State Of Washington v. Barry Nicholas Angasan

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
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STATE OF WASHINGTON, la
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No. 76938-3-1 CO
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Respondent, rn 0-11.11
DIVISION ONE
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155 P.3d 125(2007). "An abuse of discretion exists l[w]hen a trial court's exercise of its
discretion is manifestly unreasonable or based on untenable grounds or
2 The jury found Angasan guilty under the first alternative (while under the Influence of
Intoxicating liquor or any drug).
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No. 76938-3-1/7
reasons.'" State v. Quaale, 182 Wash. 2d 191, 197, 340 P.3d 213(2014)(citing
State v. Stenson, 132 Wash. 2d 668, 701,940 P.2d 1239(1997)).
Witnesses typically may not directly or indirectly testify in the form of an
opinion as to the guilt or credibility of a defendant. Kirkman, 159 Wn.2d at 927;
Quaale, 182 Wn.2d at 199. "Such testimony is unfairly prejudicial to the
defendant because it invades the exclusive province of the jury." Kirkman, 159
Wn.2d at 927. Courts, however, will not exclude expert testimony just because it
covers an issue the jury must decide. Kirkman 159 Wn.2d at 929.
To determine whether a statement constitutes impermissible opinion
testimony, courts consider "'(1) the type of witness involved,(2)the specific
nature of the testimony,(3)the nature of the charges,(4)the type of defense,
and (5)the other evidence before the trier of fact.'" Kirkman, 159 Wn.2d at 928
(citing Demerv, 144 Wn.2d at 759 (internal quotations and citation omitted)).
Testimony on the defendant's guilt, however, is "clearly inappropriate for opinion
testimony in criminal trials." Quaale, 182 Wn.2d at 200. Courts use these same
standards for excluding evidence, such as reports, that inadmissibly opine on
guilt. See State v. Demerv, 144 Wn.2d 753,760--61, 30 P.3d 1278(2001).
Here, the autopsy report identified Thomas as the unrestrained passenger
In the vehicle. This statement provided a conclusive opinion about the only
disputed element whether Angasan had been driving. See Quaale, 182 Wn.2d
at 200. Additionally, the report described Thomas as the passenger and stated
the at-fault driver was intoxicated. Because Thomas and Angasan were the only
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No. 76938-3-1/8
people in the car, these comments indicated Angasan was the at-fault,
Intoxicated driver. As a result, the autopsy report provided an opinion on
Angasan's guilt and invaded the province of the jury.
Furthermore, Dr. Goldfogel's opinion on who had been driving was
couched within his expert testimony at trial. On cross-examination, Dr. Goldfogel
admitted that the determinations came from other reports and that he had no
independent knowledge of who was driving the car. However, he also testified
that, based on his review of the crash scene reports, he believed it is "much less
likely" that Thomas had been driving. The testimony therefore further Indicated
Dr. Goldfogel believed Angasan was the intoxicated "at fault driver referenced in
the report.
The State argues the admission of the autopsy report constituted
harmless error because it provided only cumulative evidence.3 Improper opinion
testimony violates a defendant's constitutional right to have the jury decide facts
critical to his or her guilt. Quaale, 182 Wn.2d at 201-02. "Constitutional error is
harmless only if the State establishes beyond a reasonable doubt that any
reasonable jury would have reached the same result absent the error." Quaale,
182 Wn.2d at 202.
'On appeal, Angasan challenged the admissibility of his statement to Nurse Dalton that he
was the *unbelted driver on privilege grounds. Because we conclude that, even assuming the
court properly admitted the statement to Nurse Dalton, the error In admitting the autopsy report
was not harmless, we do not address Angasan's argument
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No. 76938-3-1/9
Trooper Sletten testified that he "felt comfortable" saying that Angasan
had been driving but did not respond to the scene and relied on information
provided by other detectives and a sergeant in his investigative unit. The other
testifying witnesses could only repeat conflicting statements Angasan had made
as to whether he had been driving. The court also admitted the recording of his
calls with Buchanan. Yet at trial, Angasan testified that he did not remember the
inculpatory statements and that he had not been driving when the accident
occurred. An expert testified Angasan's statements were unreliable because he
suffered a serious concussion in the accident that could have caused confusion
and memory loss for weeks.
Moreover, the statements in the report indicating Angasan had been
driving while intoxicated were more significant because it came from a
government official. See State v. Thompson, 90 Wn. App.41,46, 950 P.2d 977(1998)("an opinion as to the defendant's guilt is particularly prejudicial when it is
expressed by a government official"). Additionally, the State called Dr. Goldfogel
as an expert. During his expert testimony and in his expert report, Dr. Goldfogel
stated Thomas was the passenger, casting "an aura of scientific certainty" over
his opinion, and "significantly increasing the weight the jury likely attached to it."
Quaale 182 Wn.2d at 202.
Angasan's defense focused on his assertion he was not driving.
Witnesses presented conflicting evidence on the issue. The State has not met its
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No. 76938-3-1/10
burden to demonstrate, beyond a reasonable doubt, that a reasonable jury would
have reached the same result absent the error.4
We reverse and remand for a new trial.
C44.4.te, 9.
WE CONCUR:
' Because we find this error warrants reversal, we do not address Angasan's claims of
Ineffective assistance of counsel, error as to admission of two blood tests, cumulative error, or
Improper sentencing.
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