State Of Washington v. Marlon Iupati Lemafa

1 ,
COURT Or APPEALS DIV I
STATE OF WASHINGTON
7018 SEP 24 111110: 40
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
STATE OF WASHINGTON, )
) No. 76356-3-1
Respondent, )
) DIVISION ONE
v. )
)
MARLON 1UPATI LEMAFA, ) UNPUBLISHED OPINION
)
Appellant. ) FILED: September 24, 2018
)
BECKER, J. — Appellant Marlon Lemafa was convicted of two counts of
first degree assault. He challenges the sufficiency of the evidence underlying his
conviction. We affirm.
The assaults occurred on December 13, 2015, outside a sports bar in
Kent, Washington. Lemafa was involved in a chaotic brawl in the bar's parking
lot. The scene was captured by several surveillance cameras.
Johnny Nay and Kim Ung spent the night socializing and playing pool at
the bar. The fighting broke out around the time Nay and Ung were leaving. At
trial, the prosecutor played exhibit 16, a composite of the surveillance video
recordings. A police witness identified Lemafa, Nay, Ung, and other individuals
on the video recordings and pointed out their movements. Nay saw people
attacking a man lying on the ground. Nay, who thought he recognized the man,
No. 76356-3-1/2
intervened and separated him from his assailants, allowing him to escape. Nay
realized he did not know the man and began to walk back to his car.
At this point, Nay exchanged words with Lemafa's cousin, Feronita Moe.
Moe pushed Nay. Exhibit 16 at 1:40-1:50. Ung attempted to lead Nay away
from the confrontation. Lemafa walked up behind Nay and punched him twice in
the head, causing Nay to fall to the ground. Exhibit 16 at 2:40-2:45. Lemafa
then punched Ung, who also fell to the ground, hitting his head against the curb
as he fell. Lemafa kicked and punched Nay and Ung as they lay on the ground.
Exhibit 16 at 3:40-4:05. Moe and her boyfriend Tony Talaga joined in,
unleashing their own punches and kicks upon the prone Nay and Ung. Exhibit
16 at 3:40-4:05.
When the police arrived, they found Nay and Ung unconscious and
bleeding in the parking lot. The assault ruptured Nay's left eye. He is now blind
in the eye and will likely need to have it surgically removed. Nay's injuries left
him unable to return to his job, unable to drive at night, and suffering from
migraine headaches. He was still undergoing physical and speech therapy at the
time of the trial. Ung suffered a concussion and a broken nose that required a
metal plate to be inserted into his sinus area. The assault ruptured Ung's
tympanic membrane, leaving him with partial hearing loss in his right ear.
The jury convicted Lemafa. His offenses were "serious violent offenses"
as defined by RCW 9.94A.030(46)(v) requiring the court to impose consecutive
sentences. RCW 9.94A.589(1)(b). The court imposed consecutive standard
range sentences, totaling 222 months' imprisonment.
2
No. 76356-3-1/3
ANALYSIS
Sufficiency of the Evidence
"A person is guilty of assault in the first degree if he or she, with intent to
inflict great bodily harm.... assaults another and inflicts great bodily harm."
RCW 9A.36.011(1)(c). Great bodily harm is defined as "bodily injury which
creates a probability of death, or which causes significant serious permanent
disfigurement, or which causes a significant permanent loss or impairment of the
function of any bodily part or organ." RCW 9A.04.110(1)(c).
Lemafa does not dispute that Nay's ruptured eye is great bodily harm. He
argues that there is insufficient evidence to establish that he inflicted it. To
determine if sufficient evidence supports a conviction, we consider whether, after
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational
trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a
reasonable doubt. State v. Rich, 184 Wash. 2d 897, 903, 365 P.3d 746 (2016).
Lemafa, Moe, and Talaga all participated in the attack on Nay. The State
could not pinpoint exactly when Nay's eye was ruptured. One of the State's
medical witnesses, Dr. Eissa Hanna, testified that Nay's injury is one that
typically results from multiple blows. Absent evidence that directly establishes
that it was a blow from Lemafa that ruptured Nay's eye, Lemafa claims the State
lacked proof that he was the proximate cause of Nay's injury. Lemafa argues
that he could be convicted only as an accomplice. Before a defendant can be
convicted as an accomplice, the court must instruct the jury on accomplice
liability. State v. Davenport, 100 Wash. 2d 757, 764,675 P.2d 1213(1984).
3
No. 76356-3-1/4
Because the court did not instruct the jury on accomplice liability, Lemafa argues
that his conviction must be reversed for insufficient evidence of proximate cause.
To find that Lemafa was the proximate cause of Nay's injuries, the jury did
not have to find that Lemafa was the sole cause. State v. Christman, 160 Wn.
App. 741, 754, 249 P.3d 680, review denied, 172 Wn.2d 1002(2011). "Although
a defendant's conduct is not a proximate cause if some other cause is a sole or
superseding cause, it can be a proximate cause if another cause is merely a
concurrent cause. The same harm can have more than one proximate cause."
Christman, 160 Wash. App. at 756; cf. State v. Bauer, 180 Wash. 2d 929, 940, 329
P.3d 67(2014)(holding that legal causation may not be found in a criminal case
if "the accused did not actively participate in the immediate physical impetus of
harm"). The jury watched video of Lemafa delivering two violent punches to the
left side of Nay's face when Nay was facing the other direction. Nay fell to the
ground, and Lemafa proceeded to kick and punch him as he lay defenseless.
Lemafa's conduct was "not only intentional, but felonious, and capable of causing
harm in and of itself." Bauer, 180 Wash. 2d at 939. Considering the force of
Lemafa's blows and the fact that the blows were to the area near Nay's left eye,
a reasonable fact finder could conclude that Lemafa had criminal liability as a
principal for causing Nav's ruptured eye. The lack of an instruction on
accomplice liability is irrelevant.
As to the charge of first degree assault against Ung, Lemafa argues that
Ung's hearing loss did not amount to significant permanent loss or impairment as
required to prove great bodily harm. Lemafa claims a reasonable fact finder
4
No. 76356-3-1/5
would conclude that Ung's partial hearing loss was only temporary based on
Ung's testimony that he was unsure whether the damage was permanent and
that his hearing had improved somewhat by the time of the trial.
Lemafa overlooks Ung's testimony that his fractured tympanic membrane
left him with a constant beeping noise in his ear. The noise was still present at
the time of trial, nine months after the assault. Ung said he had been told there
were no further medical treatments available to help with the problem. Based on
this testimony, a reasonable fact finder could conclude that Ung's hearing
impairment was significant and permanent. We conclude sufficient evidence
supported the assault charges.
Prosecutorial Misconduct
Lemafa contends that a new trial is required due to the misrepresentation
of evidence in the State's closing argument. The burden of establishing the
impropriety of the prosecuting attorney's comments and their prejudicial effect
rests with the defendant. State v. McKenzie, 157 Wash. 2d 44, 52, 134 P.3d 221
(2006). The comments at issue concern whether the impairment of Ung's
hearing loss was permanent. The prosecutor stated the beeping noise in Ung's
ear was "not going away":
But you heard him testify about the damage to his hearing in his
right ear, how it was muffled for a long time. It was kind of muffled
is how he described it, almost holding his hand up to his ear. And
that now, to this day, he hears beeping when he lays down when
it's quiet. And that is not going away. That will be there. And the
evidence has shown he had no problems with his hearing before
that night.
Lemafa did not object to this argument.
5
No. 76356-3-1/6
On appeal, Lemafa contends the evidence does not support a finding that
the hearing impairment was permanent. He argues that the prosecutor
committed misconduct by misrepresenting the evidence.
"Where the defense fails to object to an improper comment, the error is
considered waived 'unless the comment is so flagrant and ill-intentioned that it
causes an enduring and resulting prejudice that could not have been neutralized
by a curative instruction to the jury." McKenzie, 157 Wash. 2d at 52, quoting State
v. Brown, 132 Wash. 2d 529, 561, 940 P.2d 546(1997). Because Lemafa did not
object, he has waived the claim of prosecutorial misconduct.
Lemafa attempts to overcome his lack of objection to the prosecutor's
remarks by recharacterizing the issue as whether defense counsel provided
ineffective assistance by failing to object. He has not shown that prosecutorial
misconduct implicates the ineffectiveness of counsel doctrine. See State v.
Fisher, 165 Wash. 2d 727, 757 n.8, 202 P.3d 937(2009). Review under the
standards for prosecutorial misconduct is sufficient to determine whether the
prosecutor's remarks warrant reversal.
In any event, the prosecutor's statements did have a basis in Ung's
testimony. Ung testified that he suffered from a constant beeping noise, his
hearing had not returned to normal after nine months, and doctors informed him
there was no further medical treatment available to remedy his hearing problems.
6
No. 76356-3-1/7
Affirmed.
i3ecle.e.te,i .
WE CONCUR:
-..41.4ehAA.A.-1
/
7