Personal Restraint Petition Of Jarrell Maurice Marshall

Filed
Washington State
Court of Appeals
Division Two
September 24, 2019
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION II
In re the Personal Restraint of: No. 49302-1-II
JARRELL MAURICE MARSHALL,
PUBLISHED OPINION
Petitioner.
MAXA, C.J. – In this personal restraint petition (PRP), Jarrell Marshall seeks freedom
from restraint imposed by the sentence following his 2007 guilty plea for one count of second
degree murder and two counts of first degree robbery. Marshall committed these crimes when he
was 16 years old, but he was sentenced in adult court. He asserts that the sentencing court erred
in failing to consider the mitigating qualities of his youth when he was sentenced.
Marshall argues that even though his PRP was filed more than one year after his
conviction became final, his PRP is not time barred under RCW 10.73.100(6) because State v.
Houston-Sconiers, 188 Wn.2d 1, 391 P.3d 409 (2017), represented a significant change in the
law that was material to his sentence and that must be applied retroactively. Our Supreme Court
in Houston-Sconiers stated that the Eighth Amendment requires sentencing courts to consider
mitigating qualities of youth when sentencing juvenile offenders. Id. at 21, 23.
We hold that Marshall’s PRP claim was untimely. Although the directive in Houston-
Sconiers that sentencing courts must consider the mitigating qualities of youth when sentencing
juvenile offenders represented a significant change in the law that is material to Marshall’s
No. 49302-1-II
sentence, it stated a procedural rule that does not apply retroactively. Accordingly, we deny
Marshall’s PRP.1
FACTS
In 2007, Marshall pleaded guilty to second degree murder and to two counts of first
degree robbery after he was part of a group who killed one person and robbed two others. He
was 16 years old when he committed the crimes.
The standard range sentence was 165-265 months for the murder charge and 51-68
months for the robbery charges. The State and defense counsel made a joint recommendation of
a 165 month sentence on the murder charge. The court instead sentenced Marshall to 189
months on the murder charge and 51 months on the robbery charges to run concurrently.
Marshall did not file a direct appeal.
In 2016, Marshall filed a PRP based on various grounds. Following subsequent
developments in the law, he ultimately focused on an argument that the sentencing court violated
the Eighth Amendment and Houston-Sconiers by failing to consider the mitigating qualities of
youth when imposing a sentence above the joint recommendation.
We ordered a reference hearing to determine what had happened at the 2007 sentencing
hearing. The trial court concluded that the sentencing court did not consider Marshall’s youthful
qualities as required under Houston-Sconiers and that Marshall suffered actual prejudice as the
result of that constitutional error. The State has challenged both findings.
1
Because we hold that Marshall’s PRP is untimely, we do not address whether he established a
constitutional error that resulted in actual and substantial prejudice.
2
No. 49302-1-II
ANALYSIS
Marshall argues that the RCW 10.73.100(6) exception to the one-year time bar for PRPs
applies because Houston-Sconiers resulted in a significant change in the law by requiring
sentencing courts to consider mitigating qualities of youth when sentencing juvenile offenders,
which was not required under prior law.2 Our Supreme Court recently declined to address this
issue. In re Pers. Restraint of Meippen, 193 Wn.2d 310, 317-18, 440 P.3d 978 (2019). We hold
that although Houston-Sconiers constituted a significant change in the law that was material to
his sentence, that case stated a procedural rule that cannot be applied retroactively. Therefore,
we hold that the RCW 10.73.100(6) exception to the PRP time bar does not apply and that
Marshall’s PRP is untimely.
A. TIMELINESS OF PRPS
Under RCW 10.73.090(1), a petitioner generally must file a PRP within one year after a
trial court judgment becomes final. A judgment is final on the date it is filed with the clerk of
the trial court. RCW 10.73.090(3)(a). Here, Marshall’s judgment and sentence became final in
2007. But he did not file his PRP until 2016.
RCW 10.73.100 lists six exceptions to the one-year limit. The exception potentially
applicable here is RCW 10.73.100(6), which states that the time bar does not apply if
[t]here has been a significant change in the law, whether substantive or procedural,
which is material to the conviction, sentence, or other order entered in a criminal or
civil proceeding instituted by the state or local government, and either the
legislature has expressly provided that the change in the law is to be applied
retroactively, or a court, in interpreting a change in the law that lacks express
2
In his PRP, Marshall also argued that State v. O’Dell, 183 Wn.2d 680, 358 P.3d 359 (2015),
constituted a significant change in the law. However, the Supreme Court in In re Pers. Restraint
of Light-Roth subsequently held that O’Dell did not constitute a significant change in the law that
provides an exception to the time bar. 191 Wn.2d 328, 330, 337-38, 422 P.3d 444 (2018).
Therefore, Marshall no longer relies on O’Dell.
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No. 49302-1-II
legislative intent regarding retroactive application, determines that sufficient
reasons exist to require retroactive application of the changed legal standard.
In other words, an exception exists when (1) there has been a “significant change in the law,” (2)
the change is “material to the . . . sentence,” and (3) “sufficient reasons exist to require
retroactive application.” RCW 10.73.100(6); see In re Pers. Restraint of Colbert, 186 Wn.2d
614, 619, 380 P.3d 504 (2016).
The issue here is whether Houston-Sconiers satisfied all three requirements of RCW
10.73.100(6).
B. O’DELL AND HOUSTON-SCONIERS
Over the last 15 years, courts increasingly have considered the impact of age on juvenile
defendants’ culpability. In a series of opinions, the United States Supreme Court held that the
Eighth Amendment prohibited sentencing juveniles to death, Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551,
578, 125 S. Ct. 1183, 161 L. Ed. 2d 1 (2005); sentencing juveniles to life sentences without the
possibility of parole in non-homicide cases, Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 81-82, 130 S. Ct.
2011, 176 L. Ed. 2d 825 (2010); and mandatory sentencing of juveniles to life without parole in
all cases. Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 479, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 183 L. Ed. 2d 407 (2012). The
Court in Montgomery v. Louisiana held that Miller stated a substantive rule that must be applied
retroactively. ___ U.S. ___, 136 S. Ct. 718, 732-36, 193 L. Ed. 2d 599 (2016).
Relying on that line of cases, our Supreme Court addressed consideration of an offender’s
youth in State v. O’Dell, 183 Wn.2d 680, 358 P.3d 359 (2015). In that case, the defendant was
convicted of second degree rape of a child, committed 10 days after his 18th birthday. Id. at
683-84. At sentencing, the defendant requested an exceptional sentence below the standard
range. Id. at 685. He argued that he was still in high school, that he would have received a
significantly lower sentence in the juvenile system, and that research showed that juveniles are
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No. 49302-1-II
more susceptible to negative influences and impulsive behavior. Id. The trial court
acknowledged the argument but ruled that it could not consider age as a mitigating circumstance.
Id. at 685-86.
The Supreme Court noted that research showed “a clear connection between youth and
decreased moral culpability for criminal conduct.” Id. at 695. That connection may relate to the
crime and diminish the defendant’s culpability, even if it is not a “per se mitigating factor
automatically entitling every youthful defendant to an exceptional sentence.” Id. at 695.
Accordingly, the court held that trial courts “must be allowed to consider youth as a mitigating
factor” in sentencing a youthful defendant. Id. at 696.
Our Supreme Court applied similar principles under the Eighth Amendment in Houston-
Sconiers, 188 Wn.2d 1. In Houston-Sconiers, the defendants were juveniles who had carried a
gun while stealing candy from Halloween trick-or-treaters. Id. at 9-11. They both were
convicted of multiple counts of robbery plus multiple firearm sentence enhancements. Id. at 12.
The trial court imposed no incarceration on the underlying crimes but believed that the law
compelled the imposition of mandatory consecutive sentences for the firearm enhancements. Id.
at 12-13. The Supreme Court noted that the trial court had no opportunity to exercise discretion
regarding the appropriateness of the sentence enhancements. Id. at 8.
The Supreme Court stated that the trial court was required to consider a juvenile
defendant’s youth in sentencing, even for statutorily mandated sentences. Id. at 8-9, 21. The
court stated that to comply with the Eighth Amendment, courts must address the differences
between children and adults by exercising “discretion to consider the mitigating qualities of
youth.” Id. at 19. The court concluded,
[W]e hold that sentencing courts must have complete discretion to consider
mitigating circumstances associated with the youth of any juvenile defendant, even
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No. 49302-1-II
in the adult criminal justice system, regardless of whether the juvenile is there
following a decline hearing or not. To the extent our state statutes have been
interpreted to bar such discretion with regard to juveniles, they are overruled. Trial
courts must consider mitigating qualities of youth at sentencing and must have
discretion to impose any sentence below the otherwise applicable SRA[3] range
and/or sentence enhancements.
Id. at 21 (emphasis added).
Relying on Miller, the court also provided guidance to trial courts on how to exercise
their discretion in juvenile sentencing. Houston-Sconiers, 188 Wn.2d at 23. The court
emphasized that the sentencing court “must consider” the following factors:
1. “[M]itigating circumstances related to the defendant’s youth – including age and its
‘hallmark features,’ such as the juvenile’s ‘immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to appreciate
risks and consequences.’ ” Id. (quoting Miller, 567 U.S. at 477).
2. “[F]actors like the nature of the juvenile’s surrounding environment and family
circumstances, the extent of the juvenile’s participation in the crime, and ‘the way familial and
peer pressures may have affected him [or her].’ ” Houston-Sconiers, 188 Wn.2d at 23 (quoting
Miller, 567 U.S. at 477).
3. “[H]ow youth impacted any legal defense, along with any factors suggesting that the
child might be successfully rehabilitated.” Houston-Sconiers, 188 Wn.2d at 23.
The court concluded, “This is what the sentencing court should have done in this case,
and this is what we remand for it to do.” Id.More recently, our Supreme Court – in a unanimous opinion – characterized the
mandatory consideration of youthful qualities ordered in Houston-Sconiers as follows:
We also recognized that the court must consider the mitigating circumstances
related to the defendant’s youth, including, but not limited to, the juvenile’s
immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to appreciate risks and consequences – the
3
Sentencing Reform Act of 1981, chapter 9.94A RCW.
6
No. 49302-1-II
nature of the juvenile’s surrounding environment and family circumstances, the
extent of the juvenile’s participation in the crime, the way familial and peer
pressures may have affected him or her, how youth impacted any legal defense, and
any factors suggesting that the juvenile might be successfully rehabilitated.
State v. Gilbert, 193 Wn.2d 169, 176, 438 P.3d 133 (2019).
C. ABILITY TO CHALLENGE STANDARD RANGE SENTENCE
The concurrence notes the general rule that a sentence within the standard sentence range
for an offense may not be appealed. RCW 9.94A.585(1). However, a defendant may appeal the
process by which a trial court imposes a sentence. State v. Knight, 176 Wn. App. 936, 957, 309
P.3d 776 (2013). Therefore, a party may challenge “ ‘the underlying legal conclusions and
determinations by which a court comes to apply a particular sentencing provision.’ ” State v.
Ramos, 187 Wn.2d 420, 433, 387 P.3d 650 (quoting State v. Williams, 149 Wn.2d 143, 147, 65
P.3d 1214 (2003)), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 467 (2017). For instance, in Ramos, the court
considered on the merits an appeal of a standard range sentence that a juvenile offender alleged
violated the Eighth Amendment. 187 Wn.2d at 433, 436-53.
Here, Marshall challenges the process by which the trial court imposed a standard range
sentence that was above the joint recommendation. Therefore, we cannot reject his PRP on the
ground that a standard range sentence generally is not appealable.
D. APPLICATION OF RCW 10.73.100(6)
As noted above, RCW 10.73.100(6) provides an exception to the time bar if (1) there has
been a significant change in the law, (2) the change is material to the defendant’s sentence, and
(3) retroactive application is required. No published opinion has addressed whether Houston-
7
No. 49302-1-II
Sconiers provides an exception to the time bar. As noted above, our Supreme Court in Meippen
declined to address this issue. 193 Wn.2d at 315.4
Significantly, here we are not addressing the actual holding of Houston-Sconiers – that
“sentencing courts must have absolute discretion to depart as far as they want below otherwise
applicable SRA ranges and/or sentencing enhancements when sentencing juveniles in adult
court.” 188 Wn.2d at 9. Marshall does not rely on that holding because he did not request a
sentence outside the standard sentencing range. He instead relies on the court’s directive that
sentencing courts must consider the mitigating qualities of youth when sentencing juvenile
offenders. Id. at 21, 23. The question is whether RCW 10.73.100(6) applies to this rule.
1. Significant Change in the Law
For purposes of RCW 10.73.100(6), a significant change in the law occurs “when an
intervening appellate decision overturns a prior appellate decision that was determinative of a
material issue.” State v. Miller, 185 Wn.2d 111, 114, 371 P.3d 528 (2016). But a decision that
merely settles a point of law without overturning prior precedent, applies settled law to new
facts, or addresses an issue for the first time does not constitute a significant change in the law.
Id. at 114-16. One test for determining whether a significant change has occurred is to identify
whether the defendant previously could have argued the same issue. Id. at 115.
In In re Personal Restraint of Light-Roth, our Supreme Court held that O’Dell did not
constitute a significant change in the law and therefore did not provide an exception to the time
bar. 191 Wn.2d 328, 336-38, 422 P.3d 444 (2018). The court concluded that even before O’Dell
was decided, a defendant could have argued youth as a mitigating factor. Id. at 337-38.
4
However, in a dissenting opinion Justice Wiggins argued that Houston-Sconiers did meet the
requirements of RCW 10.73.100(6). 193 Wn.2d at 318-29 (Wiggins, J., dissenting).
8
No. 49302-1-II
But Houston-Sconiers adopted a new sentencing rule, even when compared with O’Dell.
Houston-Sconiers stated that not only did trial courts have the discretion under the SRA to
consider youth as O’Dell clarified, but trial courts were required under the Eighth Amendment to
consider mitigating qualities of youth when sentencing a juvenile defendant. 188 Wn.2d at 21.
The court also identified certain factors relating to youth that trial courts must consider at
sentencing. Id. at 23.
We need not decide whether Houston-Sconiers expressly overruled prior precedent.5 Our
Supreme Court repeatedly has identified another characteristic of a significant change in the law:
that the defendant could not have argued the issue before the new case was decided. E.g., Light-
Roth, 191 Wn.2d at 334; Miller, 185 Wn.2d at 115; In re Pers. Restraint of Lavery, 154 Wn.2d
249, 258-59, 111 P.3d 837 (2005). “A ‘significant change in the law’ is likely to have occurred
if the defendant was unable to argue the issue in question before publication of the intervening
decision.” Light-Roth, 191 Wn.2d at 334. As the court stated in In re Personal Restraint of
Greening, although petitioners “have a duty to raise available arguments in a timely fashion . . .
they should not be faulted for having omitted arguments that were essentially unavailable at the
time.” 141 Wn.2d 687, 697, 9 P.3d 206 (2000).
Here, as the court noted in Light-Roth, Marshall could have argued that the sentencing
court should consider youth as a mitigating factor. Id. at 338. But there is no question that he
could not have argued at sentencing that the sentencing court was required under the Eighth
Amendment to consider specific mitigating qualities of his youth. Houston-Sconiers was the
first case to adopt that rule. And that rule changed the law; before Houston-Sconiers sentencing
5
In his dissent in Meippen, Justice Wiggins asserted that Houston-Sconiers expressly overruled
State v. Brown, 139 Wn.2d 20, 983 P.2d 608 (1999). Meippen, 193 Wn.2d at 321 (Wiggins, J.,
dissenting) (citing Houston-Sconiers, 188 Wn.2d at 21 n.5).
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No. 49302-1-II
courts were not required to consider youth as a mitigating factor and after Houston-Sconiers they
were.
We conclude that Houston-Sconiers constituted a significant change in the law for
purposes of RCW 10.73.100(6).
2. Materiality of Change
Whether a change in the law is material for purposes of RCW 10.73.100(6) “depends
upon the facts and circumstances of each case.” In re Pers. Restraint of Hartzell, 108 Wn. App.
934, 940, 33 P.3d 1096 (2001).
Here, Marshall was a juvenile offender. At sentencing, he was unable to argue that the
sentencing court was required to consider his youth when evaluating the joint recommendation
for a mid-range sentence. Under Houston-Sconiers, the sentencing court would be required to
consider certain mitigating qualities of youth. 188 Wn.2d at 21, 23. Marshall would be able to
argue based on the court’s mandatory consideration of these qualities that his sentence should be
lower. The required consideration of the mitigating qualities of youth may have convinced the
trial court not to impose a higher sentence than the joint recommendation. Therefore, Houston-
Sconiers is material.
The State appears to argue that Houston-Sconiers is not material because the rule stated
in that case applies only to sentences that are the functional equivalent of a life sentence.
However, Houston-Sconiers contains no such limitation. The court stated that sentencing courts
must consider the characteristic of youth any time a juvenile offender is sentenced in adult court.
188 Wn.2d at 8-9, 21, 23.
The State also appears to argue that the holding in State v. Scott, 190 Wn.2d 586, 416
P.3d 1182 (2018), precludes Houston-Sconiers from being material to Marshall’s sentence. In
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No. 49302-1-II
Scott, the juvenile defendant was sentenced to 900 months confinement and later filed a motion
requesting a new sentencing hearing that was converted to a PRP. Id. at 589-90. The court held
that collateral relief was unavailable to Scott pursuant to RAP 16.4(d), which allows collateral
relief only if available remedies are inadequate. Id. at 592, 601. The court stated that his
adequate remedy was to seek parole under RCW 9.94A.730. Id. That statute, commonly known
as the Miller fix, provides that a person convicted as juvenile can petition the indeterminate
sentence review board for early release after serving no less than 20 years of total confinement.
RCW 9.94A.730(1).
The court rejected the argument that Houston-Sconiers required resentencing. Id. at 594-
97. The court noted that the United States Supreme Court in Montgomery expressly held that a
state may remedy an unconstitutional life without the parole sentence by permitting juvenile
offenders to be considered for parole rather than resentencing them. Scott, 190 Wn.2d at 596-
97. But Scott is inapplicable here because Marshall was not sentenced to more than 20 years of
total confinement. Therefore, RCW 9.94A.730(1) does not apply to him and cannot provide an
adequate remedy under RAP 16.4(d).
We conclude that that Houston-Sconiers constituted a change in the law that was material
to Marshall’s sentence for purposes of RCW 10.73.100(6).
3. Retroactive Application
a. General Principles
A decision that constitutes a significant change in the law does not necessarily apply
retroactively. See Colbert, 186 Wn.2d at 619. Whether a decision must be applied retroactively
for purposes of RCW 10.73.100(6) depends on the federal retroactivity analysis established in
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No. 49302-1-II
Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 109 S. Ct. 1060, 103 L. Ed. 2d 334 (1989) (plurality opinion).
Colbert, 186 Wn.2d at 623.
Under the Teague analysis, a “new rule” generally will not be given retroactive
application on collateral review. Colbert, 186 Wn.2d at 623. A new rule is one that breaks new
ground or was not dictated by precedent existing when the defendant was convicted, and is a rule
upon which reasonable jurists could disagree. Id.If a decision establishes a new rule, that decision generally applies only to those cases
that are pending on direct review or not yet final. In re Pers. Restraint of Haghighi, 178 Wn.2d
435, 443, 309 P.3d 459 (2013). But under Teague, a decision will apply retroactively on
collateral review in two situations: when the decision establishes (1) “a substantive rule that
places certain behavior ‘beyond the power of the criminal law-making authority to proscribe’ ”
or (2) a “watershed rule of criminal procedure” that is “ ‘implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty.’ ” In re Pers. Restraint of Gentry, 179 Wn.2d 614, 628, 316 P.3d 1020 (2014) (quoting
Teague, 489 U.S. at 311) (internal quotation marks omitted). We apply the Teague analysis to
determine whether Houston-Sconiers applies retroactively.
b. Houston-Sconiers as a New Rule
The rule set out in Houston-Sconiers is plainly new. It was based on evolving law that
culminated in Miller, which the United States Supreme Court in Montgomery treated as new.
136 S. Ct. at 732. And the case law preceding Houston-Sconiers, Miller included, did not
establish that the Eighth Amendment required a sentencing court to consider a juvenile
defendant’s youth for all types of offenses.
12
No. 49302-1-II
c. Substantive vs. Procedural Rule
A new rule applies retroactively if it is substantive. Gentry, 179 Wn.2d at 628.
“Procedural rules . . . are designed to enhance the accuracy of a conviction or sentence by
regulating ‘the manner of determining the defendant’s culpability.’ ” Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at
730 (quoting Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 353, 124 S. Ct. 2519, 159 L. Ed. 2d 442(2004). “Substantive rules . . . set forth categorical constitutional guarantees that place certain
criminal laws and punishments altogether beyond the State’s power to impose.” Montgomery,
136 S. Ct. at 729. “A substantive rule . . . forbids ‘criminal punishment of certain primary
conduct’ or prohibits ‘a certain category of punishment for a class of defendants because of their
status or offense.’ ” Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 732 (quoting Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302,
330, 109 S. Ct. 2934, 106 L. Ed. 2d 256 (1989)).
The Supreme Court’s directive in Houston-Sconiers that sentencing courts must consider
the mitigating qualities of youth did not prohibit any category of punishment or provide that the
State could not impose certain punishment. Instead, the court addressed the manner of
determining what sentence to impose on a juvenile, establishing a process to ensure that the
sentencing of juveniles comports with the Eighth Amendment. The court held that a sentencing
court must consider certain specific factors when sentencing a juvenile. Houston-Sconiers, 188
Wn.2d at 23. But the court did not limit the sentencing court’s discretion to impose a particular
sentence as long as those factors were considered. Therefore, we conclude that Houston-
Sconiers stated a procedural rule rather than a substantive one.
This conclusion is not inconsistent with Montgomery, which held that Miller established
a substantive rule. As the Court stated in Montgomery, Miller “did more than require a sentence
to consider a juvenile offender’s youth before imposing life without parole; it established that the
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No. 49302-1-II
penological justifications for life without parole collapse in light of the ‘distinctive attributes of
youth.’ ” Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 734 (quoting Miller, 567 U.S. at 472). The court recognized
that Miller did not erect a categorical bar against sentencing a juvenile to life without parole, but
stated that Miller’s prohibition of such punishment “for all but the rarest of juvenile offenders”
amounted to a substantive protection. Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 734. The Court concluded that
the rule stated in Miller was a “substantive holding that life without parole is an excessive
sentence for children whose crimes reflect transient immaturity.” Id. at 735.
The same substantive prohibition is missing from Houston-Sconiers. Unlike in Miller,
Houston-Sconiers did not address whether the Eighth Amendment prohibited a specific sentence.
Instead of forbidding application of a particular type of punishment as in Miller, the court in
Houston-Sconiers created a generally applicable process for sentencing juvenile defendants that
regulated “ ‘the manner of determining the defendant’s culpability.’ ” Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at
730 (quoting Schriro, 542 U.S. at 353).
We conclude that the directive in Houston-Sconiers that sentencing courts must consider
the mitigating qualities of youth when sentencing juvenile offenders did not establish a
substantive rule and therefore cannot be retroactive on that basis.
d. Watershed Rule of Criminal Procedure
The second Teague exception is that a new procedural rule may apply retroactively if it is
a watershed rule of criminal procedure. Colbert, 186 Wn.2d at 624. A watershed rule is a rule
that is “ ‘implicit in the concept of ordered liberty’ ” and that implicates the “fundamental
fairness of the trial.” State v. Evans, 154 Wn.2d 438, 445, 114 P.3d 627 (2005) (quoting In re
Pers. Restraint of St. Pierre, 118 Wn.2d 321, 326, 823 P.2d 492 (1992)). The rule must not only
improve accuracy, but alter our understanding of “ ‘bedrock procedural elements essential to the
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No. 49302-1-II
fairness of a proceeding.’ ” Evans, 154 Wn.2d at 445 (quoting Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U.S. 227,
242, 110 S. Ct. 2822, 111 L. Ed. 2d 193 (1990).
Watershed rules are almost nonexistent. The United States Supreme Court has
referenced Gideon v. Wainwright,6 which guaranteed the right to counsel for criminal
defendants, as a watershed rule. Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 495, 110 S. Ct. 1257, 108 L. Ed.
2d 415 (1990); see Gentry, 179 Wn.2d at 628. Since then, the United States Supreme Court has
addressed multiple claimed watershed rules, but no new watershed has been announced. See
Gentry, 179 Wn.2d at 628. The United States Supreme Court twice has rejected watershed status
to rules addressing mitigating evidence at sentencing. Graham v. Collins, 506 U.S. 461, 476-78,
113 S. Ct. 892, 122 L. Ed. 2d 260 (1993); Beard v. Banks, 542 U.S. 406, 419-20, 124 S. Ct.
2504, 159 L. Ed. 2d 494 (2004).
Our Supreme Court similarly has never held that a rule meets the Teague watershed
criteria. Gentry, 179 Wn.2d at 628. The court in Gentry noted that in applying this exception,
“courts have been sparing to the point of unwillingness.” Id.Given the reluctance of the United States Supreme Court and our Supreme Court to find
watershed rules in this context, we conclude that Houston-Sconiers does not establish a
watershed procedural rule.
4. Summary
We conclude that the directive in Houston-Sconiers that sentencing courts must consider
the mitigating qualities of youth when sentencing juvenile offenders does not apply retroactively
to matters on collateral review. Therefore, we hold that Marshall’s PRP claim is untimely.
6
372 U.S. 335, 83 S. Ct. 792, 9 L. Ed. 2d 799 (1963).
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No. 49302-1-II
CONCLUSION
We hold that RCW 10.73.100(6) is inapplicable here and therefore that Marshall’s PRP is
untimely. Accordingly, we deny the PRP.
MAXA, C.J.
I concur:
GLASGOW, J.
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No. 49302-1-II
MELNICK, J. (concurring) — After receiving the benefits of the bargain from his plea
negotiations with the State, Jerrell Marshall now seeks in this personal restraint petition (PRP) to
renege on his stipulated plea agreement.
Marshall pled guilty to murder in the second degree and two counts of robbery in the first
degree in exchange for a stipulated sentence recommendation within the standard range. 7 The
State reduced the original charges of murder in the first degree, assault in the first degree, and three
counts of robbery in the third degree. These original charges carried a higher standard range than
the ones to which Marshall pled guilty. The murder in the first degree charge also carried a
mandatory minimum of twenty years of total confinement with no earned early release. RCW
9.94A.540(1)(a), (2). The events underlying all of these charges occurred when Marshall was 16
years old. He was sentenced in adult court.
While I agree with the majority’s result, I disagree with its reasoning and analysis. First,
Marshall has failed to show actual and substantial prejudice. Accordingly, his PRP should be
denied. Second, there has been no significant change in the law as it relates to sentencing a
defendant within the standard range. The majority takes an overly broad view of the rule in State
v. Houston-Sconiers8 and fails to factually distinguish it. I believe Houston-Sconiers is
inapplicable in this case where Marshall pled guilty to a stipulated sentence within the standard
range and where the court meted out a standard range sentence.
7
The court sentenced Marshall to a determinate standard range sentence; however, it did not follow
the stipulated plea agreement. The court advised Marshall it was not bound by the plea agreement.
8
188 Wn.2d 1, 391 P.2d 409 (2017).
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No. 49302-1-II
I. NO PREJUDICE
“A personal restraint petitioner must prove either a (1) constitutional error that results in
actual and substantial prejudice or (2) nonconstitutional error that ‘constitutes a fundamental defect
which inherently results in a complete miscarriage of justice.’” In re Pers. Restraint of Monschke,
160 Wn. App. 479, 488, 251 P.3d 884 (2010) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting In re
Pers. Restraint of Davis, 152 Wn.2d 647, 672, 101 P.3d 1 (2004)). The petitioner must prove the
error by a preponderance of the evidence. In re Pers. Restraint of Lord, 152 Wn.2d 182, 188, 94
P.3d 952 (2004).
In In re Pers. Restraint of Meippen, 193 Wn.2d 310, 317-18, 440 P.3d 978 (2019), the court
recently ruled that it need not decide if Houston-Sconiers represented a significant, material legal
change that should be applied retroactively to cases on collateral review. Instead, it decided that
because Meippen could not demonstrate actual and substantial prejudice by a preponderance of
the evidence, his personal restraint petition should be dismissed. Meippen, 193 Wn.2d at 318.
The same situation exists in this case. Marshall cannot show prejudice. He cannot
demonstrate that the sentencing court would have sentenced him to an exceptional sentence below
the range, the relief he now requests.9, 10 In fact, the stipulated plea agreement precluded Marshall
from asking or arguing for an exceptional sentence below the standard range. In exchange for the
reduction of charges, he stipulated to a specific sentence within the standard range.
9
In addition, Marshall cannot show by a preponderance of the evidence that his sentence would
have been shorter if Houston-Sconiers applied retroactively.
10
If Marshall’s PRP was granted, I question whether his proffered remedy would be imposed.
Rather, because he arguably entered into an indivisible plea agreement, there may be other
remedies. See In re Pers. Restraint of Swagerty, 186 Wn.2d 801, 810-12, 383 P.3d 454 (2016)
(regarding appropriate remedies). I need not address this issue at this time.
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I would rely on Meippen and dismiss Marshall’s PRP on this basis without further
discussion. He has not demonstrated actual and substantial prejudice.
II. NO CHANGE IN LAW
Because the majority has chosen to analyze this case differently than the Supreme Court
did in Meippen, I also address the majority’s analysis regarding whether there has been a
significant change in the law.
The majority and I agree that this PRP is time-barred under RCW 10.73.090 unless there
has been a significant change in the law that is material to Marshall’s sentence. RCW
10.73.100(6). “Whether there has been a “significant change in the law” primarily rests on whether
the defendant ‘could have argued this issue before publication of the decision.’” In re Pers.
Restraint of Light-Roth, 191 Wn.2d 328, 337, 422 P.3d 444 (2018) (internal quotations omitted)
(quoting In re Pers. Restraint of Lavery, 154 Wn.2d 249, 258-59, 111 P.3d 837 (2005)). Even if
there is a change in the law, the petitioner must show that it was material to him and his case.
RCW 10.73.100(6).
In evaluating this issue, it must be remembered that standard range sentences are
presumptively not appealable. RCW 9.94A.585. A trial court’s decision regarding the length of
a sentence within the standard range is not appealable because “as a matter of law there can be no
abuse of discretion.” State v. Ammons, 105 Wn.2d 175, 183, 713 P.2d 719, 718 P.2d 796, cert.
denied, 479 U.S. 930, 107 S. Ct. 398, 93 L. Ed. 2d 351 (1986).
At a sentencing hearing, the court “may impose any sentence within the range that it deems
appropriate.” RCW 9.94A.530(1). There is no limitation on what a court may consider in
sentencing a defendant within the standard range. 13 ROYCE A. FERGUSON, JR., WASHINGTON
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No. 49302-1-II
PRACTICE, CRIMINAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4818, at 395-96 (3d ed. 2004);11 State v. Mail,
121 Wn.2d 707, 711 n.2, 714, 854 P.2d 1042, 1044 (1993). At sentencing, a court must consider
all of the information presented to it. However, it is important to differentiate between information
presented to a court at a sentencing hearing and the weight the court gives the information.
Where the trial court follows correct procedures when sentencing a defendant to a standard
range sentence, an appeal is statutorily barred. Mail, 121 Wn.2d at 714. In Mail, the court held
“that in order for a “procedural” appeal to be allowed under Ammons, it must be shown that the
sentencing court had a duty to follow some specific procedure required by the SRA [Sentencing
Reform Act of 1981], and that the court failed to do so.” 121 Wn.2d at 712. Marshall has failed
to make such a showing.
As such, the court at sentencing could always consider such factors as a “juvenile’s
immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to appreciate risks and consequences—the nature of the
juvenile’s surrounding environment and family circumstances, the extent of the juvenile’s
participation in the crime, the way familial and peer pressures may have affected him or her, how
youth impacted any legal defense, and any factors suggesting that the juvenile might be
successfully rehabilitated.” State v. Gilbert, 193 Wn.2d 169, 176, 438 P.3d 133 (2019); Houston-
Sconiers 188 Wn.2d at 23.
Based on the foregoing, the court did not fail to follow a specific procedure required by the
SRA and Marshall does not allege any. In addition, Marshall could have argued the issue he now
11
For sentences above the standard range, the court “may rely on no more information than is
admitted by the plea agreement, or admitted, acknowledged, or proved in a trial or at the time of
sentencing, or proven pursuant to RCW 9.94A.537”. RCW 9.94A.530(2). This “real facts”
doctrine only applies to exceptional sentences above the range. It does not apply to standard range
sentences.
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No. 49302-1-II
puts forth, before publication of Houston-Sconiers. I do not believe that Marshall has
demonstrated that a change in law occurred under RCW 10.73.100(6) as it affects his case.
Marshall stipulated to a sentence within the standard range and had available to him all of
the arguments about youth enumerated in Houston-Sconiers to justify his standard range sentence.
I also note that if Marshall could not have appealed his standard range sentence, he certainly cannot
collaterally attack it in a PRP and prevail.
In arriving at this conclusion, I note that the majority has taken an overly broad view of the
rule of Houston-Sconiers and its progeny. The majority states that a sentencing court “must
consider the characteristic of youth any time a juvenile offender is sentenced in adult court.”
Majority at 10. However, this rule must be tempered by the facts of the case and the issues the
court had before it. In Houston-Sconiers the defendants went to trial. The court sentenced the
defendants to an exceptional sentence below the standard range but it did not believe it could
impose an exceptional sentence on the enhancements. The court disagreed and said that the
mandatory nature of the enhancements violated the eighth amendment when applied to juveniles
who are sentenced in adult court. Houston-Sconiers, 188 Wn.2d at 26.12
In the present case, Marshall did not go to trial; he plead guilty after receiving many great
benefits from his plea bargain, including reduced charges, no mandatory minimum, and a lower
standard range. Marshall also involved a stipulation by both parties to recommend a specific
sentence within the standard range.
12
Similarly, in State v. Gilbert, the defendant committed his crimes, murder in the first degree
with aggravating factors, murder in the first degree, and others, at 15 years of age and was
sentenced in adult court after a jury convicted him. The trial court ruled it lacked the discretion to
run the murder sentences in any way other than consecutive to each other. On appeal, the court
relied on Houston-Sconiers, reversed and ruled that the trial court had the discretion to impose an
exceptional sentence below the range and run the sentences concurrent with each other. Gilbert,
193 Wn.2d 169, 175, 438 P.3d 133 (2019).
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Lastly, although the majority has emphasized that trial courts are mandated to consider
specific mitigating factors of youth at sentencing, I must stress that courts can only consider the
evidence and information presented to them by the parties. The failure by a court to consider any
of the specific factors enumerated by the majority would not be error if neither party did not or
could not present such information. I believe the only logical way to read that rule is that
sentencing courts must consider the mitigating qualities of youth when such information is
presented to them.
Because Marshall has failed to show actual and substantial prejudice and because he has
failed to demonstrate a significant change in the law that affects his case, I concur in the result to
deny the PRP.
Melnick, J.
22