Personal Restraint Petition Of Haikel Gsouri

Filed
Washington State
Court of Appeals
Division Two
April 30, 2019
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION II
In the Matter of the No. 52181-4-II
Personal Restraint of
HAIKEL GSOURI,
Petitioner.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
MELNICK, J. -- Haikel Gsouri seeks relief from personal restraint imposed as a result of
civil contempt orders entered in his marriage dissolution proceeding. Nahed Jallali, Gsouri’s
former wife, brought a motion for contempt when Gsouri failed to pay child support and
maintenance ordered in the dissolution decree. At a contempt hearing in March 2017, Gsouri
refused to pay and refused to provide financial information. The trial court held him in contempt
and ordered him confined in the county jail until compliance with the above as purging conditions.
The trial court has conducted numerous hearings in which it has continued to find Gsouri in
contempt and has continued to have him confined in the county jail with purging conditions. It
also found him not to be indigent and refused to appoint counsel for him.
Gsouri argues that he should be released from confinement because he does not have the
ability to meet the purging conditions, rendering his confinement punitive, not remedial. In re
Pers. Restraint of King, 110 Wn.2d 793, 800, 756 P.2d 1303 (1988). We review findings of
contempt and contempt sanctions for an abuse of discretion. In re Marriage of Eklund, 143 Wn.
App. 207, 212, 177 P.3d 189 (2008). The burden of proving an inability to comply with the
purging conditions of a contempt order is on the contemnor. State v. Bower, 64 Wn. App. 227,
234, 823 P.2d 1171 (1992). The contemnor must provide corroboration of his inability to comply
No. 52181-4-II
or have a reasonable explanation for why he cannot comply. State v. Rutherford, 63 Wn.2d 949,
954-56, 389 P.2d 895 (1964). Gsouri has done neither. His financial machinations, as found in
the dissolution decree, show his continuing efforts to conceal his assets and he refuses to provide
information necessary to corroborate his claim of inability to comply. He fails to demonstrate that
the trial court abused its discretion in finding him in contempt and in ordering him confined until
he satisfies his purging conditions.
Gsouri also argues that the trial court erred in finding him not indigent and therefore not
appointing counsel for him. A party claiming indigency has the burden of proof. State v. Clark,
88 Wn.2d 533, 534, 563 P.2d 1253 (1977). The record, particularly the findings in the dissolution
decree, supports the trial court’s findings that Gsouri is not indigent. Accordingly, the trial court
did not abuse its discretion in refusing to appoint counsel or appoint financial experts. State v.
Cuthbert, 154 Wn. App. 318, 326, 225 P.3d 407 (2010).
Finally,1 Gsouri argues that being required to comply with the purging conditions would
violate his right against self-incrimination. But he does not demonstrate how his compliance
would tend to expose him to liability. State v. Parker, 79 Wn.2d 326, 332, 485 P.2d 60 (1971).
Gsouri fails to demonstrate unlawful restraint. Therefore, we deny his petition and his
request for appointment of counsel.
In so ruling, we iterate that “[i]nsofar as a civil contempt sanction can only be used to
coerce compliance, it logically follows that incarceration for civil contempt can continue only so
long as it serves a coercive purpose.” King v. Dep’t of Soc. & Health Servs., 110 Wn.2d 793, 802,
756 P.2d 1303 (1988). It is well established that a contemnor cannot be held in jail forever. King,
1
In his reply, Gsouri complains of the county jail opening his legal mail. But that is not a form of
restraint that can be addressed in a personal restraint petition.
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No. 52181-4-II
110 Wn.2d at 803. “Once a court becomes convinced that the contemnor will steadfastly refuse
to comply with the terms of the contempt citation,” the court must release him “‘since incarceration
would no longer serve the purpose of the civil contempt order coercing [compliance].’” King, 110
Wn.2d at 803 (quoting United States ex. rel. Thom v. Jenkins, 760 F.2d 736, 740 (7th Cir. 1985)).
The incarcerated contemnor must be afforded the opportunity “to show that the confinement has
lost its coercive effect or that there is no reasonable possibility of compliance with the court order.”
King, 110 Wn.2d at 805.
When reviewing a contemnor’s confinement on this basis, it is clear that the passage of
time alone does not eliminate the coercive effect of civil contempt. King, 110 Wn.2d at 803. The
court must consider the individual circumstances of the contemnor, including his ability to comply,
as well as the “significance of the ends to be achieved.” King, 110 Wn.2d at 805. Consideration
of these factors and determination of whether “civil contempt no longer serves a coercive purpose
is a matter left to the sound discretion of the trial judge to be decided on a case-by-case basis.”
King, 110 Wn.2d at 802-03.
King approved incarceration for civil contempt for 11 months. Here, Gsouri has been
incarcerated for civil contempt for failure to pay child support since March 17, 2017, more than
two years and more than twice the time approved in King.
We recognize that Gsouri’s contempt involves the failure to pay child support and
maintenance, both of which involve the well-being of other people and both of which are clearly
different from fines and fees. “Parents have the responsibility to make decisions and perform other
parental functions necessary for the care and growth of their minor children.” RCW 26.09.002.
Nonetheless, King requires that a court must meaningfully consider whether Gsouri’s
confinement has lost its coercive effect and whether there is still a reasonable possibility of
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No. 52181-4-II
compliance with the court order. Our review of the record does not demonstrate that the trial court
has meaningfully engaged in this required consideration. Because the trial court is in the best
position to consider the factors discussed above, it should make this determination at its periodic
reviews of Gsouri’s contempt.
We deny the petition and the request for appointment of counsel.
A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the
Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record in accordance with RCW 2.06.040,
it is so ordered.
MELNICK, J.
We concur:
MAXA, C.J.
GLASGOW, J.
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