Herbert And Barbara Heintz, Appellant's v. Jp Morgan

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
HERBERT HEINTZ and BARBARA No. 70628-4-1
HEINTZ, husband and wife,
DIVISION ONE
Appellants,
JP MORGAN CHASE BANK, UNPUBLISHED
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, and
QUALITY LOAN SERVICE FILED: June 16, 2014
CORPORATION OF WASHINGTON,
trustee,
Respondents.
Cox, J. — After defaulting on a promissory note secured by a deed of trust,
the borrower filed suit claiming the lender increased the monthly payment in
violation of terms of the note and the successor trustee under the deed of trust
lacked authority to schedule a nonjudicial foreclosure sale. Because no genuine
issue of material fact appears in the record and the lender and successor trustee
are entitled to judgment as a matter of law, we affirm the orders dismissing the
complaint.
In October 2007, Herbert and Barbara Heintz (Heintz) obtained a one
million dollar loan to refinance their home from Washington Mutual Bank FA by
means of a promissory note and a deed of trust to secure the note. In December
2012, Heintz filed a complaint to restrain a nonjudicial foreclosure sale and for
restitution for breach of the loan agreement against Quality Loan Service Corp. of
No. 70628-4-1/2
Washington (Quality) as the successor trustee and JP Morgan Chase Bank NA
(Chase) as the successor to Washington Mutual. Heintz claimed that the note
provided for a fixed minimum monthly payment for five years and that Chase
breached the terms of the note by increasing the monthly payment amount,
wrongfully claiming a default, and then directing commencement of a foreclosure
on the deed of trust. Heintz later amended the complaint to allege that "they
have never received a Notice of Default, as required by RCW 61.24.030
and .031; with respect to the foreclosure sale the trustee set for November 16,
2012."
Chase filed a CR 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss the complaint, arguing that
Heintz failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted because the
plain undisputed terms of the note allow for changes to the minimum monthly
payment during the first five years. Quality filed a CR 56 motion for summary
judgment dismissal based on evidence showing it mailed to Heintz a notice of
default in October 2010, pursuant to former RCW 61.24.030 (2010).
The parties stipulated to a hearing on the motions without oral argument.
The trial court granted Chase's motion to dismiss and Quality's motion for
summary judgment.
Heintz appeals.
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
We review de novo both a summary judgment order and the propriety of a
trial court's dismissal of an action under CR 12(b)(6).1 In reviewing a summary
1 Lam v. Global Med. Svs.. Inc.. 127 Wash. App. 657, 661 n.4, 111 P.3d 1258 (2005); Dave
Robbins Constr. v. First American Title Co.. 158 Wash. App. 895, 899, 249 P.3d 625 (2010).
No. 70628-4-1/3
judgment order, we view the facts and reasonable inferences in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party.2 We may affirm an order granting summary
judgment if there are no genuine issues of material fact for trial and the moving
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.3 Under 12(b)(6), dismissal is
proper only if "it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff cannot prove any set of
facts which would justify recovery."4 In making this determination, the court
presumes the plaintiff's allegations to be true and "may consider hypothetical
facts not included in the record."5 If materials "outside the pleadings are
presented to and not excluded by the court," the CR 12(b)(6) motion is treated as
a summary judgment motion under CR 56.6
As below, Heintz claims on appeal that Chase raised the monthly payment
in violation of the terms of the note providing a "moratorium" preventing any
change to the monthly payment amount for five years. We disagree.
In a section entitled "4. INTEREST RATE AND MONTHLY PAYMENT
CHANGES," the note provides in pertinent part:
(E) Payment Change Dates
Effective every year commencing DECEMBER 01, 2008, and on
the same date each twelfth month thereafter ("Payment Change
Date"), the Note Holder will determine the amount of the monthly
paymentthat would be sufficient to repay the projected principal
balance I am expected to owe as of the Payment Change Date in
full on the maturity date at the interest rate in effect 45 days prior to
the Payment Change Date in substantially equal payments. The
result of this calculation is the new amount of my minimum monthly
payment, subject to Section 4(F) below, and I will make payments
2 Lam, 127 Wash. App. at 661 n.4.
3 CR 56(c).
4 Tenore v. AT&T Wireless Services. 136 Wash. 2d 322, 329-30, 962 P.2d 104 (1998).
5ld
6 CR 12(b)(6).
No. 70628-4-1/4
in this new amount until the next Payment Change Date unless my
payments are changed earlier under Section 4(H) of this Note.
(F) Monthly Payment Limitations
Unless Section 4(H) and 4(1) below apply, the amount of my new
minimum monthly payment, beginning with a Payment Change
Date, will be limited to 7 1/2% more or less than the amount I have
been paying. This payment cap applies only to the principal
payment and does not apply to any escrow payments Lender may
require under the Security Instrument.
(H) Limit on My Unpaid Principal; Increased Minimum Monthly
Payment
My unpaid principal can never exceed a maximum amount equal to
115% of the principal amount originally borrowed. In the event my
unpaid Principal would otherwise exceed that 115% limitation, I will
begin paying a new minimum monthly payment until the next
Payment Change Date notwithstanding the 7 1/2% annual payment
increase limitation. The new minimum monthly payment will be an
amount which would be sufficient to repay my then unpaid Principal
in full on the Maturity Date at my interest rate in effect the month
prior to the payment due date in substantially equal payments.
(I) Required Full Monthly Payment
On the fifth anniversary of the due date of the first monthly payment,
and on that same day every fifth year thereafter, my minimum
monthly payment will be adjusted without regard to the payment
cap limitation in Section 4(F).[7]
The unambiguous terms of the note provide for the annual recalculation of
the monthly payment beginning after the first year of the loan. And the "payment
cap" merely limits the extent of each change to a 7 1/2 percent increase or
decrease from the previous monthly payment until December 1, 2012, the fifth
anniversary of the due date of the first monthly payment. Heintz fails to identify
any language in the note preventing annual changes to the minimum payment in
the first five years. Because the reasonable meaning of the words in the note
7 Clerk's Papers at 114.
No. 70628-4-1/5
demonstrate the objective intent of the parties, we will not consider extrinsic
evidence offered by Heintz to support the claim of a different intent.8
Although Heintz did not specifically claim that Chase breached the terms
of the note by increasing the monthly payment by more than 7 14 percent, to the
extent the court considered such hypothetical facts to be encompassed within the
broad language of the complaint, dismissal under CR 12(b)(6) would have been
inappropriate. But Chase presented copies of letters sent to Heintz between
2008 and 2011 listing the new monthly payment calculated for each Payment
Change Date, none of which exceeds the previous payment by more than 7 14
percent. And the record indicates that the trial court did not exclude the evidence.
Heintz failed to respond with any evidence to raise a genuine issue for trial as to
whether Chase breached the terms of the note. Because dismissal of Heintz's
claim against Chase was proper under CR 56, the trial court did not err.
For the first time on appeal, Heintz claims that other terms of the note are
illusory, vague, and incomprehensible. These arguments contradict Heintz's
position below and were not properly preserved. We will not consider them.9
Heintz next contends that a genuine issue of fact for trial exists whether
Quality violated the Deeds of Trust Act, chapter 61.24 RCW. Heintz
acknowledges receiving a notice of default in 2010 and a notice of a February
2011 sale, which was never held. But Heintz claims the act required Quality to
s Hearst Communications. Inc. v. Seattle Times Co.. 154 Wash. 2d 493, 503-04, 115 P.3d
262 (2005).
9 RAP 2.5(a): Cowiche Canyon Conservancy v. Bosley, 118Wn.2d801, 809, 828 P.2d
549(1992).
No. 70628-4-1/6
issue a new notice of default before issuing the second notice of sale in
November 2012. We disagree.
In 2010, the act required the trustee to provide a written notice of default
to the borrower at least 30 days before issuing a notice of sale.10 The act also
provided time limits for the notice of sale and required the trustee to conduct the
sale within 120 days of the original sale date or it would lose the authority to sell
without issuing a new notice of sale.11 But Heintz fails to identify any authority for
the claim that Quality lost its authority to act on the 2010 notice of default. And
no evidence before the trial court suggested that Heintz cured the default. The
trial court properly granted summary judgment to Quality.
ATTORNEY FEES
Heintz and Chase each request an award of attorney fees under the terms
of the deed of trust. The instrument provides, "Lender shall be entitled to recover
its reasonable attorneys' fees and costs in any action or proceeding to construe
or enforce any term of this Security Instrument." As the prevailing party, Chase
is entitled to an award of fees under this provision.
Accordingly, we award Chase attorney fees and costs, subject to Chase's
compliance with RAP 18.1.
10 Former RCW 61.24.030(8) (2010).
11 Former RCW 61.24.040 (2010^: Albice v. Premier Mortgage Services of Washington,
Inc., 174 Wash. 2d 560, 568, 276 P.3d 1277 (2012).
No. 70628-4-1/7
We affirm the summary judgment order and award attorney fees to Chase,
subject to its compliance with RAP 18.1. _
WE CONCUR:
I s\cM-*^ —1
, „ C3
**~
o ~>
cr, _-<: -f, r- •,
CJ1
cr.
•;z-'~4
7