In Re Detention Of: P.p.

Filed
Washington State
Court of Appeals
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
Division Two
DIVISION II December 11, 2018
In the Matter of the Detention of: No. 50773-1-II
P.P.
PUBLISHED OPINION
STATE OF WASHINGTON; JOHNATHAN
SHARRETTE, PH.D.; and SUKHINDERPAL
AULAKH, M.D.,
Petitioners,
v.
P.P.,
Respondent.
BJORGEN, J. — The State filed a petition for involuntary commitment after the superior
court declared P.P. incompetent to stand trial on felony charges. The superior court granted the
petition for involuntary commitment, dismissed the felony charges against P.P., and ordered that
P.P. be involuntarily committed for a period not to exceed 180 days.
P.P. appeals the involuntary commitment order, arguing that the superior court erred
when it concluded that the law does not allow him to become a good faith voluntary patient. P.P.
also argues that our court should remand this matter to the superior court for de novo review of
the commissioner’s findings of fact. P.P. concedes that the order is moot, but the State and P.P.
both agree on the need to clarify whether an individual who has been found incompetent to stand
trial on felony charges may become a good faith voluntary patient instead of being involuntarily
committed. We agree and reach the merits because it is a matter of continuing and substantial
public interest.
No. 50773-1-II
On the merits, we hold the law does not provide mentally ill persons found incompetent
to stand trial for felony charges the legal opportunity to become good faith voluntary patients.
We affirm the superior court’s involuntary commitment order.
FACTS
In 2017, the State charged P.P. with three counts of felony indecent exposure and one
count of voyeurism. The superior court found P.P. incompetent to stand trial, dismissed his
criminal charges, and committed him to a state hospital for an involuntary 72-hour evaluation
and treatment period for the purposes of civil commitment.
After the 72-hour evaluation, Dr. Sukhinderpal Aulakh and Dr. Johnathan Sharrette filed
a petition for a 180-day involuntary civil commitment on the basis of former RCW 71.05.280(3)
and (4) (2015). At the beginning of the involuntary civil commitment hearing, P.P. requested
that he be found a good faith voluntary patient and that the petition be dismissed. The
commissioner denied the motion, but invited the parties to brief the issue and continued the
hearing.
At the next hearing, the commissioner determined that petitioners are required to prove
that an individual is not a good faith voluntary patient at 90- and 180-day civil commitment
hearings. The commissioner then heard testimony on this issue.
Dr. Sharrette testified that, in his opinion, he did not believe P.P. would in good faith
seek voluntary treatment. He stated that P.P. recently lied to an evaluator during a competency
evaluation. He also testified that P.P. had recently left a voluntary hospitalization after only
seven days and that his explanation for doing so was because he felt the hospitalization was
doing him no good. In addition, Dr. Sharrette testified that P.P. explained to him that he believed
a computer controlled his physical, emotional, and hormonal body. Dr. Sharrette also provided
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No. 50773-1-II
testimony regarding his concerns about medical compliance in the community, P.P.’s lack of
insight into the benefit of treatment, and his long hospitalization history.
After hearing testimony from both Dr. Sharrette and P.P., who admitted that he lied to the
competency evaluator to avoid potential hospitalization, the commissioner found that P.P. did
not meet the criteria for a good faith voluntary patient. The commissioner further found that P.P.
committed acts constituting the felony indecent exposure and that, due to his mental illness, he
was likely to commit similar felony acts in the future. The commissioner entered an order for
involuntary commitment not to exceed 180 days.
P.P. filed a motion for revision with the superior court, seeking to be found a good faith
voluntary patient. The petitioners’ then filed a cross motion for revision. At the hearing on the
motions, the superior court found that P.P. would not be a good faith voluntary patient.
Specifically, the superior court stated,
Even if the good faith voluntary status is available, it’s been demonstrated, as
previously noted, that the respondent is not a good faith volunteer based on his
failure to comply with voluntary treatment at the UW [University of Washington]
Medical Center in 2015, when he left after seven days, because the treatment wasn’t
helping, as well as his admission to providing inaccurate information to skew the
results of the competency evaluation and avoid further treatment and his admission
that he wants to get out of treatment and that it doesn’t really work.
The most recent involuntary hospitalization is not helpful in establishing a
track record because it doesn’t establish that he’s a good faith volunteer when he
has the complete freedom to walk away.
Verbatim Report of Proceedings (Aug. 11, 2017) at 33-34.
On August 11, 2017, the superior court entered an order that denied P.P.’s motion for
revision and granted the petitioners’ cross motion to revise. The superior court also concluded
that “RCW 71.05.280, and RCW 71.05.320 do not require Petitioners to prove ‘good faith
voluntary’ status prior to civil commitment.” Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 135. Therefore, and
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No. 50773-1-II
consistently with the arguments made, we read the superior court’s ruling to conclude that the
State is not required to prove good faith voluntary status because P.P. did not have an
opportunity under the relevant statutes to become a good faith voluntary patient. Based on this
conclusion, the order stated,
The Court Commissioner’s July 14, 2017 order is revised striking the “finding” on
page 2, lines 8-9 that “during any commitment hearing, 14, 90, or 180 day hearing,
the issue of voluntary admission may be raised” and replacing it with this Court’s
conclusion of law that petitioner is not required to prove “good faith voluntary
status prior to civil commitment.”
CP at 135-36.
P.P. appeals.
ANALYSIS
I. MATTERS OF CONTINUING AND SUBSTANTIAL PUBLIC INTEREST
P.P. concedes that his case is technically moot because the 180-day involuntary
commitment order has expired. However, both P.P. and the State agree that we should decide his
case on the merits because the issue presented involves a matter of continuing and substantial
public interest. Assuming without deciding that P.P.’s appeal is moot,1 we agree that we should
reach the merits because this case involves a matter of continuing and substantial public interest.
Even if an appeal is moot, we may still reach the merits if it involves “matters of
continuing and substantial public interest.” Sorenson v. Bellingham, 80 Wash. 2d 547, 558, 496
P.2d 512 (1972). The criteria to be considered in determining whether a continuing and
substantial public interest is involved include: (1) the public or private nature of the question
1
Although cited by neither party on appeal, we acknowledge the authority of In re Det. of M.K.,
168 Wash. App. 621, 625-30, 279 P.3d 897 (2012), which held that its appeal was not moot after
an involuntary commitment period had expired. See also In the Matter of A.J., 196 Wash. App. 79,
81, 383 P.3d 536 (2016) (holding the same); In re L.T.S., 197 Wash. App. 230, 233-34, 389 P.3d
660 (2016) (holding the same).
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No. 50773-1-II
presented, (2) the desirability of an authoritative determination which will provide future
guidance to public officers, and (3) the likelihood that the question will recur. Sorenson, 80
Wash. 2d at 558.
Our Supreme Court has consistently stated that the need to clarify the statutory scheme
governing civil commitment is a matter of continuing and substantial public interest. See, e.g., In
re Det. of M.W. v. Dep’t of Soc. & Health Servs., 185 Wash. 2d 633, 649, 374 P.3d 1123 (2016); In
re Det. of R.S., 124 Wash. 2d 766, 770, 881 P.2d 972 (1994); Matter of Det. of Swanson, 115
Wash. 2d 21, 24-25, 804 P.2d 1 (1990); In re Det. of LaBelle, 107 Wash. 2d 196, 200, 728 P.2d 138
(1986); In re Det. of Cross, 99 Wash. 2d 373, 377, 662 P.2d 828 (1983).
P.P.’s first issue on appeal involves whether the superior court erred when it concluded
he did not have an opportunity under the law to become a good faith voluntary patient. Applying
the Sorenson criteria to this issue, we conclude that it is public in nature because it involves
significant constitutional questions and statutory interpretation, an authoritative determination
will provide future guidance to public officials, and given the relative frequency of involuntary
commitments, the issue is certain to recur on a regular basis.
For these reasons, we address the merits of whether the superior court erred when it
concluded P.P. did not have the opportunity under the law to become a good faith voluntary
patient.
II. GOOD FAITH VOLUNTARY STATUS
P.P. argues that the superior court erred when it concluded that the law does not allow
him to become a good faith voluntary patient. He bases this argument on statutory, due process,
and equal protection grounds. We disagree.
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A. Standard of Review
We review constitutional questions de novo, with a presumption that the challenged
measures are constitutional. M.W., 185 Wash. 2d at 647. The party challenging a statute has the
burden of proving that it is unconstitutional. Id.
We similarly review questions of statutory interpretation de novo. In re Det. of Marcum,
189 Wash. 2d 1, 8, 403 P.3d 16 (2017). The primary objective of any statutory interpretation and
construction inquiry is to determine and carry out the intent of the legislature. In re Det. of
Martin, 163 Wash. 2d 501, 506, 182 P.3d 951 (2008). If possible, we derive legislative intent
solely from the plain language enacted by the legislature, considering the text of the provision in
question, the context of the statute in which the provision is found, related provisions,
amendments to the provision, and the statutory scheme as a whole. Dep’t of Ecology v.
Campbell & Gwinn, LLC, 146 Wash. 2d 1, 9-10, 43 P.3d 4 (2002). When interpreting a statute, we
first look to its plain language. Martin, 163 Wash. 2d at 508. “If the plain language is subject to
only one interpretation, our inquiry is at an end.” Id. After consideration of all relevant statutory
language, if “the statute remains susceptible to more than one reasonable meaning, the statute is
ambiguous and it is appropriate to resort to aids to construction, including legislative history.”
Campbell & Gwinn, 146 Wash. 2d at 12.
B. Statutory Scheme
The question presented involves whether a mentally ill person must be given an
opportunity to become a good faith voluntary patient when he or she comes before the superior
court on a petition for involuntary commitment after having been declared incompetent to stand
trial and having felony charges dismissed.
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In general, a mentally ill person may be involuntarily committed under the Involuntary
Treatment Act (ITA), chapter 71.05 RCW, by one of two avenues. The first avenue involves
procedures initiated by mental health professionals under former RCW 71.05.150 (2015). A
mental health professional may file a petition for initial detention or involuntary outpatient
evaluation based on credible allegations that the person has a mental disorder and presents an
imminent risk of harm to themselves or others or is gravely disabled. Former RCW
71.05.150(1)(a); former RCW 71.05.153 (2015); In re Det. of D.W. v. Dep’t of Soc. & Health
Servs., 181 Wash. 2d 201, 204, 332 P.3d 423 (2014). If there is probable cause to support the
petition, and the person has refused or failed to accept appropriate evaluation and treatment
voluntarily, the superior court may issue an order to detain the person at a designated evaluation
and treatment facility for not more than a 72-hour evaluation and treatment period. Former
RCW 71.05.150(2)(a). At the conclusion of the 72-hour commitment, a petition for an additional
14 days of involuntary intensive treatment or an additional 90 days of a less restrictive
alternative to involuntary intensive treatment may be filed. Former RCW 71.05.230 (2016).
Among other requirements, such petitions may only be filed if the person has been
advised of the need for voluntary treatment and the professional staff of the facility has evidence
that he or she has not in good faith volunteered. Former RCW 71.05.230(2).
Where a potential detainee has put her status as a good faith voluntary patient at
issue, the burden is on the State to show by a preponderance of the evidence that
the patient has not in good faith volunteered for appropriate treatment before
involuntary treatment may be ordered.
In re Det. of Kirby, 65 Wash. App. 862, 870-71, 829 P.2d 1139 (1992). At the expiration of the
14-day period of intensive treatment, a person may be committed for further treatment if
statutory grounds warranting additional commitment are met. Former RCW 71.05.280; former
RCW 71.05.320 (2016).
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The second avenue of involuntary commitment involves procedures after the dismissal of
a felony charge under RCW 10.77.086. If the superior court determines a person is incompetent
to stand trial, and criminal charges have been dismissed due to that incompetency, the person is
sent to a state hospital for a 72-hour evaluation period for the purpose of filing a civil
commitment petition. RCW 10.77.086(4). The evaluating physicians at the state hospital may
file a civil commitment petition, which is for 180 days of involuntary treatment and is subject to
the requirements and procedures of all other 180-day civil commitment petitions. Former RCW
71.05.280(3); former RCW 71.05.290 (2016). This second avenue bypasses the 14-day and 90-
day requirements mandated under the first avenue of the ITA, and does not contain a similar
option allowing voluntary treatment.
Thus, the applicable statutes do not provide to mentally ill persons, found incompetent to
stand trial for felony charges, the legal opportunity to become good faith voluntary patients. To
the extent P.P. is arguing that the statute itself affords him the opportunity to become a good
faith voluntary patient in this situation, his argument fails.
With this statutory backdrop in mind, we next turn to P.P.’s constitutional challenges.
C. Substantive Due Process
P.P. argues that a patient in his position has a Fourteenth Amendment due process right to
become a good faith voluntary patient despite being found incompetent to stand trial and having
felony charges dismissed. We disagree.
Substantive due process prohibits the government from interfering with a fundamental
right unless the infringement is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest. In re Det.
of Morgan, 180 Wash. 2d 312, 324, 330 P.3d 774 (2014). Civil commitment must be based on
findings of both mental illness and dangerousness in order to meet the requirements of
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substantive due process. M.W., 185 Wash. 2d at 649. Our Supreme Court has stated, “Because
civil commitment laws deprive individuals of their fundamental right to liberty, they must be
narrowly tailored to serve compelling government interests.” Id. We thus apply that
requirement to our review of RCW 10.77.086 and the relevant provisions of chapter 71.05 RCW.
We recognize that M.W. also stated that substantive due process “‘requires that the nature
of commitment bear some reasonable relation to the purpose for which the individual is
committed.’” 185 Wash. 2d at 649 (quoting Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 79, 112 S. Ct. 1780,
118 L. Ed. 2d 437 (1992)). The quoted language suggests rational basis review, not the explicit
requirement of M.W. that civil commitment law be narrowly tailored to serve compelling state
interests. Id. As noted, however, M.W. expressly requires that civil commitment laws “be
narrowly tailored to serve compelling government interests.” Id. We do not read M.W. to mean
that its somewhat orphaned reference to “some reasonable relation” is to rescind its explicit
requirement of narrow tailoring to serve a compelling state interest, especially when that stricter
requirement, a fortiori, requires a reasonable relation in order to be narrowly tailored.
This conclusion is strengthened by the nature of Foucha. In that decision, the Supreme
Court held that one found not guilty by reason of insanity is entitled to release when he has
recovered his sanity or is no longer dangerous, relying on a prior decision. 504 U.S. at 77. The
Court recited the “some reasonable relation” rule in holding that because Foucha was no longer
suffering from mental disease or illness, he could not be held under its prior decision that one is
entitled to release upon recovering sanity. Id. at 79. This recitation cannot be read as holding
that substantive due process requires only rational basis review of civil commitment laws,
especially when that doctrine was only discussed later in the opinion. Id. at 80. For these
reasons, we ask whether the statute is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest.
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P.P. relies on In re Detention of Chorney, 64 Wash. App. 469, 825 P.2d 330 (1992), for the
proposition that he had a due process right to become a good faith voluntary patient. In Chorney,
the superior court granted a civil commitment petition that involuntarily detained Chorney for 14
days of treatment. Id. at 471. Chorney argued the superior court erred when it failed to make a
determination on the question of whether he had “not in good faith volunteered” within the
meaning of former RCW 71.05.230(2). Id. at 471. Division One of our court reasoned that
because of the potential “curtailment of liberty effected under the civil commitment statute, the
right to due process requires the intervention of an impartial third party to ensure that procedural
requirements have been met.” Id. at 477. Accordingly, the court held that where a potential
detainee has put her status as a good faith voluntary patient at issue, the burden is on the State to
show by a preponderance of the evidence that the patient has not in good faith volunteered for
appropriate treatment before involuntary treatment may be ordered. Id. at 477-78.
For a number of reasons, Chorney does not support P.P.’s claims. First, Chorney does
not hold that all mentally ill persons have an unqualified statutory right to be considered a good
faith voluntary patient. Second, and more importantly, Chorney involved ITA procedures
initiated by a mental health professional under former RCW 71.05.150, not ITA procedures
subsequent to a finding of incompetence to stand trial and the dismissal of felony charges under
RCW 10.77.086. The only portion of chapter 71.05 RCW that requires the superior court to
consider whether a patient would be voluntary is former RCW 71.05.230(2), and that provision
applies to 14-day commitment hearings, not a petition for 180-day commitment following a
determination of incompetence to stand trial. Former RCW 71.05.280(3), former RCW
71.05.290, and former RCW 71.05.320 are the specific provisions that address petitions
following a finding of incompetency to stand trial and the dismissal of felony charges, and there
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is no mention of good faith voluntary status in those provisions. Chorney does not apply to those
who have had felony charges dismissed because the superior court declared them incompetent to
stand trial.
P.P. cites former RCW 71.05.050 (2015) to support his argument that, when read as a
whole, the statute provides the option to become a good faith voluntary patient subsequent to a
finding of incompetency to stand trial and the dismissal of felony charges. Former RCW
71.05.050(1) provides, in part, as follows:
Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to limit the right of any person to apply
voluntarily to any public or private agency or practitioner for treatment of a mental
disorder, either by direct application or by referral.
This statute merely clarifies that the ITA does not prohibit individuals from seeking treatment
outside the procedures of chapter 71.05 RCW. It also specifies the rights of mentally ill persons
who have sought voluntary treatment and the procedures for hospital staff if a voluntary patient
requesting discharge presents an imminent likelihood of serious harm or is gravely disabled,
among other things. Read in context, this provision does not create a liberty interest that would
trigger the protections of substantive due process in P.P.’s case.
P.P. has made no argument that RCW 10.77.086 and the relevant provisions of chapter
71.05 RCW are not narrowly tailored to serve compelling government interests. Our Supreme
Court, on the other hand, has held that certain provisions of chapter 71.05 RCW do not violate
substantive due process and are narrowly tailored to serve compelling government interests. See,
e.g., M.W., 185 Wash. 2d at 649-53 (addressing former RCW 71.05.320). For reasons similar to
those outlined in M.W., we likewise conclude that the provisions at issue (RCW 10.77.086,
former RCW 71.05.230, former RCW 71.05.280, former RCW 71.05.290, and former RCW
71.05.320) serve the touchstones of substantive due process relevant to the civil commitment
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process—ensuring that initial and continued confinement is based on an individual’s mental
illness and dangerousness. See M.W., 185 Wash. 2d at 649-53.
The aspects of the ITA at issue are narrowly tailored to serve a very particular group in
need of proper care who pose a threat to public safety—mentally ill persons found incompetent
to stand trial for felonies. The ITA serves a number of important governmental interests. Most
importantly, the ITA aims to protect the health and safety of persons suffering from mental
disorders and to protect public safety. See former RCW 71.05.010(a)-(g) (2015). Our Supreme
Court has held that the State has a compelling interest in protecting the community from
mentally ill persons who pose a danger to themselves and others and in providing care to those
who are unable to care for themselves. M.W., 185 Wash. 2d at 649-53. As discussed above, the
ITA does not afford those found incompetent to stand trial on felony charges the option of
becoming voluntary patients. Denying persons found incompetent to stand trial for felonies and
who suffer from a mental disorder the potential ability to circumvent the ITA by claiming the
opportunity to become good faith voluntary patients directly serves the ends of protecting public
safety and providing care to those with mental disorders.
We hold that RCW 10.77.086 and the relevant provisions of chapter 71.05 RCW satisfy
substantive due process, because the statutes are narrowly drawn to further the State’s
compelling interest in ensuring public safety and in ensuring proper treatment of those with
mental disorders who have been declared incompetent to stand trial.
D. Equal Protection
P.P. next argues that similarly situated persons have a Fourteenth Amendment equal
protection right to become good faith voluntary patients despite findings of incompetency to
stand trial and dismissal of felony charges. We disagree.
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Our Supreme Court has said,
Civil commitment statutes that treat classes of individuals differently are subject to
the rational basis standard, which requires that all members of a class are treated
alike, that there is a rational basis for distinguishing the class from others, and that
the classification is rationally related to the law’s purpose.
M.W., 185 Wash. 2d at 664. The rational basis standard is relaxed and highly deferential. In re
Det. of Turay, 139 Wash. 2d 379, 410, 986 P.2d 790 (1999). Under this standard a legislative
classification will be upheld unless it rests on grounds entirely unrelated to the achievement of
legitimate state objectives. Id. The burden is on the party challenging the classification to show
that it is entirely arbitrary. Id.
P.P. argues that if the superior court’s ruling is allowed to stand, similarly situated
persons could be involuntarily committed without the protections afforded by the statutory
scheme; specifically, without the opportunity to become a good faith voluntary patient. P.P.
claims essentially that (1) all persons who have been involuntarily committed belong to the same
class, (2) there is no rational basis for distinguishing between persons involuntarily committed by
way of former RCW 71.05.150 and RCW 10.77.086, and (3) it is entirely arbitrary to allow some
persons involuntarily committed the opportunity to become good faith voluntary patients, but not
others.
P.P. relies on Matter of Detention of Dydasco, 135 Wash. 2d 943, 959 P.2d 1111 (1998), to
conclude that “there is no rational basis to hold that respondents facing short, 14-day
commitment have the right to undergo voluntar[]y commitment, but respondents facing the
significantly longer 180-day commitment are foreclosed from doing so.” Br. of Appellant at 12.
Dydasco, however, does not support P.P.’s contention.
Dydasco claimed he received insufficient notice of the State’s intention to seek a 180-day
involuntary commitment. 135 Wash. 2d at 945. On direct appeal, Division One held that former
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RCW 71.05.300 requires 3 days’ notice of filing for only 90-day petitions that follow a 14-day
period of intensive treatment. Id. at 947. The court held that persons, like Dydasco, who were
completing 90-day less restrictive treatment were not entitled to 3 days’ notice of a petition for a
180-day commitment. Id.
Our Supreme Court disagreed and reversed. The court stated that providing less notice to
persons subject to longer commitments was irrational and violated the equal protection clause.
Id. at 952. Further, the court reasoned that even though the statute was silent as to the notice
requirement, because the legislature chose to give 3 days’ notice of further commitment
proceedings to persons completing 14-day treatment, equal protection requires the same notice
be given to persons completing 90-day or 180-day commitments. Id. Accordingly, our Supreme
Court held that Dydasco was entitled to 3 days’ notice of the State’s intent to seek additional
commitment. Id.
Dydasco is distinguishable. While there was no rational basis for providing less notice to
persons subject to longer commitments, there is a rational basis for treating those found
incompetent to stand trial differently from other detainees. Simply put, persons involuntarily
committed via RCW 10.77.086 (and the relevant provisions of chapter 71.05 RCW) have been
accused of felonies, declared incompetent to stand trial, and have had their felony charges
dismissed. Persons with mental disorders committed via former RCW 71.05.150 have not
necessarily been accused of any crimes. Thus, assuming all persons with mental disorders who
have been involuntarily committed are members of the same class, there is a rational basis for
upholding the differing treatment within that class.
We hold that denying persons with mental disorders who have been declared incompetent
to stand trial and have had their felony charges dismissed the legal opportunity to become good
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faith voluntary patients does not violate equal protection, since it is rationally related to
legitimate governmental interests. First, all individuals incompetent to stand trial for felony
charges are subject to the same uniform procedure under chapter 71.05 RCW. Second, the
legislature has compelling state interests in distinguishing certain persons with mental disorders
who have been accused of committing crimes from other persons with mental disorders subject
to involuntary treatment. See, e.g., In re Det. of Patterson, 90 Wash. 2d 144, 151, 579 P.2d 1335
(1978), overruled on other grounds by In re Det. of McLaughlin, 100 Wash. 2d 832, 676 P.2d 444
(1984). Third, the statute is rationally related to those state interests because the distinction—
whether a person with a mental disorder has the legal opportunity to become a good faith
voluntary patient—depends on whether that person was accused of crimes, found incompetent,
and had criminal charges dismissed due to incompetency.
We are aware that individuals incompetent to stand trial for felony charges are presumed
innocent and that there has been no adjudication of guilt or innocence. Still, in these
circumstances the State has at least presented evidence sufficient to establish probable cause in
order to bring the charges against the accused. The government has strong interests in ensuring
public safety and in ensuring proper treatment for all persons with mental disorders. This statute
singles out a particular set of such persons—those found incompetent to stand trial for felony
charges—and does not allow them to become good faith voluntary patients. It allows persons
with mental disorders who have not been not been found incompetent to stand trial the
opportunity to become good faith voluntary patients because they ostensibly pose less of a risk to
themselves and the public.
Furthermore, the ITA imposes special provisions and procedures that attach to
individuals committed following the dismissal of felony charges in order to provide for public
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safety. These provisions include: (1) prosecutor, law enforcement, victim, and witness
notifications upon release from commitment, (2) the ability for a prosecutor to intervene in and
object to an individual’s release, (3) public safety review panel oversight for violent felony
charges, and (4) specialized recommitment procedures for violent charges. See former RCW
71.05.425 (2013); former RCW 71.05.325 (2000); former RCW 71.05.330 (1998); former RCW
71.05.335 (1986); former RCW 71.05.340 (2015); RCW 10.77.270. If a person suffering from a
mental disorder who had felony charges dismissed due to incompetency was given the
opportunity to become a good faith voluntary patient, these statutory protections would be
compromised and perhaps lost. The distinctions in the statutory scheme for individuals
incompetent to stand trial for felony charges are rationally related to the State’s legitimate
interests.
Based on the analysis above, we hold the superior court did not err when it concluded
that the law does not provide P.P. with the opportunity to become a good faith voluntary patient.
E. Remand to Superior Court
P.P. finally argues that this court should remand to the superior court for de novo review
of P.P.’s good faith voluntary status. Specifically, P.P. claims that because the superior court
reversed the commissioner’s conclusion of law, the superior court never reviewed de novo the
commissioner’s findings of fact. At oral argument, however, P.P. withdrew this assignment of
error. Accordingly, we decline to address this argument.
CONCLUSION
We hold the ITA does not provide persons with mental disorders found incompetent to
stand trial for felony charges the legal opportunity to become good faith voluntary patients. We
hold that RCW 10.77.086 and the relevant provisions of chapter 71.05 RCW satisfy substantive
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due process, because the statute is narrowly drawn to further the State’s compelling interest in
ensuring public safety and in ensuring proper treatment of persons with mental disorders. We
also hold that barring persons with mental disorders who have been declared incompetent to
stand trial for felony charges from becoming good faith voluntary patients does not violate equal
protection, because it is rationally related to legitimate governmental interests.
We affirm the superior court’s involuntary commitment order.
Bjorgen, J.
We concur:
Lee, A.C.J.
Melnick, J.
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