State Of Washington v. Sonja Hutchens

COURT OF APPEALS
gym 1SIO 11
2015 JUL - 7 AM 8: 45
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WA
DIVISION II
STATE OF WASHINGTON, Nn 4591 !
Respondent,
V.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
SONJA ELAINE HUTCHENS,
Appellant.
MAXA, J. — Sonja Hutchens appeals her convictions for second degree assault and first
degree burglary. We hold that ( 1) the record is insufficient for us to address Hutchens' s claim
that her attorney provided ineffective assistance by giving her incorrect legal advice regarding
the withdrawal of an instruction on a lesser included offense on the assault charge, ( 2) the trial
court did not err by declining to include a statement that a person has no duty to retreat in a jury
instruction stating that person has the right to stand her ground and defend against an attack, ( 3)
we will not consider Hutchens' s argument that the trial court exceeded its authority in ordering
her to pay legal financial obligations ( LFOs) without finding that she had the present or future
ability to pay because Hutchens did not raise the issue in the trial court, and ( 4) Hutchens' s
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assertions of error in her statement of additional grounds ( SAG) have no merit. Accordingly, we
affirm Hutchens' s convictions and sentence.
FACTS
In May 2013, Hutchens and Jill Earnhardt had a physical altercation in a parking lot.
Hutchens approached Earnhardt' s car, the door opened, and the two women began physically
fighting. During the altercation, Hutchens entered Earnhardt' s vehicle and hit and slapped
Earnhardt. Hutchens and Earnhardt exited the vehicle while still grappling with each other.
Someone pulled the two apart, and Hutchens delivered a final strike to Earnhardt' s face.
The State charged Hutchens with second degree assault. On the first day of trial, the
State amended the information to add a first degree burglary charge. At trial, there was
conflicting testimony regarding who initiated the altercation. Some witnesses testified that
Hutchens pulled opened the door and initiated the fight. A defense witness testified that as
Hutchens approached Earnhardt' s car, Earnhardt opened the door and hit Hutchens, causing her
to stumble.
The second degree assault charge was based on RCW 9A. 36. 021( 1)( a), which requires
proof that the defendant assaulted another and inflicted substantial bodily harm. Hutchens
presented some evidence at trial that the blow to Earnhardt' s face may not have caused a
fracture, and argued in closing that the State did not prove, the substantial bodily harm element.
Hutchens also argued that she acted in self-defense.
Defense counsel initially requested, but later withdrew, an instruction on the lesser
included offense of fourth degree assault, which offense does not require proof of substantial
bodily harm. In withdrawing the lesser included offense instruction, defense counsel stated that
the " legalistic reason" for withdrawing the instruction was. because Hutchens could not be
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convicted of first degree burglary if she was not convicted of assault. Report of Proceedings
RP) ( Jan. 29, 2014) at 548.
At Hutchens' s request and over the State' s objection, the trial court gave three self-
defense instructions, including a " lawful force —no duty to retreat" instruction. That instruction
stated a person may stand her ground and defend against an attack by the use of lawful force.
However, the trial court declined to include in the instruction a statement Hutchens proposed that
the law does not impose a duty to retreat. Hutchens objected to this omission.
The jury convicted Hutchens on both charges. As part of Hutchens' s sentence, the trial
court ordered her to pay a $ 1; 000 LFO for her court- appointed attorney fees. The court did not
determine whether Hutchens had the present or future ability to pay her LFOs, but Hutchens did
not object to the imposition of LFOs at sentencing.
Hutchens appeals.
ANALYSIS
A. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
Hutchens argues that she received ineffective assistance of counsel because ( 1) her
attorney provided inaccurate legal advice that influenced her decision to withdraw a lesser
included offense instruction on the second degree assault charge, and ( 2) she was prejudiced
because there is a reasonable probability that she would not have withdrawn the instruction but
for her counsel' s erroneous advice, and a reasonable jury could have convicted her of the lesser
included offense. We hold that the record is insufficient to establish whether defense counsel
gave erroneous advice regarding the instruction or whether Hutchens relied on that advice.
Therefore, we decline to address Hutchens' s ineffective assistance of counsel claim.
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1. Legal Principles
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 22 of the
Washington Constitution guarantee a criminal defendant' s right to effective assistance of
counsel. State v. Grier, 171 Wash. 2d 17, 32, 246 P.3d 1260 ( 2011). Where a criminal defendant
has been denied effective assistance of counsel, we will reverse any resulting conviction and
remand for a new trial.. See id. To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the
defendant must show that ( 1) defense counsel' s representation was deficient, and ( 2) the
deficient representation prejudiced the defendant. Id. at 32- 33. " Where the claim of ineffective
assistance is based upon counsel' s failure to request a particular jury instruction, the defendant
must show he was entitled to the instruction, counsel' s performance was deficient in failing to
request it, and the failure to request the instruction caused prejudice." State v. Thompson, 169
Wash. App. 436, 495, 290 P.3d 996 ( 2012).
2. Insufficient Record to Address Ineffective Assistance
Our Supreme Court in Grier emphasized that when an appellant raises an ineffective
assistance claim, the reviewing court may consider only facts within the appellate record. 171
Wash. 2d at 29. When such a claim is based on off-the- record conversations, the proper procedure
is to file a personal restraint petition. Id. Here, we would need to examine evidence outside the
record to determine whether Hutchens' s counsel gave her erroneous advice and whether
Hutchens relied on that advice in deciding to forego a lesser included offense instruction.
The parties agree that Hutchens was entitled to a jury instruction on the lesser included
offense of fourth degree assault, and that defense counsel deliberately chose to withdraw that
instruction. Our Supreme Court indicated in Grier that defense counsel' s decision to forego a
lesser included offense instruction in favor of an " all or nothing" strategy in most cases should
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not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. 171 Wash. 2d at 39- 40. However, Hutchens
focuses not on the decision to forego the lesser included offense instruction, but on her counsel' s
allegedly erroneous advice that led her to make to that decision. She claims that her counsel
misled her into believing that she could not be convicted of first degree burglary if she was
acquitted of assault, and that she relied on this misinformation in deciding to forego a lesser.
included offense instruction.
Hutchens' s argument is based on a brief statement defense counsel made to the trial court
when withdrawing the lesser included offense instruction. After stating that he had proposed
such an instruction, defense counsel stated:
She does not want to put the lesser -included offense in there. There' s plusses [ sic]
and minuses to that. I - - I tend to err on doing those, but she had her reasons for
not doing them. The ... sort of legalistic reason for not doing it is that, for Burglary
1, it require - - allows a Burglary 1 conviction for essentially any assault.
So a lesser included could count for that. If we don' t have a lesser included in, if
we can prevail on the issue of self-defense in some form, then that would eliminate
the Burglary 1 and the Assault 2. Again, maybe not a tactical reason I - - I would
most prefer to do that, but I am not going to always overrun my clients . [ W] e' ve
had some battles on that and she prefers to go without Assault 4. 1 will - - we' ve
been advised of it .... I' m making that her option; she' s picking it.
RP ( Jan. 29, 2014) at 548- 49.
Defense counsel' s statement and the related record is insufficient to allow us to address
Hutchens' s ineffective assistance of counsel claim in two respects. First, the record does not
disclose whether defense counsel actually gave Hutchens advice on the impact the lesser
included offense instruction could have on the first degree burglary charge. The only advice
defense counsel told the trial court he had given Hutchens was that " it could be an all or
nothing." RP ( Jan. 29, 2014) at 548. Defense counsel told the trial court there was a " legalistic
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reason" for not giving the instruction, but the record does not reveal whether defense counsel
actually communicated that reason to Hutchens. RP ( Jan. 29, 2014) at 548.
Second, even if defense counsel provided erroneous advice, the record does not reveal
whether Hutchens relied on that advice in deciding to forego the lesser included offense
instruction. The record suggests that defense counsel advised her not to forego the instruction;
he said he tended to err in favor of giving the instruction and that foregoing the instruction was
not a tactical reason he preferred. Defense counsel emphasized that Hutchens was adamant and
that she preferred not to submit the instruction. But the record does not show whether Hutchens
relied on defense counsel' s advice in reaching this decision.
Because the record does not disclose whether defense counsel gave Hutchens erroneous
advice or whether Hutchens relied on that advice, we cannot consider Hutchens' s ineffective
assistance of counsel claim on direct appeal.
B. " NO DUTY TO RETREAT" JURY INSTRUCTION
The trial court gave a " lawful force —no duty to retreat" jury instruction. Hutchens
argues the trial court erred in denying her proposed version of the instruction, which included a
specific statement that there was no duty to retreat. We disagree.
Legal Principles
In general, we review a trial court' s choice of jury instructions for an abuse of discretion.
State v.
Hathaway, 161 Wn. App. 634, 647, 251 P.3d 253 ( 2011). Jury instructions are
appropriate if they allow counsel to argue their theories of the case, are not misleading, and when
read as a whole properly state the applicable law. State v. Aguirre, 168 Wash. 2d 350, 363- 64, 229
P.3d 669 ( 2010). It is not error to refuse to give a specific instruction when a more general
instruction adequately explains the law and allows each party to argue its theory of the case.
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Hathaway, 161 Wash. App. at 647. Jury instructions on self-defense must do more than
adequately convey the law; they " must make the relevant legal standard `` manifestly apparent to
the average juror.' " State v. McCreven, 170 Wash. App. 444, 462, 284 P.3d 793 ( 2012) ( quoting
State v. Allery, 101 Wash. 2d 591, 595, 682 P.2d 312 ( 1984)).
A person has no duty to retreat when assaulted in a place where he or she is entitled to be.
State v. Redmond, 150 Wn.2d. 489, 493, 78 P.3d 1001 ( 2003). This rule of law is incorporated in
WPIC 17. 05, which is entitled " Lawful Force —No Duty to Retreat." 11 WASHINGTON
PRACTICE SERIES: PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 17. 05, at 264- 65 ( 3d ed. 2008) ( WPIC).
When a defendant is entitled to a self-defense instruction, the trial court should also should give
a " no duty to retreat" instruction when the jury " may objectively conclude that flight is a
reasonably effective alternative to the use of force in self-defense." Id. at. 495. On the other
hand, a " no duty to retreat" instruction is not required if the evidence shows that retreat was not a
reasonable alternative to the use of force. See State v. Studd, 137 Wash. 2d 533, 549, 973 P.2d
1049 ( 1999) ( holding that no instruction was required when defendant was being held at
gunpoint and could not have avoided the use of force by retreating).
2. Adequacy of Trial Court' s Instructions
Under Redmond, the evidence here was sufficient for the trial court to give a " no duty to
retreat" instruction. The jury could have concluded that flight was a reasonable alternative for
Hutchens when Earnhardt hit her with the car door and when Hutchens hit Earnhardt after they
were pulled from the car and separated. And the trial court did give such an instruction, based on
WPIC 17. 05. The question is whether the trial court' s instructions adequately stated the law and
allowed Hutchens to argue her theory of the case regarding the absence of a duty to retreat.
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The trial court gave three standard instructions regarding the use of lawful force in self-
defense. Instruction 15 was based on WPIC 17. 02, which is entitled " Lawful Force —Defense of
Self, Others, Property." This instruction informed the jury that it is a defense to the charge of
second degree assault that the force was " lawful" and provided a definition of lawful force.
Instruction 16 was based on WPIC 17. 04, which is entitled " Lawful Force —Actual Danger Not
Necessary." This instruction informed the jury that a person can defend herself if she believes in
good faith and on reasonable grounds that she is in actual danger of injury, regardless of whether
she was in actual danger. Hutchens did not object to these instructions.
Instruction 17 was based on WPIC 17. 05, which is entitled " Lawful Force —No Duty to
Retreat." This instruction stated:
It is lawful for a person who is in a place where that person has a right to be who
has reasonable grounds for believing that she is being attacked to stand her ground
and defend against such attack by the use of lawful force.
CP at 261. This instruction included only the first sentence of WPIC 17. 05. Hutchens also
proposed that the trial court give the second sentence of WPIC 17. 05, which states: " The law
does not impose a duty to retreat." The trial court declined to include this sentence.
Hutchens argues that the trial court erred in not giving the second sentence of WPIC
17. 05. The second sentence is a part of the standard " lawful force —no duty to retreat"
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instructions, and the better practice may be to include that sentence when the evidence indicates
that retreat was a reasonable alternative for the defendant. However, the first sentence of WPIC
17. 05, which the trial court included in instruction 17, clearly informs the jury that a defendant
has no duty to retreat. The instruction states that if the defendant is being attacked, she has the
right to " stand her ground and defend against such attack by the use of lawful force." WPIC
17. 05.
Further, instruction 17 allowed Hutchens to argue her theory of the case. Based on the
trial court' s instructions, Hutchens argued in closing argument that she had no duty to retreat:
W] e' re not a nation of pacifists. We - - we are a no -retreat jurisdiction. It' s in
the jury instructions. It starts off around 15 and goes beyond that, about self-
defense. We are a nation that was not born about people turning their cheeks.
RP ( Jan. 29, 2014) at 616 ( emphasis added).
So from [Hutchens' s] thinking, because she gets hit by the door, the door is opening
on her, so she' s going around because, you know, something is going to happen
with this person she' s had this history of hostility with. So she' s allowed to do that
because this is a no -retreat ... jurisdiction.
RP ( Jan. 29, 2014) at 645- 46 .(emphasis added).
And again, Instruction Number 7 [ sic, 17], . . . shows this is a no -retreat
jurisdiction, so there' s no reason for her to walk away from this and wait to see
what [ Earnhardt] does next.
RP ( Jan. 29, 2014) at 647 ( emphasis added).
There' s also the factual issues and how it interrelates to the jury instructions, aside
from the self-defense case, where she has - doesn' t -have a duty to retreat, has a
duty to act on appearances.
RP ( Jan. 29, 2014) at 655- 56 ( emphasis added).
s The language " the law does not impose a duty to retreat" is in brackets in WPIC 17. 05.
However, that does not mean that it should be treated as an optional addition. Instead, the
instruction' s second paragraph has two bracketed alternatives, and generally the trial court
should select one of those two alternatives. WPIC 17. 05 comment 264- 65.
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We review a trial court' s choice ofjury instructions for an abuse of discretion.
Hathaway, 161 Wash. App. at 647. Instruction 17 expressly stated that Hutchens had the right to
stand her ground and defend." CP at 261. Therefore, the instruction clearly implied that
Hutchens had no duty to retreat. Adding a sentence specifically stating that there is no duty to
retreat was unnecessary for Hutchens to argue her self-defense theory. Accordingly, we hold
that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in failing to include a specific statement that a
person has no duty to retreat in the " lawful force —no duty to retreat" jury instruction.
C. LEGAL FINANCIAL OBLIGATIONS
Hutchens argues that the trial court violated her right to counsel when it imposed legal
financial obligations without finding she had the present or future ability to pay. We decline to
reach this claim.
Hutchens did not challenge the trial court' s finding during sentencing, and we generally
do not consider issues raised for the first time on appeal. See State v. Blazina, 174 Wash. App.
906, 911, 301 P.3d 492 ( 2013), remanded on other grounds, 182 Wash. 2d 827 ( 2015). Our
decision in Blazina, nearly seven months before Hutchens' s sentencing, provided notice that the
failure to object to LFOs during sentencing waives a related claim of error on appeal. Id. As our
Supreme Court noted in reviewing the decision in Blazina, an appellate court may use its
discretion to decide whether to reach unpreserved claims of error. 182 Wash. 2d at 830. We
decline to exercise such discretion here.
D. SAG ASSERTIONS
1. Motion to Amend Information
Hutchens asserts that the trial court erred in allowing the State to amend the information
to include first degree burglary on the first day of trial. We disagree.
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This court reviews a trial court' s decision to allow the State to amend the charge for
abuse of discretion. State v. Ziegler, 138 Wn. App. 804, 808, 158 P.3d 647 ( 2007). CrR 2. 1( d)
provides that a trial court may permit the prosecutor to amend an information at any time before
verdict or finding if substantial rights of the defendant are not prejudiced. As a result, in order to
challenge an amendment, the defendant must demonstrate that it prejudices her substantial rights.
See State v. Hockaday, 144 Wash. App. 918, 927, 184 P.3d 1273 ( 2008).
Here, the State filed its motion to amend on November 21, 2013, well before trial. The
trial court granted the motion on January 27, 2014. In her SAG, Hutchens makes no attempt to
demonstrate how the State' s amendment prejudiced her substantial rights. Therefore, we hold
that this claim fails.
2.- Overcharging by the Prosecutor
Hutchens asserts that the State abused its discretion in overcharging her in order to obtain
a guilty plea. Hutchens asserts that the first degree burglary charge did not adequately describe
the nature of her conduct and that the State sought the charge only after she pursued her right to a
trial. We hold that Hutchens' s claim of abuse of prosecutorial discretion is without merit.
Prosecutors have discretion in their charging decisions. State v. Korum, 157 Wash. 2d 614,
625, 141 P.3d 13 ( 2006). Courts may not substitute their judgment for the prosecutor' s. Id. at
626.
Hutchens relies on RCW 9. 94A. 411( 2)( a), which provides general charging guidelines.
But these charging guidelines " are intended solely for the guidance of prosecutors in the state of
Washington. They are not intended to, do not and may not be relied upon to create a right or
benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law by a party in litigation with the state."
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RCW 9. 94A.401. Therefore, we hold that Hutchens' s claim of prosecutorial abuse of discretion
fails.
3. Insufficient Evidence for First Degree Burglary
Hutchens asserts that the definition of "building" as used in RCW 9A.52. 020 and defined
in RCW 9A.04. 110( 5) does not include Earnhardt' s vehicle, and therefore there was insufficient
evidence to support her first degree burglary conviction. We hold that the statute is
unambiguous and that the term " building" includes any vehicle for purposes of first degree
Z
burglary.
A person commits the crime of first degree burglary when, with.intent to commit a crime
against a person or property therein, he or she enters or remains unlawfully in a " building" and
assaults any person. RCW 9A. 52. 020. RCW 9A. 04. 110( 5) defines the term "[ b] uilding" as " in
addition to its ordinary meaning, includes any dwelling, fenced area, vehicle, railway car, cargo
container, or any other structure used for lodging of persons or -for carrying on business therein,
or for the use, sale, or deposit of goods." ( Emphasis added.)
Here, the law is clear that the term " building" in RCW 9A.04. 110( 5) includes any
vehicle. To the extent that Hutchens asserts that the phrase " or any other structure used for
lodging of persons or for carrying on business therein" following the list of terms that includes
vehicles could reasonably be interpreted as meaning that a vehicle is a building only if used for
lodging or business purposes, we disagree. Our Supreme Court rejected such an interpretation in
State v. Wentz, 149 Wash. 2d 342, 350- 52, 68 P.3d 282 ( 2003). We hold that for purposes of the
2 Hutchens also seems to assert that the trial court erred in allowing the prosecutor to amend the
information to add a first degree burglary charge without showing that a vehicle is a building.
Based on our analysis below, we also reject this assertion.
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first degree burglary statute, RCW 9A.04. 110( 5) unambiguously provides that a " building"
includes any vehicle.
Accordingly, we reject Hutchens' s assertion that that the State presented insufficient
evidence to prove she entered a " building" as required in RCW 9A.52. 020 and defined in RCW
9A. 04. 110( 5).
4. WPIC 2. 05 Jury Instruction Challenge
Hutchens asserts that the trial court erred in failing to provide the full WPIC 2. 05
instruction explaining when a vehicle could be considered a building for the purposes of a first
degree burglary charge. We disagree.
WPIC 2. 05 states, "
Building, in addition to its ordinary meaning, includes any [ dwelling]
fenced area] [ vehicle] [ railway car] [ cargo container]. [
Building also includes any other
structure used [ mainly] [ for lodging ofpersons] [ for carrying on business therein) [ for the use,
sale, or deposit ofgoods]]." The trial court' s instruction stated, " Building, in addition to its
ordinary meaning, includes any vehicle." CP at 264. As discussed above, the law is clear that
the term " building" in RCW 9A.04. 110( 5) includes any vehicle. Therefore, the trial court' s
instruction properly informed the jury of the applicable law, and the. second sentence of WPIC
2. 05 was unnecessary.
We hold that the trial court did not err in giving the instruction defining " building."
5. Jury Question Regarding Definition of Premise
Hutchens asserts that the trial court incorrectly stated the law in answering a jury question
regarding the definition of "premise" during deliberations. We disagree.
The trial court' s decision to answer jury questions and give further instructions is
discretionary. State v. Kindell, 181 Wn. App 844, 850, 326 P.3d 876 ( 2014). However, such
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instructions must accurately state the law. Id. We review the legal accuracy of jury instructions
de novo. Id. Instructing the jury in a manner that relieves the State of its burden to prove every
element of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt is reversible error. Id.
During deliberations, the jury asked the court for further instruction on the definition of
premise." The trial court provided the definition of "premises" according to RCW 9A.52. 010
6): " `` Premises' includes any building." RP ( Jan. 29, 2014) at 686. This was a correct
statement of the applicable law. As a result, we hold that the trial court did not err in responding
to the jury question.
6. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Hutchens asserts that she received ineffective assistance of counsel ( 1) when her defense
counsel did not adequately prepare for pretrial hearings and failed to request a continuance, ( 2)
ignored her " emails and phone calls," and ( 3) failed to move for continuance at trial.3 SAG at 5.
We disagree.
First, Hutchens asserts that her attorney did not adequately prepare for pretrial omnibus
and readiness hearings and failed to request a continuance. Hutchens' s claims depend upon facts
outside the record, and are not reviewable in a direct appeal. State v. McFarland, 127 Wash. 2d
322, 335, 899 P.2d 1251 ( 1995). Therefore, we need not consider these arguments.
Second, Hutchens asserts that her defense counsel admitted to " ignoring [ her] emails and
phone calls." SAG at 5. However, the record indicates that her attorney responded to some of
Hutchens' s emails and phone calls regarding cases to research and her proposed trial strategies.
3 Hutchens also asserts in her SAG that defense counsel provided " misinformation and negligent
advice." SAG at 5. To the extent that this assertion relates to the lesser included defense
instruction, we have addressed that issue above. Otherwise, we cannot review this assertion
because it is insufficient to inform us of the nature of the alleged error. RAP 10. 10( c).
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Moreover, the record indicates that Hutchens' s attorney had filed motions and made arguments
on her behalf. Based on the trial court record, we hold that defense counsel' s performance was
not deficient in this regard.
Third, Hutchens asserts that defense counsel failed to make motions for a continuance at
trial, particularly after the State added a first degree burglary charge on the first day of trial.
However, whether defense counsel was deficient in not requesting a continuance or whether that
decision prejudiced Hutchens is outside the record. Therefore, we cannot consider this assertion.
McFarland, 127 Wash. 2d at 335.
We reject Hutchens' s ineffective assistance of counsel claims.
7. Offender Score Calculation
Hutchens asserts that the trial court should not have included her two felony theft
convictions from Oregon in her offender score because the convictions washed out. We
disagree.
We review offender score calculations de novo. State v. Powell, 172 Wn. App, 455, 459,
290 P.3d 353 ( 2012). Hutchens was convicted of two counts of first degree theft under Oregon
law in 2006. The trial court apparently determined that for the purposes of calculating her
offender score, these convictions were comparable to convictions for second degree theft under
Washington law. A second degree theft conviction under RCW 9A.56. 040 is a class C felony
that washes out if the offender spends " five consecutive years in the community without
committing any crime that subsequently results in a conviction." RCW 9. 94A. 525( 2)( c).
Hutchens contends that her two Oregon theft convictions should have washed out because she
did not commit a crime between 2006 and 2013, and therefore the five year wash out period has
passed.
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However, the record shows that Hutchens was convicted of conspiracy to commit first
degree assault with a firearm and sentenced in 2008. Because Hutchens did not spend more than
five consecutive years in the community without committing a crime that resulted in a
conviction, her 2006 theft convictions do not wash out. Therefore, we reject this claim.
We affirm Hutchens' s convictions and sentence.
A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the
Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record in accordance with RCW
2. 06. 040, it is so ordered.
MAXA, J.
We concur:
yyam,,.
WOiWK, P. J.
k
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