Heidi Marie Welborn v. Joshua Conrad Welborn

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
IN RE MARRIAGE OF No. 73194-7-1
HEIDI MARIE WELBORN,
Respondent,
DIVISION ONE
and
JOSHUA CONRAD WELBORN, UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Appellant. FILED: March 14, 2016
Spearman, C.J. — Joshua Conrad Welborn appeals an order of child
support. He argues that the trial court erred in its calculations, failed to consider
the parents' shared residential custody, and failed to credit him for child health
insurance expenses. He also challenges various property divisions entered as
part of the decree of dissolution. Finding no error, we affirm.
FACTS
Welborn and Heidi Marie McKinnon (formerly Welborn) married in 1996.
They have three children. Welborn and McKinnon separated in 2014. Under an
agreed parenting plan, each parent has residential custody of the children half of
the time.
Welborn and McKinnon divorced in 2015. The trial court entered findings
of fact and conclusions of law after a two-day trial. The court found that the
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parties had no separate property. The court divided the parties' community
assets and liabilities. The trial court determined child support according to the
standard calculation and ordered Welborn to pay $345.16 per month.
Welborn appeals the order of child support and the property division. In
addition to the clerk's papers, Welborn submitted to this court trial exhibits 112,
114, and 124 and excerpts from the verbatim report of proceedings.
DISCUSSION
We review a trial court's order of child support for abuse of discretion. In re
Marriage of Schnurman, 178 Wash. App. 634, 638, 316 P.3d 514 (2013) reviewed
denied, 180Wn.2d 1010 (2014) (citing In re Marriage of Booth, 114Wn.2d772,
776, 791 P.2d 519 (1990)). A trial court abuses its discretion if its decision is
unreasonable or rests on untenable grounds, jd.
To issue a child support order, the trial court begins by setting the basic
child support obligation. RCW 26.19.011(1). The basic child support obligation is
based on the parents' combined monthly net income and the number and ages of
the children. RCW 26.19.020. The trial court determines the standard calculation,
which is the presumptive amount of child support owed by the obligor parent.
RCW 26.19.011(8). The trial court then has discretion to deviate from the
standard calculation based on factors such as the parents' income and expenses
and the children's residential schedule. RCW 26.19.075. If the trial court deviates
from the standard formula, it must enter written findings of fact supporting the
deviation. RCW 26.19.075(3).
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In this case, the trial court used the Washington State Child Support
Schedule Worksheets to calculate the basic child support obligation. Based on
the parties' proportional share of income, the court determined that the standard
calculation required Welborn to pay $345.16. Under the heading "Reasons for
Deviation from Standard Calculation," the trial court noted that the children are
scheduled to live equally with each parent. Clerk's Papers (CP) at 50. However,
the trial court did not deviate from the standard calculation and ordered Welborn
to pay child support of $345.16 per month.
Welborn argues that the trial court erred because it failed to offset his
support obligation by the proportion of time he has residential custody of the
children and by his expenses in providing health insurance for the children. He
also asserts that the trial court erred in its calculations. His arguments are without
merit.
Welborn first argues that the trial court should have applied the formula
established in In re Marriage of Arvev, 77 Wash. App. 817, 894 P.2d 1346 (1995),
to offset his child support obligation by the proportion of time he has residential
custody of the children. Welborn is mistaken because Arvev applies to split
custody arrangements where each parent has residential custody of one child.
Arvev, 77 Wash. App. at 825. Arvev does not apply in cases of shared residential
custody. State ex rel. M.M.G. v. Graham, 159 Wash. 2d 623, 636, 152 P.3d 1005
(2007). When the parents share residential custody, the trial court has discretion
to deviate from the standard calculation based on the amount of residential time
the children spend with each parent. Id. The trial court in this instance ordered
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Welborn to pay the standard calculation as determined by statute. There was no
abuse of discretion.
Welborn next argues that the trial court erred in not offsetting his child
support obligation by the cost of health insurance for the children. But he
provides no authority supporting his argument that the trial court was required to
reduce his child support obligation by the amount that he pays for the children's
portion of his health insurance premium. The authority Welborn does cite, the
Washington State Child Support Schedule Definitions and Standards,1 states that
health care costs are not included in the economic table and are to be shared by
the parents in the same proportion as the basic support obligation. We reject
Welborn's argument as unsupported.2
Finally, Welborn argues that his monthly child support payments would
have been significantly lower if the trial court had inputthe correct numbers on
the Washington State Child Support Schedule Worksheets. But because Exhibit
(Ex.) 115 is not in the record before this court, we cannot consider Welborn's
argument.
Welborn next argues that the trial court erred in its division of property.
The trial court found that the parties had no separate property and included
Welborn's retirement accounts in its list of community property. In making a
1 Available at: https://www.courts.wa.gov/forms/documents/WSCSS_Schedule2015.pdf
2 Welborn also appears to dispute the cost of his employer-based health insurance. He
argues that Ex. 101 shows that he paid approximately $350 per month for the children's portion of
his health care premium, not the $116 per month stated by the trial court. Because Welborn has
not included Ex. 101 in the record before this court, we are unable to address this argument.
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property division, the trial court must determine the nature and extent of the
parties' community and separate property. RCW 26.09.080. See White v. White,
105 Wash. App. 545, 549-50, 20 P.3d 481 (2001) (discussing characterization and
division of property). The court has broad discretion to "make such disposition of
the property and the liabilities of the parties, either community or separate, as
shall appear just and equitable after considering all relevant factors. . . ." RCW
26.09.080. We review a trial court's findings of fact for substantial evidence and
its division of property for manifest abuse of discretion. In re Marriage of
Rockwell, 141 Wash. App. 235, 242-43, 170 P.3d 572 (2007). A manifest abuse of
discretion may be found where the trial court's decree results in an obvious
disparity in the parties' economic circumstances. Jd. at 243.
Welborn asserts that the court erred in characterizing two of his retirement
accounts in their entirety as community property because only 31 percent of
these accounts were funded during the marriage. McKinnon argues that the trial
court properly characterized these accounts as community property because
they were funded during the time that Welborn and McKinnon cohabited before
they married.
We are unable to review the trial court's finding of fact for substantial
evidence because the entire record is not before us. We note, however, that
regardless of whether the accounts were community or separate property, the
trial court had discretion to divide them. Welborn has offered no evidence that the
trial court's division was a manifest abuse of discretion.
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Welborn next argues that the trial court erred in failing to equally divide a
$6,000 social security disability payment awarded to the children and received by
McKinnon before the parties separated. Welborn makes no argument that the
trial court abused its discretion or that the award resulted in an obvious economic
disparity between the parties. To the extent Welborn challenges the factual basis
of the trial court's division, we reject his challenge because he failed to provide a
verbatim report of proceedings sufficient to review the trial court's findings.
Finally, Welborn argues that the spreadsheet attached to the trial court's
findings offact and conclusions of law does not accurately reflect the payments
ordered or the amount of McKinnon's credit card payments and retirement
account. He asserts that the allegedly incorrect spreadsheet constitutes legal
error that require reversal of the trial court's findings.
The amount of McKinnon's credit card payments and retirement accounts
are questions offact that we are unable to review on the record before us.
Welborn is correct that the trial court ordered McKinnon to make a payment that
is not reflected in the spreadsheet. The trial court ordered McKinnon to make two
separate payments of$12,000 to Welborn. First, it ordered herto pay $12,000
from her Fidelity Roth IRA to Welborn's Fidelity Roth IRA. This award is reflected
on the spreadsheet attached to the findings offact. The trial court also ordered
McKinnon to pay Welborn an additional $12,000 within the next 180 days as an
award in lieu of a share of McKinnon's Public Employees' Retirement System
(PERS) account and as an adjustment to the credit card liabilities owed by the
parties. This second payment of $12,000 is not reflected on the spreadsheet.
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The second payment of $12,000 ordered by the court is apparently not
included in the spreadsheet because it is not a division of property but a debt
owed to Welborn that McKinnon may satisfy out of any of her property. In any
case, the fact that the sum does not appear on the spreadsheet does not relieve
McKinnon of the order to pay the amount to Welborn. The absence of the sum on
the spreadsheet is not legal error.
Affirmed.
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