State of Washington v. Amy Jo Dana Murphy

FILED
JANUARY 25, 2018
In the Office of the Clerk of Court
WA State Court of Appeals, Division III
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION THREE
STATE OF WASHINGTON, ) No. 34373-1-III
)
Respondent, )
)
v. )
)
AMY JO DANA MURPHY, ) UNPUBLISHED OPINION
)
Appellant, )
)
SHAWN ALAN STAHLMAN, )
)
Defendant. )
LAWRENCE-BERREY, J. — Amy Jo Murphy appeals her convictions for second
degree assault, attempted second degree burglary, and possession of a stolen motor
vehicle. She challenges the sufficiency of the evidence on each of her convictions. We
reject her challenges and affirm.
FACTS
Around 2:00 a.m. one morning Gary Oliver heard a vehicle stop and park near his
rural home. A motion light came on, and he saw a man about 30 to 35 feet away reaching
No. 34373-1-III
State v. Murphy
toward the door to his shop. Oliver yelled at the man to get out of there, and the man took
off running. Oliver then heard a car door slam and saw a white Ford minivan drive away.
Shirtless and without a cellphone, Oliver pursued the minivan in his half-ton Ford
pickup. Oliver caught up to the minivan and honked and flashed his lights in an attempt
to get the minivan to stop. The minivan did not stop. So Oliver, with both vehicles
traveling 80 to 90 miles per hour, pulled alongside the minivan. He noticed two
occupants—a woman driving and a very agitated man in the front passenger seat. The
woman then rammed the minivan into Oliver’s pickup. Oliver backed off, but continued
the pursuit.
The minivan came to a stop at a stop sign and Oliver stopped his pickup five feet
behind it. Oliver put his pickup in park and opened the door to approach the minivan. As
he did this, he saw the male passenger get out of the minivan armed with a one-handed
sledgehammer. Oliver then drove in reverse to get away from the man. The man swung
the sledgehammer and struck the left front fender behind the headlight of the truck. The
man got back into the minivan, and the woman driver then drove backward toward the
pickup. To avoid being hit, Oliver made a hard turn to the right, and drove over a curb
and into a fence.
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The minivan took off, and Oliver again pursued it. The chase continued at high
speeds for several miles. The chase ended only after the minivan hit a curb, causing the
tire to burst and the minivan to fly six feet into the air. Both occupants of the minivan
then fled on foot. Oliver parked his pickup near the minivan, took the keys out of the
wrecked vehicle, and went to a nearby gas station to call the police. Oliver later
identified a used tire and wheel inside the minivan that belonged to him.
Police contacted the owner of the minivan, Ann Wells. It was determined that the
male passenger was her step-grandson, Shawn Stahlman, and the driver was his fiancée,
Amy Jo Murphy. Wells told police that she did not give either person permission to drive
her minivan that night.
The State charged Murphy and Stahlman with various offenses, including second
degree assault (involving the sledgehammer), attempted second degree burglary, and
possession of a stolen motor vehicle. The cases proceeded to a simultaneous bench trial
for Stahlman and jury trial for Murphy.
At trial, Murphy testified that she received permission to use the minivan from
Wells’s significant other while Wells was on the phone. Wells refuted Murphy’s claim.
Wells testified, “I don’t remember being on the phone at all. I remember them asking and
I would not give permission.” Report of Proceedings (RP) at 261.
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State v. Murphy
A jury found Murphy guilty of the three offenses, and Murphy appealed.
ANALYSIS
Murphy argues the State presented insufficient evidence to sustain any of her three
convictions.
A. STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR SUFFICIENCY CHALLENGES
In a criminal case, the State must provide sufficient evidence to prove each
element of the charged offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S.
307, 316, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1979). When a defendant challenges the
sufficiency of the evidence, the proper inquiry is “whether, after viewing the evidence in
the light most favorable to the State, any rational trier of fact could have found guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Salinas, 119 Wn.2d 192, 201, 829 P.2d 1068(1992). “[A]ll reasonable inferences from the evidence must be drawn in favor of the
State and interpreted most strongly against the defendant.” Id. Furthermore, “[a] claim of
insufficiency admits the truth of the State’s evidence and all inferences that reasonably
can be drawn therefrom.” Id. In a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence,
circumstantial evidence and direct evidence carry equal weight. State v. Goodman, 150
Wn.2d 774, 781, 83 P.3d 410 (2004).
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State v. Murphy
B. ACCOMPLICE TO SECOND DEGREE ASSAULT
Murphy contends there is insufficient evidence to support her conviction for
accomplice to second degree assault for Stahlman’s use of the sledgehammer. We
disagree.
Murphy’s argument relies on us considering the facts in the light most favorable to
her. She argues Stahlman’s use of the sledgehammer was lawful because “[she] and
Stahlman had been chased down for miles by a stranger, who looked like a ‘nut case’ and
was playing cat and mouse with [us] at speeds of 80-90 miles per hour.” Br. of Appellant
at 14. But our review of the sufficiency of the evidence requires us to consider the
evidence and all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the State. The
State’s evidence suggests that Murphy and Stahlman raced along rural roads and
residential neighborhoods at high speeds to escape Oliver, from whom they stole a used
tire and wheel. And in an attempt to complete their escape, Stahlman approached Oliver
with a sledgehammer, arguably a deadly weapon, and swung it intending to cause Oliver
to fear bodily harm.
Murphy also argues “[t]here was no evidence that a terrified and hysterical Ms.
Murphy was aware Stahlman had the sledgehammer, or encouraged him to use it, or
asked him to use it, or agreed that he should use it, to scare Oliver away from them.” Br.
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No. 34373-1-III
State v. Murphy
of Appellant at 13. The State’s evidence suggests that Murphy, for the first time in 13
miles, stopped. And she stopped for the purpose of allowing Stahlman to frighten Oliver
with a sledgehammer so that Oliver would end his pursuit of them. The State’s evidence
of Murphy’s complicity is strengthened by the fact that immediately after Stahlman
returned to the minivan, Murphy drove the minivan as a weapon aimed at Oliver.
We conclude that substantial evidence supports Murphy’s conviction for
accomplice to second degree assault.
C. ACCOMPLICE TO ATTEMPTED SECOND DEGREE BURGLARY
Murphy contends there is insufficient evidence to support her conviction for
accomplice to attempted second degree burglary. We again disagree.
A person commits second degree burglary “if, with intent to commit a crime
against a person or property therein, he or she enters or remains unlawfully in a building
other than a vehicle or a dwelling.” RCW 9A.52.030(1). A person “attempts” an offense
when, with the intent to commit a specific crime, he or she takes a substantial step toward
committing the crime. RCW 9A.28.020(1). A person who knowingly aids the
commission of the crime is as culpable as the person who performs the criminal acts.
RCW 9A.08.020.
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The State’s evidence suggests that Murphy drove herself and Stahlman onto a
stranger’s property around 2:00 a.m. early one morning. Stahlman took and placed
Oliver’s used tire and wheel in the minivan. Murphy, the minivan driver, surely saw
Stahlman do this. Stahlman then went toward Oliver’s shop and reached toward the shop
door as if to open it. The jury was entitled to make the reasonable inference that
Stahlman intended to enter the shop and take additional items. Stahlman would have
succeeded in taking additional items had Oliver not seen him and shouted out.
We conclude that substantial evidence supports Murphy’s conviction for
accomplice to attempted second degree burglary.
D. POSSESSION OF STOLEN MOTOR VEHICLE
Murphy contends that there is insufficient evidence to support her conviction for
possession of a stolen motor vehicle. We again disagree.
A person is guilty of possession of a stolen motor vehicle if he or she possesses a
stolen motor vehicle. RCW 9A.56.068. The State must prove that the defendant acted
with knowledge that the motor vehicle had been stolen. State v. Porter, 186 Wn.2d 85,
90, 375 P.3d 664 (2016).
Wells was the owner of the minivan. She testified that her step-grandson had
asked to borrow the minivan earlier in the day, and she had told him no. Wells also
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No. 343 73-1-111
State v. Murphy
refuted Murphy's testimony that she obtained permission to use the minivan when Wells
was on the phone. Wells testified, "I don't remember being on the phone at all. I
remember them asking and I would not give permission." RP at 261. The jury heard the
testimonies and believed Wells. The State's evidence suggests that Murphy drove
Wells's minivan after Wells told her and Stahlman that they could not use it.
We conclude that substantial evidence supports Murphy's conviction for
possession of a stolen motor vehicle.
Affirmed. 1
A majority of the panel has determined this opinion will not be printed in the
Washington Appellate Reports, but it will be filed for public record pursuant to
RCW 2.06.040.
WE CONCUR:
Lawrence-Berrey, J.
.' j
Fearing, C.J. rt
1
Murphy asks that we waive appellate costs in the event the State substantially
prevails. We deem the State has substantially prevailed. In the event the State seeks
appellate costs, we direct our commissioner to consider the request in accordance with
RAP 14.2.
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