Larry L. & Susan Peterson, Appellant's v. Gregg & Kelly Smith

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION ONE
GREGG SMITH and KELLY SMITH, ) No. 74328-7-1
husband and wife, )
)
Respondents, )
)
V. ) UNPUBLISHED OPINION
)
LARRY L. PETERSON and SUSAN )
PETERSON, husband and wife and the )
marital community thereof, )
)
Appellants. ) FILED: March 6, 2017
SCHINDLER, J. — This is the second appeal in this case. Larry and Susan
Peterson appeal the trial court order directing them to remove, modify, or relocate a
canopy on their dock that encroaches on the adjacent property of Gregg and Kelly
Smith. Because the court abused its discretion by ordering the removal, modification, or
relocation of the canopy without considering the equitable factors for encroachment, we
reverse and remand.
The facts are set forth in our previous decision, Smith v. Peterson, 166 Wn. App.
1023, 2012 WL 432246, at *1, and will be repeated only as necessary. The Smiths and
the Petersons own adjacent properties on Lake Washington in Bellevue. A dock is
located near the two properties and extends west into Lake Washington. The dock has
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an overhead canopy that extends north and south from both sides of the dock. The
canopy consists of a metal roof supported by three wooden pilings on each side of the
dock. The dock and the canopy have existed in this configuration for more than 50
years.
In a 2008 quiet title action, the Smiths and the Petersons claimed an ownership
interest in the covered dock. Following a trial, the court concluded the dock and canopy
belonged to the Petersons. But because the survey showed the northern portion of the
canopy overhangs into the Smiths' property, the court concluded the three northern
pilings supporting the dock canopy belonged to the Smiths.
In the first appeal, we affirmed the trial court's decision that(1) the Smiths had
not acquired an ownership interest in the dock through mutual recognition and
acquiescence,(2) presence of the canopy was insufficient to establish title to the
underlying shorelands by adverse possession, and (3) the Petersons did not establish a
prescriptive easement for use of the canopy. Smith, 2012 WL 432246, at *6-*7.
On July 28, 2015, the Smiths filed a "Motion To Enforce Judgment or in the
Alternative To Modify Judgment Pursuant to CR 60." The Smiths sought an order
allowing removal or modification of the pilings. The Smiths also sought an order
directing the Petersons to "remove and/or modify their 'metal cover' so as not to
interfere with the Smiths use and enjoyment of their property, or encroach further on the
Smiths' property."
The court granted the Smiths' motion and ordered the Petersons to "remove,"
"modify," or "relocate" the canopy. The court's order states, in pertinent part:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDICATED and DECREED that
plaintiff's motion is granted. The Court orders the Petersons to either (i)
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remove, (ii) modify and/or (iii) relocate their metal covering or canopy on
the northern covered moorage on or before June 1, 2016 so as to no
longer rest on the Smith pilings and to no longer encroach or overhang
upon the Smith's [sic] property.
If the Petersons do not (i) remove, (ii) modify and/or (iii) relocate the
metal covering or canopy on the northern covered moorage by June 1,
2016, the Court further orders, that in compliance with its October 14,
2010 Judgment, the Smiths are permitted to remove and/or modify the
pilings on their property without further interference by the Petersons.
Collateral Estoppel and Res Judicata
The Petersons argue collateral estoppel and res judicata bar the motion for an
order to remove or modify the pilings and the order directing them to remove, modify, or
relocate the canopy.1
We review de novo whether collateral estoppel or res judicata applies to bar an
action. Christensen v. Grant County Hosp. Dist. No. 1, 152 Wn.2d 299, 305, 96 P.3d
957(2004); Berschauer Phillips Const. Co. v. Mut. of Enumclaw Ins. Co., 175 Wn. App.
222, 227, 308 P.3d 681 (2013). Collateral estoppel applies where:
(1) the issue decided in the earlier proceeding was identical to the issue
presented in the later proceeding;(2)the earlier proceeding ended in a
judgment on the merits;(3) the party against whom collateral estoppel is
asserted was a party to, or in privity with a party to, the earlier proceeding;
and (4) application of collateral estoppel does not work an injustice on the
party against whom it is applied.
Christensen, 152 Wn.2d at 307. Res judicata applies where the subsequent action
involves "(1) the same subject matter,(2)the same cause of action,(3)the same
persons or parties, and (4)the same quality of persons for or against whom the decision
1 The Smiths filed a motion on the merits to affirm and submitted three declarations to this court in
support of the motion. The Petersons filed a motion to strike the declarations under RAP 9.11(a) as
evidence outside the record. A commissioner referred the motion to strike to the panel. Because the
three declarations are not necessary for our review, we do not consider them and grant the motion to
strike. Ha v. Signal Elec., Inc., 182 Wn. App. 436, 456, 332 P.3d 991 (2014).
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is made as did a prior adjudication." Williams v. Leone & Keeble, Inc., 171 Wn.2d 726,
730, 254 P.3d 818(2011).
The party asserting collateral estoppel or res judicata bears the burden of
establishing that the doctrine applies. Christensen, 152 Wn.2d at 307; Hisle v. Todd
Pac. Shipyards Corp., 151 Wn.2d 853, 865, 93 P.3d 108(2004). Because the
Petersons do not identify or address any of the elements of collateral estoppel or res
judicata, they do not carry their burden of establishing that either collateral estoppel or
res judicata applies. See also In re Recall of Washam, 171 Wn.2d 503, 515, 257 P.3d
513(2011)("'We do not consider claims insufficiently argued by the parties.' ")(quoting
State v. Ford, 137 Wn.2d 472, 477 n.1, 973 P.2d 452(1999)); Duvall v. Nelson,
Wn. App. , 387 P.3d 1158, 1168(2017)("We will not consider an inadequately
briefed argument.").
Law of the Case
The Petersons assert the court disregarded our decision in Smith and the law of
the case by ordering them to remove, modify, or relocate the canopy.
Under the law-of-the-case doctrine,"'when a court decides upon a rule of law,
that decision should continue to govern the same issues in subsequent stages in the
same case.'" Pepper v. United States, 562 U.S. 476, 506, 131 S. Ct. 1229, 179
L.Ed.2d 196(2011)(quoting Arizona v. California, 460 U.S. 605, 618, 103 S. Ct. 1382,
75 L. Ed. 2d 318 (1983)); Musacchio v. United States, U.S. , 136 S. Ct. 709,
716, 193 L. Ed. 2d 639(2016); Roberson v. Perez, 156 Wn.2d 33, 41, 123 P.3d 844(2005). "The doctrine 'expresses the practice of courts generally to refuse to reopen
what has been decided,' but it does not 'limit [courts] power.'" Musacchio, 136 S. Ct. at
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7162(quoting Messenger v. Anderson, 225 U.S. 436, 444, 32S. Ct. 739,56 L. Ed. 1152(1912)).
For the law-of-the-case doctrine to apply, "'the issue in question must have been
decided explicitly or by necessary implication in the previous disposition.'" Silva-
Pereira v. Lynch, 827 F.3d 1176, 1190 (9th Cir. 2016)(quoting United States v. Lummi
Nation, 763 F.3d 1180, 1185 (9th Cir. 2014)). Removal, modification, or relocation of
the encroaching dock canopy were not issues decided in Smith.3 Consequently, the
law-of-the-case doctrine does not apply.4
Equitable Factors
The Petersons also contend the court erred by ordering them to remove, modify,
or relocate the encroaching canopy without considering equitable factors that must be
considered in an encroachment case. The Smiths do not respond to this argument.
A trial court sitting in equity has "tremendous discretion to fashion a remedy 'to
do substantial justice to the parties and put an end to the litigation.'" Young v. Young,
164 Wn.2d 477, 488, 191 P.3d 1258(2008)(quoting Esmieu v. Hsieh, 92 Wn.2d 530,
535, 598 P.2d 1369 (1979)). The trial court's equity power "is inherently flexible and
fact-specific." Proctor v. Huntington, 169 Wn.2d 491, 503, 238 P.3d 1117(2010). We
review the trial court's exercise of its equitable authority for abuse of discretion.
Sorenson v. Pyeatt, 158 Wn.2d 523, 531, 146 P.3d 1172(2006); In re Proceedings of
2 Alteration in original.
3 In Smith, footnote 10 mentions but does not otherwise address the trial court conclusion that
"removal [of the canopy] would be wasteful and destructive." Smith, 2012 WL 432246, at *7 n.10.
4 Because Smith affirmed the trial court's decision that "the Petersons did not establish a
prescriptive easement for use of the canopy," we also reject the Petersons' argument that the order
directing them to remove, modify, or relocate the canopy violated their easement rights. Smith, 2012 WL
432246, at *7 n.9.
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King County for the Foreclosure of Liens for Delinquent Real Prop. Taxes for the Years
1985 Through 1988, & Some Prior Years, 123 Wn.2d 197, 204, 867 P.2d 605(1994);
Recreational Equip., Inc. v. World Wrapps Nw., Inc., 165 Wn. App. 553, 559, 266 P.3d
924 (2011). "If the trial court's ruling is based on an erroneous view of the law or
involves application of an incorrect legal analysis, it necessarily abuses its discretion."
Dix v. IdT Grp., Inc., 160 Wn.2d 826, 833, 161 P.3d 1016 (2007).
"'Generally, courts will order an encroacher to remove encroaching structures
even though it is extraordinary relief.'" Coqdell v. 1999 O'Ravez Family, LLC, 153 Wn.
App. 384, 391, 220 P.3d 1259(2009)(quoting Proctor v. Huntington, 146 Wn. App. 836,
846, 192 P.3d 958 (2008)); Proctor v. Huntington, 169 Wn.2d 491, 504, 238 P.3d 1117(2010); Arnold v. Melani, 75 Wn.2d 143, 152,449 P.2d 800 (1968). "However, an
exception exists 'where such an order would be oppressive.'" Coqdell, 153 Wn. App. at
391 (quoting Proctor, 146 Wn. App. at 847); Arnold, 75 Wn.2d at 152.
In Arnold, the Washington Supreme Court held a court may refuse to enjoin an
encroachment under certain circumstances.
[A] mandatory injunction can be withheld as oppressive when... it
appears... that: (1)The encroacher did not simply take a calculated risk,
act in bad faith, or negligently, willfully or indifferently locate the
encroaching structure;(2)the damage to the landowner was slight and the
benefit of removal equally small;(3) there was ample remaining room for a
structure suitable for the area and no real limitation on the property's
future use;(4) it is impractical to move the structure as built; and (5)there
is an enormous disparity in resulting hardships.
Arnold, 75 Wn.2d at 152.
The Supreme Court in Proctor states the "entire purpose of our pronouncement
in Arnold was to show that injunctions should not mechanically follow from any
encroachment." Proctor, 169 Wn.2d at 502. The Supreme Court held that when a court
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is asked to eject an encroacher, it must "reason through the Arnold elements as part of
its duty to achieve fairness between the parties." Proctor, 169 Wn.2d at 502-03.
Here, contrary to the Supreme Court's direction in Proctor, the court
mechanically applied the Smiths' right to "the quiet enjoyment of their property" in
concluding the Petersons must remove, modify, or relocate the canopy. Because the
record shows the court did not consider the Arnold factors before ordering the
Petersons to remove, modify, or relocate the encroaching canopy, we reverse and
remand.5
WE CONCUR:
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5 The Smiths request attorney fees under RAP 18.9(a). Because an appeal is not frivolous where
the appellant raises a debatable issue, we deny the request for attorney fees. Advocates for Responsible
Dev. v. W. Wash. Growth Mgmt. Hearings Bd., 170 Wn.2d 577, 580, 245 P.3d 764(2010).
7