Dahlyla Lang-knight, V. Christopher Knight

Filed
Washington State
Court of Appeals
Division Two
September 21, 2021
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION II
In the Matter of the Marriage of No. 53793-1-II
DAHLYLA LANG-KNIGHT,
Respondent, UNPUBLISHED OPINION
and
CHRISTOPHER KNIGHT,
Appellant.
MAXA, J. – Christopher Knight appeals the trial court’s entry of a dissolution decree,
findings of fact and conclusions of law, final parenting plan, and child support order. The
parenting plan designated Knight’s former wife, Dahlyla Lang-Knight, as the primary residential
parent and imposed restrictions on Knight’s decision making authority under RCW
26.09.191(3)(e).
We hold that (1) substantial evidence supports the trial court’s finding that Knight
engaged in abusive use of conflict, and (2) we will not consider Knight’s other assignments of
error because he failed to provide any argument regarding them. Accordingly, we affirm the trial
court’s dissolution orders.
No. 53793-1-II
FACTS
Background
Knight and Lang-Knight married in 2011. They had two children together, AK and EK,
who were seven and five years old when Lang-Knight filed a petition for dissolution. Lang-
Knight also had an older son, AL, from a previous marriage.
Lang-Knight was a stay-at-home mother from the time that AK was born until 2016,
when she returned to the workforce as a full-time caregiver. She later started a cleaning business
and took over some of her sister Tamara Bertrand’s clients. Knight worked as a fabricator until
he was fired in 2013. He subsequently worked on and off at three different fabrication
companies, driving for Lyft, and as a substitute para-educator.
In March 2018, Lang-Knight filed a petition for dissolution of the marriage and a
proposed temporary parenting plan. The proposed temporary parenting plan alleged that Knight
had emotionally abused AK and EK, had a history of domestic violence, and had assaulted
someone at home. The trial court subsequently entered a temporary parenting plan that
designated Lang-Knight as the primary custodian of the children and the sole decision-maker
relating to AK and EK’s schooling and health care.
In August, the trial court assigned a family court services evaluator, Terry Vetter, to
conduct an investigation with respect to Knight and Lang-Knight’s family and a parenting plan.
The court order included investigating Knight and Lang-Knight’s mental health issues,
determining who should be assigned the primary parent, determining a residential schedule, and
determining whether any RCW 26.09.191 restrictions should apply.
In July 2019, the trial court held a two-day bench trial on the petition for dissolution, final
parenting plan, and final child support order. Lang-Knight asked to be made the primary
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No. 53793-1-II
residential parent with Knight having visitation rights, while Knight requested joint custody.
Knight was self-represented at trial and Lang-Knight was represented by an attorney.
Bertrand Testimony
Bertrand testified about the state of Knight and Lang-Knight’s family dynamics. She
stated that she often acted as a mediator between Knight and Lang-Knight to get them to stop
fighting and to discuss important matters. She also testified that Knight was unwilling to get a
job, did not keep the house clean while he stayed at home, and that Knight would work on his
computer in a different room while AK and EK entertained themselves in the main part of the
house. Bertrand stated that Lang-Knight was an attentive mother and very involved with AK and
EK’s lives.
Vetter Testimony
Vetter testified about the evaluation he made regarding Knight and Lang-Knight. He
stated that he found no basis for allegations of domestic abuse or child abuse and that the
children were doing well in school. Vetter did not recommend any RCW 26.09.191 restrictions
based on either Knight or Lang-Knight’s mental health.
Vetter stated that both Knight and Lang-Knight indicated to him that there was some
conflict between them and that they did not have the ability to cooperatively parent. Because of
the conflict between the two parents, Vetter did not recommend that the trial court adopt the
proposed shared parenting schedule in Knight’s proposed parenting plan. Vetter explained that a
shared-type residential program or parenting plan was not in the children’s best interest when
there is conflict between the parents. He stated that a shared-type parenting plan in that scenario
typically resulted in children having more difficulties and aligned children with one parent over
another parent.
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No. 53793-1-II
Vetter ultimately recommended that Lang-Knight be designated as the primary residential
parent because she already had been performing that function, had her family nearby as a support
system, and unlike Knight, had not been diagnosed with depression and adult attention deficit
disorder.
Vetter noted that there was conflict between Knight and Lang-Knight regarding the
telephone communication provision in the temporary parenting plan. As a result, he
recommended that the final parenting plan include a specific time on specific days that Knight
could call AK and EK for 30 minutes. Vetter testified that it would be within the scope of his
recommendation if Knight provided cell phones to AK and EK so long as they used the cell
phones within the telephone communication schedule.
Vetter recommended that Knight and Lang-Knight use a shared notebook or
technological application to communicate information related to their children rather than emails
because emails were a source of conflict for the parents.
Lang-Knight Testimony
Lang-Knight requested that the court adopt an abusive use of conflict finding. She
testified that Knight sent hostile emails that caused her stress and were not beneficial to raising
their daughters. She explained that she attempted to communicate with Knight through Vetter’s
recommended notebook, but that Knight refused to return the notebook to her. She also stated
that Knight did not follow the recommendation to not contact her except for purposes of
facilitating telephone contact or to discuss the children’s issues. Lang-Knight stated that even
after court orders, Knight sent her emails with disparaging comments or other unrelated matters.
Lang-Knight testified that Knight did not follow the recommendation regarding the
telephone contact. Instead, he provided a cell phone to their children, remotely turned on the
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No. 53793-1-II
location tracker application to check their location, and texted and called their children on their
cell phones whenever he wanted. After Lang-Knight returned the cell phones to Knight, he
attempted to communicate with their children through Lang-Knight and AL, demanded that
Lang-Knight allow their children to play computer games with him whenever he wanted, and
demanded that he be allowed to speak with their children outside of the established times. When
Lang-Knight asked Knight to stop contacting AL to communicate with AK and EK, he
responded that he would contact AL whenever he wanted to.
Lang-Knight also stated that Knight would show up at school events when it was Lang-
Knight’s turn to have the children. She explained that Knight would take over at school events
to the point where Lang-Knight could not participate in things with their children. She stated
that one time, this caused extreme anxiety to AK, causing her to cry in a corner and asking Lang-
Knight if they could go home. Lang-Knight explained that she did not feel comfortable visiting
the children at lunch time on the off-chance that Knight also would be there.
Lang-Knight asked that Knight be limited to reasonable visitations during school
lunchtime because he would visit the girls for lunch or volunteer at school up to four times a
week. She stated that it was disruptive for the girls to have Knight there that often because they
were unable to socialize with their friends during lunch.
Lang-Knight stated that when she asked Knight where he was living after he was evicted,
he sent an angry email refusing to tell her his address in violation of the temporary parenting
plan. When Lang-Knight sought an emergency order to restrict Knight’s visits, she stated that
Knight continued to refuse to provide his address. She stated that she voluntarily agreed to
reinstate the parenting plan after Knight obtained suitable housing.
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No. 53793-1-II
Lang-Knight testified that Knight had used AK and EK for purposes of soliciting funds
on a website page to buy bunk beds. The website included pictures of AK and EK. This
apparently was in violation of a provision in a court order that stated that he was not allowed to
talk about Lang-Knight online or use AK or EK for purposes of financial gain.
Knight Testimony
Knight generally disagreed with Lang-Knight’s characterization of some of the events
above. He testified that Lang-Knight was difficult with respect to communicating information
about their children, such as refusing to answer him when he asked her how AK was doing with
attending the Boys and Girls Club. He also pointed to the fact that he was never notified about
his daughter being taken to urgent care at one point.
Knight conceded that he did not follow proper procedure to return the shared notebook to
Lang-Knight and explained that he refused to use the notebook because the notebook was kept in
their daughter’s backpack and she could read it on the way home on the bus.
Trial Court Ruling
Following trial, the trial court entered a final parenting plan designating Lang-Knight as
the primary residential parent. The plan provided that the children would live with Knight every
other weekend, every other Wednesday, and every other week in the summer.
The trial court ordered that Lang-Knight would have sole decision-making authority
regarding the children’s schooling and health care. The court limited Knight’s decision making
authority based on a finding that Knight engaged in abusive use of conflict “in a way that
endangers or damages the psychological development of [AK and EK].” Clerk’s Papers (CP) at
449. But the limitation applied only to decision making, not residential time. The court engaged
in a lengthy colloquy to explain the reasoning behind its ruling.
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No. 53793-1-II
Knight appeals the final dissolution decree, findings of fact and conclusions of law, final
parenting-plan order, and final child support order.
ANALYSIS
A. STANDARD OF REVIEW
A trial court has broad discretion in developing a parenting plan. In re Marriage of
Katare, 175 Wn.2d 23, 35, 283 P.3d 546 (2012). This discretion is guided by (1) RCW
26.09.184, which states the objectives of a parenting plan and identifies the required provisions;
(2) RCW 26.09.187(3)(a), which lists seven factors that the court must consider when adopting
residential provisions; (3) RCW 26.09.002, which declares that the best interests of the child is
the standard for determining parental responsibilities; (4) RCW 26.09.191(1)-(2), which provide
certain factors that require limitations of a parent’s decision-making and residential time, and (5)
RCW 26.09.191(3), which provides certain factors that permit limitations on any parenting plan
provisions. See Katare, 175 Wn.2d at 35-36.
We review a trial court’s parenting plan for abuse of discretion. In re Marriage of Black,
188 Wn.2d 114, 127, 392 P.3d 1041 (2017). A trial court abuses its discretion when a decision is
manifestly unreasonably or based on untenable grounds or reasons. Id. We review the trial
court’s findings of fact to determine whether substantial evidence supports them. Id. Evidence
is substantial if it is sufficient in quantity to persuade a fair-minded person of the truth of the
declared premise. Id. On appeal, we do not review the trial court’s credibility determinations or
reweigh the evidence. Id.Appellate courts are extremely reluctant to disturb child placement decisions “[b]ecause
the trial court hears evidence firsthand and has a unique opportunity to observe the witnesses.”
In re Parenting & Support of C.T., 193 Wn. App. 427, 442, 378 P.3d 183 (2016).
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No. 53793-1-II
B. ABUSIVE USE OF CONFLICT
Knight argues that the trial court erred when it designated Lang-Knight as the primary
residential parent and sole decision-making authority in part because Knight had engaged in an
abusive use of conflict. He claims that substantial evidence does not support the court’s abusive
use of conflict finding. We disagree.
1. Legal Principles
Under RCW 26.09.191(3)1, the trial court has discretion to preclude or limit any
provisions of the parenting plan if one of seven factors is present. The rationale for imposing
limitations on a parenting plan is that “[a] parent’s involvement or conduct may have an adverse
effect on the child’s best interests.” RCW 26.09.191(3). “The trial court has discretion to
determine whether the evidence presented meets the requirements of RCW 26.09.191.” In re
Parenting & Support of L.H., 198 Wn. App. 190, 194, 391 P.3d 490 (2016).
Relevant here, RCW 26.09.191(3)(e) states that a limitation on parenting plan provisions
may be imposed when there is an “abusive use of conflict by the parent which creates the danger
of serious damage to the child’s psychological development.” A party is not required to show
actual damage to the child’s psychological development. In re Marriage of Burrill, 113 Wn.
App. 863, 872, 56 P.3d 993 (2002). Courts have made an abusive use of conflict finding when
one parent has inserted a child into a parental conflict which could psychologically damage the
child. See id. at 867-68.
1
RCW 26.09.191 has been amended since the events of this case transpired. Because these
amendments do not impact the statutory language relied on by this court, we refer to the current
statute.
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No. 53793-1-II
2. Analysis
The trial court did not specify the factual basis for its abusive use of conflict finding, but
the court apparently found Lang-Knight’s overall testimony credible. Lang-Knight testified that
Knight consistently failed to abide by several provisions of the temporary parenting plan which
caused significant conflict between her and Knight and great distress for their children.
Specifically, the record shows that Knight attempted to insert himself into his children’s lives in
violation of the temporary parenting plan several times, which inevitably placed AK and EK in
the middle of Knight and Lang-Knight’s contentious dissolution proceedings. See Burrill, 113
Wn. App. at 867-68. Knight refused to use the recommended notebook to communicate with
Lang-Knight and used AL to pass along messages to AK and EK. Finally, Knight used images
of AK and EK for purposes of soliciting funds on a GoFundMe website without consulting
Lang-Knight.
Based on Lang-Knight’s testimony and corroborative testimony from Bertrand and
Vetter, the evidence supports a finding that Knight was a significant source of conflict and that
his failure to abide by the provisions in the temporary parenting plan posed as a danger of serious
psychological damage to the children. Knight disagreed with Lang-Knight’s characterization of
the conflict between them and specific events, but it is within the trial court’s discretion to weigh
the evidence and determine witness credibility. Black, 188 Wn.2d at 127. For the same reason,
Vetter’s opinion that there should not be any RCW 26.09.191 restrictions is not fatal to the trial
court’s abusive use of conflict finding. Accordingly, we conclude that substantial evidence
supports the trial court’s finding of an abusive use of conflict.
Knight claims that the trial court’s abusive use of conflict finding was inconsistent and
confusing and that it was unclear whether the trial court actually limited Knight’s residential time
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No. 53793-1-II
on the basis of that finding. But the trial court’s oral ruling clearly stated the abusive use of
conflict finding, and the court stated that the finding would not affect the parenting schedule and
was otherwise factored into the final parenting plan. This statement is consistent with the final
parenting plan, which stated that “[t]here are no limitations or conditions that apply [under RCW
26.09.191] except for that of decision making authority” and that Lang-Knight had sole decision-
making authority regarding school and health care in part because of the abusive use of conflict
finding. CP at 450 (emphasis added). The parenting time schedule is separate from who has
decision-making authority. Accordingly, we reject Knight’s argument that the trial court’s
rulings were inconsistent and confusing.
Relying on In re Marriage of Chandola, 180 Wn.2d 632, 636, 327 P.3d 644 (2014),
Knight also claims that the trial court was required to find evidence of a parent’s problematic
conduct and actual harm to the child caused by the conduct. But the court in Chandola imposed
restrictions under RCW 26.09.131(3)(g), not under RCW 26.09.131(3)(e). 180 Wn.2d at 636.
Restrictions based on an abusive use of conflict finding does not require actual psychological
damage. Burrill, 113 Wn. App. at 872. A party only needs to show that there is a danger of such
damage. Id. And as stated above, there is substantial evidence to support the trial court’s
abusive use of conflict finding.
We hold that the trial court did not err in finding that Knight had engaged in the abusive
use of conflict justifying a limitation under RCW 26.09.191(3)(e).
C. OTHER ASSIGNMENTS OF ERRORS
Knight lists several additional assignments of error regarding the trial court’s entry of the
dissolution decree, findings of fact and conclusions of law, final parenting plan, and child
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support order. But Knight only makes vague, passing references to these assignments of error in
his brief and presents no argument regarding them.
We generally do not consider an assignment of error if the appellant offers no argument
regarding that assignment of error. Cave Props. v. City of Bainbridge Island, 199 Wn. App. 651,
667, 401 P.3d 327 (2017); see also RAP 10.3(a)(6). In addition, we hold self-represented
litigants to the same standards as attorneys, who must comply with the rules of appellate
procedure. In re Marriage of Olson, 69 Wn. App. 621, 626, 850 P.2d 527 (1993). Accordingly,
we decline to address Knight’s additional assignments of error because he does not offer any
argument, authority, or citations to the record to support his claims.
D. ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL
Lang-Knight argues that she should be awarded reasonable attorney fees under RAP 18.1,
apparently on the grounds of Knight’s alleged intransigence. We decline to award fees on
appeal.
RAP 18.1(a) provides that a party may have a right to recover reasonable attorney fees on
appeal if applicable law grants the party the right to do so. Here, Lang-Knight argues that this
court may award attorney fees in a dissolution case based on a party’s intransigence and
obstruction, citing Katare, 175 Wn.2d at 42, and Chandola, 180 Wn.2d at 657. However, there
is no indication of Knight’s intransigence on appeal. Therefore, we decline to award attorney
fees to Lang-Knight on this basis.
CONCLUSION
We affirm the trial court’s dissolution orders.
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No. 53793-1-II
A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the
Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record in accordance with RCW
2.06.040, it is so ordered.
MAXA, J.
We concur:
WORSWICK, P.J.
CRUSER, J.
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