Michael Chiofar Gummo Bear v. Michael Underwood

FILED
MAY 26, 2015
In the Office of the Clerk of Court
WA State Court of Appeals, Division III
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION THREE
MICHAEL CHIOFAR GUMMO BEAR, )
by and through his DPOA, RICHARD )
LENNSTROM, )
) No. 32127-4-III
Appellant, )
)
v. )
)
WASHINGTON STATE: its superior )
court, COA-I Hon. Comm. ELLIS, )
COA-II Hon. Comm. SCHMIDT, )
DSHS, DOC, DOL, et al.; PIERCE )
COUNTY: All its agents and Employees, )
et al; KING COUNTY: All its agents and )
Employees, et al; CITY OF SEATILE: )
All its agents and Employees, et al; )
WILLIAM MICHELMAN, JD; )
VALERIE MARUSHIGE, JD; LARRY ) UNPUBLISHED OPINION
GARRETT, JD; and All Their agents & )
Employees, )
)
Defendants, )
)
MICHAEL UNDERWOOD, JD, )
)
Respondent. )
SIDDOWAY, C.J. Michael Chiofar Gummo Bear appeals the trial court's
dismissal of his legal malpractice action against Michael Underwood, whom he alleged
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Gummo Bear v. Underwood
negligently represented him in a 2008 prosecution for felony harassment. The trial court
granted summary judgment dismissing Mr. Bear's complaint notwithstanding Mr. Bear's
request that consideration of the motion be continued until a limited guardian could be
appointed to handle litigation on his behalf.
The trial court never addressed Mr. Bear's legal capacity on the record. Mr.
Bear's assignments of error implicitly contend that the court should have appointed a
guardian ad litem (GAL) sua sponte. We do not find the manifest evidence of need for a
GAL that would demonstrate an abuse of discretion by the trial court, however, nor did
Mr. Bear make the showing required to justity a continuance.
Because the undisputed evidence demonstrated that Mr. Bear had never personally
served Mr. Underwood with process and that the statute of limitations had run, we affirm
the trial court's dismissal of Mr. Bear's claim.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In May 2008, Mr. Bear was charged with felony criminal harassment after he
made a threatening phone call to a judicial assistant in the Pierce County Superior Court.
The court appointed Michael Underwood to represent him.
The State later amended the information, reducing the charge to misdemeanor
harassment, because it recognized it would be difficult to prove the victim was in
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reasonable fear that the threat would be carried out. The judicial assistant told
prosecutors she was not afraid Mr. Bear would act on his threat.
In August 2008, after Mr. Bear was found competent to stand trial, he entered an
Alfordl plea to an amended charge of gross misdemeanor harassment. The State and Mr.
Bear recommended a 365-day sentence with 277 days suspended and credit for the 88
days served; Mr. Bear told the court he was entering the guilty plea because he wanted to
get out ofjail that day. State v. Chiofar, noted at 152 Wn. App. 1017,2009 WL
2942666. 2 The record on which the court relied in accepting the plea did not include
evidence that the threatened judicial assistant reasonably feared that Mr. Bear would
carry out his threat; to the contrary, it included the deputy prosecutor's admission that the
State would have difficulty proving the fear element of felony harassment.
Shortly after pleading guilty, Mr. Bear appealed, seeking to withdraw his guilty
plea. In an unpublished decision, Division Two of this court overturned Mr. Bear's
guilty plea, finding that it lacked a factual basis. Id. As the court observed, "[a]n
element of criminal harassment, whether felony or misdemeanor, is that 'the person
INorth Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 91 S. Ct. 160,27 L. Ed. 2d 162 (1970).
2 We cite the unpublished decision not as an authority, but for the history of the
criminal prosecution as relevant to the malpractice action. Cf OR l4.1(a) (prohibiting
citation to unpublished opinions of the Court of Appeals as authority). We note that Mr.
Bear has referred to himself in earlier litigation by different names, including, "Michael
Theodore Bear," "Michael Chiofar," and "Michael Oummo." We use the surname
"Bear" based on the summons and complaint filed below.
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threatened [be] in reasonable fear that the threat will be carried out.'" Id. at *2 (quoting
RCW 9A.46.020(l)(b) (emphasis added)). The court concluded that Mr. Bear's "stated
belief that conviction was likely ifhe went to trial shows a misunderstanding of the law,"
and his plea was therefore not voluntary. Id. at *3 (footnote omitted). It vacated the
conviction and remanded to the trial court with instructions to allow Mr. Bear to
withdraw his guilty plea and to dismiss the charge. The charge was dismissed on
November 19,2009.
The present action was commenced in Pierce County Superior Court several
months later by the filing of a summons and complaint. Named as plaintiffwas
"CHIOFAR GUMMO BEAR, Michael, by and through his DPOA: LENNSTROM,
Richard." Clerk's Papers (CP) at 1. The first sentence of the complaint stated
Michael CHIOFAR, Plaintiff herein, together with his Durable Power of
Attorney ("DPOA") Richard LENNSTROM, is authorized to act upon the
Plaintiffs involuntary incapacity.
CP at 4.
The complaint named ten defendants: Michael Underwood, three other lawyers,
two judicial officers, and four state or local agencies. It alleged that each of the lawyers
named as defendants "has committed malpractice in my case(s)." CP at 5. After naming
the defendants and alleging jurisdiction and venue, the complaint included this first
allegation of fact:
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Michael CHIOF AR and his "DPOA", Richard LENNSTROM, are
and have been recipients ofDSHS payments for Social Security, Disability
benefits, and Supplemental Security income. They have been determined
to be eligible for medical benefits for the medically needy. Michael
CHIOFAR has a mental handicap which qualifies under State and Federal
law as a handicap. He has been determined to be incapacitated to handle
certain legal affairs. Richard LENNSTROM has a mental and physical
handicap which qualitY as handicaps under State and F ederallaw. They
have and continue to ask for accommodations to their disabilities.
CP at 6. Elsewhere, the complaint alleged, "Plaintiffs diagnosis of 'Paranoid
Schizophrenia' needs to be accommodated as ... acts and omissions [by attorneys and
officials] and lack of explanation exacerbate Plaintiffs mental disability." CP at 7.
The case was timely removed to the United States District Court for the Western
District of Washington. In respons~ to a motion by Mr. Bear for appointment of a
guardian ad litem on his behalf (a motion joined in by one of the lawyer-defendants), the
federal court appointed John O'Melveny as a guardian ad litem "for the limited purpose
of reviewing the pleadings in this action and making a determination as to whether [Mr.]
Bear's pending claims have merit and whether it is in [Mr.] Bear's best interest to
proceed with the lawsuit." CP at 269.
Mr. O'Melveny submitted a report to the federal court in February 2011, in which
he concluded that while none of Mr. Bear's claims against any other defendant had merit,
Mr. Bear may have a tort claim against Mr. Underwood for not informing Mr. Bear
before he entered his guilty plea that the evidence did not support each element of
criminal harassment. Mr. O'Melveny acknowledged the limits of his information on Mr.
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Underwood's representation and stated that whether Mr. Bear in fact had a claim "would
be a factual question." CP at 292.
After receiving Mr. O'Melveny's report, the federal court dismissed with
prejudice all of Mr. Bear's claims other than the malpractice claim against Mr.
Underwood. It declined to retain jurisdiction of the state law malpractice claim and
remanded it to the Pierce County Superior Court.
Over two years later, in July 2013, Mr. Underwood filed an answer and
affirmative defenses and shortly thereafter moved for summary judgment. He based his
summary judgment motion on evidence that Mr. Bear had not yet served process on Mr.
Underwood as required by RCW 4.28.080 and CR 4, and argument that Mr. Bear's legal
malpractice claim had become time-barred, pointing out that the statute of limitations for
a legal malpractice action in Washington is three years, as provided by RCW 4.16.080(3).
A cause of action accrues and the limitation period begins to run when the client
"discovers, or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have discovered the facts
which give rise to his or her cause of action." Peters v. Simmons, 87 Wash. 2d 400, 406,
552 P.2d 1053 (1976). Mr. Underwood argued that Mr. Bear's malpractice claim accrued
at the latest on November 19, 2009, when the criminal harassment charge was dismissed.
On that basis, the three-year limitations period expired on November 19, 2012.
Mr. Underwood eventually noted his motion for a September 27, 2013 hearing
date. On September 16,2013, Mr. Bear filed a "Response to Summary Judgment:
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Motion for Continuance." CP at 342. He did not respond to the substantive merits of Mr.
Underwood's motion but instead requested a continuance "until at least December 4,
2013." Id. The submission was signed by Mr. Bear and a new "durable power of
attorney," John Scannell.
The response and motion for continuance cited RCW 4.08.060, which
contemplates that a party to a superior court action who is incapacitated shall appear by
guardian or have a guardian ad litem appointed. Alleging that he had been declared
mentally incompetent by at least four different courts, Mr. Bear argued:
Michael Chiofar Gummo Bear has no guardian at the present time. His
former durable power of attorney Richard Lennstrom attempted to petition
the Pierce County Superior Court for appointment of guardian but passed
away before one was appointed. John Scannell attempted to have the
action finished but the court decided that proper venue was King County.
The case was then transferred to King County for appointment of a
guardianship. It is expected that a guardian ad litem will be appointed
today for investigation of a guardianship which would be accomplished on
November 4,2013.
CP at 343.
The record of the hearing on September 27 is sparse. No transcript has been filed.
Courtroom minutes state:
Start Daterrime: 09/27/139:11 AM
September 27,2013 09:10 AM Atty Michael Ryan present on behalf of
deft Underwood[.] John Scannlon present as person with power of attorney
for petitioner. Court hears from Atty Ryan. 09: 14 AM Court inquires of
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Mr. Scannlon (who is disbarred from Washington State 3). 09:15 AM
Court grants motion for summary judgment ....
End Daterrime: 09/27/13 9:15 AM
CP at 408.
The court signed the order granting summary judgment that was presented by Mr.
Underwood's counsel. In reciting the materials reviewed by the court, the order included
"Response of plaintiff, if any," but it did not reflect any disposition of Mr. Bear's motion
for a continuance. It did not address Mr. Bear's legal capacity. Mr. Bear appeals.
ANALYSIS
Mr. Bear does not contend that he ever properly served Mr. Underwood with
process. He does not dispute that if he was competent for a three year period running
between the time the harassment charges against him were dismissed on November 19,
2009, and the dismissal of his malpractice case against Mr. Underwood on September 27,
2013, then the statute of limitations for a legal malpractice would have run and summary
judgment dismissal would have been proper.
He suggests, however, that if he proved he was "incompetent or disabled to such a
degree that he ... [could not] understand the nature" of his malpractice action so as to
toll the running of the statute of limitations under RCW 4.16.190 or as a matter of equity,
3Reply materials filed by Mr. Underwood had included a Washington State Bar
Association Notice of the disbarment of John R. Scannell effective September 9,2010.
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then summary judgment would be improper. He raises two related assignments of error:
first, that the trial court erred in refusing to appoint a GAL or grant a continuance until a
guardian could be appointed and second, that it erred by dismissing the complaint where
no guardian or GAL had been appointed. We address his assignments of error in turn.
1. Failure to appoint a GAL or grant the requested continuance
A. Failure to appoint a GAL sua sponte
Mr. Bear did not move the trial court to appoint a GAL, so his implicit position is
that the trial court should have appointed a GAL sua sponte.
RCW 4.08.060(1) provides:
When an incapacitated person is a party to an action in the superior courts
he or she shall appear by guardian, or if he or she has no guardian, or in the
opinion of the court the guardian is an improper person, the court shall
appoint one to act as guardian ad litem. Said guardian shall be appointed as
follows:
(1) When the incapacitated person is plaintiff, upon the application
of a relative or friend of the incapacitated person.
(Emphasis added). Although the statute addresses appointment of a GAL following
application for such an appointment, "[a]n application by one of the parties to a lawsuit is
not a prerequisite. A trial court on its own motion may appoint a guardian ad litem."
Graham v. Graham, 40 Wn.2d 64,67,240 P.2d 564 (1941) (emphasis omitted).
Moreover,
the court should appoint a guardian ad litem for a litigant when it is
'reasonably convinced that a party litigant is not competent,
understandingly and intelligently, to comprehend the significance of legal
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proceedings and the effect and relationship of such proceedings in terms of
the best interests of such party litigant.'
Vo v. Pham, 81 Wash. App. 781, 790, 916 P.2d 462 (1996) (quoting Graham, 40 Wash. 2d at
66-67) (emphasis added).
We review a trial court's determination of the need for a GAL for an abuse of
discretion. Id. at 784. Where a trial court is not presented with any application or request
for appointment of a GAL, we must review the record and determine whether any
reasonable judge would have recognized a need to appoint one.
Mr. Underwood's submissions included evidence that Mr. Bear's unique mental
health issue related to litigation is not that he cannot comprehend legal proceedings but
that he is irrationally addicted to bringing lawsuits. In a somewhat sympathetic
medical/psychological report by Janice B. Edward, PhD, filed in Pierce County Superior
Court Case No. 08-1-02447-6, Dr. Edward stated that Mr. Bear reported having
graduated from high school as his class valedictorian, having graduated from college, and
having completed a year of law school; she described him as "quite intelligent." CP at
160. But she described him as "pathologically litigious," with many adverse
consequences for himself:
[H]e has incurred legal sanctions, spent money that he cannot afford, has
caused himself additional stress, feels himselfto be out of control and to be,
at times, suicidal. It also prevents him from getting the help that he needs
because professionals are concerned about being sued by him .... In reality
he is not resolving any of his emotional issues with these lawsuits, which is
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what he hopes to do with them, but is actually adding to the burden of his
mental illness.
CP at 164. She recommended that Mr. Bear only be allowed to sue through a guardian,
who should be a person with no personal relationship with Mr. Bear, and that he be
allowed to submit requests to initiate lawsuits only once every 90 days.
Mr. Underwood's evidence included orders from other courts that consistently
treated Mr. Bear not as incapable of comprehending the legal process as a lawsuit
proceeded, but as making repeatedly irrational decisions in bringing lawsuits in the first
place. Mr. Underwood's evidence included a 2008 order of the King County Superior
Court finding Mr. Bear to be a vexatious litigant and imposing, as its only limitation, a
restraint against Mr. Bear filing lawsuits in King County unless a court-appointed
guardian had first reviewed the matter, determined that it had probable merit, and affixed
his or her signature in accordance with CR 11. His evidence included a 2010 order of the
Thurston County Superior Court adopting King County's position that Mr. Bear was a
vexatious litigant and imposing the same limitation.
Finally, Mr. Underwood's evidence included evidence that federal district court
judge Benjamin Settle, to whom the lawsuit below was assigned during the period it was
removed to federal court, found it appropriate to appoint a guardian ad litem only for the
limited purpose of deciding whether the claims had sufficient merit to proceed and not for
any other purpose. He included evidence that when another of Mr. Bear's actions was
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assigned to Judge Settle in 2013, he dismissed the lawsuit on the pleadings without
appointing any guardian ad litem at all.
Mr. Bear's own pro se submissions demonstrate that he is an intelligent person and
that he is more capable than many pro se parties in some of his legal reasoning, even if
his lack of education and experience together with his mental health issues make him a
poor judge of which claims are worthy of pursuit.
"Mental competency is presumed." Vo, 81 Wash. App. at 784 (citing Binder v.
Binder, 50 Wash. 2d 142, 148,309 P.2d 1050 (1957)). Because the trial court was
presented with no motion and no manifest indication that Mr. Bear was in need of
appointment of a guardian ad litem, it did not abuse its discretion in failing to appoint one
sua sponte.
B. Failure to grant the requested continuance
Alternatively, Mr. Bear argues that the court should have granted his motion for a
continuance and awaited the appointment of a limited guardian by the King County court.
By the time Mr. Underwood filed his motion for summary judgment, Mr. Bear had
participated in the lawsuit below without a guardian of his person through the removal of
the lawsuit to federal court, an amendment of the complaint, Mr. Bear's motion for
appointment of a guardian ad litem in federal court, Mr. Bear's motion for
reconsideration of the federal court's dismissal of most of his claims, and an appeal to the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.
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He did not file his response to the motion for summary judgment and request for
continuance until eleven days before the date set for the hearing of Mr. Underwood's
motion. While he represented in the request for continuance that he had been declared
mentally incompetent by at least four different courts, he did not provide copies of those
orders and provided no explanation why he now needed a guardian of his person to
proceed with a three-and-one-half-year-old lawsuit.
CR 56(t) governs continuances when a party faced with a motion for summary
judgment cannot timely present by affidavit facts essential to justify his opposition to the
motion. The rule "provides that 'the court ... may order a continuance to permit
affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be taken.' (Emphasis added.) Where the
decision of the trial court is a matter of discretion, it will not be disturbed on review
except on a clear showing of abuse of discretion." Farmer v. Davis, 161 Wash. App. 420,
430,250 PJd 138 (2011).
Discretion is abused when it is based on untenable grounds or is manifestly
unreasonable. In re Det. ofSchuoler, 106 Wn.2d 500,512, 723 P.2d 1103 (1986). A
court does not abuse its discretion in denying a continuance under CR 56( t) where "( 1)
the requesting party does not offer a good reason for the delay in obtaining the desired
evidence; (2) the requesting party does not state what evidence would be established
through the additional discovery; or (3) the desired evidence will not raise a genuine issue
of material fact." Turner v. Kohler, 54 Wash. App. 688, 693, 775 P.2d 474 (1989).
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For the first time on appeal (and, notably, pro se) Mr. Bear argues that had the trial
court awaited appointment of a guardian of his person, he could have raised the defenses
of statutory tolling of the limitations period under RCW 4.16.190 or equitable tolling.
But critically, he did not point out these potential defenses in the trial court nor did he
identify evidence supporting the defenses and explain why only a guardian of his person
would be able to gather and present such evidence.
Because Mr. Bear's motion in the trial court fell far short of the showing required
to support a continuance under CR 56(t), the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
implicitly refusing to continue the summary judgment hearing.
(1) Dismissal ofthe complaint where no guardian or GAL
had been appointed.
Mr. Bear's second assignment of error is to dismissal of his complaint where no
guardian or GAL had been appointed. Having already concluded that the court
committed no error by failing to appoint a GAL or await appointment of a limited
guardian of Mr. Bear's person, the only remaining issue is whether the trial court erred by
dismissing the complaint.
We review summary judgment orders de novo, performing the same inquiry as the
trial court. Hisle v. Todd Pac. Shipyards Corp., 151 Wash. 2d 853, 860-61, 93 P.3d 108
(2004). The court views "the facts and the inferences from the facts in a light most
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favorable to the nonmoving party." Jones v. Allstate Ins. Co., 146 Wn.2d 291,300,45
P.3d 1068 (2002).
Mr. Underwood presented prima facie evidence of a statute of limitations defense
to the malpractice claim. Mr. Bear presented no affidavits or other proper evidence
demonstrating that the facts supporting the time bar were genuinely disputed. Summary
judgment was therefore proper.
Affirmed.
A majority of the panel has determined this opinion will not be printed in the
Washington Appellate Reports, but it will be filed for public record pursuant to RCW
2.06.040.
WE CONCUR:
Brown, J.
Lawrence-Berre ,J.
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