Deoide Lea Cunningham v. State Of Wa., Dshs

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION ONE
DEOIDE LEA CUNNINGHAM, )
) No. 73713-9-1
Appellant, )
) ORDER DENYING APPELLANT'S
v. ) MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION,
) GRANTING RESPONDENT'S
STATE OF WASHINGTON, ) MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL AND ) AND WITHDRAWING AND
HEALTH SERVICES, ) SUBSTITUTING OPINION
)
Respondent. )
)
Appellant, Deoide Cunningham, and respondent, Department of Social and
Health Services, have filed motions for reconsideration of the opinion filed in the above
matter on July 31, 2017.1 A majority of the panel has decided that appellant's motion
should be denied and respondent's motion should be granted. The opinion filed on July
31, 2017, shall be withdrawn and a substitute opinion shall be filed. Now, therefore, it is
hereby
1 On August 3, 2017, appellant filed a motion for extension of time to "respond to
latest ruling," which this court interpreted as a request for additional time to seek
reconsideration of this court's opinion. On August 21, 2017, appellant filed a 239-page
motion for reconsideration as well as a separate 9-page document appearing to request
the consideration of supplemental evidence, both of which were considered by this
court. Accordingly, appellant's request for additional time appears to be moot.
No. 73713-9-1/2
ORDERED that the appellant's motion for reconsideration is denied. It is further
ORDERED that the respondent's motion for reconsideration is granted. And it is
further
ORDERED that the opinion filed on July 31, 2017, shall be withdrawn, and a new
opinion shall be filed.
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DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL AND ) UNPUBLISHED OPINION
HEALTH SERVICES, )
) FILED: October 9, 2017
Respondent.
BECKER, J. —When Deoide Cunningham failed to appear for an
administrative hearing, an administrative law judge entered an order of dismissal
in favor of the Department of Social and Health Services. The administrative law
judge subsequently denied Cunningham's motion to vacate the dismissal for
good cause. Cunningham does not challenge the administrative law judge's
finding that she lacked good cause but rather contends that the administrative
law judge erred in failing to consider certain evidence. We find no error in the
administrative law judge's findings regarding good cause and affirm.1
1 Respondent sought reconsideration of this court's prior opinion, filed July
31, 2017, based on authority not cited in its original brief. In the interests of
justice, we exercised our authority to consider this authority and amended our
opinion. RAP 12.2, 12.4.
No. 73713-9-1/2
Cunningham has previously received services and financial benefits from
the departrnent as a client of the Development Disabilities Administration. On
March 4, 2013, the department notified Cunningham in writing that it was
terminating her eligibility for these services effective April 1, 2013, because
Cunningham was no longer living in Washington. The notice informed
Cunningham that she had until June 4, 2013, to appeal the termination but that
she was required to file her appeal by March 31, 2013, in order to continue
receiving services pending the appeal.
Cunningham, through her representative, Karl Olson, filed a notice of
appeal and requested an administrative hearing with the Office of Administrative
Hearings.2 The record shows that Cunningham faxed the notice of appeal to the
Office of Administrative Hearings on March 7, 2013. However, it was misfiled in
one of Cunningham's other open cases. Cunningham faxed the notice of appeal
a second time on June 3, 2013. An administrative hearing was scheduled for
May 20, 2014, at 9:00 a.m. The Office of Administrative Hearings issued an
order requiring Cunningham and any of her witnesses to appear in person "due
to significant issues of credibility."
At a continuance hearing on December 17, 2013, Cunningham requested
to continue receiving services pending the appeal. On January 9, 2014, an
administrative law judge issued an order denying continued benefits because
2 Olson is Cunningham's caregiver and significant other.
2
No. 73713-9-1/3
Cunningham had not appealed the eligibility termination in time. Cunningham did
not specifically appeal this order.
Neither Cunningham nor Olson appeared at the May 20 hearing. Nor did
they contact the court or otherwise explain their absence. The administrative law
judge dismissed Cunningham's appeal.
Cunningham moved to vacate the dismissal, claiming that she had good
cause to miss the hearing. Cunningham stated that she had a medical
appointment on May 20 and her primary care physician "has asked for all
hearings to be continued until issues are identified and therapy initiated." In
support of her motion, Cunningham submitted four letters from Dr. Seth Cowan,
a naturopathic physician. The first, dated June 10, 2014, stated:
Ms. Cunningham has multiple serious medical problems. Stress
related to DSHS hearings may exacerbate her conditions.
Therefore, please allow her power of attorney, Karl Olson, to
represent her for related hearings, including via telephone calls and
in-person interviews.
The second, also dated June 10, 2014, stated:
Please excuse Mr. Olson from his appointment on 05/20/14. He
was being seen in my office that day.
The third, dated July 10, 2014, stated:
Please provide special accommodations for Deoide Cunningham
by contacting her primary care giver and representative, Karl Olson
prior to scheduling further meetings or hearings due to her complex
medical situation. If possible, please conduct meeting and hearings
via phone. The best time for Ms. Cunningham and Mr. Olson are
mid-day between 11 am and 1 pm due to care giving routines and
typical scheduled therapy appointments.
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No. 73713-9-1/4
The fourth, dated August 12, 2014, stated:
Ms. Cunningham has a complex medical history including seizure
disorder, severe constipation and chronic pain. It is my
understanding that she required an urgent medical intervention on
May 20, 2014, which required her to miss a scheduled DSHS
hearing. Please consider reinstating her hearing.
In response, the department submitted an affidavit in which Dr. Cowan
stated that Olson's May 20 appointment had been at 1:40 p.m., several hours
after the 9:00 a.m. hearing, and was for the purpose of discussing Cunningham's
condition, not for an emergent medical matter. Dr. Cowan also stated that
Cunningham had not been a patient of his on May 20 and he had not even met
her until June 6. Dr. Cowan stated that he was "still unaware of the scope and
severity of Ms. Cunningham's purported medical conditions, and that the
statement he provided to OAH regarding Ms. Cunningham's condition was at Mr.
Olson's request and was based solely on information provided by Mr. Olson."
An administrative law judge denied the motion to vacate the dismissal.
The administrative law judge found that Dr. Cowan did not have any personal
knowledge of the contents of his statements and that the letters were insufficient
to establish "a link between Ms. Cunningham and Mr. Olson's medical conditions
and their inability to attend a hearing." The administrative law judge concluded
that Cunningham had not shown good cause for failing to attend the May 20
hearing.
As to Cunningham's continued benefits, the administrative law judge
found that Cunningham had not filed her notice of appeal until June 3, 2013, and
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No. 73713-9-1/5
was thus not entitled to continued benefits. The administrative law judge further
found:
4.10 The motion for a continuance was therefore heard on
December 17, 2013.... At the same time, Mr. Olson raised, for the
first time, the issue of continued benefits under docket number 06-
2013-A-0805 claiming Ms. Cunningham had timely requested a
hearing by fax on March 7, 2013. The available evidence was
reviewed, argument taken, and Mr. Olson was given additional time
to provide more evidence of his alleged timely fax.
4.11 On December 23, 2013, Mr. Olson submitted additional
documentation by certified mail, return receipt requested. (A letter
from the purported March 7, 2013 fax sender and another copy of
the purported fax transmission.) On January 6, 2014, DSHS filed a
response. On January 9, 2014, an order denying continued
benefits was issued.
In a footnote, the administrative law judge noted:
More importantly, even if continued benefits had been granted
based on the purported timely request, they would have terminated,
pursuant to WAC 388- 825-150 (11)(c), when Ms. Cunningham
failed to appear for hearing on May 20, 2014. There is no right to
resume continued benefits pending hearing when a petition to
vacate is filed. Even if the letters or other evidence was persuasive
that the ruling denying continued benefits was in error, there is no
legal basis to grant continued benefits at this point. He may appeal
that issue (as he had earlier been instructed) if and when he
appeals this initial decision.
Cunningham filed a petition for review with the department's Board of
Appeals. A review judge adopted the administrative law judge's findings that
Cunningham had not established good cause for her failure to appear at the
administrative hearing. The review judge declined to consider Cunningham's
challenge to the denial of continued benefits, finding that Cunningham had not
sought review of the January 9 order denying continued benefits.
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No. 73713-9-1/6
Cunningham sought review in Skagit County Superior Court, which also
affirmed the administrative law judge's decision. Cunningham appeals.
In reviewing an administrative action, we sit in the same position as the
superior court, applying the standards of the Administrative Procedure Act,
chapter 34.05 RCW,directly to the record before the agency. Brighton v. Dep't
of Transp., 109 Wash. App. 855, 861-62, 38 P.3d 344 (2001). To the extent they
modify or replace the administrative law judge's findings of fact and conclusions
of law, a review judge's findings and conclusions are relevant on appeal. Tapper
v. Emp't Sec. Dep't, 122 Wash. 2d 397, 406, 858 P.2d 494(1993). The party
challenging an agency's action bears the burden of demonstrating the invalidity
of the decision. Brighton, 109 Wash. App. at 862 (citing RCW 34.05.570(1)(a)).
We review an agency's factual findings to determine whether they are
supported by substantial evidence. Port of Seattle v. Pollution Control Hrgs Bd.,
151 Wash. 2d 568, 588, 90 P.3d 659 (2004). Substantial evidence is a sufficient
quantity of evidence to persuade a fair-minded person of the truth or correctness
of the agency action. Port of Seattle, 151 Wash. 2d at 588. We will overturn an
agency's findings only if they are "clearly erroneous" and we are "'definitely and
firmly convinced that a mistake has been made." Port of Seattle, 151 Wash. 2d at
588, quoting Buechel v. Dep't of Ecology, 125 Wash. 2d 196, 202, 884 P.2d 910
(1994). We view the "evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom in the light
most favorable to the party who prevailed at the administrative proceeding
below." Kirby v. Empit Sec. Dep't, 185 Wash. App. 706, 713, 342 P.3d 1151
(2014), review denied, 183 Wash. 2d 1010 (2015).
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No. 73713-9-1/7
Cunningham primarily challenges the administrative law judge's decision
denying continued benefits pending the appeal. Cunningham contends that the
administrative law judge violated her right to due process and her right to present
a complete defense when it "concealed" or "destroyed" the notice of appeal she
faxed on March 7.
The department acknowledges that Cunningham timely filed her notice of
appeal to be entitled to continued benefits. See WAG 388-825-130(3)(individual
must request administrative hearing within 10 days in order to maintain current
services during the appeal process). Because the notice of appeal had been
misfiled, the administrative law judge was not aware of it. Therefore, the
administrative law judge's finding that Cunningham was not entitled to continued
benefits because of her untimely filing was erroneous.3
However, because we affirm the dismissal of Cunningham's appeal,
thereby upholding the department's termination of her benefits, the erroneous
finding was harmless. Even if Cunningham had received benefits during the
pendency of her appeal, she would not be entitled to them now, as Medicaid
beneficiaries are not entitled to keep benefits received pending a hearing when
3 The department contends that the issue of continued benefits is not
properly before us on appeal because Cunningham did not timely appeal the
January 9 order. But it is not clear that the January 9 order was an appealable
order. The order does not provide Cunningham with notice of her right to appeal.
See WAG XXX-XX-XXXX(9) and (10)(requiring an administrative law judge to
include in its decision "how to request changes in the decision and the deadlines
for requesting them" and "the date the decision becomes final according to WAG
XXX-XX-XXXX). Furthermore, the administrative law judge's initial order clearly
stated that Cunningham could appeal the denial of continued benefits as part of
her appeal of the initial order.
No. 73713-9-1/8
the agency's original action to terminate them is sustained. See 42 C.F.R.§
431.230(b)("If the agency's action is sustained by the hearing decision, the
agency may institute recovery procedures against the applicant or beneficiary to
recoup the cost of any services furnished the beneficiary.").
Cunningham also contends that the administrative law judge "concealed"
or "destroyed" evidence that the department had withdrawn the March 4
notification in a different proceeding. But, even based on the documents
Cunningham has provided from this unrelated proceeding, Cunningham's claim
has no basis in fact.
Finally, Cunningham contends that the review judge failed to consider two
additional letters that she provided in support of her motion to vacate. The first,
dated May 5, 2014, is from Kenneth Dunning, a licensed mental health
counselor. According to Dunning, who has reportedly provided counseling for
Olson since 2001, Olson has "complained that he is having difficulty maintaining
a level of mental acuity over prolonged periods" and "believes this difficulty
impairs his ability to deal with matters involving intense concentration." The
second, dated May 16, 2014, is from Mary Stone, a licensed mental health
counselor. According to Stone, who has seen both Cunningham and Olson for
counseling since February 2007, Cunningham "is unable to represent herself due
to a seizure disorder and other medical conditions" and Olson "has difficulty with
concentration and reasoning, and would not be able to adequately. .. represent
8
No. 73713-9-1/9
himself or Ms. Cunningham at this time." But Cunningham fails to establish that
these letters, attached as an appendix to her opening brief, were actually
provided to the administrative law judge. Nor does Cunningham articulate how
either of these letters would be relevant to the question of whether she was
unable to appear in person on May 20.
We affirm the superior court's order affirming the administrative law
A.
judge's decision.
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WE CONCUR:
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4 Cunningham also included copies of identical letters written by Stone,
dated February 16, 2014, and December 26, 2013.
9