State Of Washington v. Wyatt Henderson

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2015 JAN 20 AH 9:1*1
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF WASHINGTON, No. 70929-1-1
Respondent,
v.
WYATT JAMES HENDERSON,
DOB 10/16/95, UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Appellant. FILED: January 20, 2015
Verellen, J. — Wyatt Henderson appeals from his juvenile adjudication for two
counts of Violation of the Uniform Controlled Substances Act, chapter 69.50 RCW. He
argues the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence, contending that
he was subject to an unlawful seizure and search. Because the officer had specific and
articulable facts that criminal conduct had occurred or was about to occur and had a
reasonable belief that Henderson might be armed and presently dangerous, we affirm.
FACTS
On the afternoon of July 2, 2011, Seattle Police Officer Christopher Brownlee
was in uniform and patrolling Cal Anderson Park on his bicycle. Brownlee has
extensive training and experience recognizing street level drug sales, including buying
drugs as an undercover officer. Because the park was known to officers to be a
"hotspot" of criminal activity, including sales of heroin and methamphetamines,
Brownlee was routinely deployed "to do proactive enforcement to actively seek out
No. 70929-1-1/2
crimes as they are occurring."1 The park spans two city blocks and contains tennis
courts, soccer fields, a playground and a wading pool, but the northwest corner of the
park is largely empty and secluded. Brownlee identified this northwest corner as one of
the areas with the highest amount of criminal activity.
As Brownlee rode into the northwest corner, he saw two males, Henderson and
Peter Hakala, standing very close together, face-to-face, slightly offset from each other,
with their hands down close to their waistbands. According to Brownlee, during a hand-
to-hand drug transaction, the buyer and seller typically stand "face-to-face and in close
proximity so that a casual passerby could not see what was actually transpiring."2
Brownlee saw the tip of what he believed to be a plastic baggie in Hakala's left hand,
and was aware that street-level narcotics are often packaged in plastic baggies. Based
on his training and experience, Brownlee believed that Henderson and Hakala were
about to engage in a hand-to-hand drug transaction. As Brownlee rode closer, Hakala
caught sight of him. Hakala's eyes widened and "he kind of got a 'dam it' look on his
face."3 Henderson and Hakala immediately turned their bodies away from Brownlee
and obscured their hands.
Brownlee approached the males, saying, "Hey, what are you doing?"4
Henderson responded that he was "hanging out" and that Hakala was telling him to
"stay away from tweakers."5 Because Henderson appeared to be a juvenile, Brownlee
1 Report of Proceedings (RP) (Sept. 10, 2013) at 8-9.
2 id, at 15.
3 Id at 17.
4 id, at 27.
5 Id.
No. 70929-1-1/3
asked his name and age. Henderson responded that his name was Tyler J. Hanson,
that he was 15 years old and from Stanwood. Brownlee knew most of the homeless
youth that frequented the park and did not recognize Henderson Suspecting that
Henderson was a runaway, Brownlee decided to have dispatchers run the name and
date of birth Henderson gave him through a database to determine if he had been
reported missing. Brownlee typically received a result in less than two minutes.
As Brownlee used his radio to contact dispatch, Henderson began to shuffle his
feet back and forth and cast his eyes about from left to right. In Brownlee's experience,
these movements can be indicators of an impending attack. Brownlee asked
Henderson to stop moving around, and Henderson complied. Henderson then put his
hands underneath his shirt. Brownlee again ordered Henderson to stop moving.
Brownlee then noticed that Henderson had the word "Peace" and a phone number
written in marker on his arm. Brownlee knew an individual with the street name of
Peace as a methamphetamine dealer who had been involved in a ring of burglaries.
Brownlee asked Henderson, "All right, so what kind of drugs are you using now?"6
Henderson admitted that he had used heroin that morning. Because Brownlee had
previously had drug users brandish needles at him as a makeshift weapon, Brownlee
asked Henderson if he had any needles on him. Henderson stated that he was not
sure.
Based on Henderson's body posturing, body movements, and the possibility that
Henderson had needles on his person, Brownlee proceeded to pat Henderson down for
weapons. Brownlee felt a bulge in Henderson's pocket and asked if it was a wallet.
6 Id. at 36.
No. 70929-1-1/4
Henderson responded that it was. Because Brownlee had not yet heard back from
dispatch, he suspected that Henderson had given him a false name. Brownlee asked if
he could remove Henderson's wallet from his pocket and Henderson agreed. Brownlee
saw what appeared to be an identification card sticking out of the wallet. He asked
Henderson if he could take it out of the wallet, and Henderson responded, "I would
rather you didn't."7 Brownlee said, "You lied to me about your name, didn't you?"8
Henderson admitted that he had lied and that he had two outstanding warrants.
Brownlee placed Henderson under arrest. Brownlee verified the warrants and read
Henderson his Miranda rights.9 Brownlee searched Henderson and found a
methamphetamine pipe. During a subsequent search of Henderson's backpack,
Brownlee also found heroin, several used syringes, and paraphernalia used to cook
heroin.
The State charged Henderson with two counts of Violation of the Uniform
Controlled Substances Act, RCW 69.50.4013. Henderson moved to suppress the
statements and physical evidence obtained following his seizure. After a CrR 3.6
hearing, the trial court denied the motion and found that the seizure, protective frisk, and
search of Henderson's backpack were lawful. Following a bench trial on stipulated
facts, the trial court found Henderson guilty as charged. Henderson appeals.
DISCUSSION
Henderson contends that the trial erred by denying his motion to suppress
because the seizure and the subsequent protective frisk were unlawful. We review a
7 id, at 42.
8id,
9 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966).
No. 70929-1-1/5
trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress to determine whether substantial evidence
supports the trial court's factual findings and whether its factual findings support its
conclusions of law.10 "Evidence is substantial when it is enough 'to persuade a fair-
minded person of the truth of the stated premise.'"11 Unchallenged findings of fact are
verities on appeal.12 We review conclusions of law de novo.13
Seizure
A seizure occurs when, "considering all the circumstances, an individual's
freedom of movement is restrained and the individual would not believe he or she is free
to leave or decline a request due to an officer's use of force or display of authority."14
This is an objective standard that looks to the law enforcement officer's actions and
asks whether a reasonable person in the individual's position would feel he or she was
being detained.15
Under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I,
section 7 of the Washington State Constitution, a warrantless seizure is considered per
se unconstitutional.16 If a seizure is unlawful, the subsequent search and fruits of that
10 State v. Garvin. 166 Wash. 2d 242, 249, 207 P.3d 1266 (2009).
11 id (quoting State v. Reid. 98 Wash. App. 152, 156, 988 P.2d 1038 (1999)).
12 State v. Valdez. 167 Wash. 2d 761, 767, 224 P.3d 751 (2009). Henderson
challenges only Finding of Fact 14, which reads: "At this point, [when Brownlee decided
to check Henderson's name in the computer database], Henderson was free to end
their conversation and could have walked away." Clerk's Papers at 63.
13 Garvin, 166 Wash. 2d at 249.
14 State v. Rankin, 151 Wash. 2d 689, 695, 92 P.3d 202 (2004).
15 id,
16 Id.
No. 70929-1-1/6
search are inadmissible.17 However, officers may conduct a brief investigatory
detention of a person, commonly called a Terry18 stop, absent a warrant.19 The officer
must have "a reasonable suspicion, grounded in specific and articulable facts, that the
person stopped has been or is about to be involved in a crime."20 "A reasonable,
articulable suspicion means that there 'is a substantial possibility that criminal conduct
has occurred or is about to occur.'"21 We determine the reasonableness of the officer's
suspicion based on the totality of the circumstances.22 In reviewing those
circumstances, we may consider such factors as the officer's training and experience,
the location of the stop, and the conduct of the person detained.23
Here, the unchallenged findings of fact support the trial court's denial of
Henderson's motion to suppress.24 Henderson was in an isolated corner of Cal
Anderson Park, which was known for a high incidence of narcotics use and delivery.
Henderson and Hakala were standing face-to-face with their hands near their waists, a
17 State v. Kennedy, 107 Wash. 2d 1, 4, 726 P.2d 445 (1986).
18 Terry v. Ohio. 392 U.S. 1.88S. Ct. 1868, 20 L Ed. 2d 889 (1968).
19 State v. Acrev. 148 Wash. 2d 738, 746-47, 64 P.3d 594 (2003).
20 id, at 747.
21 State v. Snapp. 174 Wash. 2d 177, 197-98, 275 P.3d 289 (2012) (quoting
Kennedy, 107 Wash. 2d at 6).
22 Id, at 198.
23 State v. Glover, 116 Wash. 2d 509, 514, 806 P.2d 760 (1991).
24 The trial court concluded that up until the point where Brownlee contacted
dispatch with Henderson's name and date of birth to determine if he was a runaway,
Brownlee and Henderson's interaction constituted a "social contact," not a seizure.
However, Henderson argues, and the State agrees, that Henderson was seized once
Brownlee approached and asked, "What are you doing?" We need not address this
issue because Brownlee had a reasonable, articulable suspicion to conduct a Terry stop
at that point. We may affirm the denial of a suppression motion on any ground that is
supported by the record. State v. Avery. 103 Wash. App. 527, 537, 13 P.3d 226 (2000).
No. 70929-1-1/7
posture typically used in hand-to-hand drug transactions to conceal the exchange from
passers-by. Brownlee saw the tip of a plastic baggie, commonly used to package
drugs, in Hakala's hand. As Brownlee approached, Hakala appeared startled, and both
Henderson and Hakala turned away to hide their hands. The totality of the
circumstances, combined with Brownlee's training and experience, gave rise to a
reasonable suspicion that Henderson was about to buy or sell drugs, thereby justifying a
Terry stop.
Henderson argues that this case is similar to State v. Gatewood.25 State v.
Doughty26 and State v. Richardson,27 three cases in which a defendant's actions were
deemed insufficient to justify a Terry stop. None of these cases are comparable.
In Gatewood. officers on patrol drove by a bus shelter where the defendant was
sitting. The defendant's eyes widened and he twisted his body as though to hide
something. He left the bus shelter and jaywalked across the street, where the officers
stopped him.28 The court held that "[sjtartled reactions to seeing the police do not
amount to reasonable suspicion."29 In Doughty, an officer saw the defendant approach
and leave a suspected drug house late at night.30 The court noted that a defendant's
mere presence in a high crime area, late at night, did not provide the legal basis for a
Terry stop.31 In Richardson, officers were patrolling an area late at night known for high
25 163 Wash. 2d 534, 182 P.3d 426 (2008).
26 170 Wash. 2d 57, 239 P.3d 573 (2010).
27 64 Wash. App. 693, 825 P.2d 754 (1992).
28 Gatewood, 163 Wash. 2d at 537.
29 id, at 540.
30 Doughty, 170 Wash. 2d at 59-60.
31 Id. at 62.
No. 70929-1-1/8
drug activity, when they observed a man engaging in suspicious behavior: approaching
cars to talk to their occupants, then walking away when officers approached.32 The
officers later saw the man with the defendant.33 The court held "an individual's mere
proximity to others independently suspected of criminal activity" does not justify an
investigative stop.34
But here, Brownlee did not stop Henderson based solely on a nervous
expression, as in Gatewood, on his presence in a high-crime area, as in Doughty, or for
his proximity to Hakala, as in Richardson. Brownlee stopped Henderson because the
totality of those circumstances supported Brownlee's reasonable suspicion. The stop
was not unlawful.
Protective Frisk
As part of a Terry stop, an officer may conduct a protective frisk for weapons
when the officer has a reasonable concern for his safety.35 A reasonable safety
concern exists "when an officer can point to 'specific and articulable facts' which create
an objectively reasonable belief that a suspect is 'armed and presently dangerous.'"36
"'[Cjourts are reluctant to substitute their judgment for that of police officers in the field.
A founded suspicion is all that is necessary, some basis from which the court can
determine that the [frisk] was not arbitrary or harassing.'"37 We must consider the
32 Richardson, 64 Wash. App. at 694.
33 id, at 694-95.
34 id, at 697.
35 State v. Collins, 121 Wash. 2d 168, 173, 847 P.2d 919 (1993).
36 id, (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 21, 24).
37 id, (emphasis omitted) (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting State v. Belieu, 112 Wash. 2d 587, 601-02, 773 P.2d 46 (1989)).
No. 70929-1-1/9
entirety of the circumstances in determining the validity of a protective frisk.38
The unchallenged findings of fact support the trial court's conclusion that the frisk
was lawful. As Brownlee talked to Henderson, Henderson shuffled his feet, darted his
eyes around, and reached under his shirt. Brownlee was concerned that these
movements could signify that Henderson was preparing to access a weapon to attack
him. Henderson admitted that he had used heroin that morning. When Brownlee asked
Henderson if he had needles on him, Henderson stated he was not sure. Brownlee had
experience with drug users brandishing needles and other drug paraphernalia at him as
a weapon. These were specific and articulable facts that supported a founded
suspicion that Henderson may be armed and dangerous. Under the circumstances,
Brownlee's protective frisk of Henderson was justified.
Affirmed.
WE CONCUR:
1/<<>kt y . ^
38 State v. Glossbrener, 146 Wash. 2d 670, 679, 49 P.3d 128 (2002).
9