State Of Washington, Resp. v. Tanis A. Coleman, App.

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
STATE OF WASHINGTON, NO. 73500-4-1 o
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TANIS COLEMAN, UNPUBLISHED OPINION ZK
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~981 P.2d 25(1999). A party's lack of preparation or oversight does not establish good cause. ]d. For
instance, there is no good cause when the State does not diligently compile
documentation or seek a hearing within the 180-day period. State v. Tetreault, 99 Wn.
App 435, 437-38, 998 P.2d 330 (2000). On the other hand, courts have held in
analogous settings that a prosecutor's scheduling conflicts, including a scheduled
vacation or a court's need to attend a judicial conference may constitute good cause to
extend proceedings beyond time limits. C_L State v. Flinn, 154 Wn.2d 193, 200, 110
P.3d 748 (2005) (scheduling conflicts may justify a continuance beyond speedy trial
expiration date); State v. Flinn, 119 Wn.App. 232, 246-47, 80 P.3d 171 (2003) (annual
judicial conferences may justify trial extension under speedy trial rules); State v.
Williams, 104 Wn. App. 516, 522, 17 P.3d 648 (2001) (prosecutor's scheduling conflicts
may constitute unforeseen or unavoidable circumstances warranting trial extension
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No. 71155-5-1/5
under speedy trial rules). We review a court's decision to extend sentencing beyond a
statutory time limit for abuse of discretion. State v. Roberts, 77 Wn. App. 678, 685, 894
P.2d 1340 (1995)("trial court has broad discretion to determine whether there is good
cause to postpone sentencing" beyond 40-day time limit).
Here, Coleman contends the "good cause" found by the court at the initial restitution
hearing on April 10, 2015 was insufficient. He maintains, and we concur, that mere
commencement of the restitution hearing did not toll or extend the 180-day period.1
He also contends that the court's continuance of the April 10 hearing to a date within the
180-day period did not alter the expiration date for the 180-day period or justify the court's
April 17 continuance for entry of findings beyond the 180-day period. The State responds
that the court's April 10 continuance and finding of good cause, which were based in part
on witness unavailability and the defense's "late argument," "tolled" the 180-day period for
the length of the continuance. VRP (04/10/15) at 11
Neither party provides authority or statutory analysis addressing whether the
180-day period can be "tolled" by a continuance ordered and completed within the 180-
day period. And even assuming the continuance from April 10 to April 17 somehow
tolled the 180-day period for one week, the 180-day expiration date would have reset to
April 29—still several days shy of the court's May 1 order determining restitution. In any
event, we need not resolve these issues because we conclude the court had good
cause at the April 17 hearing to continue the proceeding beyond the 180-day limit.
1We note that contrary to the trial court's impression, nothing in RCW 9.94A.753(1) indicates that
starting a restitution hearing within the 180-day period tolls or satisfies the 180-day requirement. The
statute plainly requires courts to "determine" the amount of restitution within 180 days, not merely
commence a hearing within that time.
No. 71155-5-1/6
As the State points out, it is clear from the transcript of the April 17 hearing that
the court extended the proceedings beyond the 180-day time limit due to the
unavailability of counsel and the court. The prosecutor was leaving town the following
day and returning after expiration of the 180-day period. Defense counsel was leaving
for four days on the day the prosecutor returned, and the court had a conflict with a
judicial conference. In order to accommodate these obligations, the court ruled that
counsel could file proposed findings when they returned after expiration of the 180-day
period. Nothing in the record indicates that this continuance was due to a party's lack of
preparation, diligence, or other self-created hardship. Given the obligations of the
parties and the court, and considering that the hearing was essentially finished except
for the parties proposed findings and the court's written ruling, there was good cause to
continue the matter beyond the 180-day time limit. The court did not abuse its discretion
or exceed its authority.
Citing Tetreault, Coleman contends the court "failed to exercise its discretion in
extending the 180-day deadline because itfailed to consider any of the factors
discussed in Tetreault. . ." Appellant's Reply Br. at 2. But nothing in Tetreault or any
authority cited by Coleman requires a court to consider, on the record, the continuance
factors mentioned in Tetreault before delaying a determination of restitution beyond the
180-day limit.
Coleman also states in conclusory fashion that "the court did not mention the
words 'good cause'" when, after learning of counsel's unavailability, it told them they
could file their findings when they returned. App. Reply Br. at 2. But he provides no
authority or analysis requiring a court to make an express finding of good cause. We do
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No. 71155-5-1/7
not consider conclusory arguments unsupported by relevant authority. Cowiche Canyon
Conservancy v. Boslev, 118 Wn.2d 801, 809, 828 P.2d 549 (1992) (arguments not
supported by authority or analysis need not be considered); State v. Elliott, 114 Wn.2d
6, 15, 785 P.2d 440 (1990) (appellate court need not consider claims that are
insufficiently argued); State v. Rafav. 168 Wn.App. 734, 843, 285 P.3d 83 (2012)
(rejecting claim due to absence of meaningful argument or authority to support
conclusory claim).
Given our conclusion that the court had good cause to exceed the 180-day time
limit, we need not decide whether the challenged restitution order also fell within the
modification exception to that limit.
Affirmed.
WE CONCUR
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