State of Washington v. Dennis Wallace Patterson

FILED
OCTOBER 20, 2016
In the Office of the Clerk of Court
WA State Court of Appeals, Division Ill
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION THREE
STATE OF WASHINGTON, ) No. 33814-2-111
)
Respondent, )
)
v. ) OPINION PUBLISHED IN PART
)
DENNIS WALLACE PATTERSON, )
)
Appellant. )
LAWRENCE-BERREY, J. - Dennis Patterson appeals his convictions for disorderly
conduct and interference with a court. He argues a provision of the disorderly conduct
statute, RCW 9A.84.030(1)(b), is unconstitutionally overbroad and infringes on protected
speech. He also argues the State presented insufficient evidence of his intent to disrupt or
interfere with court proceedings.
In the published part of this opinion, we conclude the challenged provision of the
disorderly conduct statute does not reach a substantial amount of constitutionally
protected speech, and therefore is not overbroad. In the unpublished part of this opinion,
we reject his second argument and his argument contained in his statement of additional
grounds for review (SAG). We therefore affirm.
No. 33814-2-III
State v. Patterson
FACTS
Mr. Patterson believes that several elected Stevens County officials, including
judges, are not authorized to perform the duties of their offices because they have not
complied with state laws relating to taking, filing, and bonding their oaths of office.
Although he has brought his concerns to the attention of county and state officials, his
concerns have not been addressed to his satisfaction. Believing that certain county
officials, including District Court Judge Gina Tveit, were acting outside of the law, Mr.
Patterson believed his only option was to present his grievance in person to Judge Tveit in
her courtroom before she called a session to order.
On the morning of January 5, 2015, Mr. Patterson and several others who shared
his beliefs gathered in the gallery of Judge Tveit's courtroom. Judge Tveit hears the
traffic infraction docket on Monday mornings, and her courtroom was full that morning
with people waiting to have their infractions considered by her. As Judge Tveit entered
the courtroom, Mr. Patterson remained standing and began to loudly read his prepared
statement. Judge Tveit told Mr. Patterson that court was in session, but he interrupted her
and continued explaining why she lacked authority to judge anyone. Judge Tveit, trying
to speak over Mr. Patterson, said a court rule prohibited persons in the audience from
speaking. Continuing, she explained court proceedings were recorded, and the reason
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State v. Patterson
audience members were prohibited from speaking was to preserve the full record. Judge
Tveit, still attempting to speak over Mr. Patterson, said his loud speaking was disrupting
court proceedings. She then declared court was in recess, and ordered him to leave. Mr.
Patterson continued to question the judge's authority.
A deputy sheriff stationed in the courtroom approached Mr. Patterson and told him
he was trespassing. Mr. Patterson did not leave. The deputy physically removed Mr.
Patterson from the courtroom and placed him under arrest. As this was happening,
another man in the courtroom began to loudly read a prepared statement. He, too, was
removed.
Judge Tveit returned to the courtroom. Proceedings were immediately interrupted
again by a third person loudly reading a statement. Once this third person was removed
from the courtroom, order was restored and Judge Tveit was able to proceed with the
morning infraction docket. The interruptions delayed court proceedings by 20 minutes.
The State charged Mr. Patterson with disorderly conduct and interference with a
court. At the trial, Judge Tveit testified she has a duty to maintain control of the
courtroom, and order is important for effective and efficient administration of court
business. She testified she recessed court that Monday morning because Mr. Patterson
would not stop talking loudly, and his actions prevented her from hearing cases. Judge
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No. 33814-2-111
State v. Patterson
Tveit acknowledged there is no procedure in place for a citizen to directly address a judge
if they have a grievance or issue with that judge. And a sign posted outside the courtroom
informs the public that contact or conversation with a judge outside of the courtroom is
prohibited.
A jury found Mr. Patterson guilty of both counts. He appeals his convictions.
ANALYSIS
A. CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGE TO PROVISION OF DISORDERLY CONDUCT
STATUTE
Mr. Patterson first argues the provision of the disorderly conduct statute under
which he was convicted is overbroad and infringes on constitutionally protected speech
under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 5 of the
Washington Constitution.
The interpretation of constitutional provisions and legislative enactments presents
a question of law reviewed de novo. City of Spokane v. Rothwell, 166 Wn.2d 872, 876,
215 P.3d 162 (2009); Federal Way Sch. Dist. No. 210 v. State, 167 Wn.2d 514,523,219
P.3d 941 (2009). Generally, legislative enactments are presumed constitutional. State v.
Bahl, 164 Wn.2d 739, 753, 193 P.3d 678 (2008). The party challenging an enactment has
the burden of proving its unconstitutionality beyond a reasonable doubt. Voters Educ.
Comm. v. Pub. Disclosure Comm 'n, 161 Wn.2d 4 70, 481, 166 P .3d 117 4 (2007). But in
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No. 33814-2-III
State v. Patterson
the free speech context, "' the State usually bears the burden of justifying a restriction on
speech.'" State v. lmmelt, 173 Wn.2d 1, 6, 267 P Jd 305 (2011) (internal quotation
marks omitted) (quoting Voters Educ. Comm., 161 Wn.2d at 482).
The disorderly conduct statute, RCW 9A.84.030, makes it a misdemeanor to
engage in four proscribed forms of speech and/or conduct. The provision at issue here is
RCW 9A.84.030(l)(b). It provides that:
( 1) A person is guilty of disorderly conduct if the person:
(b) Intentionally disrupts any lawful assembly or meeting of persons
without lawful authority.
RCW 9A.84.030.
Mr. Patterson makes a facial overbreadth challenge to this provision. In a facial
challenge, a person may argue the statute is overbroad without first demonstrating that his
or her own conduct could not be regulated by a sufficiently specific statute. lmmelt, 173
Wn.2d at 7. Such a challenge is permitted because
First Amendment overbreadth doctrine is largely prophylactic, aimed
at preventing any "chilling" of constitutionally protected expression. As a
result, courts will permit facial overbreadth challenges when the statute in
question chills or burdens constitutionally protected conduct. Overbreadth
doctrine also has a constitutionally mandated "core", in which a defendant
has a right not to be sanctioned except under a constitutionally valid rule of
law. When a defendant convicted under a criminal statute challenges the
statute as overbroad, he or she is asserting that the conviction rests on an
unconstitutional law. Application of the overbreadth doctrine is strong
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No. 33814-2-III
State v. Patterson
medicine, however, and should be employed by a court sparingly and only
as a last resort.
State v. Halstien, 122 Wn.2d 109, 122, 857 P.2d 270 (1993) (citations omitted).
"[O]ur article I, section 5 analysis of overbreadth follows the analysis under the
First Amendment." Bradburn v. N Cent. Reg'l Library Dist., 168 Wn.2d 789, 804, 231
P.3d 166 (2010). A court's first task in an overbreadth challenge is to determine whether
the enactment at issue reaches a substantial amount of constitutionally protected speech or
expressive conduct. Immelt, 173 Wn.2d at 7; City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 458,
107 S. Ct. 2502, 96 L. Ed. 2d 398 (1987). An enactment is overbroad if it "' sweeps
within its prohibitions'" a substantial amount of constitutionally protected conduct.
Immelt, 173 Wn.2d at 6 (quoting City of Tacoma v. Luvene, 118 Wn.2d 826, 839, 827
P.2d 1374 (1992)). Criminal statutes must be scrutinized with "particular care," and those
that make a substantial amount of constitutionally protected speech unlawful may be held
facially invalid even if there is also a legitimate application. Hill, 482 U.S. at 459. But
"[a] statute or ordinance will be overturned only if the court is unable to place a
sufficiently limiting construction on a standardless sweep of legislation." Luvene, 118
Wn.2d at 840.
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No. 33814-2-III
State v. Patterson
To determine whether a statute sweeps too broadly, we must first construe it. We
will abstain from declaring a statute unconstitutional if we can fairly give the statute a
narrow construction. "In cases involving a facial challenge to a statute, the pivotal
question in determining whether abstention is appropriate is whether the statute is 'fairly
subject to an interpretation which will render unnecessary or substantially modify the ...
constitutional question.'" Hill, 482 U.S. at 468 (quoting Harman v. Forssenius, 380 U.S.
528, 534-35, 85 S. Ct. 1177, 14 L. Ed. 2d 50 (1965)).
The provision here is short and direct, with few words or phrases subject to
judicial construction. One word that requires judicial construction is "disrupt." That
word can be construed to mean a slight disruption or to mean a substantial disruption.
One phrase that requires judicial construction is the exception, "without lawful authority."
The lawful authority exception can refer to law enforcement or it can refer to any specific
recognized authority-such as a principal in a school or a teacher in a classroom. So to
render RCW 9A.84.030(l)(b) constitutional, we give the scope of the statute a narrow
reading, and the exception a broad reading. Therefore, we hold RCW 9A.84.030(1)(b)
requires the State to prove the intentional disruption was substantial, meaning that it
reasonably caused the meeting to be delayed or canceled. We also hold that the State
must prove the disrupter did not have specific recognized authority to disrupt the
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No. 33814-2-III
State v. Patterson
meeting. 1
"[T]he overbreadth doctrine attenuates as the sanctioned behavior moves from
pure speech toward conduct." lmmelt, 173 Wn.2d at 8. Here, the disorderly conduct
provision sanctions conduct more than speech. Although an assembly of people may be
substantially interrupted by words as readily as by conduct, the statute is speech neutral,
and focuses on the disruption rather than the viewpoint expressed by the disrupter. For
example, had Mr. Patterson stood and loudly read the Wizard of Oz, and continued to
read loudly after the judge ordered him to stop, the judge still would have recessed court.
In Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104, 92 S. Ct. 1953, 32 L. Ed. 2d 584 (1972), the
United States Supreme Court upheld a provision of Kentucky's disorderly conduct statute.
Under the provision in question, a person was guilty of disorderly conduct if, "' with
intent to cause public inconvenience, annoyance or alarm, or recklessly creating a risk
thereof, he ... [c]ongregates with other persons in a public place and refuses to comply
with a lawful order of the police to disperse."' Id. at 108 (quoting KY. REV. STAT.
§ 437.016(l)(t) (1968)). In upholding the provision, the court noted the Kentucky statute
1
Mr. Patterson relies on People v. Rapp, 492 Mich. 67, 821 N.W.2d 452 (2012) to
establish the provision here is substantially overbroad. Although Rapp involved a
Michigan State University ordinance that criminalized conduct similar to the provision
here, we depart from that court's result primarily because that court broadly construed the
ordinance instead of narrowly construing it, as our precedent requires of us.
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No. 33814-2-III
State v. Patterson
was construed very narrowly by the state court so to encompass only insubstantial
protected speech or activity. Colten, 407 U.S. at 111.
Having set forth the above principles, we now undertake the task of weighing "the
amount of protected speech proscribed by the [law] against the amount of unprotected
speech that the [law] legitimately prohibits." Immelt, 173 Wn.2d at 11. We note the
provision, as construed, would prohibit very little protected speech or conduct. A person
who merely intends to make his or her views known would not be subject to the law's
proscription. Instead, only the person who intends to substantially disrupt a meeting so
the meeting is delayed or canceled would be subject to the law's proscription.
A person generally has a free speech right to make his or her views known, but the
rubric of free speech does not include the intent to substantially interfere with a meeting.
Notably, the United States Supreme Court has held:
The rights of free speech and assembly, while fundamental in our
democratic society, still do not mean that everyone with opinions or beliefs
to express may address a group at any public place and at any time. The
constitutional guarantee of liberty implies the existence of an organized
society maintaining public order, without which liberty itself would be lost
in the excesses of anarchy.
Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536,554, 85 S. Ct. 453, 13 L. Ed. 2d 471 (1965).
We conclude that, because RCW 9A.84.030(1)(b) does not reach a substantial
amount of constitutionally protected speech, it is not overbroad.
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No. 33814-2-III
State v. Patterson
The remainder of this opinion has no precedential value. Therefore, it will be filed
for public record in accordance with the rules governing unpublished opinions.
RCW 2.06.040.
B. SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE
Mr. Patterson next argues the State failed to prove he intended to disrupt or
interfere with a court proceeding, but only proved he intended to exercise his
constitutional right to petition the government for redress of his grievances. In so
arguing, Mr. Patterson challenges both his disorderly conduct conviction and his
interference with a court conviction.
In a criminal case, the State must provide sufficient evidence to prove each
element of the charged offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S.
307,316, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1979). When a defendant challenges the
sufficiency of the evidence, the proper inquiry is "whether, after viewing the evidence in
the light most favorable to the State, any rational trier of fact could have found guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Salinas, 119 Wn.2d 192,201, 829 P.2d 1068(1992). "[A]ll reasonable inferences from the evidence must be drawn in favor of the
State and interpreted most strongly against the defendant." Id. Furthermore, "[a] claim of
insufficiency admits the truth of the State's evidence and all inferences that reasonably
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No. 33814-2-III
State v. Patterson
can be drawn therefrom." Id.In a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, circumstantial evidence and
direct evidence carry equal weight. State v. Goodman, 150 Wn.2d 774, 781, 83 P.3d 410(2004). This court's role is not to reweigh the evidence and substitute its judgment for
that of the jury. State v. Green, 94 Wn.2d 216,221,616 P.2d 628 (1980). Instead,
because the jurors observed the witnesses testify firsthand, this court defers to the jury's
resolution of conflicting testimony, evaluation of witness credibility, and decision
regarding the persuasiveness and the appropriate weight to be given the evidence. State v.
Thomas, 150 Wn.2d 821, 874-75, 83 P.3d 970 (2004).
As we have held above, the pertinent provision of Washington's disorderly
conduct statute required the State to prove Mr. Patterson intended to substantially disrupt
the courtroom to cause it to be reasonably delayed or discontinued. Mr. Patterson does
not argue Judge Tveit's decision to recess was unreasonable or that he had specific
authority to disrupt.
The interference with a court statute provides, in relevant part:
Whoever, interfering with, obstructing, or impeding the administration of
justice ... in or near a building housing a court of the state of Washington
... resorts to any ... demonstration in or near any such building ... shall
be guilty of a gross misdemeanor.
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State v. Patterson
RCW 9.27.015. 2
Here, Mr. Patterson argues his only intent was to petition Judge Tveit for a redress
of his grievances, not to disrupt the morning's court proceedings. But he did disrupt the
court proceedings. And he continued to disrupt the court proceedings after Judge Tveit
announced court was in session, and while she articulated the reason why persons from
the audience were required to be quiet. Judge Tveit testified she believed it was
necessary to call a recess so that order could be restored in the courtroom. If Mr.
Patterson's purpose was to petition Judge Tveit and not to disrupt the court proceedings,
he might have found a less onerous method than causing a cacophony at the beginning of
the morning docket and requiring every person who had court business to wait an
additional 20 minutes to have their matters considered.
When evidence supports both an innocent explanation and a criminal explanation,
a jury is entitled to infer guilt. State v. Bockob, 159 Wn.2d 311, 340-41, 150 P.3d 59(2006). Mr. Patterson was entitled to make his argument to the jury, and the jury was
entitled to disbelieve it. State v. Montgomery, 163 Wn.2d 577,587, 183 P.3d 267 (2008).
Because a rational trier of fact could have found that Mr. Patterson acted with the intent
2
RCW 9.27.015 does not contain a mens rea element. However, the court's
instructions added an intent element to this offense. We express no opinion as to whether
RCW 9 .27.015 would be declared unconstitutionally overbroad under the test we
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No. 33814-2-111
State v. Patterson
to substantially disrupt the courtroom, we will not disturb a jury's finding when it is based
on substantial evidence.
C. APPELLATE COSTS
In compliance with this court's local rule, Mr. Patterson filed a supplemental brief
with appropriate argument, supported by a current declaration of financial circumstances,
establishing his current and future inability to pay an award of appellate costs. We
therefore deny the State an award of appellate costs.
STATEMENT OF ADDITIONAL GROUNDS FOR REVIEW
In his SAG, Mr. Patterson argues he was arrested and convicted unlawfully
because he was exercising his constitutional right. Specifically, Mr. Patterson argues: "It
is a foregone conclusion that if even the United States Congress can't criminalize our
right to peaceably assemble and redress of our grievances then county and state
government officers can't. Absent a constitutional amendment, neither can a jury." SAG
at 2.
Although phrased differently, this is the same argument we addressed above: Mr.
Patterson was entitled to argue to the jury that his intent was only to peaceably assemble
and seek government redress of his grievances. But the jury was also entitled to
articulate today.
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No. 33814-2-III
State v. Patterson
disbelieve him and find that he intended to throw the courtroom into disorder. We all
have the right to peaceably assemble and petition the government for redress of our
grievances. But as with all constitutional rights, this right is qualified. See Cox, 379 U.S.
at 554 (the constitutional guarantee of liberty implies the existence of an organized
society maintaining public order).
Lawrence-Berrey, J.
WE CONCUR:
Fear~/_j ``w~.!Jr-
sid~y,J.
1
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