State Of Washington v. Donnell Wayne Price, Apppellant

Mi-1- OF APPEAf
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTi
2015 JUL 28
DIVISION II AAM 8, 2S
S
STATE OF WASHINGTON, No. 46066 -1 - II
S
Respondent,
V.
DONNELL WAYNE PRICE, UNPUBLISHED OPE
M
MELNICK, J. — Donnell Wayne Price appeals the reimposition of his exceptional sentence
during resentencing. He argues that the trial court erred by imposing an exceptional sentence based
on an aggravating factor not properly found by the jury and that it violated his right of allocution
by imposing sentence before allowing Price to speak. We disagree. Price did not preserve for
review the validity of the special verdict instruction and any violation of Price' s right of allocution
was harmless. We affirm the exceptional sentence but remand for the ministerial correction of
scrivener' s errors in the judgment and sentence.
FACTS
In 2006, the State charged Price with murder in the first degree while armed with a firearm
and unlawful possession of a firearm in the second degree. The State also alleged that the murder
was a crime of domestic violence, during which Price' s conduct manifested either deliberate
cruelty or intimidation of the victim.
In 2007, a jury found Price guilty as charged and returned special verdicts finding that he
committed the murder while armed with a firearm and that his conduct manifested intimidation of
the victim.' The trial court imposed an exceptional sentence that added 60 months for each of the
The jury did not find that Price acted with deliberate cruelty.
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two special verdicts, for a total sentence of 494 months. The trial court entered written findings
of fact and conclusions of law to support the exceptional sentence.
Price appealed and the resulting decision set forth the facts supporting his convictions:
On September 3, 2006, Olga Carter called 911 to report a domestic violence
incident involving her boyfriend, Donnell Price. Carter told the 911 operator that
Price had a gun. Police responded and arrived at Price' s home in Tacoma.
When the officers approached the house, they heard a man and woman
arguing inside and then heard the man say something about flashing lights outside.
They then saw Price come to the door and step outside. An officer shined his
flashlight on him and announced " Tacoma Police," but Price went back inside and
slammed the door shut.
A few seconds later, the police heard a woman scream. Officers quickly
approached the front and back doors and demanded that the occupants come out.
When there was no response, they kicked in the front door and then heard a gunshot.
The officers then continued to announce their presence and to call on the occupants
to come out of the house, but there was no response. Price eventually came out
through the front door after repeated police demands.
Police then entered the house and found Carter dead on the floor in the
utility room. On a nearby table, police also found a handwritten note that contained
Carter' s fingerprints, was in her handwriting, and was on paper torn from a
notebook in her purse. The note read:
From: Olga Mommy
Mommy Luv
Mr. Price
Shot Me
Dead
He thought
I Fooled Around
A Gun
to my
Head.
Carter had a daughter named AuBriana.
An autopsy confirmed that Carter died of a single gunshot wound. The fatal
wound was a contact gunshot wound to her neck. Forensic evidence indicated that
the gun had been placed against her neck pointed upward and that the bullet
travelled through her throat, cervical vertebrae, spinal cord, and brain. Forensic
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evidence also showed that Price had gunpowder burns on his shirt and chest,
indicating that he was holding Carter very close to him when the shot was fired.
State v. Price, noted at 153 Wash. App. 1038, 2009 WL 3260914, at * 1; see also Clerk' s Papers ( CP)
at 37- 39.
The Price court rejected the two issues raised on appeal: Price' s assertions that the trial
court violated his right to a public trial and erred by admitting the victim' s handwritten note. 2009
WL 3260914, at * 3- 5; see also CP at 43, 47.
In 2011, Price filed a personal restraint petition and challenged the wording of his special
verdict instruction, the validity of his offender score, and the seriousness levels listed in his
judgment and sentence. 2 Price argued that his prior convictions washed and were not properly part
of his offender score. We rejected Price' s claim of instructional error but granted the petition in
part and remanded for resentencing so that the State could " provide all relevant documentation to
prove Price' s criminal history and resulting offender score." CP at 84 ( Order Granting Petition in
Part in Case No. 42646 -3 - II, filed Oct. 9, 2012). We also remanded for correction of the erroneous
seriousness levels listed for each offense in the judgment and sentence. See CP at 85 ( Order in
Case No. 42646 -3 - II).
A new judge presided over the resentencing hearing because the original judge had retired.
The trial court granted defense counsel' s motion to withdraw and continued the hearing to allow
for the appointment of assigned counsel. When the hearing reconvened, the trial court summarized
its understanding of the issues before it:
2 Price' s instructional challenge was based on State v. Bashaw, 169 Wash. 2d 133, 234 P.3d 195
2010), which the Washington Supreme Court overruled in State v. Nunez, 174 Wash. 2d 707, 285
P.3d 21 ( 2012). He has filed two other petitions that we have dismissed. See Order Dismissing
Petition, In re Pets. Restraint of Price, No. 43697 -3 - II (Wash. Ct. App. Oct. 4, 2012); Order
Dismissing, Petition, In re Pers. Restraint ofPrice, No. 47380 -1 - II (Wash. Ct. App. Mar. 4, 2015).
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As I understand it from the Court of Appeals' decision ... [ the case] was .
remanded to review the offender score and just sentencing if the offender score
was wrong, as I understand it, and the issue being whether some prior offenses that
Mr. Price had had washed.
Report of Proceedings ( RP) at 14.
During the hearing, it became apparent that the prosecutor needed an additional document
to establish Price' s offender score. Before continuing the hearing, the trial court allowed three
members of the victim' s family to speak.
When the resentencing hearing resumed, the trial court determined that the State' s evidence
supported the previously calculated offender score of four. After two other members of the
victim' s family gave statements, the prosecutor outlined some of the facts of the crime that had
been revealed at trial. The prosecutor argued that the trial court should impose the same sentence
that Price received in 2007.
The defense responded by directing the trial court' s attention to the special verdict form
that had supported the " intimidation of the victim" aggravating factor. That verdict form provided:
We, the jury, having found the defendant guilty of Murder in the First
Degree or Murder in the Second Degree; return a special verdict by answering the
following question from the court:
QUESTION: During the commission of this offense, did the defendant' s
conduct manifest intimidation of the victim?
CP at 10. Defense counsel argued that this form showed that the jury had not found that the murder
was a crime of domestic violence, which was required to support the aggravating factor in question.
As a consequence, counsel maintained that the trial court could not reimpose an exceptional
sentence without violating Price' s rights under Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S. Ct.
2531, 159 L. Ed. 2d 403 ( 2004).
The prosecutor argued that the issue regarding the special verdict instruction was beyond
the scope of the hearing. The trial court ruled as follows:
il
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Well, with respect to the issue of the exceptional sentence, the jury did find
by special verdict that there was an aggravating circumstance, so I think Judge
Fleming did have the ability, if he wished, to impose an exceptional sentence.
RP at 76.
The trial court then stated that it saw no reason to depart from Price' s original sentence and
sentenced Price to 374 months, plus 60 months for the weapon enhancement and 60 months for
the aggravating factor. " I' m simply adopting what Judge Fleming, who heard the trial and knows
it a lot better than I did and was there, did." RP at 78. The court added that it would impose the
same legal financial obligations.
When defense counsel observed that the trial court had made its ruling without providing
Price with his right to allocute, the court apologized and invited Price to speak. The trial court
noted that the sentence was not yet final, Price then complained of problems in receiving his legal
paperwork and reasserted his allegation of a public trial violation. Price also referred to his status
as a minister and a Mason, the pain he had inflicted on his family, and the fact that resentencing
was taking place on his wedding anniversary.
The trial court again apologized for not hearing Price earlier, stated that nothing Price said
had changed the court' s mind, and imposed the sentence it had described earlier. After the
prosecutor stated that " the record should reflect the Court' s judgment was not final at the point in
time when the Court allowed Mr. Price to allocute," the court declared, " It' s still not final because
I haven' t signed it yet.... After hearing him, I reconsidered it and reimposed it, and I apologize
for not hearing from him before I gave my initial inclination." RP at 85.
Price appeals his resentencing.
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ANALYSIS
I. REVIEW OF EXCEPTIONAL SENTENCE
Price argues on appeal that the trial court erred by imposing an exceptional sentence based
on an aggravating factor that was not properly found by the jury. See Blakely, 542 U.S. at 303
unless admitted by defendant, facts supporting exceptional sentence must be submitted to jury
and proved beyond reasonable doubt). The State responds that this issue has not been preserved
for review.
We begin our analysis with RAP 2. 5( c)( 1), which states:
If a trial court decision is otherwise properly before.the appellate court, the
appellate court may at the instance of a party review and determine the propriety of
a decision of the trial court even though a similar decision was not disputed in an
earlier review of the same case.
This rule does not revive every issue or decision which was not raised in an earlier
appeal." State v. Barberio, 121 Wash. 2d 48, 50, 846 P.2d 519 ( 1993). RAP 2. 5( c)( 1) allows both
trial and appellate courts discretion to revisit an issue on remand that was not the subject of the
earlier appeal. State v. Kilgore, 167 Wash. 2d 28, 38, 216 P.3d 393 ( 2009). " Only if the trial court,
on remand, exercised its independent judgment, reviewed and ruled again on such issue does it
become an appealable question." Barberio, 121 Wash. 2d at 50. And, even if it is appealable, the
appellate court still retains discretion to review it under RAP 2. 5( c)( 1). Barberio, 121 Wash. 2d at
51.
In Barberio, the defendant did not challenge his exceptional sentences on appeal. 121
Wash. 2d at 49. At resentencing, he challenged for the first time the aggravating factors supporting
his exceptional sentence. Barberio, 121 Wash. 2d at 49. The trial court declined to address the issue
and reimposed the same exceptional sentence. Barberio, 121 Wash. 2d at 50- 51. The trial court
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emphasized that neither new evidence nor the Court of Appeals opinion merited reexamination of
Barberio' s sentence. Barberio, 121 Wash. 2d at 51- 52.
Price did not raise the Blakely challenge to his special verdict instruction during his trial,
in his first direct appeal, or in any of his three subsequent personal restraint petitions. During his
resentencing, the trial court allowed the defense to make its record concerning the alleged Blakely
error but did not rule on its merits. See State v. Parmelee, 172 Wash. App. 899, 908, 292 P.3d 7.99
where resentencing court allowed defense to make a record and allowed the State to respond but
declined to consider the issue, the issue was not properly before the Court of Appeals), review
denied, 177 Wash. 2d 1027 ( 2013). The trial court instead stated that the jury found an aggravating
circumstance and that the prior judge had the ability to impose an exceptional sentence. Because
the trial court declined to reach the merits of Price' s challenge to the special verdict instruction,
we decline to do so as well. Kilgore, 167 Wash. 2d at 40; Barberio, 121 Wash. 2d at 50- 51.
II. RIGHT OF ALLOCUTION
Price contends that the trial court violated his right of allocution by imposing sentence
before giving him a chance to speak. " Allocution is the right of a criminal defendant to make a
personal argument or statement to the court before the pronouncement of sentence." State v.
Canfield, 154 Wash. 2d 698, 701, 116 P.3d 391 ( 2005). This right is guaranteed by RCW
9. 94A.500( 1), and we review an alleged violation of this statutory right de novo. State v. Hatchie,
161 Wash. 2d 390, 405, 166 P.3d 698 ( 2007).
The State contends that Price waived the issue because he did not object by requesting
resentencing before a different judge. See State v. Aguilar -Rivera; 83 Wash. App. 199, 200, 920
P.2d 623 ( 1996) ( violation of right of allocution entitles defendant to new sentencing hearing
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46066 -1 - II.
before different judge). There is no authority requiring a defendant to request this remedy in order
to preserve this issue for review.
Here, the trial court noted its intention to reimpose Price' s original sentence before defense
counsel interrupted to state that her client wanted to speak. The trial court then apologized and
allowed Price to make a statement. When Price finished, the trial court stated that Price' s
comments did not alter the court' s original inclination. Price' s objection sufficiently preserved the
allocution issue for review. .
It is evident that the trial court did not precisely adhere to statutory procedure in sentencing
Price. RCW 9. 94A. 500( 1); see In re Pers. Restraint ofEcheverria, 141 Wash. 2d 323, 336, 6 P.3d
573 ( 2000) ( trial court should " scrupulously follow" the statutory requirements by directly
addressing defendants during sentencing, asking whether they wish to say anything in mitigation
of sentence, and allowing them to make arguments as to the proper sentence before imposition of
sentence). 3 Price argues that the trial court' s actions constitute error that require resentencing
before a different judge, while the State maintains that any error was harmless. We agree with the
State.
Washington decisions differ on whether a violation of the right of allocution can constitute
harmless error. In State v. Delange, 31 Wn. App. 800, 801, 644 P.2d 1200 ( 1982), the trial court
noted its intention to accept the State' s recommendation and sentenced the defendant to 10 years
before defense counsel objected that the court had denied the defendant her right of allocution.
When the defendant stated that she should have been heard before she was sentenced, the court
3 Echeverria referred to former RCW 9. 94A. 110, which was recodified as RCW 9. 94A.500 in
2001. 141 Wash. 2d at 336; LAWS OF 2001, ch. 10, § 6.
46066 -1 - II
stated that she hadn' t yet been sentenced and invited her to speak. Delange, 31 Wash. App. at 801.
The trial court then imposed a 10 -year sentence. Delange, 31 Wash. App. at 802.
In Delange, the trial court had not entered its formal sentence before allowing the defendant
to allocute, thus she exercised her right of allocution before sentencing. 31 Wash. App. at 802.
Although that right should have been afforded before the court revealed its intention with respect
to sentence, its failure to do so was inadvertent. When defense counsel brought this to the court' s
attention, defendant was immediately given the opportunity to speak." Delange, 31 Wash. App. at
802- 03. The Delange court determined that there was no need to reverse and remand for
resentencing. 31 Wash. App. at 803.
A subsequent decision rejected the State' s claim of harmless error. State v. Crider, 78 Wn.
App. 849, 860- 61, 899 P.2d 24 ( 1995). In Crider, the defendant filed a notice of appeal based on
a violation of his right of allocution immediately after the trial court entered judgment. 78 Wn.
App. at. 853. At the trial court' s invitation, the defendant then made a statement, but the court was
not swayed. , Crider, 78 Wn. App. at 853. The Crider court concluded that "[ a] pplying harmless
error in the face of a total failure of allocution prior to the imposition of sentence would severely
erode a right which the State concedes to be fundamental." 78 Wash. App. at 861. The Crider court
vacated the sentence and remanded for resentencing. 78 Wash. App. at 861.
In Aguilar -Rivera, the trial court imposed an exceptional sentence, legal financial
obligations, 12 months of community supervision with conditions, and then stated, " That is the
sentence of the court." 83 Wn. App. at 200- 01. When the trial court directed the defendant to
come forward for fingerprinting, defense counsel pointed out that the court had not permitted his
client to allocute. Aguilar -Rivera, 83 Wash. App. at 201. The trial court acknowledged that it had
just " skipped over" the allocution and listened to the defendant' s statement. Aguilar -Rivera, 83
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Wn. App. at 201. The trial court then adhered to its initial sentence. Aguilar -Rivera, 83 Wash. App.
at 201. On appeal, the Aguilar -Rivera court rejected Delange and held that " when the right of
allocution is inadvertently omitted until after the court has orally announced the sentence it intends
to impose, the remedy is to send the defendant before a different judge for a new sentencing
hearing." 83 Wash. App. at 203.
In State v. Gonzales, 90 Wn. App. 852, 853- 54, 954 P.2d 360 ( 1998), the court employed
a harmless error test where the defendant urged the trial courtto proceed with sentencing and asked
for the recommended low-end sentence, which the trial court then imposed. The Gonzales court
noted that although the trial court had erred by failing to allow the defendant to speak on his own
behalf, " to conclude that the denial of his right to allocution was prejudicial under the facts of this
case would place form above substance." 90 Wash. App. at 855.
The facts here are closer to those in Delange than those of the other cases cited, and we see
no reason to reject the application of harmless error. The trial court' s inadvertent failure to allow
Price to speak before announcing its intended sentence constitutes harmless error. The trial court
had not yet pronounced the final sentence, and after Price spoke, the court observed that the
sentence was not yet final. The trial court listened to Price and afterwards exercised its discretion
in sentencing him. We decline to find prejudicial error on the facts presented and affirm the
exceptional sentence imposed during the defendant' s resentencing.
III. Scrivener' s Errors
The State points out that the defendant' s judgment and sentence contains inconsistent
references to his offender score and sentencing ranges. Paragraph 2. 3 misstates his offender score
as one and provides corresponding sentence ranges for each conviction. The trial court determined
that Price' s offender score was properly calculated as four and that his sentencing ranges were
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those reflected in paragraph 4. 12; Le, 341 to 434 months for count I ( including the 60 -month
enhancement), and 12+ to 16 months for count II. We remand for a ministerial correction of the
scrivener' s errors in paragraph 2. 3 of Price' s judgment and sentence. State v. Moten, 95 Wash. App.
927, 934- 35, 976 P.2d 1286 ( 1999).
We affirm the exceptional sentence but remand for the ministerial correction of the
scrivener' s errors identified in this opinion:
A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not" be printed in the
Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record in accordance with RCW 2. 06. 040,
it is so ordered.
a
Melnick, J.
We concur:
Johanson, C. J.
F; igen, J.
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