State Of Washington, V Michael Ray Horn

Filed
Washington State
Court of Appeals
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
Division Two
DIVISION II April 24, 2018
STATE OF WASHINGTON, No. 48489-7-II
Respondent, PUBLISHED OPINION
v.
MICHAEL RAY HORN,
Appellant.
BJORGEN, J. — Michael Ray Horn appeals his conviction of domestic violence felony
harassment, arguing that his constitutional right to present a defense was violated. He also
contends that the imposition of mandatory deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) collection and crime
victim penalty assessment (VPA) fees violated his substantive due process rights, and he requests
that appellate costs be waived. Finally, he raises additional claims in a statement of additional
grounds (SAG).
We hold that (1) Horn’s right to present a defense was not violated, (2) the mandatory
imposition of DNA and VPA fees did not violate his substantive due process rights, (3) under
RAP 14.2, Horn may challenge costs on appeal before our court commissioner if the State
requests them and he objects to them, and (4) Horn’s SAG claims fail. Accordingly, we affirm.
FACTS
Horn and Suzy Oubre became romantically involved while Oubre was estranged from
another man with whom she had had a relationship. Horn and Oubre began openly dating in
January 2015.
In January 2015, Horn and Oubre were at Oubre’s residence drinking alcoholic
beverages. While Oubre was using her cellphone, Horn grew angry and accused her of texting
No. 48489-7-II
the man with whom she had been involved. According to Oubre, she had never seen him have
“an episode like this before.” Report of Proceedings (RP) at 141. Horn grabbed Oubre’s night
shirt and ripped it open, hitting her on the chest in the process.
Scared that the downstairs neighbor would hear the scuffle, Oubre and Horn went to
Horn’s home. Once they arrived and got out of the car, Oubre told Horn that she was going to
leave, but Horn grabbed her. They began wrestling when Horn pushed her against a wall and
down into a flower bed. He bit her multiple times. Oubre did not call the police. After this
incident, when Horn would drink too much and get aggressive, she would refer to that facet of
Horn’s personality as “Bo-Bo.” RP at 151. When “Bo-Bo” came out, Oubre was scared for her
life.
On August 7, 2015, Oubre texted Horn that she could no longer “worry about him” and
that she had a fear of “Bo-Bo.” RP at 196-97. Horn later brought wine and dinner to her house.
After dinner, Oubre was on her bed in the master bedroom playing a cellphone game when Horn
asked who she was texting. Like the January incident, Horn became angry and accused her of
texting the individual with whom she had been involved.
Oubre told Horn that their relationship was “not going to work.” RP at 205. In response,
Horn ripped off Oubre’s bra and told her she was not going anywhere. After Oubre struck Horn
in the chest a couple of times, Horn punched her in the eye, knocking her across the bedroom
floor. Horn demanded that Oubre retrieve her cellphone so that he could see the text messages.
Oubre, who was now scared, complied and gave her cellphone to him.
As Horn was looking through the text messages, Oubre tried to push past Horn and leave
the master bathroom. Horn blocked her path to the door, and pushed, punched, and kicked her.
Eventually, Oubre asked Horn if she could lie down on the bed and have some ice for her eye
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No. 48489-7-II
injury, but he told her that she was not “going to need to worry about [her] eye.” RP at 213. He
said that he had thought “about this a long time, and you and I are going to die tonight.” RP at
213. Oubre believed him.
Horn retrieved Oubre’s gun from under the mattress, and then straddled her, cocked the
gun, and put it in his mouth. He asked her how she “was going to feel when he blew his brains
out on the ceiling.” RP at 216. Horn subsequently took the gun out of his mouth and pointed it
at Oubre’s head. He told her that she was “going to go to heaven or hell tonight, whichever one
[she] deserve[s].” RP at 218-19. As Horn locked the door to the master bedroom, he repeatedly
said that they were both going to die. Oubre believed Horn and felt like her life was going to end
that night. Oubre got up and tried to leave, but Horn stopped her by pushing her onto the floor
and by punching and kicking her. Eventually, Oubre was able to coax Horn to lay down and fall
sleep.
While Horn was asleep, Oubre left and went to the hospital where her extensive injuries
were treated. She spoke with the police while at the hospital, and Horn was then arrested.
Among other offenses, Horn was charged with domestic violence felony harassment
based on the August incident. Horn posted bail on August 20, 2015. Oubre and Horn got
engaged on September 5 and took a trip together. Horn was later charged with violating a no-
contact order,1 to which he pled guilty in district court. As part of the events related to that
charge, videotape evidence showed Horn naked while jumping on top of Oubre’s car.
Before trial on the felony harassment charge, the State sought to introduce evidence of
the January 2015 incident under ER 404(b) to show that Horn’s threat to kill Oubre in August
1
Although the record does not make this clear, it appears that Oubre was the protected party in
this no-contact order.
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2015 placed her in reasonable fear that the threat would be carried out. One of the elements of
felony harassment is that the victim be placed in reasonable fear that a threat will be carried out.
RCW 9A.46.020(1)(a)(i), (b), (2)(b)(ii).
The defense objected and in the alternative argued that if the State was permitted to
introduce this evidence, the defense should be able to introduce evidence of Oubre and Horn’s
engagement and trip after August 2015. In the defense’s view, this evidence showed that Oubre
did not have a reasonable fear that Horn would carry out his threat to kill her on August 7.
The State opposed the admission of evidence of their engagement and trip because “it
triggers a bunch of things,” including Horn’s later violation of a no-contact order where he was
naked and jumping on top of Oubre’s vehicle. RP at 72. The State also did not believe the
evidence was relevant to whether Oubre was fearful in August, stating:
The subsequent knowledge does not address the fear on the day of the crime.
You can’t retroactively apply that fear. The fear has to be at that time, what the
victim knew at that point in time.
RP at 73. The defense responded that without this evidence, the jury is left
with the false impression that Mr. Horn is this horrible abuser, and they can’t even
hear about the fact that even though this allegedly happened, she’s going off with
him . . ., knowing there’s a protective order, having a good time.
RP at 75.
The trial court first determined that evidence related to the January incident would be
admitted because it would “help the jury to determine whether [Oubre] had . . . a reasonable fear
or not.” RP at 79. However, it declined the defense’s request to admit the evidence of the
engagement and vacation, stating:
I understand where [the defense] is coming from. . . . [I]f we’re to ascertain or
determine what her fear was on August 7th, what happened afterwards informs the
jury to a certain extent of how fearful she was on August 7th. . . .
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No. 48489-7-II
And I think but-for the complications and the muddying of waters that
occurs with charges in another court, . . . I think I would be inclined to allow some
of that information, if it was close in time of the assault. Because I think that does
inform whether her fear was reasonable, you know, like a day or two afterwards. .
..
[H]ere we’re talking he was out [on bail] by August 20th, they were engaged by
September 5th, so we’re talking a month later. At that point I’m concerned because
people do things to protect themselves.
An alleged victim very well may say the best way I can protect myself is
when he’s kind of on the ropes when the police are after him and he’s facing
charges. Maybe now is a good time. I, quote-unquote, . . . can’t get rid of him now,
but maybe if I can keep him at bay by placating him.
I don’t know what’s going on in a person’s mind, but I think if I were to
allow open what happened subsequent, especially a month, month and a half later,
that muddies the water too much. And if I were to allow that, then I think the State
would have an opportunity to say, look, you violated the no-contact order violation,
and that goes to her fear.
....
[I]f we didn’t have the complications of the muddied waters, of the violation of a
no-contact order, allegations of climbing naked, entering into the home without
permission, I think that goes too far afield, and I think that would confuse the jury
as to the issues, and I think it actually could shed a very negative light on Mr. Horn,
maybe even worse than allowing the January event, so that’s my rationale.
RP at 80-83.
During trial, Oubre, Horn, and the police officers testified. Horn’s statements given in an
interview with police immediately after the August 7 incident were admitted into evidence. In
that interview, he told the interviewing officer that he drank alcohol, “blacked out,” and did not
remember what happened that night. RP at 558. When he testified in his own defense, Horn
stated that he drank, and he did not remember the night of the August 7 incident because he
“blacked out.” RP at 598-99, 602-03, 611.
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The jury found Horn guilty of two counts of fourth degree assault, unlawful possession of
a firearm, and domestic violence felony harassment. At sentencing, the court imposed
mandatory DNA collection and VPA fees. Horn appeals.
ANALYSIS
I. RIGHT TO PRESENT DEFENSE
Horn argues that his Sixth Amendment right to present his defense was violated because
the trial court did not admit evidence of Oubre and Horn’s engagement and trip taken after the
August 7 incident. For the reasons below, we hold that Horn fails to show a Sixth Amendment
violation.
A. Standard of Review
We review a Sixth Amendment right to present a defense claim under a three-step test.
First, the evidence that a defendant desires to introduce “‘must be of at least minimal
relevance.’” State v. Jones, 168 Wash. 2d 713, 720, 230 P.3d 576 (2010) (quoting State v. Darden,
145 Wash. 2d 612, 622, 41 P.3d 1189 (2002)). A defendant only has a right to present evidence
that is relevant. Id.; ER 401. Second, if relevant, the burden shifts to the State to show that the
relevant evidence “‘is so prejudicial as to disrupt the fairness of the fact-finding process at trial.’”
Jones, 168 Wash. 2d at 720 (quoting Darden, 145 Wash. 2d at 622). Third, the State’s interest in
excluding prejudicial evidence must also be balanced against the defendant’s need for the
information sought, and relevant information can be withheld only if the State’s interest
outweighs the defendant’s need. Id. The same test is used to review claims that the right to
confront witnesses was violated. State v. Lee, 188 Wash. 2d 473, 488, 396 P.3d 316 (2017).
We review constitutional issues de novo. State v. Armstrong, 188 Wash. 2d 333, 339, 394
P.3d 373 (2017). Consistently with that principle, our Supreme Court has held that we review de
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No. 48489-7-II
novo a defendant’s claim that his Sixth Amendment right to present a defense was violated.
Jones, 168 Wash. 2d at 719. On the other hand, we generally review a trial court’s evidentiary
rulings for an abuse of discretion. State v. Strizheus, 163 Wash. App. 820, 829, 262 P.3d 100
(2011). For example, in Lee, 188 Wash. 2d at 486-88, our Supreme Court held that we review for
an abuse of discretion a trial court’s ruling limiting cross-examination of a witness that
implicated the defendant’s constitutional right of confrontation. In Darden, 145 Wash. 2d at 619,
our Supreme Court, in a confrontation clause challenge, also held that a trial court’s ruling on the
admissibility of evidence is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.
To preserve the rule in Jones that we review a Sixth Amendment right to present a
defense claim de novo, some element of the three-step Jones test must be reviewed de novo. The
first prong of the Jones test, the inquiry into minimal relevance, see Jones, 168 Wash. 2d at 720, is
the one most directly involving the admission of evidence and most directly demanding ample
breathing room for the trial court. Therefore, to preserve both our de novo review of
constitutional claims and the review of evidentiary rulings for an abuse of discretion, we review
the first prong of the test above, whether the evidence of Oubre and Horn’s engagement and trip
is minimally relevant, for an abuse of discretion. To ensure de novo review of the Sixth
Amendment claim itself, the second and third prongs of the test would be reviewed de novo.
This approach preserves each standard of review in a way fitting the type of determination under
review.
This approach also tracks the Supreme Court’s rulings in State v. Clark, 187 Wash. 2d 641,
648-49, 389 P.3d 462 (2017), which held:
We review the trial court’s evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion and
defer to those rulings unless “‘no reasonable person would take the view adopted
by the trial court.’” State v. Atsbeha, 142 Wash. 2d 904, 914, 16 P.3d 626 (2001)
(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting State v. Ellis, 136 Wash. 2d 498, 504, 963
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No. 48489-7-II
P.2d 843 (1998)). If the court excluded relevant defense evidence, we determine
as a matter of law whether the exclusion violated the constitutional right to present
a defense. State v. Jones, 168 Wash. 2d 713, 719, 230 P.3d 576 (2010).
As in Clark, we review the first step of the Jones test, whether the excluded evidence was
minimally relevant, for an abuse of discretion. Consistently with Clark, if the first step is met,
we would review the remaining two steps de novo.
The concurrence in this case would first determine whether the trial court abused its
discretion in excluding the evidence at issue and then examine the constitutional claim de novo.
Here, the trial court excluded evidence of the engagement and trip out of an apparent concern
that it was irrelevant and confusing. Adding a preliminary step to the Jones test to review that
decision under abuse of discretion would be superfluous, since minimal relevance is already
reviewed under the first prong of that test. The most economical method of proceeding is to
recognize, as the majority opinion does, that minimal relevance is reviewed for abuse of
discretion under the first prong of Jones.
An abuse of discretion is present only if there is a clear showing that the exercise of
discretion was manifestly unreasonable, based on untenable grounds, or based on untenable
reasons. State v. Dye, 178 Wash. 2d 541, 548, 309 P.3d 1192 (2013). A decision is based on
untenable grounds or made for untenable reasons if it rests on facts unsupported in the record or
was reached by applying the wrong legal standard. Id. A decision is manifestly unreasonable if
it falls outside the range of acceptable choices, given the facts and the applicable legal standard.
Id.
B. The Trial Court Did Not Deprive Horn of His Right to Present a Defense
A defendant is guilty of felony harassment if without lawful authority, the person (1)
knowingly threatens to kill an individual and (2) his words or conduct places the threatened
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No. 48489-7-II
individual in reasonable fear that the threat to kill will be carried out. RCW 9A.46.020(1)(a)(i),
(b), (2)(b)(ii); State v. C.G., 150 Wash. 2d 604, 612, 80 P.3d 594 (2003).
To show a violation of the right to present a defense, the excluded evidence, that of Horn
and Oubre’s engagement and trip, must first be of at least minimal relevance. Jones, 168 Wash. 2d
at 720. Evidence is relevant if it has “any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of
consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be
without the evidence.” ER 401. The threshold to admit relevant evidence is very low.
Darden, 145 Wash. 2d at 621. Impeachment evidence is relevant if: (1) it tends to cast doubt on
the credibility of the person being impeached and (2) the credibility of the person
being impeached is a fact of consequence to the action. State v. Allen S., 98 Wash. App. 452, 459-
60, 989 P.2d 1222 (1999).
Oubre testified that she feared that Horn would carry out his threat to kill her during the
August 7 incident. Her testimony provided evidence to support an essential element of Horn’s
felony harassment conviction. Oubre’s subsequent engagement and trip with Horn thus would
be relevant, if at all, to impeach her testimony that she feared Horn at the time he threatened to
kill her.
Turning to the first of the requirements for impeachment evidence above, Horn was
released on bail on August 20, and he and Oubre were engaged on September 5. The charged
felony harassment occurred on August 7. With the frightening nature of the threats and violence
against Oubre on August 7 and the passage of nearly a month until their engagement, Oubre’s
change of heart casts little doubt on her testimony that on August 7, in the face of repeated
violence and death threats, she feared for her life.
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No. 48489-7-II
More importantly, we note that expert testimony on the battered person syndrome is
admissible in Washington, State v. Allery, 101 Wash. 2d 591, 597, 682 P.2d 312 (1984), and that an
element of that syndrome is a recognition of the cycles of domestic violence.2 Specifically,
Allery recognized the presence of temporary lulls in the physical abuse inflicted on the battered
partner, in which “she forgives her assailant, hoping that the abuse will not reoccur.” 101 Wash. 2d
at 597. More recently, in a dissent, now Chief Justice Fairhurst of our Supreme Court
characterized Allery as recognizing “the general acceptance in the scientific community of the
theory of battered person syndrome and the cycles of domestic violence.” State v. Schultz, 170
Wash. 2d 746, 764, 248 P.3d 484 (2011) (Fairhurst, dissenting). In Schultz, the majority did not
question the battered person syndrome or the presence of cycles of violence, but held that under
the circumstances the possibility of domestic violence did not justify a warrantless entry into a
dwelling. 170 Wash. 2d at 750.
For these reasons, especially the judicial recognition of the cycles of violence and
reconciliation in relationships involving domestic violence, the evidence of Oubre’s engagement
to and trip with Horn was not minimally relevant. The trial court’s exclusion of that evidence
was neither manifestly unreasonable, based on untenable grounds, nor based on untenable
reasons. Thus, under the abuse of discretion standard, the exclusion of this evidence did not
deprive Horn of his right to present a defense under the first prong of the Jones test. Because
Horn does not meet the first requirement of the three step test in Jones, 168 Wash. 2d at 720, his
claim that the trial court deprived him of the right to present a defense fails.
2
We express no opinion as to whether such evidence must be from an expert.
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No. 48489-7-II
II. MANDATORY LEGAL FINANCIAL OBLIGATIONS
Horn argues that the mandatory DNA collection and VPA fees are unconstitutional as
applied to defendants who do not have the ability, or the likely ability, to pay them. In State v.
Seward, 196 Wash. App. 579, 584-86, 384 P.3d 620 (2016),3 review denied, 188 Wash. 2d 1015
(2017), we rejected this argument and held that the DNA collection and VPA fees are rationally
related to legitimate state interests and therefore do not violate a defendant’s right to substantive
due process. Under Seward, we uphold the imposition of these fees on Horn.
III. SAG
Horn’s first SAG claim is not an argument, but a question: “I want to know if my speedy
trial rights were violated?” SAG at 1. This generalized question is not particularized enough to
permit appellate review. We are “not obligated to search [the] record in support of claims made
in [the SAG].” RAP 10.10(c); State v. Thompson, 169 Wash. App. 436, 493 n.195, 290 P.3d 996
(2012). Although Horn questions whether his speedy trial rights might have been violated, we
cannot assume the role of an advocate and comb the record to determine whether he has a
meritorious speedy trial right claim. Therefore, we decline to address this claim any further.
Horn’s second SAG claim states that he “was not allowed to complete [his] mental health
evaluation for . . . [(post-traumatic stress disorder)] PTSD.” SAG at 1. Assuming this to be true,
Horn fails to articulate how this prejudiced his trial. The record shows that his defense counsel
elicited evidence regarding his PTSD, and his PTSD diagnosis was brought out during closing
argument. For these reasons, this claim fails.
Horn’s final SAG claim is that he “didn’t have any witnesses! I had 0—the State had
18.” SAG at 1. First, Horn did have a witness testify in his defense—himself. To the extent he
3
(Bjorgen, C.J., dissenting).
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No. 48489-7-II
is arguing that he received ineffective assistance of counsel4 because his attorney failed to call
more witnesses, nothing in the appellate record indicates that Horn had any other favorable
witnesses that would have testified on his behalf. If Horn believes otherwise, he should
supplement the record and make this claim in a personal restraint petition. See State v.
McFarland, 127 Wash. 2d 322, 338, 899 P.2d 1251 (1995).
For these reasons, Horn’s SAG claims fail.
IV. APPELLATE COSTS
Horn asks that we exercise our discretion to deny any appellate costs the State requests.
Under RAP 14.2, a commissioner of this court will determine whether to award appellate costs if
the State decides to file a cost bill and if Horn objects to that cost bill.
CONCLUSION
Horn’s right to present a defense was not violated, and his other claims fail. Therefore,
we affirm his conviction.
Bjorgen, P.J.
I concur:
Sutton, J.
4
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 669-70, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984).
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No. 48489-7-II
MELNICK, J. (concurring) — I agree with the majority’s opinion that the trial court did not
abuse its discretion in excluding evidence relating to the engagement and vacation. However, I
disagree with the majority equating a review for “minimal relevance” with the “abuse of
discretion” standard of review. See Majority at 6-9; see also ER 401, ER 402, ER 403. I think the
minimal relevance test5 should only be utilized when an appellate court determines the trial court
abused its discretion in excluding evidence and it then examines the constitutional claim de novo.
Rather than using the majority’s analysis, I instead believe that the correct analytical framework
is contained in State v. Blair, No. 50037-0-II (Wash. Ct. App. Apr. 24, 2018).
As Blair states, when a defendant alleges a violation of the right to trial or confrontation
based on the trial court’s exclusion of evidence, the standard of review is abuse of discretion. If
there is no abuse of discretion, there is no error, and the inquiry ends. If the trial court does abuse
its discretion, then we take the next step and review de novo the claim that a constitutional right
has been violated.
Because neither the majority nor I concludes the trial court abused its discretion in
excluding the challenged evidence, I concur with the majority result to affirm.
Melnick, J.
5
State v. Jones, 168 Wash. 2d 713, 720, 230 P.3d 576 (2010).
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