John Robinett Pension Plan & Trust, App. v. City Of Snohomish, Res.

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
JOHN ROBINETT PENSION PLAN
& TRUST, a Washington trust, No. 76214-1-1
:et.)
Appellant, DIVISION ONE
V. UNPUBLISHED OPINION
CITY OF SNOHOMISH, a Washington
municipality; and BICKFORD
INVESTMENTS, L.L.C., a Washington
limited liability company,
Respondents. FILED: January 16, 2018
TRICKEY, A.C.J. —The John Robinett Pension Plan & Trust(the Trust)filed
this quiet title action under Washington's 1890 "nonuse" statute, alleging that an
encroaching street right of way was never opened for public use within five years
of its 1890 dedication. Because there are no genuine issues of material fact and
the Trust's claim is barred by laches, we affirm the summary judgment dismissing
the claim.
FACTS
The relevant facts are essentially undisputed. Appellant John Robinett
Pension Plan & Trust and respondent Bickford Investments, LLC (Bickford) own
two parcels of real property in Snohomish, Washington. The parcels are separated
by a 70-foot public right of way (the Right of Way).
A public paved road (the Road) running generally east to west from State
Route 9 to Bickford Avenue lies within a portion of the Right of Way. The Right of
No. 76214-1-1 / 2
Way to the south of the Road extends over part of the Bickford property. The
Bickford property is currently unimproved, but contains foundations and concrete
floors from prior structures.
The Right of Way to the north of the Road extends over part of the existing
house and yard on the Trust property. The house was built in 1948.
The Right of Way was dedicated as High Street in the Plat of Panting's
Addition to Snohomish County, recorded on March 22, 1890. The Road is
currently designated as 66th Street or 20th Street in public records. The city of
Snohomish (City) annexed the area in 2001 and maintains the Road.
In 1903, the county surveyor reported on a petition to open Schubert Road
(the Schubert Road Report). The report identified only three properties that the
proposed road would pass through and the three affected property owners. All
three properties were located in Section 6, Township 28, Range 6. The Bickford
and Trust properties are in Section 1, Township 28, Range 5 of Panting's Addition,
an area to the west of the properties identified in the 1903 report.
In 1914, a petition sought to establish Wm. Robinson Road. As with the
Schubert Road petition, the identified petitioners all owned property in Section 6,
Township 28, Range 6.
In undisputed declarations, Thomas E. Barry, a licensed surveyor, reviewed
the Schubert Road Report from 1903 and the Wm. Robinson Road survey records
from 1914 to 1915(Road Survey #541) and concluded:
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No. 76214-1-1 /3
I have reviewed the documents concerning the 1903 petition for
establishment of Schubert Road . . . . The petitioned right-of-way
does not include any landowners in Panting's Addition. It infers that
High Street was a platted public road, with no ownership interest by
adjoining blocks or lots. If the petition intended to establish a new
public county road, then the owners of the adjacent lots and blocks
would have been required to sign the petition. The only landowners
who signed [the] petition were located in Section 6 which is east of
Panting's Addition. The road alignment, as petitioned, connected
Schubert Road to High Street. The petition appears to recognize that
High Street was an existing established public road. Thus, it did not
require signatures by owners abutting the already established High
Street.
. . . I have reviewed the survey notes for the County Road Survey
#541 for Wm. Robinson Road. This survey was conducted in 1914,
11 years after the 1903 petition. The survey notes include references
to an existing traveled road on pages 38-40 of field notes(pages 42-
44 of the Robinett Declaration). This "traveled way" is along High
Street. It is clear that an improved road existed prior to 1914. The
1903 petition did not include any signatures of the landowners in
Panting's Addition. It can be inferred that a "traveled way" existed at
the time the 1903 petition was granted.M
Barry also noted that the 1914 to 1915 survey identified existing block
corners along High Street within Panting's Addition, consistent with the 70-foot
wide dedication on the 1890 plat map.
The surveyor indicates the recovery of Block corners in Panting
Addition. If this road alignment had been unimproved forested
conditions, the surveyor would not have discovered such a bounty of
boundary evidence.
... By the surveyor field note evidence, it is clear that block corners
were established prior to the Road Survey #541. Contrary to the
declaration statements that established road ways did not exist from
1890-1903, there is evidence that some form of access was
1 Clerk's Papers(CP)at 38-39.
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No. 76214-1-1 /4
developed for the Panting Addition settlers. The right of way
boundaries were clearly marked on High Street prior to the 1914-
1915 Road Survey #541.[2]
Bob Heirman was born in 1932 and grew up in a house located on the road
now known as 66th Street. Heirman's parents had lived in the house before he
was born. In a declaration, Heirman recalled that 66th Street existed as a gravel
road before it was paved. Heirman's grandparents had purchased a nearby farm
off Bickford Avenue in 1906. Heirman also knew a neighbor who had built his
house on 66th Street in 1909.
Except for the 1890 plat map of Panting's Addition, the parties have not
identified any records from 1890 to 1903 referencing the Right of Way in the Plat.
The Trust purchased its property in 2006. The statutory warranty deed
includes a legal description that notes a previously vacated street and that places
the parcel north of the High Street Right of Way:
COMMENCING AT THE INTERSECTION OF THE CENTERLINE
OF VACATED SENECA STREET WITH THE NORTH LINE OF
HIGH STREET, PANTING'S ADDITION TO SNOHOMISH THE
TRUE POINT OF BEGINNING.E31
John Robinett, the Trust's trustee and manager, is an experienced real estate
agent and owns a real estate agency.
2 CP at 100.
3 CP at 43.
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No. 76214-1-1 / 5
In 2012, after a survey disclosed the encroachment, the Trust filed this quiet
title action against Bickford and the City of Snohomish (collectively Bickford). The
Trust alleged that under Washington's nonuse statute, Laws of 1889-90, chapter
19, section 32, the Right of Way had remained unopened and unused for at least
five years after its dedication in 1890, and had therefore reverted in equal shares
to the predecessors of the Trust and Bickford. The Trust further alleged that it had
adversely possessed the portion of the Right of Way that had reverted to Bickford's
predecessors.
The parties eventually filed cross motions for summary judgment. The trial
court granted summary judgment in favor of Bickford and the City, concluding that
the Trust had failed to establish an essential element of its claim under the nonuse
statute and that in any event, the doctrine of laches barred the Trust's claim.
ANALYSIS
Standard of Review
When reviewing a grant of summary judgment, an appellate court
undertakes the same inquiry as the trial court. Wilson v. Steinbach,98 Wn.2d 434,
437, 656 P.2d 1030 (1982). We consider the evidence and the reasonable
inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Schaaf v.
Highfield, 127 Wash. 2d 17, 21, 896 P.2d 665 (1995). Summary judgment is
appropriate "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,show that there is no genuine
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No. 76214-1-1/6
issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as
a matter of law." CR 56(c); White v. State, 131 Wash. 2d 1, 9, 929 P.2d 396(1997).
The moving party can satisfy its initial burden under CR 56 by
demonstrating the absence of evidence supporting the nonmoving party's case.
Young v. Key Pharms., Inc., 112 Wash. 2d 216, 225 n.1, 770 P.2d 182 (1989). The
burden then shifts to the nonmoving party to set forth specific facts demonstrating
a genuine issue for trial. Kendall v. Public Hosp. Dist. No. 6, 118 Wash. 2d 1, 8-9,
820 P.2d 497(1991).
To satisfy this burden, the nonmoving party
may not rely on the allegations in the pleadings but must set forth
specific facts by affidavit or otherwise that show a genuine issue
exists. Additionally, any such affidavit must be based on personal
knowledge admissible at trial and not merely on conclusory
allegations, speculative statements or argumentative assertions.
Las v. Yellow Front Stores, Inc., 66 Wash. App. 196, 198, 831 P.2d 744 (1992)
(footnotes and citations omitted).
Nonuse Statute
In 1890, the Legislature passed the "nonuse" statute, which provided:
Any county road, or part thereof, which has heretofore been or
may hereafter be authorized, which remains unopened for public use
for the space offive years after the order is made or authority granted
for opening the same, shall be and the same is hereby vacated, and
the authority for building the same barred by lapse of time.
Laws of 1889, ch. 19,§ 32, p. 603; see Wells v. Miller, 42 Wash. App. 94, 96-97, 708
P.2d 1223(1985).
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No. 76214-1-1 /7
By this enactment, the Legislature fixed a statutory time limit
within which the county was required to perform the condition of the
grant. If the purpose of the grant was not accomplished within 5
years, a reversion of the authority to construct a road would result.
When the street has not been opened within that 5-year period, the
right of abutting property owners to the vacated street vests by
operation of law.
Wells, 42 Wash. App. at 97 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
The statute was amended in 1909 and now excludes roads dedicated by
plat. See RCW 36.87.090. The 1909 amendment did not, however, affect the
rights of abutting property owners to streets that were dedicated and unopened for
five years before the amendment. Gillis v. King County, 42 Wash. 2d 373, 377, 255
P.2d 546 (1953). The burden of demonstrating a street has remained unopened
for the statutory period rests on the proponent of the claim. Brokaw v. Town of
Stanwood, 79 Wash. 322, 325-26, 140 P. 358 (1914).
To demonstrate that High Street was not opened or developed for five years
after its dedication in 1890, the Trust relies almost exclusively on the surveyor's
comment in the 1903 Schubert Road Report that there was "no other road in the
vicinity which is of equal utility for the citizens in the vicinity of said proposed road."
The Trust maintains that the County's approval of the 1903 petition "would make
no sense if the 1890 right of way had been opened and developed."5
4 CP at 315.
5 Br. of Appellant at 6.
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No. 76214-1-1 /8
But the Trust's argument rests on the unsupported assumption that the road
proposed in the 1903 petition also included the High Street Right of Way. The
Trust fails to address that portion of the surveyor's notes, that expressly set forth
the "names of persons interested in lands over which said proposed road will pass,
who consent to the establishment of the same."' The only persons identified are
three owners of property in Section 6, Township 28, Range 6, land located outside
of Panting's Addition, to the east and north of the High Street Right of Way. The
report also purports to list "all persons interested in lands over which said proposed
road will pass who refuse their consent," but does not identify any owners who
refused consent to the proposed road.
If High Street was unopened in 1903, then the property owners along the
Right of Way would have had to sign the petition as "persons interested in lands
over which said proposed road will pass?" Under the circumstances,the Schubert
Road Report fails to support an inference that High Street remained unopened as
of 1903.
The Trust's reliance on the absence of evidence in Snohomish County's
"file relating to the 1890 Plat dedication and subsequent road dedications" is
equally misplaced.' The Trust asserts that the County would have had to
6 CP at 315.
7 CP at 315(emphasis added).
CP at 315.
9 Br. of Appellant at 6.
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No. 76214-1-1 / 9
undertake some affirmative action to open the Right of Way and that the absence
of such evidence in the file supports an inference that the Right of Way remained
unopened after its dedication in 1903.
But the Trust cites no relevant authority to support this conclusory assertion.
Moreover, it has long been the rule that the complete absence of evidence does
not satisfy a proponent's burden under the nonuse statute:
In the case before us, we have no evidence whatever that Rainier
street was unopened for public use during any portion of the period
from the time of its dedication in 1891 to the taking possession of this
portion thereof by respondents in 1902. For aught that appears in
this record, and we are to remember that all of the evidence
presented to the trial court is before us, Rainier street, along in front
of respondents' lots, may have, during this entire period, been
actually physically open for public use, unobstructed, unenclosed,
and by nature well suited for ordinary travel by such means as are in
common use upon public highways. Shall we presume to the
contrary, in the total absence of proof upon that question? We are
of the opinion that we should not do so, and that the burden of
showing that such a street has remained unopened for public use for
the period named in the statute should be upon those who rest their
claims upon such a fact.
Brokaw v. Town of Stanwood, 79 Wash. 322, 325-26, 140 P. 358(1914). Nor has
the Trust identified any evidence suggesting the physical characteristics of the
Right of Way after 1890 prevented its use as a street. See, e.g., Cheney v. King
County, 72 Wash. 490, 130 P. 893 (1913)(evidence affirmatively demonstrated
that the right of way was not open as a street and not physically capable of use by
the usual means of travel). A party may not rely on mere speculation to defeat a
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No. 76214-1-1 /10
properly supported motion for summary judgment. Seven Gables Corp. v.
MGM/UA Entm't Co., 106 Wash. 2d 1, 13, 721 P.2d 1 (1986).
Because the Trust failed to identify any evidence raising an inference that
High Street was unopened for public use after 1890, the trial court properly
dismissed its claim under the nonuse statute on summary judgment.
Laches
The Trust also challenges the trial court's determination that laches barred
the Trust's claim. Laches, an equitable defense based on estoppel, applies when
a defendant affirmatively establishes "(1) knowledge by plaintiff offacts constituting
a cause of action or a reasonable opportunity to discover such fact; (2)
unreasonable delay by plaintiff in commencing an action; and (3) damage to
defendant resulting from the delay in bringing the action." Davidson v. State,116
Wn. 2d 13, 25, 802 P.2d 1374 (1991).
(1) Knowledge of or Reasonable Opportunity to Discover Cause of Action
As to the first prong, the Trust asserts that John Robinett had no knowledge
of or reasonable opportunity to discover the encroaching Right of Way. The Trust
also claims that the "reference in the title report raised no red flags."1°
But the Trust fails to address the metes and bounds legal description on the
statutory warranty deed that places the property north of the "north line of High
10 Br. of Appellant at 9.
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No. 76214-1-1 / 11
Street, Panting's Addition." Nor does the Trust dispute that the Plat of Panting's
Addition disclosing the 70-foot High Street Right of Way is a readily available public
document and that the Snohomish County Online Property Information Interactive
Map clearly shows the High Street Right of Way running through the house on the
Trust property.
It is well established that the Trust and its predecessors in interest "are
charged with knowledge of the facts constituting nonuse as "141 persons are
charged with knowledge of the provisions of statutes and must take notice
thereof." Real Progress, Inc. v. City of Seattle, 91 Wash. App. 833, 844, 963 P.2d
890 (1998)(quoting Davidson, 116 Wash. 2d at 26). The trial court properly found
that Bickford satisfied its burden on the first prong of the !aches test. See Real
Progress, 91 Wash. App. at 844.
(2) Unreasonable Delay
As to the second prong, the Trust asserts that Robinett "did not
unreasonably delay his suit to solve the problem."11 In its reply brief, the Trust
adds that the nature of the Right of Way and location of a long-established road
"explain and justify the delay in addressing" the issue.12 The Trust provides no
meaningful legal argument or citation to relevant authority to support these
conclusory assertions. See Saunders v. Lloyd's of London, 113 Wash. 2d 330, 345,
11 Br. of Appellant at 9.
12 Reply Br. of Appellant at 3.
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779 P.2d 249 (1989) (appellate court will generally decline to consider issues
unsupported by cogent legal argument and citation to relevant authority).
Here, more than 110 years passed before the Trust filed a lawsuit under the
nonuse statute. This was sufficient to satisfy Bickford's burden on the second
prong of the !aches test. See Real Progress v. Seattle, 91 Wash. App. at 844
("waiting over 100 years" to file an action under the nonuse statute was sufficient
to satisfy a party's burden to demonstrate an unreasonable delay for purposes of
!aches).
(3) Material Prejudice
Our Supreme Court has noted that the "doctrine of laches commonly
recognizes the unavoidable loss of defense evidence as establishing material
prejudice." Davidson, 116 Wash. 2d at 26-27 (62-year delay deprived the State of
substantial evidence). As exemplified by the declaration of 83-year-old Bob
Heirman, the long delay in bringing suit in this case resulted in the inevitable loss
of witnesses who could have provided first-hand evidence about the use and
physical characteristics of the High Street Right of Way from 1890 to 1895.
The Trust's reliance on Real Progress v. Seattle is misplaced. In Real
Progress, the court's determination that the city of Seattle had failed to
demonstrate prejudice rested on evidence of an aerial photograph showing no
development, a map noting the area of the dedicated street was "impassable," and
expert testimony that the street area was "impassable to vehicular traffic." Real
12
No. 76214-1-1 /13
Progress, 91 Wash. App. at 844-45. In light of such affirmative evidence
demonstrating an area with "impassable" physical characteristics, the court
concluded the city of Seattle would have been unable to establish that the street
had been opened within five years of platting. No comparable affirmative evidence
was available here. The trial court properly found that the delay materially
prejudiced Bickford's ability to obtain relevant evidence.
Because there was no material factual issue as to laches, the trial court
properly entered summary judgment in favor of Bickford.13
Affirmed.
e..------.
WE CONCUR:
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13 Because it was based on the nonuse statute, the trial court properly dismissed the
Trust's adverse possession claim.
13