State Of Washington v. Nicholas B. Winterberger

FILED
COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION II
2014 AUG - 5 10: 140
STATE OF WASHINGTON
i3Y
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION II
STATE OF WASHINGTON, No. 44451 -8 -II
Respondent, UNPUBLISHED OPINION
v.
NICHOLAS B. WINTERBERGER,
Appellant.
BJORGEN, A.C. J. = Nicholas Winterberger appeals from sentencing conditions imposed
following his guilty plea to third degree rape. Agreeing that some of the sentencing conditions
were imposed in error, we remand to the trial court to strike them.'
FACTS
The State charged Winterberger, then age 18, with second degree rape of a girl he met while
both were taking classes at Remann Hall. He entered a Newton plea to third degree rape. A
presentence investigation report informed the trial court that he had a prior juvenile adjudication for
third degree assault with sexual motivation and that he had completed a substance abuse treatment
program. The presentence investigation report recommended a sentence of 15 months of
A commissioner of this court initially considered Winterberger' s appeal as a motion on the
merits under RAP 18. 14 and then transferred it to a panel of judges.
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State v. Newton, 87 Wash. 2d 363, 372 -73, 552 P.2d 682 ( 1976); see also N Carolina v. Alford,
400 U.S. 25, 31, 91 S. Ct. 160, 27 L. Ed. 2d 162 ( 1970).
No. 44451 -8 -II
confinement, to be followed by 36 months of community custody under conditions contained in
Exhibit H attached to the presentence report. Among those conditions were the following:
11. Enter and complete, following release, a state approved sexual deviancy
treatment program ( if Court- Ordered)
through a certified sexual deviancy
counselor. You are to sign all necessary releases to ensure your Community
Corrections Officer will be able to monitor your progress in treatment.
12. You shall not change sexual deviancy treatment providers without prior
approval from the Court and your Community Corrections Officer.
13. You shall not possess or consume any controlled substances without a valid
prescription from a licensed physician.
14. Have no contact with the victim ( CTS), or any minor children. This includes
but is not limited to personal, verbal, written or contact through a third party.
Contact with minor children, if any, will need to be supervised, and will require
prior approval by the Sexual Deviancy Treatment Provider and the CCO.
15. Hold no position of authority or trust involving children under the age of 18.
16. Do not initiate, or have in any way, physical contact with children under the
age of 18 for any reason, unless approved as per # 14 above. Do not have any
contact with physically or mentally vulnerable individuals.
17. Inform your Community Corrections Officer of any romantic relationships to
verify there is [ sic] no victim -
age children involved.
18. Submit to polygraph and /or plethysmograph testing upon direction of your
Community Corrections Officer and /or therapist at your expense.
19. Register as a sex offender in your county of residence per current Statute
requirements pertaining to your crime of conviction.
20. Do not go to or frequent places where children congregate, ( Fast -
food outlets,
libraries, theaters, shopping malls, play grounds and parks.) unless otherwise
approved by the Court.
21. Submit to testing for DNA purposes, and for an HIV test also if Court-
ordered.
22. Follow all conditions imposed by your treatment provider( s) and CCO.
23. Obey all laws, and abide by any curfew that may be imposed by your CCO.
24. You shall not have access to the Internet at any location nor shall you have
access to computers ( with the exception of for employment purposes) unless
otherwise approved by the CCO. You also are prohibited from joining or perusing
any public social websites ( Face book, MySpace, etc.) or telephoning any
sexually -oriented " 900" telephone numbers.
25. Do not possess or peruse any sexually explicit materials in any medium. Your
sexual deviancy treatment provider will define sexually explicit material. Do not
patronize prostitutes or establishments that promote the commercialization of sex.
Also, do not possess or use any cell phone that may provide access to the Internet
as well.
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No. 44451 -8 -II
26. Obtain a Substance Abuse Evaluation, and then follow any recommended
treatment as directed until successful completion of any compulsory treatment
program.
Clerk' s Papers ( CP) at 71 -72 ( emphasis omitted).
Winterberger objected to condition 26 because there was no evidence that controlled
substances or alcohol was involved in the crime. He objected to the conditions regarding minors,
other than the victim, because the victim was only one year younger than him, so he did not take
advantage of any age differential. In addition, he objected to conditions 23, 24 and 25 to the extent
that they created a curfew, forbade him from possessing or perusing sexually explicit materials, and
restricted his access to the Internet and to computers. The trial court imposed all of the conditions
contained in Exhibit H of the presentence investigation report, and Winterberger appeals.
ANALYSIS
Winterberger renews his arguments objecting to the imposition of conditions 24, 25 and 26.
He also, for the first time on appeal, objects to condition 18 to the extent it obliges him to undergo
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penile plethysmograph testing upon direction of a community corrections officer ( CCO). We
review de novo the trial court' s statutory authority to impose conditions of community custody
and any questions of statutory interpretation relating to that authority. State v. Armendariz, 160
Wash. 2d 106, 110, 156 P.3d 201 ( 2007). However, if the trial court has authority to impose the
condition, we review its decision to do so for an abuse of discretion. Armendariz, 160 Wash. 2d at
110.
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Illegal or erroneous sentences may be challenged for the first time on appeal. State v. Bahl, 164
Wash. 2d 739, 744, 193 P.3d 678 ( 2008).
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No. 44451 -8 -II
First, Winterberger argues that the trial court erred in imposing condition 26, requiring a
substance abuse evaluation and any recommended treatment, because it did not make a finding
under RCW 9.94A.607( 1) that he has a chemical dependency that contributed to the crime. State
v. Jones, 118 Wn. App. 199, 207 -08, 76 P.3d 258 ( 2003). The State responds that Winterberger
admitted to using marijuana at least three to four times per week during the year prior to the
crime, so the condition was properly imposed. But without the trial court making a finding that
Winterberger' s marijuana use contributed to the crime, we agree that it abused its discretion in
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imposing condition 26 and remand for the trial court to strike that condition in its entirety.
Second, he argues that the trial court erred in imposing condition 25 to the extent it
ordered that he could not " possess or peruse any sexually explicit materials in any medium." Br.
of Appellant at 8. He contends that the condition is unconstitutionally vague. In Bahl, the
Supreme Court considered a challenge to a similar, but not identical condition of community
custody that stated:
Do not possess or access pornographic materials, as directed by the supervising
Community Corrections Officer. Do not frequent establishments whose primary
business pertains to sexually explicit or erotic material."
Bahl, 164 Wash. 2d at 743 ( quoting 1 Clerk' s Papers at 28). The court held first that the ban on
possessing pornographic materials was vague and that the discretion of the CCO only made the
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The State correctly Autrey held that "` [a] lthough the conduct prohibited
points out that State v.
during community custody must be directly related to the crime, it need not be causally related to
the crime. "' 136 Wn. App. 460, 467, 150 P.3d 580 ( 2006) ( quoting State v. Letourneau, 100
Wn. App. 424, 432, 997 P.2d 436 ( 2000)). Recognizing that the line between causing a
condition and contributing to it may be indistinct, Autry nonetheless cannot be read as effacing
the requirement of RCW 9. 94A.607( 1) that the court find a chemical dependency that
contributed to the crime before requiring a substance abuse evaluation and treatment. That
finding or its equivalent was not made here.
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No. 44451 -8 -II
vagueness more apparent because it was apparent there were no ascertainable standards for
enforcement. Bahl, 164 Wash. 2d at 758. The court also held, though, that the references to
sexually explicit" and " erotic" were not vague, since in their context the terms, their dictionary
definitions, and the statutory definition in RCW 9. 68. 130( 2) restricted Bahl " from patronizing
adult bookstores, adult dance clubs, and the like." Bahl, 164 Wash. 2d at 759.
If the term " sexually explicit material" is not vague in a ban on visiting establishments
whose primary business pertains to that material, it would not be vague in a ban on possessing or
accessing such material. Condition 25 does vest discretion in a third party to " define" that
material, but we see a gulf between this situation and the CCO' s discretion found suspect in
Bahl. Here, the discretion rests in Winterberger' s sexual deviancy treatment provider and is
exercised in the course of providing that treatment. This is not the sort of personal or arbitrary
discretion which the vagueness doctrine is designed to limit. See Burien Bark Supply v. King
County, 106 Wash. 2d 868, 871, 725 P.2d 994 ( 1986) ( ordinance void for vagueness because
criteria for enforcement is left entirely to the discretion of county officials). Rather, condition 25
recognizes the discretion and flexibility a therapist or other treatment provider must have to
respond to the unique circumstances posed by each client or patient. This recognition does not
insulate a grant of discretion from a vagueness challenge if it in fact is exercised in an arbitrary
or irrational manner. It does mean that a reasonable grant of therapeutic discretion such as this is
not void for vagueness on its face. The trial court was authorized to impose this condition and
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No. 44451 -8 -II
did not abuse its discretion in doing so.
Third, Winterberger argues that the trial court erred in imposing condition 25 to the
extent that it ordered him to not " patronize prostitutes or establishments that promote the
commercialization of sex." CP at 71 -72. The State suggests that this condition is also a
condition of his sexual deviancy treatment, but concedes that if the condition were imposed
independently, it should be stricken. We conclude that the condition is independent of
Winterberger' s sexual deviancy treatment and accept the State' s concession. Accordingly, we
remand with instructions to strike the portion of condition 25 that states, " Do not patronize
prostitutes or establishments that promote the commercialization of sex." CP at 71 -72.
Winterberger remains subject to unchallenged condition 22, requiring him to follow all
conditions imposed by his treatment provider and CCO and unchallenged condition 23, requiring
him to obey all laws and abide by any curfew imposed by the CCO.
Fourth, he argues that the trial court erred in imposing conditions 24 and 25 to the extent
they restricted his access to the Internet, to computers, to public social web sites and to cell
phones with Internet access. He contends that none of them are related to his crime and so they
cannot be imposed as " crime- related prohibitions" under RCW 9. 94A.703( 3)( f). Br. of
Appellant at 11. The State concedes that the trial court erred, in this regard, and we accept that
concession. See State v. Zimmer, 146 Wn. App. 405, 414, 190 P.3d 121 ( 2008) ( striking a
condition prohibiting cell phone use when no evidence in the record supported a finding that
defendant used the device in connection with the crime); State v. O' Cain, 144 Wash. App. 772,
775, 184 P.3d 1262 ( 2008) ( striking condition prohibiting Internet access because no evidence
that Internet use contributed to or facilitated the rape). We remand with instructions to strike
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No. 44451 -8 -II
condition 24 and the portion of condition 25 that states, " Also, do not possess or use any cell
phone that may provide access to the Internet as well." CP at 71 -72.
Finally, Winterberger argues that the trial court erred in imposing condition 18 to the
extent that it requires him to undergo penile plethysmograph testing upon direction of a CCO. He
contends that because such testing serves only a diagnostic or treatment purpose, and does not
serve a monitoring purpose, there is no rational basis for allowing a CCO to order him to
undergo that testing. In State v. Riles, 135 Wash. 2d 326, 337, 345, 957 P.2d 655 ( 1998), overruled
on other grounds by State v. Valencia, 169 Wash. 2d 782, 239 P.3d 1059 ( 2010), the court upheld a
placements
condition of community requiring plethysmograph testing " upon the request of your
therapist and /
or [ CCO]" as long as the trial court also required " crime- related treatment which
reasonably would rely upon plethysmograph testing as a physiological assessment measure."
Condition 11 of Winterberger' s community custody required him to enter and complete a state
approved sexual deviancy treatment program through a certified sexual deviancy counselor.
Plethysmograph testing is an essential element in the assessment and treatment of the sexual
aggressor. Riles, 135 Wash. 2d 344 n. 58, 345 -46. Therefore, requiring this testing along with
Winterberger' s sexual deviancy treatment is authorized under Riles.
To summarize, we remand to the trial court to strike ( 1) all of condition 24; ( 2) that
portion of condition 25 that states, " Do not patronize prostitutes or establishments that promote
the commercialization of sex. Also, do not possess or use any cell phone that may provide
s
Former RCW 9. 94A. 120( 9)( b) ( 1998), the statute under which this condition was imposed on
Riles, was recodified in 2001 as RCW 9. 94A.505, a provision dealing with community custody.
LAws of 2001, ch. 10, § 6.
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No. 44451 -8 -II
access to the Internet as well "; and ( 3) all of condition 26.
A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the
Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record in accordance with RCW
2. 06. 040, it is so ordered.
We concur:
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