State Of Washington v. Kevin Stanfield

Filed
Washington State
Court of Appeals
Division Two
October 22, 2019
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION II
STATE OF WASHINGTON, No. 51724-8-II
Respondent,
v.
KEVIN ARTHUR STANFIELD, UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Appellant.
MELNICK, P.J. — Kevin Stanfield appeals an order of restitution. The restitution resulted
from Stanfield’s attempting to elude a pursuing police vehicle conviction. At sentencing, the court
ordered that he pay $24,873.50 in restitution for damage to a police vehicle.
Stanfield argues that an insufficient causal connection exists between his crime and the
damage.
In a statement of additional grounds (SAG), Stanfield further asserts that he received
ineffective assistance of counsel, that the deputy’s actions during the police chase violated both
department policy and his rights under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution,
that the State violated double jeopardy, and that the State violated his Fifth Amendment rights.
Stanfield additionally asserts that the statute defining the crime attempting to elude a pursuing
police vehicle is unconstitutionally vague.
We affirm.
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FACTS
One evening, Deputy Nathan Betts pursued Stanfield following an alleged assault Stanfield
committed at a gas station. Stanfield refused to stop in response to Betts’s lights and sirens. At
one point, Stanfield entered a highway and began speeding. He reached speeds between 90 and
100 miles per hour.
Stanfield attempted to enter an Interstate 5 (I-5) northbound onramp, but he spun out into
a grass median. After coming to a stop in the median, Stanfield reentered the highway. Betts, who
had been pursuing Stanfield, attempted an unsuccessful precision immobilization technique (PIT)
maneuver.1 Stanfield sped away.
Stanfield reached I-5 and drove in the far-right merge-only lane. Betts entered the lane just
to the left of Stanfield. Betts eventually pulled nearly level with Stanfield such that his front
bumper was near Stanfield’s driver’s side door. Stanfield then turned into Betts, causing both
vehicles to crash.
Betts’s vehicle slid across four lanes of traffic and crashed into the concrete center median.
Stanfield’s vehicle similarly went across the four lanes of traffic and crashed into the center
median. However, Stanfield’s vehicle went up and over the 4-foot center median, coming to a
stop upside down in the I-5 southbound lanes. The police later took Stanfield to the hospital and
interviewed him.
The State charged Stanfield with two counts of assault in the second degree, assault in the
fourth degree, and attempting to elude a pursuing police vehicle. Stanfield pled not guilty to all
charges, and the case proceeded to trial.
1
A PIT maneuver is an attempt to disable a vehicle by using the front end of one vehicle to hit the
back of the other vehicle to spin it out and stop it.
2
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The court held a pretrial hearing regarding the admissibility of statements Stanfield made
to police officers when they interviewed him at the hospital. The State introduced evidence that
Stanfield was transported to the hospital shortly after the accident. The police visited Stanfield at
the hospital and read him his Miranda2 rights. Stanfield said he understood his rights and agreed
to speak. The police then asked Stanfield questions, and he appeared to understand their questions
and gave appropriate responses.
Stanfield, on the other hand, presented evidence indicating that he was in poor mental
condition when the police interviewed him. For instance, the police acknowledged that he had
blood on his face during the interview, and they were also aware that Stanfield had suffered a small
brain bleed. Stanfield stated that, as of trial, he had no recollection of the hospital interview.
The court found the statements admissible. It stated:
[C]learly, the deputy advised [Stanfield] correctly of his rights and indicated that
there was no threats, there were no promises, there was no coercion, asked if he
wanted to answer questions and he responded yes. And I think he was coherent
and seemed to understand what the questions were and what were appropriate in
his responses.
2 Report of Proceedings (RP) (Feb. 21, 2018) at 160.3
2
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966).
3
The record does not contain findings of fact and conclusions of law from the hearing.
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The statements were later introduced at trial. At the hospital, Stanfield had told the police
“he was trying to defend a homeless person [at the gas station,] and those f*****s called the
police.” 2 RP (Feb. 21, 2018) at 223. Stanfield also told the police “that when [Betts] got behind
him and turned on his lights it scared him and he did something stupid.” 2 RP (Feb. 21, 2018) at
223.
Stanfield testified that he saw Betts with his lights and sirens on behind him. Stanfield said
that he was coming to a stop when Betts attempted the PIT maneuver on him, which scared him
so he attempted to flee. Stanfield also testified that he did not see Betts to his left when he merged
onto I-5 and crashed into him.
Stanfield did not object to the court’s jury instructions. He did not propose an instruction
for an affirmative defense4 to the attempting to elude a pursuing police vehicle charge.
The jury found Stanfield guilty of attempting to elude a pursuing police vehicle but
acquitted him of the three other charges.
At Stanfield’s sentencing hearing, the State sought restitution in the amount of $24,873.50
for damage to the police vehicle. Stanfield objected. The trial court imposed the State’s requested
restitution. Stanfield appeals.
ANALYSIS
Stanfield argues that the trial court erred in imposing restitution because the damage to the
police vehicle was not caused by his attempt to elude the police. We disagree.
We review a sentencing court’s authority to order restitution de novo. State v. Oakley, 158
Wash. App. 544, 552, 242 P.3d 886 (2010). A trial court’s authority to impose restitution is derived
4
It is an affirmative defense to the crime of attempting to elude a pursuing police vehicle if “(a) A
reasonable person would not believe that the signal to stop was given by a police officer; and (b)
driving after the signal to stop was reasonable under the circumstances.” RCW 46.61.024(2).
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from statute. RCW 9.94A.753; State v. Enstone, 137 Wash. 2d 675, 682, 974 P.2d 828 (1999). The
statute only authorizes a court to impose restitution if a causal connection exists between the
defendant’s offense and the damage for which restitution is sought. Enstone, 137 Wash. 2d at 682.
Whether the loss is causally connected to the crime for which the defendant was convicted is a
question of law which we review de novo. State v. Acevedo, 159 Wash. App. 221, 229-30, 248 P.3d
526 (2010).
A causal connection exists if “but for” the offense, the loss or damages to a victim’s
property would not have occurred. State v. Tobin, 161 Wash. 2d 517, 524, 166 P.3d 1167 (2007).
Here, the jury found Stanfield guilty of attempting to elude a pursuing police vehicle. In
his attempts to elude the police, Stanfield reached almost 100 miles per hour in his vehicle. At
one point, the police tried to end the chase by performing a PIT maneuver on Stanfield’s vehicle.
The maneuver was unsuccessful, and Stanfield continued to flee. Eventually, Stanfield turned his
car into Betts’s, causing both vehicles to crash. Extensive damage resulted.
We conclude that a causal connection exists between Stanfield’s crime and the damage to
the police vehicle, and we affirm the order of restitution.
SAG
I. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
Stanfield appears to assert that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his
attorney failed to request the affirmative defense jury instruction to the crime of attempting to
elude a pursuing police vehicle. We disagree.
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 22 of the
Washington State Constitution guarantee the right to effective assistance of counsel. Strickland v.
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Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 685-86, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984); State v. Grier, 171
Wash. 2d 17, 32, 246 P.3d 1260 (2011).
We review claims of ineffective assistance of counsel de novo. State v. Sutherby, 165
Wash. 2d 870, 883, 204 P.3d 916 (2009). To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel,
the defendant must show both that defense counsel’s representation was deficient and that the
deficient representation prejudiced the defendant. Grier, 171 Wash. 2d at 32-33. “Where the claim
of ineffective assistance is based upon counsel’s failure to request a particular jury instruction, the
defendant must show he was entitled to the instruction.” State v. Thompson, 169 Wash. App. 436,
495, 290 P.3d 996 (2012).
A party is entitled to a jury instruction on a theory of the case when evidence exists in the
record to support the party’s theory. State v. Hughes, 106 Wash. 2d 176, 191, 721 P.2d 902 (1986).
The trial court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the party requesting the instruction.
State v. Fernandez–Medina, 141 Wash. 2d 448, 455-56, 6 P.3d 1150 (2000).
Here, in order for Stanfield to have been entitled to the instruction, the evidence at trial
must have established that a reasonable person would not have believed that Betts was a police
officer who signaled Stanfield to stop and that Stanfield’s decision to continue driving after the
signal was reasonable. RCW 46.61.024(2).
We conclude that the evidence, including Stanfield’s testimony, does not support the giving
of an instruction on this affirmative defense.
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II. VIOLATION OF POLICE MODEL POLICY
Stanfield asserts that Betts violated Washington Association of Sheriffs & Police Chiefs
(WASPC) model policy. We reject Stanfield’s argument.
Pursuant to RCW 43.101.225, law enforcement officers must be trained on vehicular
pursuits. A neighboring statutory provision requires that the law enforcement bodies of the State
of Washington “develop a written model policy on vehicular pursuits.” RCW 43.101.226(1).
Pursuant to this legislative directive, WASPC developed the WASPC Model Policy—Vehicle
Pursuits, https://www.waspc.org/assets/ProfessionalServices/modelpolicies/vehiclepursuit.pdf.
The model policy establishes guidelines in the event of a motor vehicle pursuit and lists numerous
factors an officer should consider when deciding to terminate a pursuit, including the seriousness
of the offense and safety to the public.
Stanfield does not argue how any alleged violation of the model policy provides him relief.
We reject his argument.
III. SEARCH AND SEIZURE
Stanfield asserts that Betts’s PIT maneuver was an unlawful seizure under the Fourth
Amendment to the United States Constitution.5 We disagree.
“[A] Fourth Amendment seizure [occurs] . . . when there is a governmental termination of
freedom of movement through means intentionally applied.” Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S.
593, 596-97, 109 S. Ct. 1378, 103 L. Ed. 2d 628 (1989) (emphasis omitted). However, the United
States Constitution only prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
5
Stanfield does not argue that Betts’s actions violated his rights under article I, section 7 of the
Washington Constitution.
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“The analysis . . . focuses on whether the police have acted reasonably under the circumstances.”
State v. Morse, 156 Wash. 2d 1, 9, 123 P.3d 832 (2005).
In Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 375, 386, 127 S. Ct. 1769, 167 L. Ed. 2d 686 (2007), the
Supreme Court concluded that an officer’s crashing into the rear of the respondent’s fleeing vehicle
was reasonable under the circumstances and therefore did not violate the Fourth Amendment. In
determining the reasonableness of the police officer’s actions, the Court “consider[ed] the risk of
bodily harm that [the officer’s] actions posed to respondent in light of the threat to the public that
[the officer] was trying to eliminate.” Scott, 550 U.S. at 383. Because crashing into the rear of
the respondent’s vehicle was less dangerous than other potential methods and because of the
sizeable threat the respondent posed to others, the court “ha[d] little difficulty in concluding it was
reasonable for [the officer] to take the action that he did.” Scott, 550 U.S. at 384.
We similarly conclude that Betts’s PIT maneuver was reasonable under the circumstances.
Due to the speed at which Stanfield fled from the police, along with other factors, he threatened
the lives of others. Accordingly, we conclude that Betts’s PIT maneuver did not violate Stanfield’s
rights under the Fourth Amendment.
Furthermore, the police did not obtain any evidence as a result of the allegedly unlawful
PIT maneuver. Thus, even if we concluded that the PIT maneuver was unlawful, there is nothing
to suppress. We conclude that Stanfield’s argument on this issue fails. Cf. State v. Scherf, 192
Wash. 2d 350, 371, 429 P.3d 776 (2018) (because there were no statements to suppress, the court
concluded that “even if a [CrR 3.1] violation occurred, it was harmless”).
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IV. DOUBLE JEOPARDY
Stanfield asserts that the State violated his rights to be free from double jeopardy when it
charged him with attempting to elude a pursuing police vehicle (RCW 46.61.024) and negligent
driving in the second degree (RCW 46.61.525). We disagree.
The record does not indicate that the State charged Stanfield with negligent driving in the
second degree. Because Stanfield’s claim relies on factual allegations that are outside the record
of this appeal, we have no ability to assess his arguments. Accordingly, we reject his claim and
conclude that any remedy is only available through a personal restraint petition. State v. Linville,
191 Wash. 2d 513, 525, 423 P.3d 842 (2018).
V. UNLAWFUL INTERROGATION
Stanfield asserts that the police officers’ interrogation of him at the hospital after the
accident violated his rights under the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution. We
disagree.6
To be valid, a waiver of Miranda rights must be voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently
made. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444, 479, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966).
Whether there has been a valid waiver depends on the totality of the circumstances, including the
background, experience, and conduct of defendant. North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 374-
75, 99 S. Ct. 1755, 60 L. Ed. 2d 286 (1979).
6
Stanfield does not assign error to the fact that the court failed to enter findings of fact and
conclusions of law after the CrR 3.5 hearing. The absence of written findings is harmless if a trial
court’s oral ruling is sufficient to permit appellate review. State v. Weller, 185 Wash. App. 913, 923,
344 P.3d 695 (2015). Here, the record is sufficient to permit review. Therefore, we conclude that
the court’s error was harmless.
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We review a trial court’s denial of a suppression motion in two stages. First, we review
the trial court’s findings of fact for substantial evidence. State v. Broadaway, 133 Wash. 2d 118,
130, 942 P.2d 363 (1997). Substantial evidence supports a finding where there is a sufficient
quantity of evidence to persuade a rational person of the truth of the finding. State v. Hill, 123
Wash. 2d 641, 644, 870 P.2d 313 (1994). Unchallenged findings of fact are verities upon appeal.
Hill, 123 Wash. 2d at 644. Second, we determine whether the findings of fact support the trial court’s
conclusions of law, an issue we review de novo. State v. Vickers, 148 Wash. 2d 91, 116, 59 P.3d 58
(2002).
It appears that Stanfield only challenges the court’s finding that he was sufficiently
coherent and the court’s conclusion that he made a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent waiver.
Therefore, the court’s other findings are deemed verities.
We first conclude that substantial evidence supports the court’s findings. We next
conclude that the court’s findings of fact support its conclusion that Stanfield made a voluntary,
knowing, and intelligent waiver when he subsequently agreed to speak with the police.
Accordingly, the trial court did not err in finding Stanfield’s statements admissible.
VI. VAGUENESS
Stanfield asserts that the statute defining the crime of attempting to elude a pursuing police
vehicle, RCW 46.61.024, is unconstitutionally vague because it uses the term “immediately.” We
disagree.
In State v. Sherman, 98 Wash. 2d 53, 56-57, 653 P.2d 612 (1982), the court rejected the
identical argument that Stanfield makes here. The court held that the term “immediately” in RCW
46.61.024 does not render the statute unconstitutionally vague. Sherman, 98 Wash. 2d at 57; see also
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State v. Mather, 28 Wash. App. 700, 702-03, 626 P.2d 44 (1981) (same). We similarly reject
Stanfield’s assertion.
We affirm.
A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the
Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record in accordance with RCW 2.06.040,
it is so ordered.
Melnick, P.J.
We concur:
Glasgow, J.
Fearing, J.
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