Personal Restraint Petition Of Brandon White

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
In the Matter of the Personal No. 76988-0-1
Restraint of
DIVISION ONE
BRANDON KENNETH WHITE,
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Petitioner. FILED: December 2, 2019
CHUN, J. — In this personal restraint petition (PRP), Brandon White argues
he is entitled to resentencing because a significant change in the law of
sentencing young adults and juveniles renders unconstitutional the statute under
which he was sentenced, RCW 10.95.030. White also argues the State did not
present sufficient evidence to support his conviction. Because White's claim of
unconstitutionality is untimely, we deny the petition in its entirety.
I. BACKGROUND
A jury convicted White of aggravated first degree murder, and made
special findings that he committed the crime with a gun and knife. White was
19 years old at the time of the crime. The trial court sentenced him to life without
the possibility of parole(LWOP). White's judgment and sentence became final
on February 3, 2004, when our Supreme Court denied White's petition for review.
See State v. White, No. 49825-8-1 (Wash. Ct. App. June 16, 2003)(unpublished),
No. 76988-0-1/2
review denied, 150 Wash. 2d 1034 (2004). White initially filed this petition on June
6, 2017, over 13 years after the judgment reached finality.
II. ANALYSIS
A petitioner typically must file a PRP within one year of the final judgment
of their conviction. RCW 10.73.090. But RCW 10.73.100 provides exceptions to
the one-year limit. The grounds for relief excepted from the one year time bar
that are applicable to White's petition are subsections (4) and (6):
(4) The defendant pled not guilty and the evidence introduced at
trial was insufficient to support the conviction; . . .
(6) There has been a significant change in the law, whether
substantive or procedural, which is material to the conviction,
sentence, or other order entered in a criminal or civil proceeding
instituted by the state or local government, and either the legislature
has expressly provided that the change in the law is to be applied
retroactively, or a court, in interpreting a change in the law that lacks
express legislative intent regarding retroactive application,
determines that sufficient reasons exist to require retroactive
application of the changed legal standard.
RCW 10.73.100.
White argues that a significant change in the law of sentencing juveniles
and young adults has occurred. Based on this claim, he argues that RCW
10.95.030, the statute under which the trial court sentenced him, is
unconstitutional as applied to adult offenders with youthful characteristics. The
State asserts that his grounds for relief under RCW 10.73.100(6) are time barred,
because no significant change in law has occurred. Thus, the State argues, his
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petition must be denied in its entirety because it is mixed. We agree with the
State.
A. RCW 10.73.100(6)
White argues he is entitled to resentencing because a significant change
in the law renders unconstitutional the statute under which he was sentenced,
RCW 10.95.030. He elaborates that the statute is unconstitutional as applied to
him because the court was unable to consider his youth as a mitigating factor
and impose a sentence less than life without parole. But no significant change in
law has occurred, so his claim of unconstitutionality is time barred.
"A petitioner can overcome the one-year time bar under RCW
10.73.100(6) if [they] can identify (1) a significant change in the law (2) that is
material and (3) that applies retroactively." In re Pers. Restraint of Light-Roth,
191 Wash. 2d 328, 333, 422 P.3d 444(2018)(internal quotation marks and citation
omitted). "A significant change in the law occurs when an intervening opinion
has effectively overturned a prior appellate decision that was originally
determinative of a material issue." In re Pers. Restraint of Colbert, 186 Wash. 2d
614, 619, 380 P.3d 504(2016)(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
"One test to determine whether an intervening case represents a significant
change in the law is whether the defendant could have argued this issue before
publication of the decision." State v. Miller, 185 Wash. 2d 111, 115, 371 P.3d 528
(2016)(internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
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In support of his argument that a significant change in law has occurred,
White points to a constellation of recent federal and state cases that address
sentencing of juveniles and youthful offenders: Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S.
551, 578, 125 S. Ct. 1183, 161 L. Ed. 2d 1(2005)(holding the United States
Constitution's Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit imposition of the
death penalty on juvenile offenders); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 82, 130 S.
Ct. 2011, 176 L. Ed. 2d 825(2010)(holding the United States Constitution's
Eighth Amendment prohibits LWOP sentences for juveniles who did not commit
homicide); Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 502, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 183 L. Ed. 2d
407(2012)(holding the United States Constitution's Eighth Amendment bars
mandatory LWOP sentences for juveniles); State v. O'Dell, 183 Wash. 2d 680,
698-99, 358 P.3d 359(2015)(holding non-juvenile defendants' youthfulness can
support exceptional sentences below the standard range applicable to adult
felony defendants); State v. Houston-Sconiers, 188 Wash. 2d 1, 34, 391 P.3d 409
(2017)(holding that sentencing courts must consider the mitigating qualities of
youth when sentencing juveniles, and must have discretion to depart from
mandatory sentence enhancements when sentencing juveniles in adult court);
and State v. Bassett, 192 Wash. 2d 67, 91, 428 P.3d 343(2018)(holding LWOP for
juvenile defendants violates Washington's Constitution).
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Referring to these cases, White asks the court to infer that a significant
change in law has occurred that allows sentencing courts to depart from
mandatory sentence enhancements for "youthful" adult offenders.
The holdings of Roper, Graham, Miller, Houston-Sconiers, and Bassett
apply explicitly only to juveniles.1 O'Dell is the only case White cites relating to
sentencing of "youthful" adult offenders. But in Light-Roth, our Supreme Court
held O'Dell did not constitute a significant change in law, since sentencing courts
have always had the discretion to consider a defendant's youthfulness at
sentencing. 191 Wash. 2d at 336-38.
White asks the court to examine these cases cumulatively, not
individually. White offers no legal authority in support of his proposition that the
court may examine an array of cases, and from such, infer a significant change in
law has occurred. Indeed, the test for determining whether there has been a
significant change in law asks the court to examine if the defendant could have
made their argument before the publication of a given decision—not before a
trend of decisions. See Miller, 185 Wash. 2d at 115. And when courts analyze
whether a significant change in law has occurred, the focus of their analysis is
whether a single case has changed Washington law in some way. See, e.q.,
Miller, 185 Wash. 2d at 115-16 (analyzing whether In re Pers. Restraint of
1 In a statement of additional authority, White also asks the court to address
State v. Gilbert, 193 Wash. 2d 169, 438 P.3d 133(2019). But similarly, Gilbert's holding
addresses only resentencing procedures for juveniles.
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Mulholland, 161 Wash. 2d 322, 166 P.3d 677(2007), significantly changed the law
of concurrent sentencing); Colbert, 186 Wash. 2d at 619 (analyzing whether State v.
W.R., 181 Wash. 2d 757, 336 P.3d 1134 (2014), significantly changed the law
regarding the burden of proof of consent in second degree rape cases); In re
Pers. Restraint of Yung-Chenq Tsai, 183 Wash. 2d 91, 105-07, 351 P.3d 138
(2015)(analyzing whether Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 130 S. Ct. 1473,
176 L. Ed. 2d 284(2010), significantly changed the law regarding ineffective
assistance of counsel). White bases his argument on an erroneous
understanding of the manner in which a "significant change in law" occurs.
Because White cannot satisfy the significant change in law element of
RCW 10.73.100(6), we need not address whether the materiality and retroactivity
elements are satisfied.
Because White cannot satisfy RCW 10.73.100(6), his claim of
unconstitutionality is time barred, and we will not consider it.
B. Mixed Petition
Because his claim of unconstitutionality is time barred, we must deny
White's entire petition:
[I]f a personal restraint petition claiming multiple grounds for relief is
filed after the one-year period of RCW 10.73.090 expires, and the
court determines that at least one of the claims is time barred, the
petition must be [denied]. Under such circumstances the court will
not analyze every claim that is raised in order to determine or advise
which claims are time barred and which are not, nor will it decide
claims under RCW 10.73.100 that are not time barred.
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No. 76988-0-1/7
In re Pers. Restraint of Hankerson, 149 Wash. 2d 695, 702-03, 72 P.3d 703
(2003). White's petition is mixed. Thus, we deny White's petition without
consideration of his "sufficiency of the evidence" claim.2
Denied.
WE CONCUR:
nirtAel el, tiC.:
,r
2 As the State conceded at oral argument, White may file a PRP in the future
bringing other claims he believes fall within the exceptions of RCW 10.73.100. While
RAP 16.4(d) bars a second petition claiming similar relief without a showing of good
cause, a successive petition will be dismissed on these grounds only where the prior
application was denied after being heard and determined on the merits. In re Pers.
Restraint of Stoudmire, 141 Wash. 2d 342, 350, 5 P.3d 1240(2000)(rev'd on other grounds
by In re Pers. Restraint of Turav, 153 Wash. 2d 44, 101 P.3d 854 (2004)). Where claims
are dismissed because they are contained in a mixed petition, the dismissal is on
procedural grounds and the court has not considered the claims on the merits.
Stoudmire, 141 Wash. 2d at 350-51.
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