Estate Of Stephen Spring v. Our Community Credit Union

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
THE ESTATE OF STEPHEN SULVAN ) No. 79705-1-I
SPRING, DECEASED; STEPHEN J. )
SPRING, Personal Representative, ) DIVISION ONE
)
Appellant, ) UNPUBLISHED OPINION
v.
OUR COMMUNITY CREDIT UNION, )
and NORTHWEST TRUSTEE )
SERVICES, as Trustee, )
Respondent.
____________________________________ ) FILED: June 10, 2019
HAZELRIGG-HERNANDEZ, J. — In order to proceed with a nonjudicial
foreclosure, the Deeds of Trust Act requires specific notice to unidentified
successors in interest. In 2017, the estate of Stephen Sulvan Spring filed this
complaint for wrongful sale, claiming it had not received notice. Our Community
Credit Union (OCCU) foreclosed on the deed of trust in 2015, before the estate
existed as a legal entity. OCCU followed the notice requirements prior to the
foreclosure. The trial court dismissed Spring’s claim on summary judgment.
Affirmed.
FACTS
In 2008, Stephen S. Spring and Shirley A. Spring granted OCCU a deed of
trust against their property at 11 SE Channel Point Rd, Shelton. Stephen S. Spring
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died in November, 2011.1 Shirley Spring began to miss payments on the
promissory note in July 2013. OCCU communicated with Shirley Spring many
times.
In May, 2015, the trustee mailed a notice of default to Shirley Spring, “The
Estate of Stephen S Spring” and “The Heirs and Devisees of The Estate of Stephen
S Spring” at multiple addresses, including the 11 Southeast Channel Point Road
address. In June, the trustee mailed a notice of trustee’s sale and notice of
foreclosure to the same addressees. The notice of trustee’s sale was recorded
with the Mason County Auditor.
In October 2015, Stephen S. Spring’s son, Stephen J. Spring, filed a
complaint to restrain the trustee’s sale. That complaint was dismissed for failure
to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. OCCU purchased the property
at the trustee’s sale later that month.
Almost a year after the sale in August 2016, Stephen J. Spring petitioned
for letters of administration for the estate of Stephen S. Spring. The estate filed a
complaint for wrongful sale in February 2017. OCCU moved for summary
judgment on the basis that it fulfilled the statutory notice requirements. The court
dismissed the estate’s complaint.
1The death certificate identifies the deceased as “Stephan Sulvan Spring” while the
parties and deed of trust consistently identify him as “Stephen Sulvan Spring.” The parties appear
to accept that the documents refer to the same individual.
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No. 79705-1-113
DISCUSSION
Summary judgment was appropriate because Spring’s complaint failed as
a matter of law.
Summary judgment orders are reviewed de novo, considering the evidence
and reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Keck
v. Collins, 184 Wash. 2d 358, 370, 357 P.3d 1080 (2015). After the defendant has
moved for summary judgment on the basis that there is an absence of evidence to
support the plaintiff’s case, the plaintiff must demonstrate facts, which if believed
by the factfinder, would entitle them to relief. Young v. Key Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,
112 Wash. 2d 216, 225, 770 P.2d 182 (1989) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477
U.S. 317, 322, 106 5. Ct. 2548, 91 L. Ed. 2d 265 (1986)). If the plaintiff fails to
establish an essential element of the case, summary judgment is appropriate. ki.
Spring alleged that the trustee’s sale failed to comply with the Deeds of
Trust Act.2 Spring argues that because the estate did not exist at the time of the
sale, the trustee could not notify the estate as required in the act.3 This court
disagrees.
The notice requirements for a trustee’s sale when the trustee knows the
borrower is deceased are contained in RCW 61.24.030(10) and RCW
61.24.040(b)(i)(B). The trustee must send notice to any successor in interest.
RCW 61.24.040(1)(b)(i)(B). If no successor in interest has been established, the
2 Chapter 61.24 RCW
~ Spring cites RCW 61.24.031, but that section only applies to deeds of trust recorded
against owner-occupied residential real property. ROW 61.24.031 (7)(a). It is undisputed that the
borrowers, Stephen S. Spring, the deceased, and Shirley A. Spring, his spouse, did not reside at
the 11 SE Channel Point Road property. Therefore, ROW 61.24.031 does not apply.
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trustee must send notice to any spouse, child, or parent of the borrower known to
the trustee, or whose name and address can be located in the public records of
any obituary, will, death certificate, or probate case in the county where the
property is located. ~; RCW 61.24.030(10).
There is no requirement to notify the deceased borrower’s estate of a
trustee’s sale when the estate has not been established. The statute specifically
provides for alternative notice in situations where the successor in interest has not
been established. In such a situation, the trustee must notify any spouse, child, or
parent the trustee can ascertain with reasonable diligence. Here, the trustee
mailed notice to Shirley Spring, decedent’s spouse, as well as notice addressed to
“The Estate of Stephen S Spring” and “The Heirs and Devisees of The Estate of
Stephen S Spring”. Each notice was sent to three different addresses, including
the 11 SE Channel Point Road address. Because the statute explicitly provides
alternative notification methods when a successor in interest has not been
established, OCCU was not required to notify the estate, and Spring’s complaint
fails as a matter of law.
II. Even if Spring’s interpretation of the Deeds of Trust Act was correct, he has
failed to designate a record sufficient for us to reverse a trial court’s
decision.
After OCCU filed a motion for summary judgment, affidavits, and documents
demonstrating compliance with the act, the burden on summary judgment shifted
to Spring to demonstrate evidence that would support a verdict in Spring’s favor.
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Spring did not designate any evidence introduced in response to OCCU’s
summary judgment motion in the record before this court. The appellant bears the
burden of perfecting the record on appeal so the reviewing court has the evidence
relevant to deciding the issues. Rhinevault v. Rhinevault, 91 Wash. App. 688, 692,
959 P.2d 687 (1998). The record before us contains only bare assertions
supporting Spring’s complaint, and does not designate any materials that contain
evidence supporting a claim that OCCU failed to comply with the Deeds of Trust
Act. Affirmed.
WE CONCUR:
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