of knowledge for the background was
Nevada Child Protective Service (CPS) binders, but the State did not seek to introduce
the records in the binders as an exhibit. During her testimony, Plumb did not refer to the
records to confirm she testified consistently with the records. Plumb never met T.T. and
thus never observed her with children. Plumb only knew T.T. from what Plumb read,
including recent Nevada reports that establish that T.T. performs well as a mother.
T.T. is the mother of seven children, three of whom are the subject of this appeal.
In addition to Karen, Cathy, and Georgia, T.T. bore Faith, a daughter older than the three
girls, Terrance, who resides on an Indian reservation in North Dakota, Andrew, born in
2011, and Zeke, born in 2013. Andrew and Zeke are also ersatz monikers. The ages of
Faith and Terrance are unknown.
Physicians have diagnosed T.T. with posttraumatic stress disorder, panic disorder,
and agoraphobia. She has suffered domestic violence. T.T. now receives counseling for
her mental health disorders.
At trial, Amanda Plumb averred that a report in the binder commented that Faith
tried to drown a seven year old. According to one report, both Faith and T.T. bang each's
respective head against a wall.
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In re the Welfare ofCa.R; CI.R and G.R.
Karen, Cathy and Georgia lived with their mother T.T. in Nevada until 2011. We
do not know when T.T. and W.R., the father of the three girls, separated. In 2011, the
State of Nevada removed Karen, Cathy, Georgia, and younger brother Andrew from
T.T.'s home in Las Vegas. Nevada filed a dependency and alleged sexual abuse of Karen
by T.T. 's former boyfriend and Andrew's father, Mark Gregory, domestic violence
against T.T. by Gregory, and T.T.'s drug use. Authorities later determined that Karen
fabricated the allegation of sexual abuse by Gregory.
Upon removal from their mother's Nevada home, Karen, Cathy, and Georgia lived
with their father, W.R., in Oregon. The State of Nevada then dismissed the dependency
proceeding with regard to the three girls. In 2013, the sisters moved to Spokane with
their father and his companion, Alicia Huante.
Amanda Plumb testified that children ofT.T. have been "removed, returned,
removed, and returned" by Nevada on multiple occasions, beginning in 2000. Clerk's
Papers (CP) at 162. Plumb gave scant details. As already written, the State of Nevada
removed Andrew, along with the three girls, in 2011. Nevada returned Andrew to T.T.
sometime in 2011. Nevada removed Andrew again on February 22, 2013.
T.T. has not had physical contact with Karen, Cathy and Georgia since their
removal from her Nevada home in 2011. Since removal, T.T. has regularly spoken on
the telephone with all three daughters, particularly with the oldest daughter, Karen. She
speaks with Karen at length every evening for up to an hour. She helps Karen with
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In re the Welfare ofCa.R; CI.R and G.R.
homework. The mother and daughter discuss school, grades, attitudinal problems,
positive ideals, and helping around the house. Karen initially expressed frustration to
T.T. about mistakes T.T. made in the latter's life. According to T.T., Karen has forgiven
her, in part, because T.T. unfailingly calls Karen and speaks consistently.
T.T. respectively speaks with Cathy and Georgia about once a week for five
minutes to a half hour. T.T. speaks to the younger girls about school and favorite things.
The foster mother of Cathy and Georgia taught them songs to sing to their mother
because they initially lacked subjects to discuss.
As a result of the 2011 Nevada dependency proceeding, T.T. underwent intensive
outpatient drug treatment for six months. Since April 2012, T.T. has successfully
completed random and frequent urinalyses. T.T. also underwent domestic violence
counseling for one year and still engages in mental health counseling. She took a
parenting class.
Upon the May 2013 birth ofZeke, T.T. remained under the specter ofa Nevada
dependency, so the State assigned Zeke to reside with his father, Anton Ort. Ort has no
CPS history. Ort and T.T. now cohabit, and Nevada returned Andrew to T.T. on July 1,
2013. Anton Ort helps raise both boys. Ort and T.T. plan to marry.
Anton Ort, T.T., Andrew, and Zeke live in a three bedroom, two bathroom
apartment obtained for them by Las Vegas' Women's Development Center. Random
urinalyses is a prerequisite to occupancy in the apartment complex. Women's
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In re the Welfare ofCa.R; CI.R and G.R.
Development Center could establish family counseling for T.T. and her three daughters.
T.T. has a support system through her church, Victory Outreach, and through other
families she met. A YMCA, providing recreation for the children, is a five minute walk.
In January 2014, Karen Rees and one of the Greenleaf daughters respectively
alleged that W.R. sexually abused her. Spokane authorities currently investigate the
allegations, but the State has filed no criminal charges against W.R .. Since some of the
purported abuse of Karen allegedly occurred in Oregon, Oregon authorities also currently
investigate the charges. As of the May 2014 trial in this dependency proceeding, Karen
lived in Spokane's Sally's Home and Cathy and Georgia resided together in foster care.
Amanda Plumb, the State social worker, testified at trial that Karen, Cathy, and
Georgia currently fare well. The three encounter no medical problems. According to
Plumb, Karen Rees is a very sweet, happy, and bright girl, who has overcome adversity.
Cathy and Georgia are also happy, and they perform well academically and
developmentally.
According to Amanda Plumb, Karen, despite her happiness, exhibits behavioral
issues. Plumb opined that Karen "may" have reactive attachment disorder in that she
attaches quickly to others. Karen occasionally expresses rage, and she bangs her head
against the wall. Plumb declared that Karen needs constant attention.
Amanda Plumb testified that Karen reports nightmares. Karen fears that her father
will kidnap and punish her for reporting sexual abuse. She is anxious when she rides on
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In re the Welfare ofCa.R; CI.R and G.R.
the Spokane street where she lived with her father and Alicia Huante. Plumb hinted that
Karen suffers from posttraumatic stress disorder, but Plumb did not provide any
background to qualify her for diagnosing the disorder. Plumb declared that a caretaker of
Cathy and Georgia reported that both lasses are afraid of "everything, bugs, outdoors,
trees, everything." CP at 169.
Amanda Plumb testified that T.T. has not agreed to engage in any services with
the State. Plumb did not identify what, if any, services the State offered to T.T. T.T.
called Plumb to inform her that Karen's glasses broke. T.T. advocated for new glasses
for her daughter.
During trial, Amanda Plumb recommended denial of placement at this time of
Karen, Cathy and Georgia with T.T. Plumb opined that raising older girls differs from
raising one and three year old boys. According to Plumb, the girls were repeatedly
traumatized in T.T.'s care. Plumb did not provide details of any of the purported trauma.
Remember that Nevada authorities concluded that Karen had not been sexually abused.
Amanda Plumb testified that the Rees daughters reported to her fear of Mark
Gregory, the purported sexual abuser of Karen. Plumb provided no testimony that Mark
would have contact with the girls ifplaced with T.T. Plumb declared: "from what I've
gathered [Andrew] has visits with him [Mark.]" CP at 165.
Amanda Plumb conveyed concern about T.T.'s ability to care for Karen when
Karen exhibits difficult behavior. Plumb declared:
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In re the Welfare ofCa.R; Cl.R and G.R.
my concern is does [T.T.] right now, currently have the ability and is
she suited to take care of those behaviors. I'm not saying she can't but I
wanna make sure before we just place [Karen] who has been traumatized
by several different people back into a situation into the same city ....
What's, what how is that PTSD gonna manifest in [T.T.'s] home and is
T.T. equipped to handle that.
CP at 169. Plumb wants "to make absolute sure with an ICPC [study] that these children
are gonna be moving back to a safe environment." CP at 213.
Amanda Plumb expressed concern to the trial court that placement of Karen,
Cathy and Georgia with T.T. would more than double T.T.'s household. Plumb has not
seen the facility in which T.T. resides. Plumb expressed concern about T.T. relapsing
into drug use. Plumb desires T.T. to undergo training geared toward parenting children
with behavioral issues and to engage in family therapy with the daughters.
Amanda Plumb recognized T. T. ' s recent improvements in parenting skills and the
potential of returning the three daughters to T.T. Nevertheless, Plumb wished Nevada to
perform an ICPC placement study and the family to engage in counseling before a return.
During her trial testimony on the telephone from Las Vegas, T.T. pledged to care
for her two young boys and her three daughters. She does not work outside the home.
Her fiance, Anton Ort, remains available to assist. T.T. noted that all but one of the
children is of school age, so she will receive daily breaks. T. T. wishes to engage the
children in church activities.
T.T. recognizes now that she earlier chose abusive partners, took controlled
8
No. 32765-5-II1 Cons. wi 32776-I-III; 32777-9-II1
In re the Welfare ofCa.R; CI.R and G.R.
substances, and placed her children in unsafe situations. She testified she will not repeat
these errors because of her support system, her drug treatment, and ongoing counseling.
T.T. is pleased with her life during the last two years.
The State ignores trial testimony from Melissa Blodgett, a family services
specialist with the Department of Family Services in Clark County, Nevada. Blodgett
serves as a caseworker who works with parents and children involved with CPS. She has
a bachelor's degree in human resources management and intensive training with the
Department of Family Services. Blodgett served as T.T.'s case worker from August 2013
until January 2014, when Nevada dismissed the dependency action concerning Andrew.
Upon assuming duties with T.T., Melissa Blodgett reviewed T.T. 's Nevada case file. The
file did not confirm a chronic history of drug abuse or neglect of children claimed by the
State of Washington.
According to Melissa Blodgett, T.T. completed intensive outpatient therapy
services. She also completed parenting and domestic violence counseling. T.T. passed
urinalyses during the entire dependency proceeding.
Melissa Blodgett observed T.T. during ten to twelve visits with her two young
boys. T.T. performed well as an attentive parent. Nevada returned the children to T.T.
because of T.T.' s performance and at the recommendation of service providers and
experts, including drug and alcohol treatment experts.
Melissa Blodgett testified that T.T.'s son Andrew has special needs and receives
9
No. 32765-5-II1 Cons. wi 32776-1-III; 32777-9-II1
In re the Welfare ofCa.R; CI.R and G.R.
speech therapy. T.T. diligently safeguards the therapy, and Andrew has progressed far
with his speech development. Despite the dependency ending, Blodgett saw Andrew in
April 2014, and Blodgett understood each word uttered by the boy. Andrew's mental and
physical development has progressed well.
According to Melissa Blodgett, Anton Ort, who lives with T.T. and the two young
boys, has no CPS history. The State of Nevada kept Zeke with Ort, upon Zeke's birth,
despite the dependency pending with T.T. Ort performed well as Zeke's father. He
could assist in parenting Karen, Cathy, and Georgia. Blodgett supports all five children
living in T.T.'s current physical residence. The home has three bedrooms and adequate
space for the children. The home is fully furnished.
According to Melissa Blodgett, Las Vegas' Women's Development Center
continues to provide services to T.T. The center assisted T.T. obtain the housing,
referred her to counseling, and assists her in safety planning, money management, and
daily living skills.
Melissa Blodgett observed that T.T. is motivated to be a parent and is capable of
caring for more than the two boys. Blodgett holds that T.T. could care for older children.
T.T. has shown exemplary parenting skills for her two sons. The two boys are well loved
and cared for. T.T. has a clear understanding of appropriate parenting and demonstrates
it through her behavior and interactions with her children. She continues to engage in
counseling and mental health services. Blodgett exudes confidence in T.T. despite
10
No. 32765-5-III Cons. wi 32776-1-III; 32777-9-III
In re the Welfare ofCa.R; CI.R and G.R.
Blodgett's knowledge ofT.T.'s CPS history. Blodgett credits the intensive outpatient
substance abuse treatment as changing T.T.
Melissa Blodgett testified that, ifT.T. needed assistance, she knows where to
obtain help. T.T. has been proactive in obtaining assistance for Andrew. T.T. remains in
contact with Blodgett, despite no requirement of contact. T.T. continues to ask Blodgett
for advice and updates Blodgett on the condition of the T.T.'s two young boys.
PROCEEDING
The State of Washington petitioned for a dependency of Karen, Cathy and
Georgia Rees, among others. W.R. agreed to the dependency with regard to his five
children that are the subject of the petition. T.T. requested that her three daughters be
returned to her in Nevada.
After a one-day trial, the court commissioner refused to return Karen, Cathy, and
Georgia to T.T. The commissioner concluded that all three daughters are dependent
within the meaning ofRCW 13.34.030(6)(c).
The court commissioner entered the following findings of fact:
a. Ms. T.T. has done an extraordinary amount of work during her
dependency in Nevada to obtain the return of two of her children, [Zeke]
Orton, age 1, and [Andrew] Gregory, age 3. She successfully completed
the following services: Intensive outpatient treatment, domestic violence
counselling, mental health counselling, parenting classes, and providing
clean UAs. Ms. T.T. has maintained stable housing and has regular contact
with her previously assigned social worker, Melissa Blodgett. Prior to the
Nevada Dependency, she had a significant history of concerning behavior,
including substance abuse and making poor choices in relationships.
11
No. 32765-5-111 Cons. wi 32776-1-111; 32777-9-111
In re the Welfare ofCa.R; Cl.R and G.R.
c. The children have experienced traumatic situations while placed
with their father. [Karen] has disclosed that she has suffered sexual abuse
by her father.
d. The court is concerned that the services provided during mother's
dependency in Nevada were not directed at reunifying her with [Karen,
Cathy, and Georgia] because they were already placed with their father.
Instead, the services were focused on returning the children's half siblings.
e. The trauma that the children experienced in the mother's home
(mother's substance abuse and domestic violence as well as [Karen's]
disclosure of sexual abuse by mother's former partner) has not been
addressed. The allegations of sexual abuse were investigated and did not
result in a founded finding by Nevada CPS. Service of counseling will
address this concern.
f. [Karen] has significant behavioral and emotional issues. She is
just now beginning to deal with these issues in counseling. Her behavior
appears to be parentified. If she were to be placed with her mother today
she would suddenly have new siblings and a new father figure as well as re­
adjusting to living with her mother. This could set the family up for failure.
This case needs to progress slowly enough that it won't disrupt the family.
g. [Karen] needs individual and family counseling to process what
she has been through.
i. An ICPC approval is needed so that the State of Nevada will
provide oversight of the family if [Karen] is placed in the home.
j. The court finds that a "C" [RCW 13.34.030(b)(c)] dependency
has been established by a preponderance of the evidence. Ms. T.T. is
currently not capable of parenting [Karen, Cathy, or Georgia] due to the
unresolved issues that led to the dependency in Nevada. Specifically, Ms.
T.T. needs to repair her relationship with the girls, and to demonstrate that
she can attend to their emotional needs including participating in any
family counsel[ ling or other therapy needed. Mother also needs to
continue her commitment to sobriety.
CP at 393-94.
RCW 13 .34.030(6)( c) requires a finding, before entry of a dependency, that the
inability of the parent to care for the child creates circumstances which constitute a
12
No. 32765-5-III Cons. wi 32776-I-III; 32777-9-III
In re the Welfare ofCa.R; Cl.R and G.R.
danger of substantial damage to the child's psychological or physical development. The
court commissioner entered no finding of fact or conclusion of law that placement of any
or all of the three daughters with T.T. would create a danger of substantial harm.
T.T. asked a superior court judge to revise the commissioner's order. The court
denied her revision request. The court adopted the commissioner's findings of fact and
added the following finding:
2. A dependency is an appropriate vehicle to provide a family with
services do [to] remedy issues in the parent/child relationship and to ensure
a smooth transition when adding three additional children to the home. The
finding of dependency was based upon the children's needs, to ensure their
safety and that a move to their mother's home would be done in an
appropriate manner that meets their needs. It will be helpful to this family
to have a social worker in Nevada, assigned through the ICPC process, who
will help to provide services and supports in reintroducing these children to
their mother's home.
CP at 385.
LEGAL ANAL YSIS
Dependency Sufficiency of Evidence
T.T. argues a lack of evidence supports the declaration of her children as State
dependents. RCW 13.34.030(6) lists four conditions under which a court may declare a
child a dependent of the State of Washington. To declare a child dependent, the trial
court must find by a preponderance of evidence that the child meets one of the statutory
definitions. In re Welfare ofKey, 119 Wn.2d 600,612,836 P.2d 200 (1992); In re
13
No. 32765-5-111 Cons. wi 32776-1-111; 32777-9-111
In re the Welfare o/Ca.R; Cl.R and G.R.
Dependency o/CM, 118 Wn. App. 643, 648, 78 P.3d 191 (2003). The State relies on
the definition found in RCW 13.34.030(6)(c).
RCW 13.34.030(6)(c) defines "Dependent child," in part, as any child who:
(c) Has no parent, guardian, or custodian capable of adequately
caring for the child, such that the child is in circumstances which constitute
a danger of substantial damage to the child's psychological or physical
development. ...
The language ofRCW 13.34.030(6)(c) recognizes the inability to judge the capability or
incapability of a parent in the abstract. Simply finding a parent incapable is insufficient
for a dependency. Instead capability must be evaluated in the context of whether the
parenting constitutes a danger of substantial damage to the child's psychological or
physical development. The trial court made no such assessment.
T.T. argues that the State must show her an unfit parent in order to establish a
dependency over her children. Much law supports T.T.'s position. The due process
clause of the state and federal constitution may also demand such a conclusion.
A longstanding tenet of Washington law declares that a parent has the natural and
legal right to the custody and control of her children, unless so completely unfit for such
duties that the welfare of the children themselves imperatively demanded another
disposition of their custody. In re Dependency o/T.J.B., 115 Wn. App. 182, 187,62 P.3d
891 (2002), review granted, judgment rev'd sub nom., In re Dependency o/Brown, 149
Wn.2d 836, 72 P.3d 757 (2003). The legislature recognized this right in RCW 13.34.020,
14
No. 32765-5-III Cons. wi 32776-1-III; 32777-9-III
In re the Welfare ofCa.R; CI.R and G.R.
in which it declared that "the family unit should remain intact unless a child's right to
conditions of basic nurture, health, or safety is jeopardized."
Both the United States and Washington Constitutions recognize a parent's
fundamental liberty interest in care and custody of her children. U.S. CONST. amends. V,
XIV; WASH. CONST., art. I, § 3; Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745,753,102 S. Ct. 1388,
71 L. Ed. 2d 599 (1982); In re Custody ofSmith, 137 Wn.2d 1,27,969 P.2d 21 (1998).
The fundamental liberty interest of natural parents in the care, custody, and management
of their child does not evaporate simply because they have not been model parents.
Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. at 753. The concept that all children are wards of the state
and that the state and its agencies have an unhampered right to determine what is best for
the child belongs to a repudiated political and moral philosophy foreign and repugnant to
American institutions. In re Welfare of Warren, 40 Wn.2d 342,343,243 P.2d 632(1952). Courts undertake a grave responsibility when they deprive parents of the care,
custody and control of their natural children. In re Welfare ofSego, 82 Wn.2d 736, 738,
513 P.2d 831 (1973).
In Dependency ofT.JB., this court agreed with the appellant that RCW
13.34.030(6)(c) (formerly RCW 13.34.030 (5)(c» requires a finding of current unfitness
as a prerequisite to a finding of dependency. 115 Wn. App. at 188. An existing ability or
capacity of parents to adequately and properly care for their children is inconsistent with
a status of dependency. 115 Wn. App. at 188. In re Dependency ofD.F.-M, 157 Wn.
15No. 32765-5-III Cons. wi 32776-1-III; 32777-9-111
In re the Welfare 0/ Ca.R; CI.R and G.R.
App. 179, 236 P.3d 961 (2010) implies, but does not hold, that the child of a fit parent
cannot be declared a dependent of the State.
The State emphasizes that a child may be declared dependent despite a fit parent.
The State relies on In re Welfare o/Key, 119 Wn.2d 600,836 P.2d 200 (1992), for this
proposition. Nevertheless, in Key, the Supreme Court held that the fit mother impliedly
consented to the dependency. Upon wishing to return Kirsten home, the mother could
revoke her consent. Moreover, the mother could veto any placement decision made by
the State. More importantly, the trial court denied a dependency on the ground ofRCW
13.34.030(6)(c) because the mother was fit. The trial court granted the dependency on a
unique statutory provision covering developmentally disabled children, the former RCW
13.34.030(2)(d) (1987). Kirsten Key suffered from spastic quadriplegia, cerebral palsy,
respiratory distress, and osteoporosis. Key supports a conclusion that Karen, Cathy and
Georgia are not dependents under RCW 13.34.030(6)(c), because T.T. has not been
declared unfit and that T.T., as mother, holds the right to determine the placement of her
daughters.
The State also relies on In re Dependency o/Schermer, 161 Wn.2d 927, 169 P.3d
452 (2007). Schermer is a matchless decision because the State resisted a dependency,
while both the child and the parents sought the dependency. Henry Schermer suffered
severe mental health issues and engaged in deviant sexual activities. The parents could
not safely care for Henry at home and reasonably feared that Henry might kill them.
16
No. 32765-5-111 Cons. wi 32776-1-111; 32777-9-111
In re the Welfare ofCa.R; Cl.R and G.R.
They could not pay for his placement outside the home without selling their home. The
State argued that a dependency requires a showing of deficiencies in a parent, but not
unfitness. The Supreme Court agreed and noted that unfitness is not an absolute
prerequisite to dependency. Schermer could be read as standing for the proposition that,
except in cases of severe disabilities of the child, unfitness is required. Its holding that
the State must show deficiencies supports T.T. since the trial testimony established no
current deficiency.
Alas, this court need not decide whether the State must prove unfitness ofT.T. or
whether the evidence supports a parental deficiency. The trial court's failure to find
incapability creating a danger of substantial harm alone requires reversal.
In re Dependency of CM, 118 Wn. App. at 651 (2003) illustrates a case in which
a dependency under RCW 13.34.030(6)(c) was supported by sufficient evidence and
findings of fact. The trial court entered a finding of fact that "the child is in
circumstances which constitute a danger of substantial damage to his physical and
psychological development because these special needs are not being addressed and
met." The child's pediatrician testified that the child showed language development
delays and the three-year-old child's memory did not correlate to the average child's
memory at that age. The pediatrician testified that the father provided insufficient
stimulation from activities like talking to the child, reading to him, and other
developmental activities. A therapist testified the father's cognitive problems interfered
17
No. 32765-5-II1 Cons. wi 32776-1-III; 32777-9-II1
In re the Welfare o/Ca.R; CI.R and G.R.
with his ability to implement proper parenting techniques. The therapist echoed the
pediatrician's testimony that the child encountered significant cognitive delays. This
court wrote:
While the record shows that McCracken loves C.M. and does his
best to care for him, there remains substantial evidence that C.M. has
developmental delays that could result in significant psychological damage
if they remain unaddressed. And there is substantial evidence that
McCracken's own mental illness and poor judgment have affected his
ability to address these delays, despite his best intentions and his best
efforts.
In re Dependency o/CM, 118 Wn. App. at 654.
CM highlights what is missing in the present appeaL In addition to the absence
of a finding of substantial harm to any of the Rees daughters, this appeal lacks evidence
to support such a finding. No physician, therapist, or counselor testified to any particular
needs of any of the sisters, let alone the inability ofT.T: to care for the needs. Amanda
Plumb, the State's only witness, without any health care qualifications, speculated that
Karen suffers from posttraumatic stress disorder, but no medical testimony supported
such a diagnosis. Plumb mentioned trauma experienced by the girls in the Nevada home
ofT.T., but provided no details of the trauma, let alone its impact on the girls. Assuming
the purported trauma included sexual abuse of Karen by Mark Gregory, authorities
concluded that the abuse did not occur. Plumb speculated that Gregory may have access
to T.T.'s home, but provided no direct evidence of such. Plumb provided no testimony
that the current care givers for each of the girls could better handle the needs of the girls
18
No. 32765-5-111 Cons. wi 32776-1-111; 32777-9-111
In re the Welfare ofCa.R; Cl.R and G.R.
than their mother T.T. Plumb provided no testimony that T.T. would thwart the
development of her three daughters.
I recognize the need to defer to the trial court's factual decisions. To evaluate a
parent's claim of insufficient evidence of dependency, we determine whether substantial
evidence supports the court's findings of fact and whether the findings support the
conclusions oflaw. In re Dependency ofS.S., 61 Wn. App. 488,504, 814 P.2d 204(1991). In a dependency proceeding, evidence is substantial if, when viewed in the light
most favorable to the party prevailing below, it is such that a rational trier of fact could
find the fact in question by a preponderance of the evidence. In re Dependency ofCB.,
61 Wn. App. 280,286,810 P.2d 518 (1991). This court is not to weigh the evidence or
the credibility of witnesses. In re Welfare ofSego, 82 Wn.2d 736, 739-40 (1973).
Nevertheless, the trial court below omitted a critical finding that any incapability ofT.T.
created circumstances constituting a danger of substantial damage to any child's mental
or physical development.
I also recognize that this court can imply a finding by the lower court. The
termination of parental rights must be based, in part, on an explicit or implicit finding of
current parental unfitness. In re Welfare ofA.B., 168 Wn.2d 908,920,232 P.3d 1104(2010). If the finding is not explicit, the court may imply the finding if the record clearly
shows that the trial court found the parent currently unfit to parent. Welfare ofA.B., at
921; In re Welfare ofA.G., 160 Wn. App. 841, 843,248 P.3d 611 (2011). In Welfare of
19
No. 32765-5-II1 Cons. wi 32776-1-III; 32777-9-III
In re the Welfare ofCa.R; CI.R and G.R.
A.G., this court reversed a termination of parental rights. We refused to imply a finding
of parental unfitness despite evidence of domestic violence impacting the health of the
children and the parent's chemical dependency.
Implying a finding is particularly improper when the evidence does not support the
finding. The trial court omitted the finding for good reason. The trial testimony included
no evidence that T.T. 's care for Karen, Cathy and Georgia would lead to substantial
damage to their respective psychological or physical developments.
The trial evidence possesses other problems. When testifying about T.T., Amanda
Plumb based most testimony on Nevada CPS records. In short, the testimony was
hearsay and could have included multiple levels of hearsay. The rules of evidence apply
to a dependency hearing. RCW 13.34.110(1); ER 1101(c)(3); In re Dependency of
K.NJ, 171 Wn.2d 568, 579, 257 P.3d 522 (2011). The Nevada records are not even
available for this court's review to determine if Plumb accurately portrayed their
contents.
In In re Welfare ofXT., 174 Wn. App. 733, 300 P.3d 824 (2013), this court
reversed a finding of dependency on the ground that the Department of Social and Health
Services social worker's testimony was based on her review of the department's file.
This court observed that the trial court's discretion does not permit juvenile courts to
disregard evidence rules, especially when the deprivation of parental rights is involved.
The court held that parents should not be deprived of parental rights on hearsay, a form of
20
;
No. 32765-5-II1 Cons. wI 32776-I-III; 32777-9-III
In re the Welfare ofCa.R; CI.R and G.R.
unsworn testimony. A social worker may refer to a written report to show the basis of the
worker's opinion, but written reports are not substantive evidence.
T.T. objected to only details of alleged abuse when Amanda Plumb testified based
on hearsay. The trial court allowed the testimony and could allow all hearsay testimony
but only for the limited purpose of supporting Amanda Plumb's opinion. Nevertheless,
the testimony could not be used as substantive evidence and be the basis for the
dependency ruling. Stale hearsay is an unfortunate foundation to base a finding of
dependency.
The trial court is the judge of the credibility of witnesses. Nevertheless, the lower
court never discounted Melissa Blodgett as a witness, who, unlike Amanda Plumb, saw
T.T. and directly observed her parenting skills. Blodgett's unimpeached testimony
conclusively established the ability ofT.T. to capably parent Karen, Cathy and Georgia.
This court's majority pretends that Melissa Blodgett never testified.
The State emphasizes that Karen, Cathy and Georgia have special needs that T.T.
is not yet trained to meet. Nevertheless, the evidence only supports Karen holding
special needs and such evidence relies on hearsay. Amanda Plumb testified that Karen
"may" suffer from posttraumatic stress disorder. Plumb further opined that Karen "may"
have reactive attachment disorder in that she attaches quickly to others. Even if Plumb
was an expert who could diagnose a disorder, the testimony is worthless because the
opinion is based on a possibility not a probability. Once a court is satisfied with a
21
No. 32765-5-111 Cons. wi 32776-1-111; 32777-9-111
In re the Welfare ofCa.R; CI.R and G.R.
witness' expertise, the test for admissibility is whether the expert can express an opinion
based on reasonable probability rather than mere conjecture or speculation. Davidson v.
Mun. ofMetro. Seattle, 43 Wn. App. 569, 571,719 P.2d 569 (1986).
Trial evidence also fails to identify how a parent should treat Karen's needs, why
T.T. is deficient in meeting the needs, what training T.T. needs to meet the needs and the
length of the training, and whether someone else meets those needs now. Many parents
are initially unfit to meet the needs of special children, but those parents learn with
experience. The State does not remove children born with special needs from parents
until the parents have the opportunity, but fail, to learn to meet the needs.
The State mentions Cathy's and Georgia's fear of the outdoors, trees, and bugs.
The testimony comes from a statement made by a caretaker to Amanda Plumb. Thus the
testimony is also hearsay. Counsel and the trier of fact were unable to explore the precise
fears of the girls. Many children are frightened of bugs and swaying trees in the dark of
night. No evidence suggests that such a fear creates special needs.
Amanda Plumb expressed concern about the size ofT.T.'s Las Vegas home. In In
re Dependency ofD.F.-M, 157 Wn. App. at 193 (2010), a social worker complained that
the father's house had too few bedrooms. This court emphasized that courts, not
administrative agencies or individual social workers, are the ultimate evaluators of a
parent's ability to care for his child. The court noted that many children have been
happily raised without bedrooms of their own.
22
No. 32765-5-III Cons. wI 32776-1-III; 32777-9-III
In re the Welfare oICa.R,· CI.R and G.R.
Amanda Plumb registered alarm about Karen, Cathy and Georgia encountering
Mark Gregory at T.T.'s home. On appeal, the State characterizes the potential for the
girls seeing Gregory as the most alarming aspect to returning Karen, Cathy and Georgia
to their mother. The State even falsely claims that Gregory subjected all three girls to
sexual abuse. This testimony is based solely on hearsay. Only Karen alleged sexual
abuse and authorities concluded the allegation was false.
Plumb declared: "from what I've gathered, [Andrew] has visits with him [Mark.]"
CP at 165. Thus, this evidence of any encounter between Mark Gregory and Karen,
Cathy and Georgia is based on more hearsay. The testimony does not even establish the
possibility ofa visit between Andrew and his father at the T.T.'s home. Assuming any
visits, the visits could be at Gregory's home.
Even assuming an encounter between Mark Gregory and one or more of the Rees
daughters, such is not grounds for creating a dependency. In In re Dependency 01
MS.D., 144 Wn. App. 468, 182 P.3d 978 (2008), the trial court ordered a dependency
based on the State's concern that the mother failed to protect her daughter from her
boyfriend, Seth Poirer. Poirer had a ten-year-old conviction for assault and criminal
mistreatment of his two-month-old baby. The mother's brother also reported to police
that Poirer sexually abused M.S.D. Nevertheless, a physician, who examined M.S.D.,
ruled out sexual abuse. This court reversed the dependency, even after recognizing the
appellate principle that this court must affirm the trial court if substantial evidence
23
No. 32765-5-III Cons. wi 32776-I-III; 32777-9-III
In re the Welfare ofCa.R; CI.R and G.R.
supports the findings of fact. This court observed that a poor choice of a partner is not a
reason for the State to interfere in the life of a family. In this appeal, authorities
concluded that Mark Gregory did not abuse Karen.
In short, Amanda Plumb frets about an immediate return of Karen, Cathy and
Georgia to T.T., but her testimony lacked evidence ofTT. being an incapable parent or
that placement with T.T would cause substantial damage to any of the three daughters.
A social worker's worries should not control dependency law. Plumb declared that she
wants "to make absolute sure with an ICPC [study] that these children are gonna be
moving back to a safe environment." CP at 213. Other parents are not subjected to an
exacting standard of absolute certainty that the home is a safe environment. T.T. does not
deserve this standard applied to her.
The court commissioner and superior court judge failed to analyze the dependency
of the other daughters, Cathy and Georgia, separate from the dependency of Karen.
Scant, if any, evidence supported a conclusion that TT. is incapable of caring for her
daughter, Karen. Even less evidence supports a conclusion that T.T is incapable of
caring for the two younger girls, let alone care by T.T. would substantially damage the
girls' development.
Interstate Compact on Placement of Children
To excuse the denial ofT.T.'s rights to her children, the State, pursuant to the
Interstate Compact on Placement of Children, sought an order directing Nevada to
24
No. 32765-5-III Cons. wi 32776-1-III; 32777-9-II1
In re the Welfare ofCa.R,· CI.R and G.R.
investigate the home ofT.T. for later placement of Karen, Cathy and Georgia in the
home. Such an order violates the law because the order directs an investigation of a
parent's home contrary to the terms of the ICPC.
In In re Dependency ofD.F.-M, 157 Wn. App. at 190-91 (2010), this court
addressed whether the ICPC applies to parental placements. We held in the negative.
Alyce Fabian-Miller bore D.F.-M. Six months later a Washington court entered an order
declaring Rico Verner as D.F.-M.'s father. Three years later, the State took D.F.-M. into
protective custody because of neglect, domestic violence, and drug use by Fabian-Miller.
Thereafter, Verner learned of the dependency and demanded dismissal of the dependency
and placement of the child with him at his home in Oklahoma. The State conceded it
lacked evidence that Verner was an unfit parent. Nevertheless, the State did not wish to
allow placement ofD.F.-M. with Verner until Verner's home state agreed to placement
under the ICPC. The trial court ordered D.F.-M. placed with Verner and Fabian-Miller
appealed. The State joined with Fabian-Miller in arguing the provisions of the ICPC
should be fulfilled before placement with Verner. This court affirmed immediate
placement with Verner in part on the ground that the ICPC did not apply to investigating
the capability of a parent.
A group of state social service administrators drafted the Interstate Compact on
Placement of Children in the 1950s to address the problem of providing services to
children placed across state lines. The compact seeks to foster cooperation and
25
No. 32765-5-II1 Cons. wi 32776-I-III; 32777-9-II1
In re the Welfare ofCa.R; CI.R and G.R.
infonnation sharing among member states so as to ensure that children requiring
placement receive the maximum opportunity to be placed in a suitable environment with
a desirable degree and type of care. All fifty states, the District of Columbia, and the
United States Virgin Islands have adopted the ICPC. Washington enacted the compact in
1971. RCW 26.34.010.
Under article III of the ICPC, the scope of the compact is limited to placements in
foster care or preliminary to an adoption. Article III also sets out the requirements for a
valid placement. No sending agency shall send to another state any child for placement
in foster care or as a preliminary to a possible adoption unless the sending agency
complies with the ICPC, which requires the sending agency to notifY the receiving state
of the intended placement and to provide such documents as may be necessary to carry
out the ICPC's purposes. The placement may not occur until the receiving state notifies
the sending agency in writing that the proposed placement does not appear to be contrary
to the interests of the child.
The ICPC does not define "foster care." In D.F.-M, we noted that the plain,
ordinary meaning of the term is the placement of a child in a substitute home, one other
than that of the child's parents. Under article II(d) of the ICPC, "placement" means "the
arrangement for the care of a child in a family free or boarding home or in a child-caring
agency or institution ... and any hospital or other medical facility." In D.F.-M, we
further observed that, although "family free" or "boarding" homes are not defined in the
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No. 32765-5-III Cons. wi 32776-I-III; 32777-9-III
In re the Welfare ofCa.R; CI.R and G.R.
compact, these terms refer to nonparental residential arrangements that provide children
with the care usually received from parents. Unlike a boarding home, the care provided
by a family free home is free of charge. Based on these observations, we held that the
provisions of the ICPC could not be employed to investigate a parent's home before
placement of a child with a parent. The compact applies only to foster care or placements
preliminary to possible adoption, neither of which is a parental placement. Because this
court ruled based on construction of the compact, we did not address Rico Verner's
alternative argument that application of the ICPC to parental placements violates the due
process clause.
The State seeks to distinguish D.F.-M on the ground that the Oklahoma father
actually saw the children, whereas T.T. has not seen her daughters for three years. No
reading of D.F.-M supports such a distinction being valid. We did not leave any door
open to permitting the use of the ICPC in parental placement under other circumstances.
The terms of the ICPC admit no exception to its limitation against applying to a parental
placement.
The majority writes that it lacks a record as to the State of Nevada's ICPC
involvement so T.T.'s objection to the application of the compact is premature. The
majority's comment fails to recognize that D.F.-M holds that Nevada is to have no ICPC
involvement. The extent or record of this involvement is immaterial. The trial court
ordered involvement contrary to the ICPC that does not apply to parental placements.
27
No. 32765-5-III Cons. wi 32776-I-III; 32777-9-III
In re the Welfare ofCa.R; CI.R and G.R.
The majority also writes that any prohibition of employing ICPC for a parental
placement does not eliminate cooperation between the two states as the parties work
toward reunification. The majority does not explain what cooperation is needed or
permissible and why two states would cooperate outside their authority to act. Again, the
trial court ordered an ICPC placement review in Nevada contrary to the interstate
compact, state statute, and this court's decision. A court's sanctioning of extralegal and
unauthorized conduct by a state agency against the will of the legislature creates a
dangerous precedence. Therefore, I respectfully dissent.
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