East Valley School District No. 90 v. Michele Taylor

FILED
MAR 07, 2013
In the Office of the Clerk of Court
W A State Court of Appeals, Division III
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION THREE
EAST VALLEY SCHOOL DISTRICT ) No. 29757-8-111
NO. 90, )
)
Petitioner, )
)
v. ) PUBLISHED OPINION
)
MICHELE TAYLOR, )
)
Respondent. )
KORSMO, C.J. - Yakima's East Valley School District No. 90 (EVSD) asks this
court to grant a constitutional writ of certiorari to review the decision of an administrative
hearing officer or in the alternative to remand the case for the superior court to decide
whether it will do so. Because the Court of Appeals does not have the power to issue a
constitutional writ of certiorari, we remand to superior court.
FACTS
On June 10,2009, EVSD placed Michele Taylor, a high school teacher, on paid
administrative leave after receiving allegations that she communicated with a minor
student for immoral purposes and had sexual intercourse with another minor student.
No. 29757-8-II1
E. Valley Sch. Dist. v. Taylor
Based on this information and subsequent investigation, criminal charges were filed
against Ms. Taylor. After a two-week trial, a jury acquitted her of all charges.
Despite the acquittal, EVSD served Ms. Taylor with a notice of probable cause to
terminate her employment based on the same allegations and other alleged policy
violations. EVSD alleged that it had probable cause to terminate Ms. Taylor's
employment because of excessive and inappropriate text messaging with the two
students, inappropriate counseling/mentoring of one of these students, sexual misconduct
with the other student, and one-time provision of medication (Ibuprofen) to this other
student, all of which EVSD argued were in violation of established district policies.
Ms. Taylor challenged the allegations and took the matter to an administrative
hearing officer. After a week-long hearing and briefing by the parties, the hearing officer
issued a 44-page decision finding each ofEVSD's allegations to be either a remediable
deficiency or unsupported by a preponderance of the evidence. The hearing officer then
ordered EVSD to reinstate Ms. Taylor.
EVSD then sought review in the Yakima County Superior Court under a statutory
writ of certiorari, RCW 7.16.040. The superior court dismissed the request, ruling that
RCW 28AA05.320 does not permit EVSD to seek statutory review of the hearing
officer's decision. EVSD timely appealed to this court, but after the briefing was filed,
the Supreme Court definitively held that RCW 28AA05.320 does not permit review
under RCW 7.16.040. Fed. Way Sch. Dist. No. 210 v. Vinson, 172 Wn.2d 756, 768, 261
2
No. 29757-8-111
E. Valley Sch. Dist. v. Taylor
P.3d 145 (2011). With its appeal mooted, EVSD sought and was granted leave to amend
its briefing. It then requested this court to issue a constitutional writ of certiorari.
While reviewing EVSD's new request, this court questioned whether the
constitution granted us the power to issue a writ of certiorari. We then directed the
parties to file supplemental briefs. Both parties agreed that this court does not have the
power to grant the requested relief and asked that the case be remanded to superior court.
ANALYSIS
The sole issue remaining in this case is whether this court has constitutional
authority to issue a writ of certiorari. We agree with the parties that we do not have that
power.
The state of Washington is a sovereign political body imbued with plenary power.
Bellevue School Dist. v. E.S., 171 Wn.2d 695, 713, 257 P.3d 570 (2011); State v. Foster,
135 Wn.2d 441, 458-59,957 P.2d 712 (1998). Our constitution, however, acts to limit
that power. State v. Gunwall, 106 Wn.2d 54,62, 720 P.2d 808 (1986) (the Washington
Constitution "serves to limit the sovereign power which inheres directly in the people and
indirectly in their elected representatives"). In accordance with this structure, our
Supreme Court has held time and again that the branches of state government can only
act according to the constitution's express and implied powers. See, e.g., City ofSeattle
v. McKenna, 172 Wn.2d 551, 557, 259 P.3d 1087 (2011) ("Importantly, there are no
common law or implied powers of the attorney general under our constitution. This court
3
No. 29757-8-II1
E. Valley Sch. Dist. v. Taylor
has always insisted on finding an enumerated constitutional or statutory basis for the
powers of executive officers, including the attorney general."); Gerberding v. Munro, 134
Wn.2d 188, 949 P .2d 1366 (1998) (holding that the legislative power does not extend to
setting qualifications for elected office in the absence of an express grant of power by the
constitution); N. Bend Stage Line, Inc. v. Dep 't ofPub. Works, 170 Wash. 217, 226-27,
16 P.2d 206 (1932) (holding that the Supreme Court can only exercise jurisdiction as
enumerated in Const. art. IV, § 4). Accordingly, we must look to the text of the
constitution to determine our jurisdiction.
Our constitution states: "The jurisdiction of the court of appeals shall be as
provided by statute or by rules authorized by statute." CONST. art. IV, § 30, cl. 2. This
provision is different than the jurisdictional provisions relating to the Supreme Court and
the superior courts. Art. IV, § 4 grants the Supreme Court "power to issue writs of
mandamus, review, prohibition, habeas corpus, certiorari and all other writs necessary
and proper to the complete exercise of its appellate and revisory jurisdiction." Art. IV,
§ 6, grants the superior courts "power to issue writs of mandamus, quo warranto, review,
certiorari, prohibition, and writs of habeas corpus." Both the Supreme Court and the
superior courts have express constitutional power to issue writs of certiorari. In contrast,
the people did not provide the Court of Appeals with similar authority and, instead, left
the court's jurisdiction to the legislature. These textual differences lead to the conclusion
that this court does not have the power to issue a constitutional writ of certiorari.
4
No. 29757-8-111
E. Valley Sch. Dist. v. Taylor
For the Court of Appeals to have any power to issue a writ of certiorari it would
thus have to be statutorily based. But, in this case RCW 28AA05.320 does not permit
any court to issue a statutory writ of certiorari. Vinson, 172 Wn.2d at 768. Thus, the
remaining question is whether it is appropriate to remand to the superior court.
In Vinson, a school district sought a statutory writ of certiorari from an
administrative hearing officer's decision to retain a teacher. Vinson, 172 Wn.2d at 766­
67. After holding that the district's chosen route for review was unavailable, the
Supreme Court noted that the district could have sought review through a constitutional
writ of certiorari. Id. at 769. The Supreme Court then considered sua sponte whether the
case warranted issuance of a constitutional writ of certiorari and held that it did not. Id.
at 768-70.
In raising the issue of constitutional certiorari, the Supreme Court relied on Bridle
Trails Cmty. Club v. City ofBellevue, 45 Wn. App. 248, 254, 724 P .2d 1110 (1986). Id.
at 768. Bridle Trails was a zoning case where landowners sought a statutory writ of
certiorari for relief from the city of Bellevue's arbitrary and capricious zoning action.
Bridle Trails, 45 Wn. App. at 249. Similar to this case, the petitioners had no right to
statutory certiorari. Id. at 250-51. Although the petitioners had not requested
constitutional certiorari at the superior court, this court still remanded for the superior
court to decide whether the petitioners deserved constitutional certiorari because "the
pleadings were sufficient to raise the issue." Id. at 254.
5
No. 29757-8-111
E. Valley Sch. Dist. v. Taylor
Unlike Bridle Trails, the superior court pleadings here could not be construed as a
request for a constitutional writ of certiorari. Typically a court will not consider a claim
for relief outside of the pleadings. E.g., Trask v. Butler, 123 Wn.2d 835, 846, 872 P.2d
1080 (1994) (refusing to reach the merits on a cause of action that the plaintiff failed to
allege in his complaint). However, courts also have broad authority to grant leave to
amend the pleadings. E.g., Herron v. Tribune Publ'g Co., 108 Wn.2d 162, 165, 736 P.2d
249 (1987). Because both parties request a remand in accordance with Vinson and Bridle
Trails and EVSD may have acted initially in reliance on Bridle Trails, we remand for the
superior court to decide whether it will exercise its power to permit an amendment to the
pleadings to consider issuing a constitutional writ of certiorarL 1
Although we remand in line with Bridle Trails and Vinson, we question whether
Bridle Trails' decision to remand for consideration ofunrequested relief violates our
public policy strongly favoring finality ofjudgments. In Nisqually Delta, the Washington
Supreme Court refused to permit the appellants to recast their appeal as a request for a
constitutional writ of certiorari in response to the court's determination that the appellants
had no right to a statutory appeal. Nisqually Delta Ass 'n v. City ofDuPont, 95 Wn.2d
563,569-70,627 P.2d 956 (1981) ("Having made [the] deliberate tactical choice" to
I "The decision to grant the [writ of certiorari] is entirely within the discretion of
the superior court, which may refuse to exercise its inherent powers of review upon
tenable reasons." Harris v. Pierce County, 84 Wn. App. 222,230,928 P.2d 1111 (1996).
6
No. 29757-8-III
E. Valley Sch. Dist. v. Taylor
appeal under the statute instead of under a constitutional writ of certiorari the petitioners
waived that theory on appeal.); Friends ofSnoqualmie Valley v. King County Boundary
Review Bd., 118 Wn.2d 488~ 497,825 P.2d 300 (1992) ("While the appellants might have
sought review by [constitutional writ of certiorari] and had standing, we decline to treat
this appeal as a writ for the same reasons we gave in Nisqually Delta."). This is
consistent with the approach taken in other cases where a party seeks to raise new claims
during or after trial, including on appeal. See Herberg v. Swartz, 89 Wn.2d 916, 925,
929,578 P.2d 17 (1978) (refusing to permit a party to raise new errors on appeal and
affirming trial court's refusal to allow a new theory right before the conclusion of trial);
Chavez v. Dep't ofLabor & Indus., 129 Wn. App. 236, 242-43, 118 P.3d 392 (2005)
(refusing to allow claimant to reopen his Labor & Industries claim and argue a new
theory for relief). Bridle Trails does not appear to fit with these decisions and we believe
eventually the Supreme Court will have to reconcile these competing cases.
Remanded.
Korsmo, C.J.
WE CONCUR:
Brown, .
7