Leanne Harris v. Jason Harris

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
r^3 , ,,„:
— —!r_
LEANNE HARRIS,
No. 73607-8-1 rv> '
Respondent,
DIVISION ONE
31 rt: J
v. oo
JASON HARRIS, UNPUBLISHED OPINION & S<
Appellant. FILED: July 25, 2016
Spearman, J. -The trial court has broad discretion to determine the
admissibility of evidence in a protection order proceeding under chapter 26.50 RCW.
Jason Harris contends the trial court erred in excluding audio recordings that violated
Washington's privacy act, the declarations of his minor children, and evidence of
Leanne Harris's prior history of marital and sexual relationships. Finding no abuse of
discretion, we affirm the trial court's entry of a protection order.
FACTS
Jason and Leanne Harris met in August 2014 on a Christian online dating site.
Under circumstances that are disputed, the parties married on October 1, 2014, in a
civil ceremony at Bellevue District Court. Jason1 acknowledges that before the
marriage, he learned that Leanne's visa had expired, that her visa status left her
unable to work, and that she had no money to support herself or her children.
When necessary for purposes of clarity, we refer to the parties by their first names.
No. 73607-8-1/2
Immediately after the marriage, the couple moved into a house in Redmond,
Washington.
On October 15, 2014, Leanne petitioned for a domestic violence protection
order. She alleged that on October 5, 2014, five days after they were married, Jason
got on top of her and forced her to have "non-consensual"2 intercourse. Leanne
asserted that she had been "celibate for many years"3 and that the parties had
agreed to remain celibate until they could arrange a church wedding ceremony.
Leanne maintained that Jason became jealous and aggressive almost immediately
after the marriage and accused her of being unfaithful. The trial court entered a
temporary protection order on October 15, 2014.
At a hearing on November 19, 2014, Jason disputed Leanne's account of the
alleged sexual assault. He claimed that during the parties' briefcourtship, Leanne
pressured him into marrying her quickly, despite his skepticism. On the day after the
marriage, Jason performed "some online research"4 and discovered Leanne's "illegal
immigrant status."5 That discovery, coupled with Leanne's "behavioral aggression"
immediately after the marriage, persuaded Jason that "I was being used and played
for the essentials of marriage for citizenship purposes. . . ."6
2 Clerk's Papers (CP) at 5.
3]d
4 CP at 63.
5ld
6 Id.
No. 73607-8-1/3
On October 3, 2014, two days after the marriage, Jason told Leanne that he
would be moving out. Jason maintains that Leanne initiated the "mutually
consensual" sexual encounter on October 5 "in an attempt in getting me to stay."7
In support of his claims, Jason submitted transcripts of five recordings he
allegedly made of his conversations and telephone calls with Leanne on October 7-
10, and 19, 2014, in which she indicated that the October 5 incident was consensual.
Jason did not submit the original recordings. He claimed that he told Leanne he was
recording the conversations.
Leanne objected to the transcripts, contending that, with one exception, she
did not know that Jason was recording the conversations and that the recordings
therefore violated the Washington privacy act, ch. 9.73 RCW. Leanne also objected
to declarations from Jason's two minor children, which described incidents allegedly
occurring October 9 and 11, 2014.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court reissued the temporary
protection order and scheduled another hearing, pending the submission of
documents from the ongoing criminal investigation. The court excluded four of the
five transcripts because Jason failed to demonstrate that Leanne consented to the
recordings. The court admitted the October 19 telephone conversation because the
transcript included Jason's statement that the call was being recorded. During the
CP at 65.
No. 73607-8-1/4
call, Leanne told Jason, "I forgive you. That's all I wanted to say."8 The court also
excluded the declarations of Jason's minor children under King County Local Family
Law Rule (KCLFLR) 6(e)(2) ("Declarations by minors are disfavored").
At the next hearing, which occurred on April 14, 2015, Jason sought to
introduce evidence of Leanne's prior marriages and relationships in Europe going
back as far as 1996. He claimed that Leanne was not divorced from one of her prior
husbands, which meant that "her passport is fraudulent," that she had committed
"identity fraud,"9 and that she "is in the open commission of bigamy."10 Jason also
asked the trial court to consider specific evidence that Leanne was "sexually active"
in 2011 and "that her history is replete of her being a sexual aggressor. . . ."11 Jason
argued that such evidence undermined the credibility of Leanne's claim that she was
celibate for many years.
The trial court was not persuaded that the proposed evidence was relevant
and excluded it. The court offered Jason the opportunity to testify "in regards to the
actual events that occurred,"12 but he declined.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court entered a one year protection
order. As to the incident that occurred on October 5, 2014, the court acknowledged
8CP 115.
9 Report of Proceedings (RP) (04/14/15) at 8.
10 Id at 9.
11 id at 10.
12 Id. at 14.
No. 73607-8-1/5
Jason's claim that the alleged sexual assault was "effectively a ploy to allow [Leanne]
to stay in the country."13 But the court found Leanne's account to be credible, noting
that her descriptions had remained relatively consistent throughout her
representations to the court and the investigating officers. The court awarded
Leanne $4,900 in attorney's fees under RCW 26.50.060(1 )(g).
Jason appeals.
DISCUSSION
On appeal, Jason contends that the trial court erred in refusing to consider the
exculpatory transcripts of his private conversations with Leanne after the alleged
assault or the declarations of his minor children. He also asserts that he should have
been permitted to testify about Leanne's prior sexual and marital relationships at the
April 14, 2015 hearing. The trial court necessarily has broad discretion in ruling on
evidentiary matters, and we will not overturn a trial court's ruling absent manifest
abuse of discretion. Sintra, Inc. v. Citv of Seattle, 131 Wash. 2d 640, 662-23, 935 P.2d
555 (1997) (citing Industrial Indem. Co. v. Kalleviq, 114 Wash. 2d 907, 926, 792 P.2d
520(1990)).
Jason appears to contend that the trial court should have considered the
proposed evidence under ER 1101(c)(4), which provides that in protection order
proceedings, "other than with respect to privileges, the rape shield statute [RCW
9A.44.020] and ER 412," the rules of evidence "need not be applied." Thus, under
13 Id at 19.
-5-
No. 73607-8-1/6
the plain terms of ER 1101(c)(4), the trial court retains discretion whether to apply the
relaxed evidentiary standards in a protection order proceeding. See generally
Blackmon v. Blackmon, 155 Wash. App. 715, 230 P.3d 233 (2010).
The trial court excluded four of the five proposed transcripts because they
contained no indication that Leanne consented to the recording of her private
conversations. Under Washington's privacy act, it is "unlawful... to intercept, or
record any: ... [p]rivate communication transmitted by telephone ... between two or
more individuals ...without first obtaining the consent of all participants in the
communication." RCW 9.73.030(1 )(a). Any information obtained in violation of this
provision is inadmissible in a civil or criminal case. RCW 9.73.050. Because the
record does not establish that Leanne consented to the recordings, the trial court did
not abuse its discretion in excluding the four transcripts.
The trial court also excluded the declarations of Jason's two minor children
under KCLFLR 6(e)(2), which provides that "[declarations by minors are disfavored."
The declarations described Leanne's conduct several days after the alleged assault.
On appeal, Jason has not addressed the relevance of the proposed evidence or the
trial court's reliance on the local family law rule. He has therefore failed to
demonstrate any error or abuse of discretion.
Jason's contention that the trial court abused its discretion in excluding his
proposed testimony at the April 14, 2015 hearing is not persuasive. Jason sought to
testify about Leanne's history of marital and sexual relationships, including
allegations going back to 1996. He claims evidence that Leanne was committing
No. 73607-8-1/7
bigamy and had recent sexual relationships undermined her credibility and
demonstrated a motive to fabricate the alleged sexual assault. But the trial court
acted well within its discretion when it concluded the evidence was irrelevant and
chose to focus instead on the evidence concerning the events of October 5, 2014,
the night of the alleged assault.
Jason also maintains that Leanne's false accusation of sexual assault was
part of her scheme to obtain a "'U Visa.'"14 But the argument is unconvincing because
he fails to discuss, in his brief, the legal requirements for such a claim. See 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(a)M5WLMMIWIIh: see generally Romero-Hernandez v. District of Columbia,
141 F.3d Supp. 29 (D.D.C. 2015). Under the circumstances of this case, we
conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it excluded the proffered
evidence as irrelevant for purposes of the protection order proceeding.
Jason contends that "ER 1101(c)(4) as applied in domestic violence protection
orders directly contravenes due process protections enshrined . . . ."15 in the state
and federal constitutions. Because he fails to support this contention with meaningful
legal argument and citation to relevant authority, we decline to consider it. See
Saunders v. Lloyd's of London, 113 Wash. 2d 330, 345, 779 P.2d 249 (1989) (appellate
court will decline to consider issues unsupported by cogent legal argument and
citation to relevant authority).
14 Brief of Appellant at 6.
15 Brief of Appellant at 16.
No. 73607-8-1/8
Leanne has requested an award of attorney's fees on appeal. The trial court
awarded Leanne attorney fees under RCW 26.50.060(1 )(g). RAP 18.1(a) allows this
court to award a party its reasonable attorney fees if an applicable law grants a party
the right to recover them at trial. We grant Leanne's request for attorney's fees on
appeal, subject to her compliance with RAP 18.1(d).
Affirmed.
WE CONCUR:
^c^/ <^/_ S^).+j,
-8-