Jennifer Wiese, Resps. v. Square Two Financial Corp., App.

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015 AUG 17 Aii 9:3
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION ONE
JENNIFER WIESE and CANDY No. 71806-1-1
BRADISON, individually and on behalf
of all other similarly situated,
Respondents,
v.
CACH, LLC, a Colorado limited liability
company; and SQUARE TWO PUBLISHED OPINION
FINANCIAL CORP., a Delaware
corporation,
Appellants,
SUTTELL & HAMMER, P.S., a
Washington corporation,
Defendant.
JENNIFER WIESE and CANDY No. 72090-2-1
BRADISON, individually and on behalf
of all other similarly situated,
Respondents,
v.
CACH, LLC, a Colorado limited liability
company; and SQUARE TWO
FINANCIAL CORP., a Delaware
corporation,
Appellants,
Nos. 71806-1-1 and 72090-2-1/2
SUTTELL & HAMMER, P.S., a
Washington corporation,
Defendant. ) FILED: August 17, 2015
Schindler, J. — Colorado limited liability company CACH LLC and its parent
company Delaware corporation SquareTwo Financial appeal denial of the motion to
compel arbitration of the claims alleged in a class action lawsuit. The class action
complaint alleges CACH and SquareTwo engaged in a civil conspiracy and unfair and
deceptive debt collection practices in violation of the Consumer Protection Act (CPA),
chapter 19.86 RCW, and the Collection Agency Act (CAA), chapter 19.16 RCW. The
complaint sought an award of damages and declaratory and injunctive relief. We hold
that except for the claim that the judgments CACH previously obtained in the collection
actions are subject to an action to vacate, the claims for civil conspiracy, violation of the
CPA and the CAA, and declaratory and injunctive relief are subject to binding
arbitration. Accordingly, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further
proceedings.
FACTS
On October 24, 2005, Candy Bradison opened a credit card account with FIA
Card Services NA (FIA). FIA is a wholly owned subsidiary of Bank of America
Corporation. A credit card agreement governed the account. Bradison used the credit
card to make a number of purchases. The last payment that she made on her account
was on April 14, 2008.
Nos. 71806-1-1 and 72090-2-1/3
On September 15, 2008, FIA assigned to CACH LLC, a Colorado limited liability
company (CACH), all "rights, title, and interest" to the past due balance Bradison owed
of $20,494.37.
In April 2010, the law firm of Suttell & Hammer PS filed a complaint on behalf of
CACH to collect the unpaid amount Bradison owed on the account. Bradison did not file
a notice of appearance or an answer. CACH filed a motion for entry of a default
judgment and an order of default.
On June 18, the superior court entered a default judgment against Bradison in
the amount of $20,494.37 plus $8,232.71 in interest, $299.50 in costs, and $650.00 in
attorney fees.
On August 23, 2007, Jennifer Wiese opened a credit card account with FIA. A
credit card agreement governed the account. Wiese used the credit card to make a
number of purchases. The last payment she made on her account was on October 22,
2008. On March 17, 2010, FIA assigned to CACH all "rights, title, and interest" to the
past due amount Wiese owed of $4,972.94.
In January 2011, the law firm of Suttell & Hammer filed a complaint on behalf of
CACH to collect the unpaid balance Wiese owed on the account. Wiese did not file a
notice of appearance or an answer. CACH filed a motion for entry of a default judgment
and an order of default.
On January 26, the court entered a default judgment against Wiese in the
amount of $4,972.94 plus $845.19 in interest and $299.50 in costs.
Nos. 71806-1-1 and 72090-2-1/4
On September 25, 2013, Bradison and Wiese filed a class action lawsuit against
CACH and its parent company Delaware corporation SquareTwo Financial
(SquareTwo).1 The complaint defines the putative class as follows:
All persons in Washington state against whom CACH, Square Two, and/or
Suttell & Hammer have taken any action in the name of CACH to collect a
defaulted or charged off debt while not licensed as a collection agency in
accordance with RCW 19.16 et seq.
The complaint alleges CACH "is a shell corporation" and a "wholly-owned
subsidiary of. . . Square Two, which operates CACH as its sole member." The
complaint alleges neither CACH nor SquareTwo were licensed as a debt collection
agency under chapter 19.16 RCW and asserts claims for civil conspiracy and unfair and
deceptive acts and practices in violation of the Consumer Protection Act (CPA), chapter
19.86 RCW, and violation of the Collection Agency Act (CAA), chapter 19.16 RCW.
The complaint seeks an award of compensatory and exemplary damages and
declaratory and injunctive relief. The injunctive relief request includes requiring CACH
to move to vacate the judgments obtained in the collection actions, to notify credit
reporting bureaus of the vacated judgments and request removal of adverse credit
history, and to return to the plaintiffs the amount collected plus interest.
On December 13, CACH filed an answer to the class action complaint. CACH
admits that it is a Colorado limited liability company with headquarters in Denver and
that SquareTwo is its sole member. CACH asserts that "it has a number of authorized
agents and authorized representatives who act on its behalf and "there is a servicing
agreement with SquareTwo." CACH admits that it "purchases charged-off consumer
credit card receivables ('accounts') from original creditor banking institutions, among
1 Bradison and Wiese also sued the law firm of Suttell & Hammer. Suttell & Hammer is not a
party to the appeal.
Nos. 71806-1-1 and 72090-2-1/5
others." CACH admits it "was not licensed as a collection agency at the time the
respective suits were filed against Ms. Bradison and Ms. Wiese." In all other respects,
CACH denies the allegations in the complaint. CACH asserts a number of affirmative
defenses including that "some or all. . . of the putative class claims ... are subject to
valid agreements to arbitrate."
On December 24, CACH filed a motion to compel arbitration and dismiss the
class action complaint. CACH argued the terms of the credit card agreement mandate
arbitration of all claims alleged in the complaint. SquareTwo also filed a motion to
compel arbitration and dismiss the complaint. SquareTwo argued it had the right to
invoke the arbitration clause because it "is being sued as the parent of CACH and is
facing identical claims as CACH." SquareTwo "relie[d] upon and adopt[ed] the
reasoning and analysis provided by CACH" in support of the motion to compel
arbitration.
In opposition, Bradison and Wiese argued the language of the credit card
agreement precluded arbitration of the claims alleged in the class action complaint. In
the alternative, they asserted CACH waived the right to arbitrate by obtaining judgments
in the collection actions.
The court denied CACH's motion to compel arbitration. The court ruled CACH
waived its right to compel arbitration by previously obtaining judgments in the collection
actions. "The court finds that CACH chose to pursue its claims by litigating the debt
owed in a judicial forum rather than through arbitration, and thus, waived its right to now
compel arbitration in the same forum." Following supplemental briefing, the court ruled
Nos. 71806-1-1 and 72090-2-1/6
that as the parent company of CACH, SquareTwo is bound by "CACH's waiver." CACH
and SquareTwo appeal.
ANALYSIS
CACH argues the court erred in denying the motion to compel arbitration of the
claims alleged in the class action complaint. CACH asserts the express language in the
arbitration provision of the credit card agreement governs, and it did not waive the right
to arbitrate the claims asserted in the class action lawsuit by obtaining judgments in the
previous collection actions. We review the decision on a motion to compel arbitration
de novo. Kilqore v. KevBank, Nat'l Ass'n. 718 F.3d 1052, 1057 (9th Cir. 2013) (en
banc); Townsend v. Quadrant Corp., 173 Wash. 2d 451, 455, 268 P.3d 917 (2012).
Arbitration Agreement
The credit card agreement states, "This arbitration agreement is made pursuant
to a transaction involving interstate commerce, and shall be governed by the Federal
Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 ('FAA')." Under the FAA, arbitration agreements are "a
matter of contract" and "shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such
grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract." AT&T Mobility
LLC v. Concepcion, U.S. , 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1745, 179 L. Ed. 2d 742 (2011);2 9
U.S.C. § 2. The FAA mandates that "courts shall direct the parties to proceed to
arbitration on issues as to which an arbitration agreement has been signed." Dean
Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd. 470 U.S. 213, 218, 105 S. Ct. 1238, 84 L. Ed. 2d 158
(1985).3
2 Internal quotation marks omitted.
3 Emphasis in original.
6
Nos. 71806-1-1 and 72090-2-1/7
There is a strong presumption in favor of arbitration to " 'ensur[e] that private
arbitration agreements are enforced.'" Mortensen v. Bresnan Commc'ns, LLC. 722
F.3d 1151, 1159 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting AT&T, 131 S. Ct. at 1748); see also Marmet
Health Care Ctr., Inc. v. Brown, U.S. , 132 S. Ct. 1201, 1203, 182 L. Ed. 2d 42
(2012) (per curiam) (noting that the FAA reflects an "emphatic federal policy" in favor of
arbitration).4 Because any arbitration agreement within the scope of the FAA "shall be
valid, irrevocable, and enforceable," "[a]ny doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable
issues, construction of the contract, or a defense of delay, waiver, or the like should be
resolved in favor of arbitration." 9 U.S.C. § 2; Kinsey v. Bradley, 53 Wash. App. 167, 170,
765 P.2d 1329 (1989) (citing Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp.,
460 U.S. 1, 24-25, 103 S. Ct. 927, 74 L. Ed. 2d 765 (1983)): see also Gandee v. LDL
Freedom Enters., Inc., 176 Wash. 2d 598, 603, 293 P.3d 1197 (2013).
In determining whether to enforce an arbitration provision, we engage in a limited
two-part inquiry: first, whether the arbitration agreement is valid, and if so, whether the
agreement encompasses the claims asserted. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler
Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 627-28, 105 S. Ct. 3346, 87 L. Ed. 2d 444
(1985). Bradison and Wiese do not challenge the validity of the arbitration provision in
the credit card agreement. Bradison and Wiese assert the language of the agreement
bars CACH and SquareTwo from invoking the arbitration provision of the credit card
agreement.
The credit card agreement states, in pertinent part:
Your Agreement with us consists of this Credit Card Agreement
.... The terms of this Agreement apply to you ifany of you applied for
and were granted an account, used the account, maintained the account,
4 Internal quotation marks omitted.
Nos. 71806-1-1 and 72090-2-1/8
and/or otherwise accepted the account. You agree to the terms and
conditions of this Agreement.
The "Arbitration and Litigation" section of the credit card agreement
unequivocally states that any claim or dispute "arising from or relating in any way to this
Agreement" shall be resolved by binding arbitration and may not be brought as a class
action.
Any claim or dispute ("Claim") by either you or us against the other,
or against the employees, agents or assigns . . . , arising from or relating
in any way to this Agreement or any prior Agreement or your account
(whether under a statute, in contract, tort, or otherwise and whether for
money damages, penalties or declaratory or equitable relief), shall, upon
election by either you or us, be resolved by binding arbitration... .
Arbitration shall take place before a single arbitrator and on an
individual basis without resort to any form of class action. Arbitration may
be selected at any time unless a judgment has been rendered or the other
party would suffer substantial prejudice by the delay in demanding
arbitration.
No Claim submitted to arbitration is heard by a jury or may be
brought as a class action or as a private attorney general. You do not
have the right to act as a class representative or participate as a member
of a class of claimants with respect to any Claim submitted to arbitration
(Class Action Waiver). The parties to this Agreement acknowledge that
the Class Action Waiver is material and essential to the arbitration of any
disputes between the parties and is nonseverable from this agreement to
arbitrate Claims. . . . The Parties acknowledge and agree that under no
circumstances will a class action be arbitrated.
This Arbitration and Litigation Section applies to all Claims now in
existence or that may arise in the future. This Arbitration and Litigation
Section shall survive the termination of your account with us as well as
any voluntary payment of the debt in full by you, any bankruptcy by you or
sale of the debt by us.
For the purposes of this Arbitration and Litigation Section, "we" and
"us" means FIA Card Services, N.A., its parent, subsidiaries, affiliates,
Nos. 71806-1-1 and 72090-2-1/9
licensees, predecessors, successors, assigns, and any purchaser of your
account, and all of their officers, directors, employees, agents and assigns
of any and all of them. Additionally, "we" or "us" shall mean any third party
providing benefits, services, or products in connection with the account
(including but not limited to credit bureaus, merchants that accept any
credit device issued under the account, rewards or enrollment services,
credit insurance companies, debt collectors and all of their officers,
directors, employees and agents) if, and only if, such a third party is
named by you as a co-defendant in any Claim you assert against us.
YOU UNDERSTAND AND AGREE THAT IF EITHER YOU OR WE
ELECT TO ARBITRATE A CLAIM, THIS ARBITRATION SECTION
PRECLUDES YOU AND US FROM HAVING A RIGHT OR
OPPORTUNITY TO LITIGATE CLAIMS THROUGH COURT, OR TO
PARTICIPATE OR BE REPRESENTED IN LITIGATION FILED IN
COURT BY OTHERS. EXCEPT AS OTHERWISE PROVIDED ABOVE,
ALL CLAIMS MUST BE RESOLVED THROUGH ARBITRATION IF YOU
OR WE ELECT TO ARBITRATED
Bradison and Wiese rely on the language that states, "Arbitration may be
selected at any time unless a judgment has been rendered."6 Bradison and Wiese
claim that because CACH obtained default judgments in the previous collection actions,
the language "unless a judgment has been rendered" bars arbitration of the claims
alleged in the class action lawsuit. This argument ignores the specific language that
states either party may invoke the right to arbitrate 'Talnv claim or dispute" and the well
settled principle that the language of arbitration agreements must be construed as a
whole.7 Adler v. Fred Lind Manor. 153 Wash. 2d 331, 351, 103 P.3d 773 (2004).
Further, an arbitration provision that encompasses any controversy "relating to" a
contract is broader than language covering only claims "arising out" of a contract.
5 Boldface in original.
6 Emphasis added.
7 Emphasis added.
Nos. 71806-1-1 and 72090-2-1/10
McClure v. Tremaine. 77 Wash. App. 312, 314-15, 890 P.2d 466 (1995).8 Here, the
arbitration provision includes broad language stating that "[a]ny claim or dispute
. . . arising from or relating in any way to this Agreement" shall be subject to binding
arbitration.
Any claim or dispute ("Claim") by either you or us against the other,
or against the employees, agents or assigns . . . , arising from or relating
in any way to this Agreement or any prior Agreement or your account
(whether under a statute, in contract, tort, or otherwise and whether for
money damages, penalties or declaratory or equitable relief), shall, upon
election by either you or us, be resolved by binding arbitration.
When a valid arbitration provision includes such broad language, "all doubts are
to be resolved in favor of arbitrability." Simula, Inc. v. Autoliv, Inc., 175 F.3d 716, 721
(9th Cir. 1999) (finding that the claims in the complaint need only "touch matters"
covered by the agreement containing the arbitration provision).9
The language Bradison and Wiese rely on stating that "[ajrbitration may be
selected at any time unless a judgment has been rendered" does not preclude
arbitration of the civil conspiracy, the CPA, and the CAA claims alleged in the class
action complaint. The court did not render a judgment in the collection actions on the
civil conspiracy, CPA, and CAA claims alleged in the class action lawsuit. Filing a
lawsuit in state court to collect a debt does not mean CACH cannot compel arbitration
where the debtor brings a lawsuit alleging different claims. CACH is entitled to invoke
the right to arbitrate the civil conspiracy, CPA, and CAA claims.
8 Internal quotation marks omitted.
9 Internal quotation marks omitted.
10
Nos. 71806-1-1 and 72090-2-1/11
Claim To Vacate Judgments
By contrast, however, we conclude the express terms of the credit card
agreement bar CACH from invoking the right to arbitrate the request to vacate the
judgments entered in the collection actions.
The class action complaint alleges that the judgments obtained by CACH in the
previous debt collection actions are subject to vacation. The complaint alleges that
because neither CACH nor SquareTwo were licensed as collection agencies at the time
they filed the collection actions against Bradison and Wiese, the judgments against
them "and all other Class members" obtained in the collection actions are "void and
voidable." Bradison and Wiese also assert prejudice to their legal position by being
"compelled to submit to arbitration" because "CACH will. . . argue that the arbitrator
should not—or cannot—second-guess [the] superior court judgments."
Typically, vacation of a judgment is sought under CR 60. However, Washington
courts recognize that vacation of a judgment deemed to be void or procured through
fraud may also be sought through an independent action in equity or a collateral attack.
Corporate Loan & Sec. Co. v. Peterson, 64 Wash. 2d 241, 243-44, 391 P.2d 199 (1964).
The plaintiffs characterize their case as an "independent suit in equity which seeks to
vacate the underlying collection action judgments."
CACH concedes that judgments have been rendered on the breach of contract
claims filed by CACH in the underlying collection matters. CACH summarily responds
that even if the exception to arbitration found in the contract—"unless a judgment has
been rendered"—applies to the underlying collection matters, the plaintiffs are barred by
res judicata from relitigating the underlying collection matters because the default
11
Nos. 71806-1-1 and 72090-2-1/12
judgments were final judgments. The briefing on that issue in this appeal does not
permit summary adjudication of the res judicata defense. This appeal arises from
CACH's motion to compel arbitration, not from a motion for summary judgment on the
vacatur claim.
We hold that the claim to vacate the judgments entered in the collection actions
is not subject to arbitration under the language of the arbitration provision in the
agreement. There is no dispute that a judgment was "rendered" in the collection
actions. Arbitration may not be compelled as to the vacatur claim raised in plaintiffs'
complaint because that claim concerns the underlying collection actions in which
"judgment has been rendered." "[W]hen a complaint contains both arbitrable and
nonarbitrable claims, the [FAA] requires courts to 'compel arbitration of pendent
arbitrable claims when one of the parties files a motion to compel, even where the result
would be the possibly inefficient maintenance of separate proceedings in different
forums.'" KPMG LLP v. Cocchi, U.S. , 132 S. Ct. 23, 26, 181 L. Ed. 2d 323
(2011) (quoting Bvrd, 470 U.S. at 217). Accordingly, plaintiffs are entitled to have their
vacatur action adjudicated in court. CACH's defense that the vacatur action is barred
by res judicata may be raised on remand.
Waiver
Bradison and Wiese claim CACH waived the right to invoke arbitration by filing
the debt collection actions in state court.
A party opposing arbitration bears a " 'heavy burden'" to show waiver of the right
to arbitrate. Steele v. Lundgren, 85 Wash. App. 845, 852, 935 P.2d 671 (1997) (quoting
Fisher v. A.G. Becker Paribas Inc., 791 F.2d 691, 694 (9th Cir. 1986)). Under federal
12
Nos. 71806-1-1 and 72090-2-1/13
law, "the ultimate determination of waiver is reviewed de novo, as a matter of law."
Steele, 85 Wash. App. at 850-51; Microstrategy, Inc. v. Lauricia. 268 F.3d 244, 250 (4th
Cir. 2001). To establish waiver of the right to arbitration, the party opposing arbitration
must demonstrate " '(1) knowledge of an existing right to compel arbitration; (2) acts
inconsistent with that existing right; and (3) prejudice to the party opposing arbitration
resulting from such inconsistent acts.'" Letizia v. Prudential Bache Sec, Inc., 802 F.2d
1185, 1187 (9th Cir.1986) (quoting Fisher, 791 F.2d at 694). " 'Waiver will be found
when the party seeking arbitration substantially invokes the judicial process to the
detriment or prejudice of the other party.'" Subway Equip. Leasing Corp. v. Forte, 169
F.3d 324, 326 (5th Cir.1999) (quoting Miller Brewing Co. v. Fort Worth Distrib. Co., 781
F.2d 494, 497 (5th Cir. 1986)).
"[A] party only invokes the judicial process to the extent it litigates a specific claim
it subsequently seeks to arbitrate." Subway, 169 F.3d at 328; see also Otis Hous. Ass'n
v. Ha, 165 Wash. 2d 582, 588, 201 P.3d 309 (2009) (A party who has litigated certain
issues and lost "may not later seek to relitigate the same issue in a different forum.").
To show waiver of the right to arbitrate, the party must have previously litigated the
same legal and factual issues that the party now seeks to arbitrate. Microstrategy, 268
F.3d at 250; Subway, 169 F.3d at 328; Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Distaio. 107 F.3d 126,
133 (2nd Cir. 1997). "[0]nly prior litigation of the same legal and factual issues as those
the party now wants to arbitrate results in waiver of the right to arbitrate." Distaio, 107
F.3d at 133; see also Verbeek Props., LLC v. GreenCo Environmental, Inc., 159 Wn.
App. 82, 91-92, 246 P.3d 205 (2010).
13
Nos. 71806-1-1 and 72090-2-1/14
Here, the previous debt collection actions are separate and distinct from the civil
conspiracy, CPA, and CAA claims alleged in the class action complaint. The court in
the collection actions on the delinquent credit card accounts "did not, was not asked to,
and was not authorized to find facts or make conclusions of law" related to the civil
conspiracy, CPA, and CAA claims CACH and SquareTwo now seek to arbitrate. See
Verbeek. 159 Wash. App. at 92.
The record shows no prejudice from delay or expense as to the civil conspiracy,
CPA, and CAA claims. Prejudice "refers to the inherent unfairness—in terms of delay,
expense, or damage to a party's legal position—that occurs when the party's opponent
forces it to litigate an issue and later seeks to arbitrate that same issue." Distaio, 107
F.3d at 134.10 In determining prejudice, we consider the extent of the delay, the degree
of litigation preceding the motion to compel, the resulting expenses, and other
surrounding circumstances. Kramer v. Hammond, 943 F.2d 176, 179 (2nd Cir. 1991).
Bradison and Wiese filed the class action complaint on September 25, 2013.
CACH filed an answer on December 13 asserting the right to arbitration. Approximately
10 days later, CACH filed a motion to compel arbitration. Contrary to the assertion of
Bradison and Wiese, the attorney fees and costs incurred in the collection actions are
unrelated to the claims asserted in the later filed class action lawsuit. "Incurring legal
expenses inherent in litigation, without more, is insufficient evidence of prejudice to
justify a finding of waiver." PPG Indus., Inc. v. Webster Auto Parts Inc., 128 F.3d 103,
107 (2nd Cir. 1997).
We conclude that pursuing the debt collection actions does not bar CACH or
SquareTwo from invoking the arbitration provision for the civil conspiracy, CPA, and
10 Emphasis added.
14
Nos. 71806-1-1 and 72090-2-1/15
CAA claims alleged in the later filed class action complaint. See Distaio, 107 F.3d at
133 ("Finding waiver where a party has previously litigated an unrelated yet arbitrable
dispute would effectively abrogate an arbitration clause once a party had litigated any
issue relating to the underlying contract containing the arbitration clause.").11
SquareTwo
In the linked appeal, SquareTwo contends the court erred in denying the motion
to compel arbitration. SquareTwo asserts that as the parent company of CACH, it is
entitled to invoke arbitration of the claims asserted in the class action complaint.
Where the claims against a parent and subsidiary are "based on the same
facts . . . and are inherently inseparable, a court may order arbitration of claims against
the parent even though the parent is not a party to the arbitration agreement."12
Townsend v. Quadrant Corp., 153 Wash. App. 870, 889, 224 P.3d 818 (2009) (citing J.J.
Ryan & Sons, Inc. v. Rhone Poulenc Textile, S.A., 863 F.2d 315, 320-21 (4th Cir. 1988)
("Ifthe parent corporation was forced to try the case, the arbitration proceedings would
be rendered meaningless and the federal policy in favor of arbitration effectively
thwarted.");13 see also PRM Energy Svs., Inc. v. Primenergy. LLC, 592 F.3d 830, 837
(8th Cir. 2010) (recognizing court may allow a nonsignatory to compel arbitration under
"agency and related principles .. . when, as a result of the nonsignatory's close
relationship with a signatory, a failure to do so would eviscerate the arbitration
agreement"); Comer v. Micor, Inc., 436 F.3d 1098, 1101 (9th Cir. 2006) ("nonsignatories
of arbitration agreements may be bound by the agreement under ordinary contract and
11 Emphasis in original.
12 Therefore, we need not address SquareTwo's arguments based on the doctrine of estoppel
and third party beneficiary.
13 Internal quotation marks omitted.
15
Nos. 71806-1-1 and 72090-2-1/16
agency principles").14 As the parent company of CACH, except for the claim to vacate
the judgments previously obtained in the collection actions, SquareTwo is entitled to
arbitrate the civil conspiracy, CPA, and CAA claims.
In sum, we hold that except for the claim to vacate the judgments obtained in the
previous collection actions that are subject to a motion to vacate, all of the other claims
alleged against CACH and SquareTwo in the class action complaint including civil
conspiracy, violation of the CPA and the CAA, and declaratory and injunctive relief are
subject to binding arbitration. Accordingly, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and
remand for further proceedings.
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