State Of Washington v. David Francisco Ruiz

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
STATE OF WASHINGTON, C3 " '.'~-
No. 71712-0-1 cr> £''• "-'*•'•
Appellant, cr. r, c:
DIVISION ONE _
v.
UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS
DAVID FRANCISCO RUIZ,
Respondent. FILED: June 15, 2015 re
Appelwick, J. — The State appeals the dismissal of its indecent liberties charge
against Ruiz for failure to establish the corpus delicti. The corpus delicti rule requires that
the State provide evidence independent of the accused's confession that demonstrates
that the charged crime occurred. The State provided sufficient evidence to make that
showing. We reverse.
FACTS
On February 10, 2012, R.B., David Ruiz, and a few others gathered at a mutual
friend's home. The group drank beer and played video games. At 1:30 a.m., the guests
dispersed. But, some of the guests stayed overnight after being invited to do so.
Ruiz went to sleep in one of the bedrooms. R.B. went to sleep on the couch in the
living room. R.B. went to sleep alone and fully clothed, with both his belt and pants zipper
fastened. When R.B. woke up, he found his pants partially down and his penis exposed
through the slit in his boxers. Ruiz was sleeping on his lap with his head in close proximity
to R.B.'s penis, Ruiz's hand was on R.B.'s inner thigh, and there was a stain on R.B.'s
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pants, which he thought was semen. R.B.'s "penis felt weird like something happened."
His penis felt as it previously had after receiving oral sex.
Ruiz later admitted touching R.B. sexually, which led to an investigation by the
police. Several days afterward, the police questioned Ruiz. He denied engaging in oral
sex with R.B. He did, however, admit to fondling R.B.'s penis with his hand and getting
sexual gratification from doing so.
The police questioned the other guests that were present the night of the alleged
incident. Two witnesses reported seeing Ruiz near R.B. during the night after everyone
had gone to bed. Around 2 a.m., one overnight guest woke up and walked through the
living room to get a glass of water from the kitchen. As he passed through the living room,
he saw Ruiz "sleeping with his face on the couch and his knees on the floor." At about
2:30 a.m., a resident of the house woke up to get water. As she passed through the living
room on the way to the kitchen, she observed that "[Ruiz] was on the couch and he was
leaning [towards R.B.]." She reported that, "Nothing looked weird to me, but I didn't have
my glasses on so I only saw their outlines since it was dark."
The State charged Ruiz with two counts of indecent liberties against R.B.1 Ruiz
moved to dismiss for failure to establish the corpus delicti. He argued that dismissal was
appropriate, because there was insufficient evidence—independent of his confession—
to support a prima facie finding that a crime had occurred.
1 On March 1, 2013, the State charged Ruiz with one count of indecent liberties.
On October 8, 2013, the State submitted its first amended information, charging Ruiz with
a second count of indecent liberties. On December 13, 2013, the State submitted its
second amended information, charging Ruiz with two counts of indecent liberties, alleging
the same criminal conduct as the prior information.
No. 71712-0-1/3
In response, the State presented police reports, including a statement from R.B.
detailing the alleged crime and surrounding circumstances. The trial court dismissed the
State's charges of indecent liberties without prejudice for insufficient corpus delicti. The
State filed the same charges again. Ruiz again moved to dismiss based on the State's
failure to establish the corpus delicti. In response, the State offered the same evidence
presented during the first action, but it added a supplemental statement from R.B.2 The
court considered R.B.'s additional statement. But, it ultimately dismissed the case
pursuant to State v. Knapstad. 107 Wash. 2d 346, 356-57, 729 P.2d 48 (1986), and CrR 8.33
due to insufficient evidence to establish the corpus delicti. The State appeals.
2 In the first action, the State presented R.B.'s supplemental statement on the day
of the scheduled hearing. Because the trial court found the State's delay in admitting the
supplemental statement constituted inexcusable neglect, the court declined to consider
the statement. In the second action, the court considered the additional statement, in
which R.B. added, that upon waking up, his penis felt as it previously has after receiving
oral sex.
3 CrR 8.3 allows a court to dismiss a case prior to trial "due to insufficient evidence
establishing a prima facie case of the crime charged." CrR 8.3(c)(3) provides,
The court shall grant the motion if there are no material disputed facts and
the undisputed facts do not establish a prima facie case of guilt. In
determining defendant's motion, the court shall view all evidence in the light
most favorable to the prosecuting attorney and the court shall make all
reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the prosecuting
attorney. The court may not weigh conflicting statements and base its
decision on the statement it finds the most credible.
CrR 8.3 adopts the procedure set out in Knapstad, 107 Wash. 2d at 356-57. See 4A
Karl B. Tegland, Washington Practice: Rules Practice CrR 8.3, drafters' comment at
219 (7th ed. Supp. 2014) ("pursuant to the holding in Knapstad, charges in a criminal
case may be dismissed for insufficient evidence prior to trial on motion by the defendant")
(quoting Drafter's Comment to 2008 Amendment to CrR 8.3).
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DISCUSSION
The State argues that the evidence was sufficient to establish the corpus delicti of
the crime of indecent liberties. Therefore, it contends that the trial court erred in
dismissing the case
A trial court's pretrial dismissal of criminal charges pursuant to a Knapstad motion,
for failure to make out a prima facie case of guilt, is subject to de novo review. State v.
Montano, 169 Wash. 2d 872, 876, 239 P.3d 360 (2010). Here, in order to dismiss the State's
case pursuant to Knapstad, the court must find insufficient evidence of the corpus delicti
to support admission of the defendant's statements into evidence at trial. See Knapstad,
107 Wash. 2d at 356-57.
"Corpus delicti" means the "'body of the crime'" and must be proved by evidence
sufficient to support the inference that there has been a criminal act. State v. Brockob,
159 Wash. 2d 311, 327, 150 P.3d 59 (2006) (quoting State v. Aten, 130 Wash. 2d 640, 655,
927 P.2d 210 (1996)). The corpus delicti rule arose from judicial distrust of confessions.
City of Bremerton v. Corbett. 106 Wash. 2d 569, 576, 723 P.2d 1135 (1986). Courts feared
that confessions would be uncritically accepted by juries, even if there was evidence that
the admissions were involuntary, coerced, or untruthful. Aten, 130 Wash. 2d at 656-57.
In Washington, courts may not consider the accused's incriminating statements
unless the State has established the corpus delicti through independent proof.4 State v.
Ray. 130 Wash. 2d 673, 679, 926 P.2d 904 (1996). "In other words, the State must present
4 Washington courts have declined to adopt a more relaxed rule used by federal
courts. Brockob, 159 Wash. 2d at 328. Under the federal rule, the government need present
only independent evidence sufficient to establish that the incriminating statement is
trustworthy. ]d.
No. 71712-0-1/5
evidence independent of the incriminating statement that the crime a defendant described
in the statement actually occurred." Brockob, 159 Wash. 2d at 328.
We review the trial court's corpus delicti determination de novo. State v. Pineda,
99 Wash. App. 65, 77-78, 992 P.2d 525 (2000). In doing so, we assume the truth of the
State's evidence and view all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the
State. Aten, 130 Wash. 2d at 658. The independent evidence need not be sufficient to
support a conviction, but it must provide "prima facie corroboration" of the charged crime.
Brockob, 159 Wash. 2d at 328. Prima facie corroboration of a defendant's incriminating
statement exists if the independent evidence supports a "'logical and reasonable
inference'" of the facts sought to be proved. Id. (quoting State v. Vanqerpen. 125 Wash. 2d
782, 796, 888 P.2d 1177 (1995)). In addition to corroborating a defendant's incriminating
statement, the independent evidence must be consistent with guilt and inconsistent with
a hypothesis of innocence. Id.
To satisfy the corpus delicti rule here, the State must provide independent
evidence that demonstrates that a crime of indecent liberties occurred pursuant to RCW
9A.44.100(1)(b). See State v. Acheson, 48 Wash. App. 630, 636-37, 740 P.2d 346 (1987)
(concluding that corpus delicti requires only proof that a crime was committed). "A person
is guilty of indecent liberties when he... knowingly causes another person to have sexual
contact with him .. . [w]hen the other person is incapable of consent by reason of being .
. . physically helpless." RCW 9A.44.100(1)(b). "Sexual contact" means "any touching of
the sexual or other intimate parts of a person done for the purpose of gratifying sexual
desire of either party or a third party." RCW 9A.44.010(2). Therefore, here, the State
must show through independent evidence not only that Ruiz touched R.B.'s penis while
No. 71712-0-1/6
R.B. was physically helpless, but also that he did so, knowingly, for sexual gratification.
See RCW 9A.44.100(1 )(b).
Here, the State's evidence—independent of Ruiz's confession—amounts to the
following: (1) Ruiz and R.B. went to sleep in separate rooms; (2) R.B. went to sleep alone
and fully clothed; (3) while asleep and unable to consent to sexual contact,5 someone
else undressed him and made contact with his penis in such a manner that made it feel
"weird"—i.e., similar to sensations he had experienced after oral sex—when he woke up;
(4) others saw Ruiz on the same couch as R.B. in the middle of the night; (5) upon waking,
R.B. found Ruiz sleeping in his lap, with his head in close proximity to R.B.'s exposed
genitals and his hand on R.B.'s inner thigh; and (6) R.B. reported the incident to the police.
From these facts, the State is entitled to the inference that Ruiz undressed R.B. and
engaged in uninvited, unwanted sexual contact with him. These facts, and the inferences
that can be drawn therefrom, are sufficient to satisfy the corpus delicti rule. See Ray, 130
Wash. 2d at 679-80 (surveying Washington case law).
Washington courts have found sufficient corpus delicti in cases where the
independent evidence consisted of eyewitness testimony—whether a victim's own
observations or another's. See State v. Stuhr, 1 Wash. 2d 521, 529, 96 P.2d 479 (1939). In
Stuhr, an officer saw the suspect in a dark corner of a garage perform a "revolting" act
with a young girl. jd. at 523. And, other witnesses observed the suspect and the child
fleeing from the scene in different directions. Id at 524. Thus, these eyewitness accounts
5 State v. Mohamed, 175 Wash. App. 45, 58-59, 301 P.3d 504 (2013) (explaining,
"The state of sleep appears to be universally understood as unconsciousness or physical
inability to communicate unwillingness'" (alteration in original) (quoting State v.
Puapuaqa, 54 Wash. App. 857, 861, 776 P.2d 170 (1989).
No. 71712-0-1/7
established the corpus delicti for indecent liberties, jd. at 529. Here, two eyewitnesses
saw Ruiz on the couch or kneeling by the couch near R.B. during the middle of the night,
after everyone had gone to sleep. They may not have testified to seeing the sexual act,
but their accounts corroborate R. B.'s statement about Ruiz presence.
Physical evidence—such as that of tangible injuries6 or reports of pain7—can also
satisfy the corpus delicti rule. State v. Biles is particularly instructive. 73 Wash. App. 281,
871 P.2d 159 (1994). A first degree child rape prosecution, Biles involved a defendant's
admission that he "barely" penetrated his daughter when she was three or four years old.
jd. at 282-83. The child's hearsay testimony indicated genital contact between herself
and her father, and that "it hurt her and she cried." Id. at 285. But, when asked if her
father ever went inside her privates, the daughter answered no. ]d. at 283. Despite this,
the Biles court concluded that the child's complaints of genital pain during sexual contact
supported a logical and reasonable inference that "penetration" in fact occurred, which
corroborated the confession. Id. at 285. Thus, the court concluded that the State
presented sufficient evidence of the corpus delicti—i.e., penetration—to establish that a
first degree rape of a child had occurred, jd. at 285.
Here, the trial court erred when it disregarded R.B.'s statements describing the
lingering physical sensation he experienced. Analogous to the reports of pain—
contemporaneous with sexual contact—in Biles, the lingering physical sensation
6 See, e.g., Acheson, 48 Wash. App. at 637 (corpus delicti established where, in
addition to lab technician's testimony that she observed sperm cell in specimen from
minor victim's vaginal cavity, examining doctor noted "an extended hymen and redness
and irritation in the vaginal area to an extent not likely to result from self-stimulation");
State v. Clevenqer. 69 Wash. 2d 136, 138-39, 417 P.2d 626 (1966) (jagged tear of vagina
and adjacent tissues to three year old victim established the corpus delicti).
•> State v. Biles, 73 Wash. App. 281, 284, 871 P.2d 159 (1994).
No. 71712-0-1/8
described by R.B. corroborates that contact with his penis in fact occurred. R.B. equated
the physical sensation from the alleged incident to his previous experiences of oral sex
with women. This comparison provides the basic premise of his case: the inference
properly drawn is that someone other than himself touched his genitals.
The trial court's reliance on Ray to support its corpus delicti determination is
misplaced. Ray voluntarily confessed that he molested his three year old daughter by
forcing her to touch his penis. Ray, 130 Wash. 2d at 675-76. Absent his confession, the
trial court found there was no independent evidence of the crime, because there was no
tangible injury and no eyewitness testimony, as the child was deemed incompetent to
testify. See jd. at 676. The Ray court found that the fact that Ray made an emergency
call to his sexual deviancy therapist after the alleged incident, together with other "sparse
facts," failed to rule out Ray's criminality or innocence, jd. at 680-81. In holding that the
State failed to establish the corpus delicti, the court reasoned, "[t]hese facts suggest that
something out of the ordinary occurred, but it is a leap in logic to conclude that any kind
of criminal conduct occurred let alone the specific conduct of first degree child
molestation." Id at 680.
Unlike Ray, here, the State offered evidence independent of Ruiz's confession.
The corpus delicti rule dictates that the independent evidence need support only a
"'logical and reasonable inference'" of the facts sought to be proved. Brockob, 159 Wash. 2d
at 328 (quoting Aten, 130 Wash. 2d at 656). Here, the evidence in the record and the
inferences drawn therefrom independently corroborate Ruiz's statements. The rule does
not require that the independent evidence disprove all other potential explanations. But,
8
No. 71712-0-1/9
the independent evidence must be consistent with guilt and inconsistent with a hypothesis
of innocence. ]d.
The trial court, applying the reasoning in Ray, concluded that the State's evidence
failed to rule out noncriminal causes of the contact. The court questioned what crime had
occurred: "It could have been indecent liberties or rape by the defendant, or it could have
been an incident of indecent exposure by the victim." The court postulated innocent
explanations for each item of evidence. For example, the court suggested that R.B. could
have pulled down his own pants. Regarding the reported sensation and stain, the court
pointed to the "possibility that [R.B.] may have had a wet dream, or he may have been
masturbating." Finding the State's evidence deficient, the trial court asked, "If the
defendant was asleep and his hand was on the leg of the complaining witness, is that a
crime? What crime would it be?" From its analysis, the court concluded that, just as in
Ray, "there's no evidence that a crime occurred" because "the quantum of evidence was
simply lacking."
The trial court misapplied Ray, thereby improperly denying the State the basic
inferences to which it was entitled. R.B. complained of nonconsensual sexual contact
and the prosecutor filed criminal charges on that basis. He reported that he awoke to find
Ruiz in his lap. The State is entitled to an inference that until that moment, R.B. had been
asleep, and therefore incapable of consenting to sexual contact. RCW 9A.44.010(5)
("'Physically helpless' means a person who is unconscious or for any other reason is
physically unable to communicate unwillingness to an act."); State v. Mohamed, 175 Wn.
App. 45, 58-59, 301 P.3d 504 (2013) (explaining, "The state of sleep appears to be
universally understood as unconsciousness or physical inability to communicate
9
No. 71712-0-1/10
unwillingness'" (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Puapuaqa, 54 Wash. App. 857, 861,
776 P.2d 170 (1989)). R. B. reported that when he went to sleep his pants were up,
zipped, and belted. The State is entitled to the inference from R.B.'s statement that his
pants were unbuckled, unzipped, and lowered by someone else while he was asleep. He
described the sensation he felt in his penis upon waking as similar to what he had
experienced from oral sex. In the light most favorable to the State, this gives rise to an
inference that R.B. was touched by another—not that he was masturbating or
experiencing a "wet dream." R. B. went to sleep alone on the couch. He awoke to find
Ruiz sleeping in his lap, with Ruiz's head in close proximity to R.B.'s exposed genitals
and a hand on R.B.'s inner thigh. Others corroborate Ruiz's presence during the night by
or on the couch. No other evidence suggests anyone else was in the room. In
considering whether there was an innocent explanation for the State's evidence, the trial
court evaluated the facts on a piecemeal basis—rather than reviewing the evidence as a
whole and drawing the inferences in the light most favorable to the State. This was error.
Collectively, the independent evidence, assumed true and viewed in the light most
favorable to the State, supports a logical and reasonable inference that R.B. was
subjected to unauthorized sexual contact while he was physically helpless. From this, it
takes no "leap in logic" to conclude that Ruiz committed such actions—and that he did so
for the purpose of sexual gratification. See Ray, 130 Wash. 2d at 680. Thus, the totality of
the independent evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the State, supports the
inference that Ruiz touched R.B.'s penis—and that he knowingly did so for sexual
gratification. Accordingly, the State established the corpus delicti ofthe crime ofindecent
liberties.
10
No. 71712-0-1/11
The trial court erred in dismissing the case pursuant to Knapstad and CrR 8.3 for
insufficient corpus delicti. We reverse.
WE CONCUR:
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SJ
11