State Of Washington v. Sallyea Mcclinton

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
THE STATE OF WASHINGTON,
No. 78076-0-I
Respondent,
DIVISION ONE
v.
PUBLISHED OPINION
SALLYEA 0. McCLINTON,
Appellant. FILED: August 26, 2019
APPELWICK, C.J. — In 1997, McClinton was convicted of first degree rape
while armed with a deadly weapon, attempted first degree rape, and first degree
burglary. In November 2017, the trial court issued a bench warrant for McClinton
based on his alleged violations of community custody conditions. Before the
hearing on his alleged violations, he moved to transfer his case to the Department
of Corrections. The trial court denied his motion, found him in violation of three
community custody conditions, and ordered him to serve 30 days of confinement.
McClinton argues that he was denied equal protection because he did not receive
the same procedural benefits as offenders who committed their underlying crime
after July 1, 2000. We affirm.
FACTS
In 1997, Sallyea McClinton was convicted of first degree rape while armed
with a deadly weapon, attempted first degree rape, and first degree burglary. The
trial court sentenced him to a total of 202 months of confinement. It also sentenced
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him to community placement for two years or up to the period of earned release,
whichever was longer.
In 2013, McClinton was released from prison and began a term of
community custody. State v. McClinton, No. 76001-7-I, slip. op. at I (Wash. Ct.
App. Mar. 5, 2018) (unpublished), http://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/pdf/76001 7
.PDF. Since that time, he has repeatedly violated his community custody
conditions. Most recently, in November 2017, the trial court issued a bench
warrant for McClinton based on three alleged violations. He was arrested on
January 1, 2018.
After his arrest, McClinton filed a motion to transfer the hearing on his
alleged violations to the Department of Corrections (DCC), or, alternatively, to “limit
the court’s authority to the same authority as granted to the [DCC] to conduct
hearings and impose sanctions pursuant to RCW 9.94A.737.” He argued that
equal protection requires that he “be provided the same procedural protections and
sanctions regime as applied to offenders whose crimes were committed after July
1,2000.”
On January 24, 2018, the trial court held a hearing on McClinton’s alleged
violations. The court denied his motion to transfer the hearing, found him in
violation of 3 community custody conditions, and ordered him to serve 30 days of
confinement. McClinton appeals.
DISCUSSION
McClinton argues that he was denied equal protection because he was not
afforded the same procedural benefits as offenders who committed their
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underlying crime on or after July 1, 2000. He asserts that those offenders are
sanctioned through the DOC process, are entitled to a hearing within 5 days of
being held in confinement, and cannot be sentenced to more than 30 days of
confinement per hearing. In contrast, he points out that the court has sanction
authority over offenders who committed their underlying crime before July 1, 2000.
He contends that, if the court has sanction authority, “there is no set time within
which [an offender] has a right to a hearing,” and an offender “could be subject up
to 60 days in jail for each violation.”
The State argues that this court should decline to review McClinton’s equal
protection claim because it is moot. McClinton concedes that his claim is~ moot,
but asks this court to reach the merits “because the case involves an issue of
substantial public interest that is likely to reoccur.”
I. Mootness
A case is moot when we can no longer provide an appellant effective relief.
In re Det. of LaBeIle, 107 Wn.2d 196, 200, 728 P.2d 138 (1986). This case is
technically moot, because McClinton’s confinement has ended. In re Det. of
Swanson, 115 Wn.2d 21, 24, 804 P.2d 1(1990). As a general rule, an appellate
court will not review a moot case. In re Det. of H.N., 188 Wn. App. 744, 749, 355
P.3d 294 (2015). But, an appellate court may decide a moot case if it involves an
issue of substantial public interest. State v. Hunley, 175 Wn.2d 901, 907, 287 P.3d
584 (2012). In deciding to review a moot issue, this court must consider (1) the
public or private nature of the issue, (2) the desirability of an authoritative
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No. 78076-0-114
determination that will provide future guidance to public officers, and (3) the
likelihood that the issue will recur. Id.The constitutionality of statutes relating to criminal sentencing presents an
issue of public interest. at 908. And, while this court can no longer provide
McClinton effective relief, the issue will likely recur with other offenders who
committed their underlying crime before July 1, 2000 and violate their sentence
conditions. Public officers would therefore benefit from an authoritative
determination on the question. Thus, we reach the merits of this case.
II. Equal Protection
McClinton argues that he was denied equal protection when he was denied
the benefits of a DCC sanctions process.1 He explains that, under RCW
9.94A.6332(7), “statutory sanctioning authority is vested in [the] DCC for those
who committed their offense after July 1, 2000.” But, under RCW 9.94B.010(1)
and 9.94B.040(1), a court has authority to impose sanctions on an offender who
committed their underlying crime before July 1, 2000. He contends that he is
similarly situated to offenders who are sanctioned by the DCC, and, as a result,
should receive the same benefits as those offenders. He also argues that the
purposes of the statute vesting sanctioning authority in the DCC would have been
1In his brief, McClinton does not specifically identify which statute violates
equal protection. Nor does he explicitly argue that the statute affording the benefits
of a DCC sanctions process should be applied retroactively to him. Rather, he
summarizes the different statutory schemes governing sanctions for offenders who
committed their underlying crime before July 1, 2000, and offenders who
committed their underlying crime on or after that date. In doing so, he argues that
there is no rational basis for denying him the benefits of a DCC process based on
the date of his offense.
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No. 78076-0-115
served by having the statutory change apply to him and others like him sentenced
before July 1, 2000. He identifies those purposes as “expedit[ing] the sanctions
process by preventing court backlog and [making] the sanctions process less
confusing by having [the] DCC take on this function.”
A. Standard of Review
The Washington Constitution article I, section 12, and the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution ensure that persons similarly
situated as to the legitimate purposes of a law receive equal treatment. State v.
Manussier, 129 Wn.2d 652, 672, 921 P.2d 473 (1996). Washington courts
construe the federal and state equal protection clauses identically. k1. This court
reviews constitutional challenges de novo. State v. Budd, 185 Wn.2d 566, 571,
374 P.3d 137 (2016).
Strict scrutiny applies when the statutory classification at issue involves a
suspect class, or threatens a fundamental right. Manussier, 129 Wn.2d at 672-73.
Intermediate scrutiny applies when important rights or semisuspect classifications
are affected. k~. at 673. The most relaxed level of scrutiny, rational basis, applies
when a statutory classification does not involve a suspect or semisuspect class
and does not threaten a fundamental right. McClinton concedes that persons
sanctioned under RCW 9.94B.040(1) are not a suspect or semisuspect class. He
also concedes that there is no fundamental right at issue. Thus, he concedes that
rational basis review applies.
Under rational basis review, the challenged law must reflect a legitimate
state objective, and the law must not be wholly irrelevant to achieving that
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No. 78076-0-1/6
objective. Manussier, 129 Wn.2d at 673. The party challenging the classification
has the burden of showing that it is purely arbitrary. State v. Coria, 120 Wn.2d
156, 172, 839 P.2d 890 (1992). Rational basis requires only that the means
employed by the statute be rationally related to a legitimate state goal; not that the
means of the challenged statute be the best way of achieving that goal. Manussier,
129 Wn.2d at 673.
B. Sanctions Procedure
The Sentencing Reform Act of 1981 (SRA), chapter 9.94A ROW, provides
that the law in effect at the time a crime was committed governs sentencing. ROW
9.94A.345. If an offender who committed an underlying crime before July 1, 2000
violates a condition or requirement of their sentence, “the court may modify its
order of judgment and sentence and impose further punishment.” ROW
9.94B.01 0; ROW 9.94B.040(1). The court may sanction the offender with up to 60
days of confinement for each violation. ROW 9.94A.633(1)(a).
In contrast, if an offender who committed an underlying crime on or after
July 1, 2000 is being supervised by the DOC and violates a sentence condition,
“any sanctions shall be imposed by [the DOOj pursuant to ROW 9.94A.737.”2
2 However, if the offender was sentenced under the drug offender
sentencing alternative, the special sex offender sentencing alternative, or the
parenting sentencing alternative, any sanctions shall be imposed by the court
under ROW 9.94A.660, 9.94A.670, or 9.94A.655, respectively. ROW
9.94A.6332(1)-(3). If an offender is being supervised by the DOC under RCW
9.92.060, 9.95.204, or 9.95.210, “upon receipt of a violation hearing report from
[the DCC], the court retains any authority that those statutes provide to respond to
a probationer’s violation of conditions.” ROW 9.94A.6332(7). And, if an offender
is not being supervised by the DCC and violates a sentence condition, “any
sanctions shall be imposed by the court pursuant to ROW 9.94A.6333.” ROW
9.94A.6332(8).
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No. 78076-0-1/7
RCW 9.94A.6332(7); see State v. Bi.qsby, 189 Wn.2d 210, 221, 399 P.3d 540(2017) (RCW 9.94B.040, which allows a court to modify an order of judgment and
sentence, applies only to crimes committed prior to July 1, 2000). If the offender
is in total confinement before a hearing on the alleged violation, the DCC must
hold a hearing within 5 business days, but not less than 24 hours, after written
notice of the alleged violation. RCW 9.94A.737(6)(b). If the offender is not in total
confinement, the DCC must hold the hearing within 15 business days, but not less
than 24 hours, after written notice of the alleged violation. RCW 9.94A.737(6)(b).
The maximum sanction the DCC may impose for a “high level violation” is 30 days
of confinement per hearing. RCW 9.94A.737(4).
The State Supreme Court explained these changes to the sanctions
procedure in Biqsby. Before July 1, 2000, the authority of the courts and the DCC
to sanction an offender for violating a sentence condition depended on whether
that offender was released on community custody or postrelease supervision.
Biqsby, 189 Wn.2d at 217. The DCC could sanction offenders released on
community custody. k~. But, offenders who had completed their confinement and
were released on postrelease supervision were entitled to a court hearing if they
were accused of violating their sentences. k1. at 217-18. Therefore, the DCC had
to track an offender’s community custody or postrelease supervision status “to
determine whether it had statutory authorization to sanction the offender for
violating his or her sentence conditions.” Id. at 21 8.
The governor at the time was concerned that splitting supervisory authority
between the courts and the DCC “hamstrung the [DCCJ’s ability to protect the
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No. 78076-0-1/8
community and resulted in many offenders escaping punishment because of the
significant backlog in the courts.” j.ç~ As a result, the legislature enacted the
Offender Accountability Act (OAA),3 which “consolidated postrelease supervision
into one term of community custody for offenses committed on or after July 1,
2000.” kI. While this change alleviated some of the DOC’s concerns, it caused
confusion for judges, lawyers, offenders, and the DOC. j.ç~ at 218-19. Despite
abolishing postrelease supervision for crimes committed on or after July 1, 2000,
the legislature kept the statutory provisions for postrelease supervision in place.
Id. at 219.
To resolve this confusion, in 2008, the legislature revised the community
custody provisions. j4. It enacted new provisions “intended to simplify the
supervision provisions of the [SRA] and increase the uniformity of its application.”
Id. It also “converted all outstanding postrelease supervision terms into community
custody terms.” j~ But, the legislature was concerned that this conversion might
be unconstitutional. ki. As a result, it moved certain statutes relating to pre-OAA
sentences, including RCW 9.94B.040, to another chapter that may be applicable
to sentences for crimes committed before July 1, 2000. kI. The legislature
reaffirmed its intent that the provisions in statutes like RCW 9.94B.040 be a
supplement to the SRA. j~
C. Rational Basis
Under the rational basis test, this court must determine whether (1) the
legislation applies alike to all members within the designated class, (2) there are
~ RCW72.09.580, .590, .904.
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No. 78076-0-1/9
reasonable grounds to distinguish between those within and those without that
class, and (3) the classification has a rational relationship to the proper purpose of
the legislation. DeYounq v. Providence Med. Ctr., 136 Wn.2d 136, 144, 960 P.2d
919 (1998). To succeed with an equal protection challenge, McClinton must first
establish that he is similarly situated with other persons in a class who have
received different treatment under the same law. State v. Osman, 157 Wn.2d 474,
484, 139 P.3d 334 (2006).
McClinton argues that the relevant class here consists of defendants (1)
who are under DCC supervision, (2) who were not sentenced to special sentencing
alternatives or conditions, and (3) against whom the State seeks to apply sanctions
for sentencing violations. But, by enacting the OAA and keeping in place the
statutes relating to pre-OAA sentencing, the legislature differentiated between two
categories of offenders based on the date of their crime. Different laws apply to
offenders who committed their underlying crime before July 1, 2000, and offenders
who committed their underlying crime on or after that date. Accordingly, McClinton
is not similarly situated to offenders who committed their underlying crime on or
after July 1, 2000.
Essentially, McClinton argues that the legislature did not have a rational
basis for creating two classes of offenders based on the date of their crime. He
asserts that the State Supreme Court “identified that the purpose of vesting [the]
DCC with sanctioning authority as provided under [RCW] 9.94A.6332 was to
expedite the sanctions process by preventing court backlog,” and “make the
sanctions process less confusing by having [the] DCC take on this function.” He
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No. 78076-0-1/10
contends that sending McClinton through the DOC process would have served
both of these goals.
In Addleman, the State Supreme Court noted that “{t}he legislature has the
power to shape the sentencing scheme without denying equal protection.” In re
Pers. Restraint of Addleman, 151 Wn.2d 769, 774, 92 P.3d 221 (2004). There,
Addleman had been sentenced under Washington’s former indeterminate
sentencing system. j.çj~ at 772 & ni. Under that system, the trial court determined
a defendant’s maximum sentence, while the minimum sentence was generally set
by the Board of Prison Terms and Paroles. ki. Washington abandoned that
system when the legislature enacted the SRA. ~ at 772 ni. The former system
applied to a decreasing number of offenders, including Addleman, whose offenses
predated the SRA’s implementation. Id. In rejecting his equal protection claim and
finding that it “ha[d] been settled,” the court relied on Foster v. Wash. State Bd. of
Prison Terms and Parole, 878 F.2d 1233 (9th Cir. 1989). Addleman, 151 Wn.2d
at 774.
Foster also involved an offender who committed his underlying crimes
before the SRA’s implementation. 878 F.2d at 1234. In addressing Foster’s equal
protection argument, the Ninth Circuit held, “There is no denial of equal protection
in having persons sentenced under one system for crimes committed before July
1, 1984 and another class of prisoners sentenced under a different system.” jç~ at
1235. It explained that “[i]mprovement in sentencing is [a] rational government
purpose.” Id.10
No. 78076-0-I/li
The State Supreme Court is clear that the legislature can shape the
sentencing scheme without denying equal protection. Addleman, 151 Wn.2d at
774. And, as the Foster court held, improvement in sentencing is a rational
government purpose. 878 F.2d at 1235. Like Foster, McClinton is subject to
sanction laws that apply to only offenders who committed their underlying crimes
before July 1, 2000, while another class of prisoners is sanctioned under a different
system. Seej~.
The purpose of the OAA was to prevent offenders on postrelease
supervision from escaping punishment due to clogged court dockets. Biqsby, 189
Wn.2d at 218. This is a rational government purpose. See Foster, 878 F.2d at
1235. All offenders who committed crimes after July 1, 2000 were subject to these
same provisions. All offenders committed crimes prior to July 1, 2000 remained
subject to judicial sanctions. Offenders within each class are treated similarly.
Offenders are entitled to be punished based on the crimes and punishments
in effect when they committed their crimes. ~ RCW 9.94A.345. The authority
of the trial court to impose sanctions for violation of the terms of sentencing is part
of that law. ~ RCW 9.94B.01 0(2). Removing that judicial sentencing authority
in favor of executive branch sanctioning authority would potentially be a change in
the punishment for the crime. This gave the legislature legitimate concern that
converting all outstanding postrelease supervision terms into community custody
terms might be unconstitutional. Bicisby, 189 Wn.2d at 219. The legislature’s
concern about the constitutionality of this conversion was a rational basis for
keeping the pre-OAA sentencing laws in place for crimes committed before July 1,
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No. 78076-0-1/12
2000. Therefore, to achieve the purpose of the statute the legislature had a
reasonable ground to create the two classes based on the date the underlying
crime was committed. Accordingly, the OAA does not violate equal protection on
the basis that it classifies offenders on whether they committed their crime before
or after July 1,2000.
We affirm.
4~~Z
WE CONCUR:
~A4 c— _ ~
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